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1. Summary 
1.1. Introduction 
1.1.1. Background 
The single European market (SEM) was conceived in the first half of the 1980s to combat the 
economic threat to Europe posed by the USA and Japan in high technology and by the newly 
industrializing countries (NICs) in assembly industries. 
The Commission's 1985 White Paper, Completing the internal market,1 focused the attention 
of Member States on the formal and informal barriers to intra-EU trade, the removal of which 
would create the environment for the development of European industries capable of 
competing in global markets. The 1987 Single European Act established a legislative 
programme of some 300 directives designed to remove these barriers, which were classified 
under three headings: 
(a) physical barriers, associated with frontier inspections, 
(b) technical barriers, causing legal and regulatory obstacles, 
(c) fiscal barriers, epitomized by differences in indirect taxes and excise duties. 
After adjustments, the SEM programme comprised 282 directives designed to create: 
(a) a new Community standards policy, 
(b) a common market for services, 
(c) conditions for industrial co-operation, 
(d) a single public procurement market, 
(e) plant and animal health controls. 
The directives are either horizontal (industry independent) or vertical (industry specific) in 
nature. Examples of the former include the removal of border controls and the harmonization 
of indirect taxation, and of the latter, mutual recognition in the pharmaceuticals industry. 
The 1988 Cecchini Report2 provided the economic justification for completing the single 
market and highlighted the interdependence of its various 'components'. At a conference on 
public procurement immediately preceding the report's press launch in London in January 
1988, Lord Cockfield, the then vice-president of the European Commission responsible for the 
single market programme, described: 
(a) the aim of the SEM as 'to create the environment in which European business can 
flourish'; 
(b) the opening-up of public procurement as one of the cornerstones of the SEM 
programme, without which the single market would not be complete. 
Completing the internal market, COM(85) 310 final of 14 June 1985. 
The cost of non-Europe in public procurement, European Commission, 1988. 
Public procurement 
The removal of the formal and informal barriers to intra-EU trade is clearly the most important 
factor in creating 'the environment in which business can flourish'. The economic impact will 
be the extent to which the wealth-generating sectors of the economy have taken advantage of 
the 'new business environment'. 
1.1.2. Public procurement before the single market 
The Cecchini Report described public-sector markets in the EUR-12 as closed and generally 
uncompetitive, with: 
(a) widely different design standards in certain key high technology sectors, for example, 
defence, power generation, telecommunications and railways, making intra-EC trade 
costly; 
(b) governments promoting competition between alternative national suppliers, reflected in 
sub-optimal - globally uncompetitive - businesses; 
(c) distorted markets due to government subsidies; 
(d) R&D effort dissipated - in the USA and Japan there were 3-5 major (global) companies 
in a sector, whereas in Europe there were often 15-20 sub-optimal players; 
(e) little incentive to invest in new technology to confront the competition from non-EC 
firms; 
(f) a lack of product specialization, such that even large EC firms had uneconomically wide 
product ranges and uneconomic production runs. 
Although EC directives on public procurement have been in force since 1971 for works and 
1977 for supplies, prior to the SEM legislation, transparency and fairness in terms of equal 
opportunity to submit offers and win contracts was strictly limited, with non-domestic 
suppliers almost completely excluded from national markets. 
In addition to deliberately ignoring the existence of the legislation and favouring national 
suppliers as a matter of official policy, purchasing entities circumvented the rules by a range of 
measures, for example: 
(a) splitting contracts into lots to avoid the publications thresholds; 
(b) specifying national technical standards and proprietary products, which favoured the 
domestic supplier; 
(c) requiring special financial or technical capacities of foreign suppliers; 
(d) allowing inadequate response times for first-time bidders; 
(e) classifying contracts as 'continuations' or 'emergencies' to take advantage of the 
directives' exclusions and, in defence procurement, as 'warlike', regardless of the 
function of the supply. 
1.1.3. Ex ante hypothesis 
The legislation's aims 
Between 1988 and 1993, a family of directives was adopted by the Council of Ministers 
defining the scope of public procurement and regulating the ways in which public and other 
covered purchasing entities procure works, supplies and services (see Appendix Β for 
bibliographical references). The aim of the legislation was to provide a framework for, and 
climate of, openness and fairness. The expectation - and desire - was that this would lead to: 
Summary 
(a) increased competition between European companies; 
(b) improved industrial efficiency and competitiveness of European companies in global 
markets; 
(c) reduced public-sector/utilities purchasing costs. 
Measures of success 
The success of the SEM in public procurement should be measured by the extent to which: 
(a) public entities and utilities are open (transparent) in informing potential suppliers of: 
(i) a commercial opportunity, 
(ii) the criteria by which their offers will be judged, 
(iii) the results of the competition; 
(b) public entities and utilities are fair in awarding contracts in terms of: 
(i) specifying objective award criteria which do not provide any potential supplier 
with an unfair technical or commercial advantage, 
(ii) assessing tenders objectively in accordance with these criteria; 
(c) supplying industries have adapted to meet the challenge of the new purchasing environ-
ment in terms of: 
(i) responding to extra-national opportunities, 
(ii) restructuring to improve competitiveness and, generally, take advantage of trade 
liberalization afforded by the SEM; 
(d) the public sector and utilities have experienced a reduction in purchasing costs. 
Of these, (a) and (b) are concerned with measuring the extent to which the directives and 
national transposing legislation are flawed in: 
(a) requiring entities covered to be open (transparent) and fair in their tendering process, 
(b) providing a climate encouraging compliance by those entities covered. 
Factors (c) and (d) measure the supply- and demand-side response to the new purchasing 
environment created and to other drivers of change, including the SEM per se, economic 
performance, privatization, globalization of key industries, mergers and acquisitions, 
information technology, telecommunications, etc. 
Economic impact 
In 1987 it was assumed that liberalization of public procurement in Member States would 
result in: 
(a) increased competition for public contracts with the most competitive suppliers winning, 
(b) a reduction in prices paid by public bodies for works, supplies and services. 
The introduction of new competitive suppliers into previously closed markets was forecast to 
result in: 
(a) a convergence of prices paid by the public sector to those of the most competitive 
suppliers - (short-term) price effect; 
(b) rationalization of production to achieve a better utilization of resources to fund price 
reductions - (medium-term) competition effect; 
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(c) reorganization of certain strategic industries along pan-European lines via joint ventures, 
mergers and acquisitions, and alliances to create global players capable of benefiting 
from the SEM and competing with the US and Japanese giants - (long-term) 
restructuring effect. 
The public sector would benefit from all three effects through being able to procure the 
economically most advantageous works, supplies and services. Within the private sector, there 
would be a redistribution of market shares and a more efficient use of productive resources, 
which, in the short term, would lead to employment reductions among uncompetitive players. 
Overall, the EU would benefit from the creation of strong European companies in strategic 
industries capable of competing with US and Japanese players in world markets. 
Key considerations 
The opening up of EU public procurement markets should be viewed as a necessary but not 
sufficient condition for achieving the SEM's economic aims. In this context, the legislation 
should be seen as a catalyst, designed to create the environment in which the desired change 
could and would occur. 
In assessing the SEM in public procurement, it is important to understand that the legislation 
places no obligation on: 
(a) the entities covered to be efficient purchasers, 
(b) suppliers to respond to business opportunities in other Member States of the European 
Union. 
A lack or limited achievement of these two outcomes should not automatically be construed as 
an indicator of failure of the legislation. The legislation could be achieving its aims of 
openness and fairness, but its desired impact on purchasers and suppliers may not have been 
achieved due to: 
(a) the shortness of timescale between the directives coming into force and the timing of the 
mid-term assessment; 
(b) a lack of suppliers' awareness/understanding of the new EU purchasing environment; 
(c) supply-side scepticism of the fairness of the award process in other Member States; 
(d) inadequate supply-side knowledge of demand-side requirements in other Member States; 
(e) limited incentive and skills at the level of purchasing officers to correctly define award 
criteria which will result in the selection of the 'economically most advantageous' 
supplier. 
1.2. Study approach 
1.2.1. Key principles 
The study's overall approach was driven by the limited availability of reliable and complete 
statistical data on the public procurement market. 
As a result, considerable importance was placed on two pieces of primary research: 
Summary 
(a) a survey of suppliers to the public sector/utilities, which was structured to allow 
inferences to be made about the total supply-side population; 
(b) a survey of a cross-section of purchasers subject to the directives. 
Since the study considered the public procurement market from all key perspectives using a 
wide range of sources (in addition to the primary research), it has been possible to take into 
account the results of a number of qualitative, quantitative and quali-quantitative analyses to 
arrive at an assessment of the impact of the legislation which is: 
(a) consistent, 
(b) plausible, 
(c) coherent. 
In some areas it has not been feasible to arrive at a definitive quantitative assessment due to a 
lack of suitable data (at a sufficient level of detail), or the existence of contradictory 
information/analyses. In such instances, arguments and hypotheses have been developed by 
working from first principles to arrive at a reasoned (quali-quantitative) conclusion. 
The study also focused on procurement-sensitive products and sectors on the basis that, if 
change had occurred, it would have been in these areas. 
A final, and key, consideration has been the fact that no one analysis holds the answer to 
whether the public procurement legislation has achieved its aims. It is only the combination of 
the results of all analyses (which themselves reflect a range of information sources) that can 
provide this overall assessment. Consequently - in common with the main report - each 
section in this executive summary analyses a key issue(s) in isolation from other sections/ 
analyses, with Section 1.9 drawing them together to arrive at an assessment of the legislation's 
impact. 
An overview of the executive summary's structure (which mirrors that of the main report) is 
shown in Table 1.1 together with the primary information sources. 
1.2.2. Data commentary 
This section provides an overview of the main data problems encountered, and the approaches 
employed to overcome them. 
Public procurement in 1987 
The prime data source for the description of the public procurement markets in 1987 was the 
Cecchini Report, The cost of non-Europe in public sector procurement (European 
Commission, 1988). Market size statistics from the Cecchini study were supplemented by data 
from the Commission's 1992 study, The implications of opening up public procurement in the 
excluded sectors in Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain. 
The implications of opening up public procurement in the excluded sectors in Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain. 
European Commission, 1992. 
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Table 1.1. Executive summary structure and key sources overview 
Measure/output 
Public procurement in 1987 
Legal measures review 
Public procurement market 
contours in 1994 
Market perceptions 
Economic analysis 
Case studies 
Impact assessment 
Primary sources/inputs 
Cost of non-Europe in public sector procurement1 and other 
European Commission studies 
National accounts 
Member State and European public procurement law experts 
European Commission - DG XV/B 
National accounts 
Demand-side survey results (for utilities) 
Member State statistical returns 
EAP database 
European Commission public procurement studies 
Tenders Electronic Daily (TED) database 
Member State officials responsible for public procurement 
Office for Official Publications of the EC 
Survey of 1,608 EUR-15 suppliers to the public sector/utilities 
Survey of 698 EUR-15 central and sub-central government 
bodies and utilities 
Comext. Eurostat external trade statistics 
DEBA, Eurostat production and employment statistics 
Enterprises in Europe, Eurostat 
Supply-side survey 
Eurostat price survey indices 
European Commission procurement and single market studies 
EuroStrategy Consultants price survey 
Industry interviews 
Comext, Eurostat trade statistics 
DEBA. Eurostat production and employment statistics 
Industry publications 
Company accounts 
Eurostat 
The individual analyses 
Section 
1.3 
1.4.1-1.4.5 
1.5.1-1.5.2 
1.6.1-1.6.2 
1.7.1-1.7.4 
1.8.1-1.8.6 
1.9.1-1.9.4 
' The cost of non-Europe in public sector procurement, European Commission. 1988. 
The following public entities and 'products' covered in the Cecchini study are not covered by 
today's directives: 
(a) nationally-owned civil airlines and their purchases, 
(b) fuel used for power generation (coal, gas, nuclear material), 
(c) 'warlike' materials (nuclear missiles, ships, aircraft, tanks, guns, ammunition, etc.). 
To ensure comparison between 1987 and today, the market size statistics in the Cecchini 
Report were adjusted to reflect the differences in coverage. 
The public procurement market in 1994 - market size 
Since no reliable data exist on the size of the EUR-15 public procurement market in 1994, 
estimates of the market size were made using a combination of a top-down and bottom-up 
analysis in each Member State. 
Estimates of government procurement of works, goods and services were, therefore, based on 
the top-down analysis, which used national accounts on general government spending and 
summed entries under the following line headings: 
Summary 
(a) purchases of goods and services, 
(b) gross fixed capital formation. 
This total was adjusted to remove defence spending on 'warlike' materials (art. 223 (EC 
Treaty) materials), which are not covered by the directives. These 'warlike' materials 
estimates were derived from national accounts statistics on defence spending and estimates of 
the share of 'warlike' materials in the study, The costs of non-Europe in defence procurement* 
The demand-side survey results proved an inadequate base for making reliable bottom-up 
central and sub-central government estimates, due to: 
(a) an overall response rate of 62%, less than the required 90-95%; 
(b) low response rates for some Member States, particularly France, Germany and Spain; 
(c) some responses missing estimates of total procurement, reflecting: 
(i) confidentiality considerations, 
(ii) problems obtaining information from different (autonomous) departments; 
(d) some respondents returning only above-threshold procurement values, as they did not 
consider below-threshold procurement of any interest to the Commission study. 
Estimates of utilities procurement were based on a combination of top-down and bottom-up 
analysis results. It was possible to use utilities' returns from the demand-side survey for 
making bottom-up estimates, since: 
(a) compared to the public sector, far fewer entities accounted for a large share of total 
utilities procurement; 
(b) responses were obtained from around 90% of all European utilities operating in the key 
sectors of power, gas, coal, oil and gas exploration/extraction, rail transport and 
telecommunications ; 
(c) completed questionnaires were returned via their European associations (which were 
briefed separately on the scope and objectives of the survey), ensuring standardized 
information covering their total annual procurement; 
(d) a large number of entities are separate companies (either state- or privately-) owned, 
operating as 'private-sector' businesses and, therefore, more likely to have a 
comprehensive view of their total purchases and annual capital expenditure. 
The public procurement market in 1994 - market size by contract type 
The market breakdown by contract type (works, supplies and services) was based on: 
(a) the EC-US procurement study5 for central and sub-central government, under the 
assumption that the 1994 breakdown was not significantly different from that in 1993; 
(b) the demand-side survey results for utilities. 
The cost of non-Europe in defence procurement, European Commission, 1994b. 
EC-US procurement, European Commission, 1994a. 
Public procurement 
The public procurement market in 1994 - market size by entity type 
Primary data sources for the breakdown of the market by principal entity type were: 
(a) the OECD national accounts for central and sub-central government,6 
(b) the bottom-up analysis of utilities procurement using the demand-side survey results. 
Where possible, the breakdowns provided by the OECD national accounts were cross-
referenced with the results from the EC-US procurement study. 
The public procurement market in 1994 - above- and below-thresholdprocurement 
The only available data sources on the split between above- and below-threshold procurement 
were: 
(a) Member State returns to the Commission; 
(b) the EC-US procurement study. 
In the 1988 report, the concept of above- and below-threshold procurement was not 
considered. The Cecchini Report focused on 'contract purchasing', concluding that entities 
were splitting contracts into lots to avoid the then directives' thresholds, which led to the 
introduction of rules on aggregation. There was no ex ante expectation of the percentage of 
total procurement which would, as a result, be above-threshold (and therefore covered by the 
directives), although it is understood that a level of at least 50% was considered most likely. 
The complexity and sensitivity of this issue is demonstrated by the: 
(a) significant differences between the estimates from these two data sources, 
(b) lack of any other reliable statistics. 
Given this, we have deliberately avoided making any additional estimates, but have instead 
highlighted a number of key issues and put forward hypotheses, which are further developed 
in the final impact assessment. 
Number of contracting entities 
A characteristic of the public sector and, to a lesser extent, utilities markets has been the lack 
of a comprehensive description (single database) of the number of entities covered by the 
directives which are capable of letting above-threshold contracts, where a 'contract' is defined 
in the context of the aggregation rules. 
This study's analysis makes use of the EAP database, for which information has been 
collected in a systematic and consistent manner across the 12 Member States. Information for 
Austria, Finland and Sweden was obtained via their national procurement representatives. 
Publication in the Official Journal of the European Communities 
Prime data sources were: 
National accounts, OECD, 1995. 
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(a) the Tenders Electronic Daily (TED) database archives for the years 1993 to 1995, 
(b) statistics published by the Office for Official Publications of the European Communities 
for the years prior to 1993.7 
Analysis of the publishing entities focused on: 
(a) central government (including TED categories 'central government' and 'armed forces'), 
(b) sub-central government (TED category 'local authorities'), 
(c) utilities (TED category 'water, energy, transport and telecommunications sectors'). 
Demand-side survey 
Some 698 purchasing entities were targeted by the survey, covering: 
(a) central government ministries; 
(b) sub-central government bodies, including: 
(i) regional and local government bodies, 
(ii) uniformed services (fire and police), 
(iii) purchasing consortia, 
(iv) health bodies; 
(c) utilities: 
(i) water, 
(ii) energy (covering coal, and oil and gas exploration and extraction, electricity and 
gas generation and distribution), 
(iii) transport (covering airports, ports, rail and urban transport), 
(iv) telecommunications. 
Table 1.2. Member State and entity type responses 
Belgium/Luxembourg 
Germany 
Denmark 
Spain 
France 
Greece 
Italy 
Ireland 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
United Kingdom 
Austria 
Sweden 
Finland 
Total 
Central government 
9 
2 
22 
2 
1 
0 
6 
6 
5 
3 
9 
4 
3 
10 
82 
Sub-central 
government 
13 
18 
22 
23 
41 
2 
42 
9 
27 
10 
53 
6 
12 
8 
286 
Utilities 
10 
7 
10 
21* 
7 
0* 
9 
7 
9 
5* 
25 
10 
7 
7 
134 
Total 
32 
27 
54 
46 
49 
2 
57 
22 
41 
18 
87 
20 
22 
25 
502 
Note: Since utilities in Greece, Spain and Portugal (marked *) were not subject to the Utilities Directive at the time of the 
survey, the questionnaire asked them for their experiences since 1990 and their intentions post-transposition (rather 
than pre- and post-directive as for the other Member States). 
Basic statistics of the Community, Eurostat, 1989, 1993. 
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The survey sample was drawn on a constrained Pareto basis. The approach was to target 
purchasers representing 80% of procurement at each level of government and utility type in 
each Member State. Hence for any Member State, the survey targeted: 
(a) central government ministries representing an estimated 80% of central government 
procurement, covering in the main ministries responsible for: 
(i) defence, 
(ii) public works, 
(iii) transport, 
(iv) education, 
(v) interior/home office, 
(vi) health, 
(vii) post and telecommunications; 
(b) purchasing entities at a regional level accounting for an estimated 80% of total regional 
procurement in the regions representing 80% of national GDP; 
(c) bodies representative of total local government procurement within sub-regions 
representing 80% of GDP or population of the regions described at (b); 
(d) the largest utilities representing 70-80% of procurement in the each of the sub-sectors as 
defined in Annexes I to X to the Utilities Directive. 
As a result, the survey covered a wide range of: 
(a) entity sizes - ranging from large spending central government ministries, such as the 
Ministry of Defence, to local authorities and local fire services and, in a number of 
cases, independent purchasing units within local bodies; 
(b) purchasers focusing on works, supplies and services. 
The survey's results have been used as indicators of changes, employing a combination of 
direct comparisons (pre- and post-Directive experience) and scoring systems. Although 
responses in some areas were disappointing, the quality and number of responses overall were 
sufficient to be considered reliable and indicative for qualitative inferences to be drawn, 
particularly since the results were consistent: 
(a) within and between Member States, 
(b) with those from the supply-side survey, 
(c) with implicit expectations based on previous studies in this area. 
The results were also considered of particular value since, despite gaps, only those with 
responsibility for procurement can really know: 
(a) what has happened in practice, 
(b) their experiences and views of the legislation. 
The information obtained from returned questionnaires was supplemented and corroborated 
by: 
(a) interviews with some 80 entities which were re-contacted to clarify their responses; 
(b) a number of written submissions from entities (including some which declined to 
complete the questionnaire) and, in the case of utilities, their representative bodies which 
took up the questionnaire's invitation to provide additional comments. 
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The supply-side survey 
Our approach was to: 
(a) focus our sample on the procurement-sensitive supplying sectors, accounting for some 
62% of the value of procurement; 
(b) ensure that the large Member States and major supplying sectors had adequate 
representation for the purposes of making inferences about the total population. 
Quota samples were drawn on a 4:1 basis from TED and Kompass and other business 
directories to ensure representation of all Member States and procurement-sensitive sectors. 
Random samples were drawn in each cell (Member State and supplying sector). In total 6,000 
companies were drawn from: 
(a) published contract award notices (CANs) in 1994 and 1995, 
(b) Kompass and other business directories. 
This approach yielded an effective sample of 1,608 companies, which was representative of 
the size of firms selling to the public sector/utilities within the quotas. 
The central selection criterion for firms surveyed was that they should, at a minimum, be 
selling to the public sector and/or utilities in their own Member State, and survey respondents 
were managers with specific responsibility for public-sector/utilities markets. 
Table 1.3. 
D 
F 
I 
UK 
E 
B/L 
NL 
DK 
Ρ 
IRL 
GR 
A 
S 
FIN 
315 
15 
19 
19 
25 
14 
8 
10 
6 
5 
4 
4 
11 
6 
4 
150 
Note: * UK figur 
Member State and sectoral coverage 
316 
9 
9 
5 
10 
8 
4 
4 
3 
5 
3 
4 
4 
4 
3 
75 
33 
24 
24 
24 
27 
18 
13 
12 
9 
7 
6 
3 
12 
9 
6 
194 
341/2 
21 
20 
22 
22 
14 
10 
10 
6 
6 
5 
6 
8 
6 
6 
162 
344 
20 
20 
22 
23 
15 
10 
9 
6 
8 
5 
6 
10 
6 
5 
165 
351 
20 
20 
19 
15 
14 
11 
10 
5 
5 
4 
3 
8 
5 
3 
142 
362 
11 
9 
10 
7 
8 
5 
5 
3 
3 
3 
1 
5 
4 
3 
77 
es do not total 211 because, due to a computer error 
37 
11 
11 
10 
7 
8 
5 
4 
3 
3 
4 
4 
6 
4 
3 
83 
,NACE 
453 
10 
11 
7 
12 
10 
5 
6 
3 
2 
3 
4 
6 
4 
2 
85 
identifyir 
471/2 
11 
10 
8 
4 
8 
5 
4 
3 
1 
3 
2 
5 
4 
3 
71 
g codes f 
502 
24 
23 
29 
24 
18 
12 
12 
9 
9 
6 
6 
13 
9 
6 
200 
sr 14 reco 
83 
24 
24 
22 
25 
18 
12 
12 
9 
7 
7 
7 
12 
9 
6 
194 
rds we« 
Total 
200 
200 
197 
211* 
153 
100 
98 
65 
61 
53 
50 
100 
70 
50 
1,608 
; lost. 
Trade flow analysis 
The trade flow analysis was based on data collected from the Comext database, (Eurostat, 
1995) covering the EUR-12 Member States as reporting countries. 
Problems with the data were identified in the form of substantial discrepancies between the 
import figures recorded by an importing country and the export data of the relevant exporting 
country, which, according to Eurostat, was due, in certain cases, to exports: 
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(a) not being recorded in the imports of the trading partner because on arrival at their 
destination they were placed under a transit procedure or in a customs warehouse; 
(b) being recorded in the imports of the importing Member States with a different value, not 
only because of the rule 'exports-fob, imports-cif, but above all as a result of special 
situations such as trade between associated companies with revaluing of imports, 
inclusion or exclusion of monetary compensatory amounts on agricultural products, and 
declaration of the value to be used for calculating value-added tax (VAT) as the 
statistical value; 
(c) being recorded in the imports of the trading partner: 
(i) during a later period (affects the overall figures and the figures by type of goods), 
(ii) under a different statistical heading (affects the figures by type of goods); 
(d) being recorded in the trading partner's imports according to different methods: 
(i) because not all the cases in which the regulation may apply have been settled 
(ships' store, postal consignments, confidential data, aircraft maintenance, etc.), 
(ii) because it was impossible to eliminate all the errors in data returns or in the 
processing and forwarding of results, 
(iii) because there were still a certain number of fraudulent declarations. 
For the purpose of consistency, we have used EUR-12 export data to measure intra-EC 
imports on the basis that total intra-EC exports in a sector equal total intra-EC imports. 
Analysis at the intra-EC level covers the period 1988-92, since: 
(a) at the time of writing, 1995 product level trade data were not available, 
(b) the introduction of a new intra-EC data collection system in 1993 (Intrastat) has made 
1993 figures unreliable and 1994 figures not comparable with pre-1993 statistics. 
Even if 1995 data were available, an extended coverage to 1994 and 1995 would not be valid 
since: 
(a) the proportion of the unexplained variation associated with the trend analysis was 
generally of the order of 30%, 
(b) any new trend based on two points (1994 and 1995) would have no meaning. 
Public-sector import penetration 
In general, there is no systematic recording or analysis of the national origin of purchases by 
entities despite the existence of reporting requirements for public-sector bodies and the 
utilities as laid down in the current directives. Although some Member States have submitted 
returns to the Commission on their procurement, the required level of detail is not available, 
since: 
(a) the coverage of the reporting requirements varies between the directives in terms of 
above- and below-threshold purchases. For example, utilities are only required to report 
below-threshold procurement; 
(b) only a small number of Member States have provided returns to the Commission; 
(c) returns are generally only available for central government bodies; 
(d) individual Member State returns are inconsistent in terms of segmentation and level of 
detail provided, and are therefore not comparable; 
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(e) the available Member State returns provide only an insight into direct purchases of 
foreign origin, and provide no information on indirect purchases. 
In addition, taking into account the problems concerning the application of aggregation rules, 
the definition of discrete operating units, etc., it is not surprising that the Member State returns 
with respect to above-threshold purchases vary from 16% to 93% coverage. This, combined 
with the lack of necessary detail, calls into question their reliability. 
Therefore, no consistent data exist on the value of purchases from foreign suppliers nor of 
purchases of foreign origin from domestic suppliers. To provide this information at a 
sufficient level of detail for 1994 would require the entities participating in the demand-side 
survey to undertake a significant amount of work at an individual contract level, which was 
not feasible within the scope of this study. 
Since no data exist or are collectable on imports into the public sector below central 
government level and into the utilities in individual Member States, it was not possible to use 
demand-side data to make sound estimates of import penetration by supplying sector or in 
total for each Member State. 
A more reliable source of information is private-sector companies supplying the public sector 
or utilities, since they keep detailed records of their exports and imports. In general, this 
information is published in their annual reports at regional level, permitting identification of 
exports to the (rest of the) EU and third countries. 
The supply-side survey provides the following (high quality) data on a representative sample 
of 1,608 suppliers to the public sector, broken down by Member State, supplying sector and 
company size: 
(a) total turnover, 
(b) percentage of turnover supplied to the domestic public sector, 
(c) percentage of turnover exported to the public sector in other EU Member States, 
(d) percentage of domestic public-sector sales imported. 
Using the supply-side sample data (where possible, cross-referenced with the Member State 
returns), estimates of intra-EU direct and total indirect import penetration by supplying sector 
and Member State were made, based on the following assumptions: 
(a) the value of intra-EU public-sector exports in a sector is equal to that of intra-EU public-
sector imports; 
(b) the total value of sales to the public sector in the EU provides a good estimate of the 
value of EU public-sector consumption. 
The estimates of third country direct import penetration for central government, as contained 
in Member State returns, have been used to estimate direct extra-EU public-sector import 
penetration. The problems described above with differences in coverage and level of detail of 
the Member State returns are of less importance when estimating direct extra-EU import 
penetration, since overall levels of direct extra-EU imports into the public sector are reported 
to be very low and, therefore, any inaccuracies will have little impact on the total estimates. 
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Price disparities 
Considerable difficulties were encountered in obtaining reliable price data, since this 
information is, understandably, highly sensitive. As a result, it was necessary to obtain price 
data from a range of sources: 
(a) The cost of non-Europe in public sector procurement, European Commission, 1988; 
(b) The implications of opening up public procurement in Greece, Italy, Portugal and 
Spain, European Commission, 1992; 
(c) Eurostat; 
(d) price data created by DRI for a study undertaken for the European Commission on price 
convergence (1997). 
Despite the limited availability of price data, comparisons of prices between Member States 
and over time (1987-94) are considered to be reliable indicators of price differences for the 
same or similar products within the EU, for the reasons given below. 
(a) Data sources are not significantly different, due to: 
(i) all data referring to prices paid by purchasers, 
(ii) the Cecchini Report (European Commission, 1988) and DRI figures all being 
based on Eurostat data. 
(b) Any changes in product over time, which happen universally or only in one country, are 
irrelevant. What matters is purchaser behaviour. For example, in a case study interview 
it emerged that one utility in one Member State had purchased a technologically 
advanced product in another Member State at a third of the domestic price. Despite this, 
all other utilities in the first Member State continued to buy the outdated technology 
domestically at the higher price. 
(c) There is a value in showing price data for the individual years to identify the level and 
nature of price disparities between Member States. 
Since the price information was inclusive of taxes, an adjustment was made by removing VAT 
under the assumption that equipment goods are subject to the standard rate of VAT in all 
Member States. 
Supply-side structure and case studies 
The principal sources used for the collection of data on production, employment and industry 
specialization were: 
(a) Eurostat 1994-95, 
(b) DEBA, industry and database estimates, 1994-95, 
(c) Basic statistics of the Community, Eurostat 1993, 1995, 
(d) industry publications, 
(e) Panorama of EU industry 1995/96, 
(f) company accounts. 
The analysis covered the 1987-94 period, where possible. 
Summary 15 
1.3. Public procurement in 1987 (Chapter 4) 
The public procurement market in 1987 was estimated at ECU 476 billion, equivalent to 
almost 12% of the EUR-15's GDP. This estimate was arrived at by adjusting the original 
Cecchini estimate of 15% of GDP for the coverage of the current (single market) directives on 
public procurement. 
Table 1.4. 
Belgium 
Denmark 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
Spain 
UK 
EUR-12 
Austria 
Finland 
Sweden 
EUR-15 
Macro-
GDP1 
121.1 
88.8 
770.2 
960.8 
40.1 
26.2 
658.2 
5.3 
188.7 
31.8 
254.2 
599.3 
3744.7 
101.8 
77.3 
139.4 
4063.2 
economic import 
Total government 
expenditure2 
71.5 
49.5 
398.2 
450.4 
19.1 
13.4 
330.6 
2.9 
112.2 
13.7 
103.7 
244.5 
1809.8 
53.6 
35.4 
83.1 
1981.9 
ance of public purchasing in 1987 (billion ECU) 
Total public 
procurement5 
15.4 
10.3 
88.3 
94.8 
6.3 
3.0 
68.4 
0.6 
21.9 
4.6 
26.4 
98.9 
438.9 
11.9 
9.0 
16.3 
476.1 
Government 
expenditure/GDP 
59.1% 
55.7% 
51.7% 
46.9% 
47.7% 
51.3% 
50.2% 
54.1% 
59.5% 
43.1% 
40.8% 
40.8% 
48.3% 
52.7% 
45.8% 
59.6% 
48.8% 
Public 
procurement/GDP 
12.7% 
11.6% 
11.5% 
9.9% 
15.7% 
11.5% 
10.4% 
11.3% 
11.6% 
14.5% 
10.4% 
16.5% 
11.7% 
11.7% 
11.6% 
11.7% 
11.7% 
Sources: ' Eurostat. 
■General government receipts, expenditure and gross debt, European Commission. DG II, 1995. 
3 B, D, F, I and UK: Cost of non-Europe in public sector procurement, European Commission, 1988. 
E, GR, P: Opening up public procurement in the excluded sectors, European Commission, 1992. 
Other countries: EuroStrategy Consultants estimates. 
The five large Member States accounted for almost 80% of the EUR-15 public procurement 
marketin 1987. 
In 1987 the EUR-12 public procurement markets were characterized by nationalistic 
purchasing, lack of transparency, wide price variances for similar products and negligible 
cross-border trade. 
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1.4. Legal measures review (Chapters 5-9) 
1.4.1. Background 
As a result of the findings of the 1988 'cost of non-Europe' study, a number of amendments 
Q 
were made to the original Works and Supplies Directives (adopted in 1971 and 1977 
respectively) to improve their effectiveness by closing 'loopholes' which had been used by 
purchasing entities to circumvent the directives' aims. 
The scope of the public procurement rules was also subsequently extended to embrace: 
(a) utilities, 
(b) services (purchased by both the public sector and utilities), 
(c) a system of remedies (to ensure suppliers had a rapid and effective system of obtaining 
redress in instances where they have been treated unfairly). 
As well as intra-EU legislation, a number of international agreements giving third country 
firms and products access to public and utilities procurement have been concluded, the 
principal of which are: 
(a) the European Economic Area (EEA) Agreement, 
(b) the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA), 
(c) bilateral agreements with the USA, 
(d) association agreements with central and eastern Europe. 
In view of these amendments and extensions in scope, a coherent and comprehensive legal 
framework should have ensured that: 
(a) the possibilities for non-compliance were limited, 
(b) suppliers would have access to effective systems of redress within Member States. 
1.4.2. Community legislative framework (Chapter 6) 
In many important areas the legislation's requirements are not clear, including, in particular: 
(a) boundaries between works and supply/services contracts, 
(b) operation of the 'aggregation rules' (both regarding which products or services should be 
aggregated, and the treatment of discrete operating units (DOUs) within the same entity), 
(c) use of 'framework agreements' in the public sector, 
(d) permissible criteria for shortlisting in the public sector, 
(e) extent to which renewals, extensions or amendments to existing contractual agreements 
constitute new contracts, 
(f) extent to which alterations to bids are permitted in open and restricted procedures. 
Council Directive 71/305/EEC of 26 July 1971 concerning the co-ordination of procedures for the award of public 
works contracts (OJ L 185, 16.8.1971, p. 5) (as amended by Directives 78/669/EEC (OJ L 225, 16.8.1978, p. 41) and 
89/440/EEC (OJ L 210, 31.7.1989, p. 1)) and Council Directive 77/62/EEC of 21 December 1976 co-ordinating 
procedures for the award of public supply contracts (OJ L 13, 15.1.1977, p. 1) (as amended by Directives 80/767/EEC 
(OJ L 215, 18.8.1980, p. 1) and 88/295/EEC (OJ L 127, 20.5.1988, p. 1)), both now superseded. 
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These problems have been perpetuated in national transposing legislation, which has, in 
general, not provided any interpretation of the directives. 
The directives also contain a number of drafting errors, inconsistencies and omissions, some 
minor, some more serious. 
As at the end of 1995, no European Union guide to the interpretation of the directives existed. 
1.4.3. National transposition (Chapter 7) 
As at 31 December 1995: 
(a) the European legal framework had not been fully transposed, with a number of key gaps 
where Member States had failed to introduce national transposing measures, particularly 
in relation to the Public Services Directive 92/50 (Austria, Belgium, France, Greece and 
Austria) and Utilities Services Directive 93/38 (Austria, Belgium, Germany, France, 
Luxembourg and UK); 
(b) numerous examples of late transposition for all directives; during this period the 
directives (with the exception of those on remedies) were effective by 'direct effect'; 
(c) a number of Member States where national transposition was late, but where 
instructions, such as circulars/administrative orders were in place requiring contracting 
entities to comply with directives, particularly in relation to the Public Works Directive 
89/440 (Denmark, Ireland, Netherlands and UK), and the Public Supplies Directive 
88/295 (Denmark, Ireland and UK).9 
Against this background, the European Commission is currently pursuing a number of 
Member States for failure to transpose and incorrect transposition of the directives. 
There is considerable variance between the date of entry into force of the directives in Member 
States, with, for example, directives only having come into force in Austria, Finland and 
Sweden in 1994 (under the EEA Agreement, now superseded by their membership of the EU 
from 1 January 1995), and the Utilities Directives yet to come into force in Greece, Portugal 
and Spain. 
Whilst the Public Procurement Directives in force had not been transposed into national law in 
all Member States, where transposition had taken place, it was largely effective in legal terms. 
1.4.4. Remedies and enforcement (Chapter 8) 
In most Member States there are two principal problems hindering effective relief (under the 
Remedies Directives, 89/665/EEC and 92/13/EEC): 
(a) the inability to obtain remedies with sufficient rapidity, 
(b) a lack of clarity in the manner in which damages are calculated or can be obtained. 
At the Member State level, there is a range of institutions dealing with public procurement, 
none of which appears to police and actively enforce the legislation. 
See note 8, p. 16. 
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At a Community level, enforcement is limited to the Commission which, under the general 
provisions of the Treaty of Rome, pursues infringements of its own initiative, including 
proceedings relating to incorrect and/or late Member State transposition, or actions brought to 
its attention by an aggrieved party. 
1.4.5. Measures affecting third country access (Chapter 9) 
The EU public procurement markets are open to a number of non­EU countries enjoying the 
benefits of multilateral and bilateral agreements. The most important is the WTO Agreement 
on Government Procurement (GPA), but the scope of agreements is far from universal, with 
derogations in relation to all sectors and third countries. 
1.5. Public procurement market contours in 1994 (Chapters 10-11) 
1.5.1. Market size (Chapter 10) 
The estimated size of the EUR­15 public procurement market in 1994 based on a combination 
of top­down and bottom­up analysis is ECU 721 billion (11.2% of EUR­15 GDP). As a share 
of GDP, this represents a reduction in most Member States, which is compensated by a 
significant increase in Germany due to unification. 
Figure 1.1. Procurement as a share of GDP in 1987 and 1994 
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Note: 1994 figures are based on mean values. 
Sources: Tables 4.2 and 10.1. 
The overall decrease in size of the public procurement market is likely to reflect the general 
decrease in public expenditure as a result of Member State policies to reduce budget deficits. 
In terms of procurement by entity type, sub­central government entities accounted for almost 
half of total EUR­15 public procurement in 1994, followed by central government (29%) and 
utilities (24%). Individual Member States showed significant variances due to institutional 
differences in public­sector structure, and the impact of austerity budgets. Compared to 1987, 
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sub-central government procurement had increased, whereas central government and utilities 
purchasing had decreased slightly, reflecting: 
(a) decentralization in purchasing from central to regional and local government, 
(b) privatization of utilities. 
In terms of procurement by contract type, supplies contracts accounted for nearly 40% of total 
purchasing in 1994, with the remainder split equally between works and services. Compared 
to 1987, no significant shift in this breakdown had occurred. 
Estimates of above-threshold procurement based on Member State returns for central 
government and the EC-US procurement study (1994) range from 25% to 60% of total EUR-
15 procurement. National estimates vary from 16% in Denmark to 93% in France. 
The key determinant of above-threshold purchasing for supplies and services is the definition 
of 'like' products or services for the purposes of aggregation. If, under the Supplies Directive, 
'like products' are defined at the level of 'vehicles', 'stationery', 'IT hardware', etc., and, 
under the Services Directive at the level described in its Annex A, it is inconceivable that 
central government purchasing entities spend less than approximately ECU 130,000 annually 
under each of these general headings. Therefore, these estimates are likely to understate the 
level of above-threshold purchasing, other than for France, which reported 93% of total 
government purchasing above threshold. 
The estimated total number of entities covered by the legislation and capable of letting 
contracts above threshold was around 111,000 in 1995, half of which were sub-central 
government entities. 
1.5.2. Publication in the Official Journal (Chapter 11) 
There has been a significant overall increase in the total number of notices published in the 
Official Journal of the European Communities (OJ) since 1987. However, Member State 
increases varied from 200% to 900%. 
The number of notices for supplies and works contracts in the nine Member States subject to 
the Supplies and Works Directives since 1989 is still growing substantially. 
There is a low level of compliance with the requirement to publish contract award notices 
(CANs) with, on average, only one CAN for every two tender notices. 
Sub-central government accounted for the majority of notices published in 1995, although 
there were differences between Member States, reflecting roles and responsibilities. 
In general, central government bodies complied with the directives' requirements in relation to 
use of procedures, with the exception of Italy, where 'accelerated restricted' was used for over 
60% of tenders. A number of Member States also made considerable use of the negotiated 
procedure. 
In general, sub-central government bodies complied with the directives' requirements in 
relation to use of procedures, with the exception of Italy, where 'accelerated restricted' was 
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used for some 38% of tenders. Noticeably high use of the negotiated procedure was also made 
in several other Member States. 
In general, utilities predominantly used the negotiated and restricted procedures, although a 
number did make significant use of the open procedure. 
In 1995, between 15,000 and 18,500 entities published notices in the OJ, with sub-central 
bodies making up about 75% of the total. 
1.6. Market perceptions (Chapters 12-13) 
1.6.1. Demand-side survey results (Chapter 12) 
Despite expected differences between Member States, types of purchasers and types of 
procurement, a number of consistent messages emerged from the survey. 
At a global level the survey showed that the legislation has had a significant impact, but that 
whilst there have been a number of benefits, these are currently seen by purchasers to be 
outweighed by associated 'costs'. 
The legislation has resulted in increased openness, with most respondents reporting having 
published more notices and now using the OJ. 
The survey's results indicated that: 
(a) without the legislation, there would have been a more restrictive approach to purchasing; 
(b) there are still high levels of non-compliance, with sub-central government entities, in 
particular, considered only to be starting to fulfil the directives' requirements. 
Whilst there were indications of continued non-compliance with the legislation's 
requirements, there were also entities which had been genuinely disappointed by the supply 
side's response (to notices published in the OJ). 
In general, whilst purchasing entities had a reasonable 'feel' for their domestic suppliers, their 
knowledge in relation to non-domestic suppliers was very low; implying that, for most, any 
increases in non-domestic penetration have been minimal. This was confirmed by entities 
which were able to provide such information. 
In relation to sub-central government's experiences, a number of entities in some of the largest 
Member States: 
(a) expressed disappointment at the lack of response to notices published; 
(b) reported that, despite the directives having been in force for almost seven years in 
relation to supplies, only recently had there been evidence of (any) new suppliers 
responding to calls for competition; 
(c) awareness of the rules at this level is still low. (The structure of sub-central government 
in Member States is likely to exacerbate non-publication, particularly where 
procurement is devolved to (small) independent units, whose procurement is not 
aggregated.) 
The 'cost' element of the legislation was most associated with: 
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(a) more complex procurement, 
(b) more time-consuming procurement. 
This 'cost' element of the legislation was exacerbated by generally perceived increases in both 
the total number of firms, and the number of non-domestic firms, submitting tenders not 
having, in general, been translated into changes in supplier bases, under the following 
conditions. 
(a) Only a minority of entities reported real benefits - primarily lower contract prices. Even 
in such instances, this perception was based on 'exceptional' cases, such as: 
(i) two instances where, in a strategic area, an innovative technical solution from a 
new non-domestic supplier resulted in savings of 50%, 
(ii) purchase of railway rolling stock from a previously unknown EU supplier as the 
direct result of a notice placed in the OJ. 
(b) The legislation's impact on any changes in supplier behaviour, such as improved 
service, was perceived to be minimal. 
The lack of lower prices indicated that, despite an increase in new firms submitting tenders, 
they were: 
(a) either not competitive, or not competing on price; 
(b) pricing to national markets (minimizing any cost saving potential for the purchaser); 
(c) not selling across border (exporting direct) - the price reduction examples quoted above 
were, significantly, from suppliers selling direct from another Member State; 
(d) not stimulating competition (for the above and other reasons, such as domestic supplier 
apathy, lack of awareness and lack of concern). 
An additional key finding not specifically covered by the survey, but consistently raised by 
entities which submitted additional comments, was the threat of legal action by suppliers. As a 
consequence of this and the legislation's lack of clarity, entities have adopted a literal (and 
defensive) approach to implementation of the rules. However, by applying the directives' 
requirements 'to the letter' rather than their 'spirit' in relation to, for example, supplier 
qualification: 
(a) administrative costs have increased, 
(b) potential new suppliers are (seen to be) deterred by the costs of completing extensive 
qualification documentation. 
With the exception of some entities with a focus on works procurement, 'economically most 
advantageous' was the preferred award criterion for all types of entity in all Member States. 
However, the nature of award criteria used indicated that, despite claiming to be awarding on 
the basis of 'economically most advantageous', in most cases, purchasers chose on the basis of 
lowest price. 
1.6.2. Supply-side survey results (Chapter 13) 
Across all Member States, and within most sectors, there were a significant number of non-
domestic subsidiaries selling to the public sector/utilities. 
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Overall, 41% ofall firms surveyed had obtained information from the OJ and TED, although 
there were differences between Member States. A significantly higher percentage of large 
firms (69%) obtained information from the OJ and TED than medium-sized (53%) and small 
(34%) companies. 
As a result of opportunities identified from the OJ and TED, 13% of all firms surveyed had 
won additional domestic business, and some 4% of all firms surveyed had won additional 
business in other EU Member States. 
Large firms had been most successful in winning additional new business in both domestic 
and non-domestic markets as a result of opportunities identified in the OJ and TED. However, 
those small and medium-sized firms which had used the OJ and TED, were as successful as 
large companies in winning business in domestic markets. 
The OJ and TED were seen in a positive fashion by those firms which had obtained 
information from them, with over 80% intending/expecting to submit at least as many tenders 
in response to notices in the future for both domestic and non-domestic markets. 
In terms of domestic business, of the firms which had obtained information from the OJ and 
TED: 
(a) almost half had identified additional domestic business opportunities, 
(b) response rates to new opportunities were very high, with over 90% having submitted 
tenders, more than 70% of those submitting having won business as a result. Success 
was generally independent of size and sector. 
In domestic markets, price was the major reason given by firms for failing to win additional 
business from opportunities identified in the O J and TED. 
In terms of non-domestic business: 
(a) a significantly higher percentage of firms reading the OJ/TED sell to other EU Member 
States than those not reading the OJ/TED, with the higher the percentage of readership 
of the OJ and TED in a Member State, the higher the percentage of firms selling to other 
EU Member States; 
(b) a significantly higher percentage of larger companies had won new business than 
medium-sized and small companies. 
Response rates for non-domestic opportunities were high, with over 80% of those that had 
identified new opportunities having submitted tenders. Of these, 44% had subsequently won 
business. 
Firms successful in non-domestic markets attributed their success to a range of factors. 
Although price was important, equal importance was attached to service, quality and technical 
innovation indicated. 
Most firms considered the cost of submitting tenders for non-domestic business to be greater 
than for domestic business. Marketing and bid preparation itself were the most important 
additional costs. 
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Of those firms which reported using the OJ and TED, some 67% (32% of all firms 
interviewed) considered the information contained in notices adequate for business purposes. 
At a general level, the quality ofinformation provided was seen to be lacking, since: 
(a) 9% of all firms interviewed had tried to sell to other EU Member States, but were not 
now doing so; 
(b) of the 58% of firms which had not tried to sell to other EU Member States, the principal 
reasons given were difficulty in identifying opportunities (13%) and the complexity of 
administrative procedures (10%). 
Overall, 36% of all firms surveyed had noticed an increase in non-domestic firms competing 
for, and winning, business from their own public-sector and utilities customers. 
This perception was supported by other survey results, principally that: 
(a) 31 % of all firms surveyed were currently selling to public-sector/utilities customers in 
other EU Member States; 
(b) 21% of all firms surveyed were selling through offices/companies based in other 
Member States (although clearly there is a degree of overlap, and the extent to which 
firms actually know whether competitors in their own markets are non-domestic 
subsidiaries is debatable). 
1.7. Economic analysis (Chapters 14-16) 
1.7.1. Trade flows (Chapter 14) 
In terms of the strategic products analysed, which are primarily bought by the public sector, 
there has been an overall increase in trade at both intra and extra-EC level, with the exception 
of locomotives and goods wagons. Extra-EC trade balances have been improving over the 
period 1988-92 with a particularly sharp rise in exports for transformers, X-ray apparatus, and 
telephonic and telegraphic switching apparatus. 
For these products, Germany, France and, to a lesser extent, the UK showed the largest 
increases in both intra-EC and extra-EC trade. 
Regarding the shopping list products which are bought by both the public and private sectors, 
there has generally been a larger increase in trade at both intra-EC and extra-EC levels than for 
the strategic public-sector purchases. Computers and network servers represented the only 
exception within the overall trend of increasing trade, whereas uniforms showed a particularly 
sharp increase in extra-EC imports, mainly from low-wage countries. 
Generally, the United Kingdom and Italy have benefited most, while Germany and France 
experienced smaller increases. 
1.7.2. Public-sector import penetration 
In 1994, an estimated 96-98% of total EU public-sector purchases was procured from 
domestic suppliers. When indirect foreign purchases are included, i.e. purchases via domestic 
suppliers such as subsidiaries, agents or importers, an estimated 7-13% of total European 
public-sector purchases was of non-domestic origin. 
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Of the direct imports into the public sector, other European suppliers accounted for an 
estimated 2-3% of total EU public-sector purchases in 1994. Third country suppliers 
accounted for less than 0.5%. 
The level of public-sector import penetration showed large variations between the 'procure-
ment sensitive' sectors. In general, public-sector purchases which are complex and have a 
relatively high technology content, such as medical equipment, railway rolling stock and office 
machinery, showed a high level of cross-border trade. 
Figure 1.2. Direct and indirect public-sector import penetration by supplying sector 
(1994) 
315 316 33 341/2 344 351 362 37 453 471/2 502 83 EUR-15 
Note: Figures are based on the mean of the upper and lower estimates. 
Source: Supply-side survey questions 26, 27 and 28. Member States' statistical reports, DG XV, 1995. 
At an individual Member State level, the larger Member States showed lower levels of public-
sector import penetration than the smaller Member States. 
Compared to 1987, public-sector import penetration increased from 6% to an estimated 
average of 10% in 1994. 
1.7.3. Price disparities (Chapter 15) 
Overall, there is no conclusive evidence of price convergence between Member States for 
products bought by the public sector. There are some exceptions for certain products where a 
degree of price convergence has occurred between 1987 and 1994, such as cardiac monitors, 
buses and office machinery, which are generally purchased directly from the manufacturer. 
Since no clear price convergence has been identified, it can be assumed that the competition 
effect predicted by the Cecchini Report in relation to the opening of public procurement has 
hot yet materialized. Therefore, any price changes observed within a Member State can only 
be attributed to factors other than the single market in public procurement. 
Despite the continued existence of price differences in 1994, the relative position of Member 
States in terms of absolute prices has changed between 1987 and 1994 for certain products, 
which can be partly explained by: 
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(a) exchange rate movements, 
(b) differences in inflation rates. 
Regarding price disparities for comparable products bought primarily by the private sector, no 
clear price convergence was observed between 1985 and 1993, except for transport equipment, 
such as motor vehicles and bicycles, ships, and aircraft. 
1.7.4. Supply-side structure (Chapter 16) 
In all industries, there has been a significant reduction in employment. 
In 'commodity' areas, there has been a redistribution of market shares between Member 
States, resulting in changes in specialization. 
For strategic industries, significant restructuring has resulted in increased supplier 
concentration and the creation of global players in the telecommunications, railway rolling 
stock and power generation sectors. 
1.8. Case studies (Chapters 17-22) 
1.8.1. Telecommunications equipment (Chapter 17) 
The EU telecommunications equipment market has undergone fundamental change since 
1987: 
(a) the supply side has been restructured and is today dominated by three economically 
strong and technologically advanced European groups; 
(b) equipment prices have come down by 20-30% in nominal terms; 
(c) market leaders - Alcatel, Siemens and Ericsson - have transferred production to other 
Member States to ensure access to local (public-sector) markets; 
(d) indirect import penetration has risen significantly, largely in components; 
(e) the EU's trade surplus with the rest of the world has been growing steadily since 1987, 
reflecting the industry's competitiveness on the world stage. 
The main drivers of change have been the globalization of the market for telecommunications 
services, which has been the motor of liberalization. Service providers - the entities covered 
by the Utilities Directive - have responded by demanding the best technical solutions. 
Although much of the ex ante hypothesis has been achieved, the role of the Utilities Directive, 
which came into force in January 1993 in most Member States, has been strictly limited. 
Liberalization of network services in January 1998 will accelerate the changes already in 
progress and is likely to contribute to the achievement of a competitive and fair 'public 
procurement' market almost overnight. 
1.8.2. Railway rolling stock (Chapter 18) 
On the demand side, governments are being pressured to liberalize previously heavily 
subsidized national markets and increase the operational independence of network operators. 
Similarly, deregulation, privatization and separation of network management from the 
provision of services is creating competition between service providers, further weakening the 
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links between purchasers and traditional suppliers. As a result, the concentration of supply has 
reduced in the majority of Member States. 
Since 1987, these developments are considered to have resulted in price reductions of the 
order of 20-30%. 
On the supply side, over-capacity due to reduced public-sector expenditure and the high cost 
of R&D has resulted in a radical process of rationalization since 1987, significantly increasing 
supplier concentration. The industry is now dominated by three major players - Adtranz, 
GEC-Alsthom and Siemens - all having a strong presence in other Member States. 
The public procurement legislation has had little impact on the competitiveness of the industry 
as the varied technical standards employed by national railways provide an inherent advantage 
to traditional suppliers which were either involved in their development, or have prior 
experience of them. 
Only in the market for new urban/mass transit systems has the increased transparency caused 
by the directives been considered a key factor in opening up the markets to competition. 
1.8.3. Power generating equipment (Chapter 19) 
The electricity generation industry is moving, via a process of liberalization and privatization, 
towards greater private sector involvement and more market-driven behaviour. Together with 
the impact of the recession, general reductions in infrastructure investment, over-capacity and 
increased competition from North American suppliers, have caused equipment prices to fall by 
between 30% and 40% since 1990. 
The public procurement legislation has acted as an accelerator to these changes, but despite its 
existence, some markets have been slow to liberalize. While technical harmonization has 
increased cross-border trade, the industry is still hampered by internal and external barriers 
such as enlarged testing requirements and certification activities. 
The supply side has begun to restructure in response to these changes, with manufacturers 
trying to enter national markets, either through consortia or acquisition, but significant 
adjustment has not yet taken place. However, over the next 18 months a number of 
manufacturers are predicting large job losses. 
1.8.4. Engineering consultancy (Chapter 20) 
In 1987, the engineering consultancy market was generally fragmented on both the supply side 
and the demand side. This has not changed significantly, although a dramatic reduction in 
demand has reduced prices and increased the intensity of competition. This effect, however, 
has taken place nationally, with cross-border EU activity remaining low (3% to 4% of 
revenue), despite the continued success of European consultancies outside Europe. 
There is a trend towards large companies becoming larger and seeking to use strategic 
partnerships and consortia as a means of developing intra-European business. At present, 
however, the positions of the leading consultancies in the UK, Germany and the Netherlands 
have not altered markedly because of continued barriers to intra-EU trade, including 
differences in fee regulations and necessary qualifications. 
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1.8.5. Uniforms (Chapter 21) 
The public procurement legislation has played a role in opening up previously closed markets, 
but other factors, such as a decline in demand, have been as important. 
The experience of major suppliers indicates that: 
(a) the potential for purchasers to continue to discriminate against new suppliers, even when 
complying with the legislation, is considerable; 
(b) non-compliance, in particular by splitting contracts (failing to aggregate), is still 
widespread, especially in smaller (sub-central) purchasers. 
The benefits of increased cross-border trade have only been realized by the industry's largest 
players. There is a strong perception, even among larger suppliers that have been successful in 
selling across borders, that key markets are still closed to non-domestic suppliers. 
SMEs have continued to focus on local and regional markets since they: 
(a) lack the resources to compete for non-domestic business; 
(b) do not consider other markets to be truly open and fair. 
In addition, the legislation is seen to have complicated the tendering process with additional 
bureaucracy in relation to, for example, (pre-) qualification which is particularly burdensome 
for SMEs. 
There is an apparent contradiction between the continued closed nature of regional and local 
markets, with purchasers still showing a national preference, and reported reductions in prices. 
It appears, however, that, in common with several other case study sectors, purchasers have 
used the legislation as a means of driving down prices while keeping the same suppliers. 
1.8.6. Construction (Chapter 22) 
The overall impact of the single European market and public procurement legislation on the 
EU civil engineering market has been minimal in comparison with the changes brought about 
by declining demand due tö reduced public finance for infrastructure investments. The result 
has been a dramatic rise in competition with prices falling throughout Europe. 
The majority of large civil engineering contracts, however, continue to be won by national 
suppliers, although in a small number of cases non-national suppliers are being used to drive 
down prices of traditional suppliers. What success there has been in developing intra-EU trade 
is due to smaller, specialist subcontractors, which have exported their know-how throughout 
Europe. 
The supply side continues to be dominated by a small number of large national contractors in 
France, Germany and the UK. The level of concentration has increased slightly due to the 
recession, forcing further mergers and acquisitions at national as well as at international level. 
The existing market structure will not remain static indefinitely, and the most likely 
competitive response will be an upsurge in mergers and acquisitions, particularly among the 
leading French and German players, as they seek to restructure and rationalize their operations, 
eliminate competition and penetrate non-national markets through cross-border ownership. 
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1.9. Impact assessment (Chapter 23) 
1.9.1. Direct impacts - openness 
Use of the Official Journal 
In general, the OJ has been a very valuable source of information. It is regarded as the single 
point of focus for business in the public sector, either domestically or in other Member States, 
in particular by suppliers committed to entering new markets. This was illustrated by the 
supply-side survey, which found that: 
(a) an estimated 41% of suppliers to the public sector obtain information from the OJ. 
However, SMEs have only a 30% readership, suggesting that larger companies are the 
main beneficiaries of this information; 
(b) an estimated 14-20% of all suppliers to the public sector had identified additional 
opportunities in their domestic markets, and an estimated 9-13% in other EU markets; 
(c) over two-thirds of OJ readers considered information provided in notices to be adequate 
for business purposes. 
These findings were supported by results from the demand-side survey, where most purchasers 
reported their only change in publication media to be the OJ. This implies that there has been 
an increase in access to opportunities within a Member State and in other EU Member States, 
since, previously, public-sector calls for competition were only published locally and 
nationally, not internationally, whereas utilities, in general, did not publish at all. 
Therefore, if suppliers did not know about opportunities before legislation came into force, 
without the OJ, they would probably still be unaware of them. In this respect, the directives 
have created, in the form of the O J, greater openness and consistency in relation to public-
sector opportunities. 
However, there is a lack of knowledge among potential suppliers of the extent of information 
on public-sector opportunities available in the OJ, due to: 
(a) limited promotion of the O J at Member State level, 
(b) relatively high subscription fees for the OJ and the TED database, especially for SMEs. 
It can also be inferred that, based on the results of the demand-side survey and the previous 
analysis, it is SMEs that have benefited the least from the legislation since: 
(a) smaller contracts are still let locally to broadly the same suppliers without publication in 
the O J (as they are not being aggregated); 
(b) a smaller proportion of SMEs use the OJ. 
Numbers of entities publishing in relation to the coverage of the directives 
As a result of the procurement legislation, there has been an increase in the number of entities 
publishing, reflecting: 
(a) implementation of the Utilities Directives, 
(b) as indicated by the demand-side survey, entities, particularly sub-central government 
bodies, only recently starting to fulfil the directives' publishing requirements. 
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The number of entities that are covered and that should be publishing does not correspond to 
the actual number of entities publishing. This is illustrated by the significant differences 
between the number of entities in the EAP database (> 100,000) and the number that had 
published in 1995 (>15,000). 
Overall, an estimated 14% of the total number of entities covered by the legislation is actually 
publishing in the OJ. 
Reasons for non-publication by entities reflect a varied understanding of the directives' 
requirements, for example: 
(a) a contract-based approach to purchasing, resulting from a misinterpretation of the 
aggregation rules; 
(b) different definitions for discrete operating units; 
(c) misunderstanding of coverage leading to non-compliance. 
In addition, non-publication is exacerbated by: 
(a) the absence of active policing and enforcement of the directives' requirements at 
Member State level; 
(b) inefficient national legal systems of redress; 
(c) suppliers' reluctance to 'prosecute' potential customers; 
(d) lack of awareness of the legislation's requirements by suppliers, particularly SMEs. 
Extent of publication of notices in relation to the coverage of the directives 
The implementation of legislation has resulted in a significant increase in the total number of 
notices published in the O J from around 12,000 in 1987 to over 95,000 in 1995, reflecting: 
(a) the entry into force of the Utilities and Services Directives on 1 January 1993; 
(b) the overall increase in awareness of the directives, as reported in the demand-side 
survey, resulting in more entities publishing and more notices being published per entity. 
The impact of the implementation of the Utilities and Services Directives is vividly illustrated 
by the step change in the number of: 
(a) notices published by the utilities, from 0% in 1992 to 14.7% of all notices published in 
1995; 
(b) services notices published, from 11.3% of all notices published by central and sub-
central government in 1993 to 28% of the total number of notices in 1995. 
However, there is still under-publication of tender notices as illustrated by: 
(a) entities not publishing, due to the varied understanding of the directives' requirements; 
(b) the continuing increase in number of supplies notices being published by public-sector 
entities despite legislation having been in force since 1989; 
(c) for every two tender notices only one CAN being published (itself an indicator of 
openness); 
(d) the reported differences in above-threshold procurement, with central government in 
some Member States claiming above-threshold procurement at a mere 16%. This is 
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inconceivable in terms of the size of aggregated budgets on supplies and services, even 
taking into account the existence of discrete operating units. 
These views are supported by a 1994 study for the European Commission on EC-US 
procurement, which showed that in one of the EU's largest Member States: 
(a) almost 10% of towns with more than 100,000 inhabitants did not report any procurement 
in 1993; 
(b) 28% of towns of 10,000-50,000 inhabitants, and over 30% of towns of 50,000-100,000 
reported no contracts. 
It was concluded to be inconceivable that these entities did not have any purchases covered by 
the directives. Likewise, a Commission analysis highlighted considerable variation between 
notice publication by similar-sized (major) sub-central government bodies with similar 
responsibilities in other Member States. 
The overall conclusion is that significant under-publication in the OJ exists as a result of: 
(a) varied interpretations of: 
(i) a contract, 
(ii) a discrete operating unit, 
(iii) the definition of 'products/services with similar characteristics' under the 
aggregation rules; 
(b) in some cases, non-compliance. 
In addition, from a demand-side perspective, there is a perceived lack of incentive to publish 
due to: 
(a) difficulties in understanding some key elements of the directives (and, consequently, 
national transpositions); 
(b) little supplier response when tender notices are published; 
(c) no active policing or enforcement. 
This is creating a 'self-fulfilling prophecy', reflecting attitudes and actions of not only the 
demand side but also of the supply side, as will be shown in the downstream impact 
assessment. 
Use of procedures 
A direct impact of the legislation has been that when entities are publishing a call for 
competition, they are, in general, complying in terms of the type of procedure used, with: 
(a) central and sub-central government primarily using the open and restricted procedures; 
(b) utilities primarily using the negotiated and restricted procedures. 
The scope of openness is only limited in relation to the use of qualification systems and 
negotiated procedures, since: 
(a) opportunities are not required to be made public. Even when the supplier is on an 
approved list, there is no obligation to notify every supplier of the opportunity; 
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(b) the level of information required to be accepted on a qualification list can be used to 
deter new suppliers (albeit unintentionally). 
Similarly, although compliant, the publication of indicative notices or notices of existence of 
qualification systems on an annual basis means suppliers that either miss the announcement or 
do not obtain information from the OJ/TED will not respond or be aware. 
In general, there is a preference by purchasers to use restricted procedures to avoid the higher 
costs associated with the administrative implications of using the open procedure. 
1.9.2. Direct impacts - fairness 
Selection of award criteria and their application 
Regarding the application of award criteria, a distinction has to be made between the tendering 
procedure chosen, with: 
(a) for the open procedure, only contract award criteria being applied; 
(b) for the restricted and negotiated procedures, three types of criteria being applied: 
(i) pre-qualification, 
(ii) shortlisting, 
(iii) award. 
In general, the pre-qualification stage can cut out competition by setting criteria which prevent 
potential suppliers from submitting tenders. In addition, assuming the awarding authority sets 
objective pre-qualification criteria, there appears to be no objective basis for selecting a subset 
of pre-qualified suppliers to tender. The absence of any permissible criteria for shortlisting 
increases the scope for misuse and favouring of traditional suppliers. 
The vast majority of awarding authorities claim to award contracts on the basis of the 'most 
economically advantageous tender', which requires the purchaser to select the overall best 
tender according to a combination of objective award criteria. Under normal circumstances the 
award criteria should be prioritized, implying the existence of a weighting system. 
In practice, purchasers: 
(a) find it difficult to measure some of their stated award criteria, such as quality; 
(b) often create a shortlist of tenders based on all criteria other than price, then choose the 
cheapest; 
(c) invariably, select on price. 
As a result, suppliers often submit tenders on one basis, and are evaluated on another. 
Both the surveys and the in-depth interviews confirmed that: 
(a) price is often the sole decision criterion (without weighting being applied); 
(b) purchasing authorities often introduce competition and award an occasional contract to a 
new supplier to force traditional players to reduce prices, even though they would have 
won under the strict application of 'most economically advantageous'. 
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Redress 
In all regulated environments there is always a degree of unfairness. This can be minimized by 
having: 
(a) clear and unambiguous rules, 
(b) effective policing, 
(c) efficient enforcement. 
Regarding clarity, important areas of the directives have been identified as unclear, notably: 
(a) boundaries between works and supply contracts; 
(b) application of the 'aggregation rules', both regarding the level at which products or 
services should be aggregated and the treatment of discrete operating units within the 
same entity; 
(c) use of 'framework agreements' in the public sector; 
(d) permissible criteria for shortlisting in the public sector; 
(e) the extent to which renewals, extensions or amendment to existing contractual 
agreements constitute new contracts; 
(f) the extent to which alterations to bids are permitted in open and restricted procedures; 
(g) rules on criteria and evidence for assessing qualification in the utilities sector applying to 
qualification systems in some circumstance but not in others, without any apparent 
justification. 
In general, there is no active policing of compliance at Member State level. 
Regarding enforcement, there is no provision for Member States to enforce compliance. 
Enforcement is restricted to suppliers instituting an action against a purchasing authority under 
the legal remedies legislation in a particular case. However, with the exception of Denmark 
and Sweden, the efficiency and effectiveness of national arrangements in relation to remedies 
are considered to be inadequate, due to: 
(a) an inability to obtain remedies with sufficient rapidity, 
(b) a lack of clarity in how damages are calculated and obtained. 
1.9.3. Downstream impacts - competition 
Supplier response 
Based on the supply-side survey results, an estimated: 
(a) 14-20% of all suppliers to the public sector have identified additional opportunities in 
their domestic markets from notices published in the OJ, with 9-13% of all suppliers to 
the public sector winning new business as a result; 
(b) 9-13% of all suppliers to the public sector had identified additional opportunities in 
other EU Member States from notices published in the OJ, with 3~4% winning 
additional business as a result. 
In both cases, this level of success is directly attributable to the directives' requirement to 
publish notices in the OJ, and their impact on the purchasing procedures and attitudes of 
public-sector entities. 
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Although firms of all sizes have been successful in winning additional business using the OJ, 
the weighting has been in favour of large companies, particularly for non-domestic business, 
reflecting their: 
(a) higher readership of the OJ: 69% of all large companies compared to 53% for medium-
sized companies and 34% for SMEs, 
(b) greater presence in non-domestic markets. 
These changes on the supply side are corroborated by the views of purchasers that there had 
been: 
(a) some increase in non-domestic suppliers tendering for opportunities; 
(b) some change in the mix of their supplier bases, predominantly large and multinational 
companies, particularly among utilities and sub-central government. 
Import penetration 
Public-sector purchases of non-domestic origin moved from an estimated 6% in 1987 to 10% 
of total public-sector purchases in 1994, of which: 
(a) direct imports increased from 1.4% to 3%, 
(b) indirect imports increased from 4.5% to 7%. 
This was consistent with the estimated increase in the number of suppliers to the public sector 
winning new additional business in other EU Member States. 
In general, the demand side did not perceive any change in nationality of their supplier base, 
which reflects: 
(a) the small and uneven nature of the increase in direct public-sector import penetration; 
(b) the majority of the increase in public-sector import penetration being purchased from a 
'domestic' supplier (including subsidiaries of foreign companies) that imported the 
procurement. 
When considering public-sector purchases in terms of 'commodity' products, which are low-
tech standard purchases (office furniture, paper, stationery, etc.), and of high-cost strategic 
products, it is in the area of 'commodity' purchases that there has been a general significant 
increase in intra-EU trade. This was reflected in the rise in public-sector indirect import 
penetration. 
For example, in paper there has been a significant increase in intra-EU trade, which is 
consistent with a high level (18%) of indirect public-sector imports. This is supported by the 
reported lack of success in winning new direct business in other Member States by paper 
suppliers to the public sector (see Table 1.5). 
Since both public and private sectors procure these commodity products from the same 
intermediate local suppliers, by inference, public-sector import penetration equals private-
sector import penetration. 
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Table 1.5. Supplier response and public-sector import penetration 
Sector/product 
Low-tech products 
Office furniture 
Uniforms 
Printing and paper 
High-tech products with 
common tech. specs. 
Office machinery 
Motor vehicles 
Medical equip. 
High-tech products with 
different technical specs. 
Boilers 
Power generating equip. 
Telecommunications 
equip. 
Railway rolling stock 
Works 
Construction/civil eng. 
Services 
Consulting engineering 
EU average 
NACE 
316 
453 
471/2 
33 
351 
37 
315 
341/2 
344 
362 
502 
83 
OJ 
readership' 
(%) 
34 
47 
26 
45 
41 
26 
31 
42 
42 
49 
44 
52 
41 
Winners of new 
domestic 
business2 
(%) 
9 
12 
6 
17 
12 
10 
12 
10 
13 
12 
11 
22 
9-13 
Winners of new 
other-EU 
business3 
(%) 
2 
4 
0 
3 
3 
2 
4 
4 
7 
10 
4 
4 
3-4 
Public-sector import 
penetration,4 1994 (%) 
direct 
5 
3 
<1 
4 
3-4 
5-6 
4 
6-7 
6-8 
10-11 
3 
1 
2-4 
indirect 
8 
13 
17-19 
22-29 
16-19 
19-21 
9-10 
11-14 
18-22 
19-21 
4-7 
5-6 
5-9 
Sources: ' Percentage of suppliers to the public sector using the OJ and TED (Figure 13.2). 
2 Percentage of suppliers to the public sector winning additional domestic business (Figure 13.12). 
3 Percentage of suppliers to the public sector winning additional business in other EU Member States 
(Figure 13.23). 
4 Table 1.1.31 in the unpublished Annex to this report. 
With respect to purchases of strategic products, in general this area of procurement has 
experienced increases in intra-EU and extra-EU trade, albeit at a somewhat lower level than 
the corresponding changes in trade for 'commodity' purchases. However, their level of direct 
purchases from non-domestic suppliers is, today, more important than that for 'commodity' 
purchases. This is supported by the supply-side survey where suppliers of strategic products, 
such as railway rolling stock and telecommunications equipment, reported the highest levels 
of new additional business in other Member States. 
In the areas of works and services, public-sector import penetration is, in broad terms far 
lower, with any public-sector trade, in the main, being related to a small number of large 
international construction projects and their closely related services, such as architecture and 
engineering consultancy. The case studies indicated a perceived continued existence of 
barriers to trade in these areas, which, in essence, the public procurement legislation could not 
be expected to overcome. 
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Price convergence 
Within a national market a company's competitiveness is determined by the efficiency of the 
use of labour and capital. The domestic price of a product is a function of the productivity and 
cost of labour, and the cost of bought-in goods and services, of which raw materials are 
generally the most important component. 
Although a depreciating currency can make the export price of the country concerned 
competitive, this price advantage is usually eroded by higher inflation and lower productivity. 
The situation is further complicated when dealing with technologically complex products, 
where a price advantage may result from innovative design, such that competitors' products 
are technologically different, though, possibly, functionally similar. 
When considering price convergence, the following key factors should be taken into account: 
(a) degree of imperfect competition - the demand- and supply-side surveys indicate that a 
minority of purchasers and suppliers are aware of the opportunities in the marketplace; 
(b) technical incompatibility - purchasing entities are restricted to existing, national 
suppliers or, when feasible, other EU suppliers incur additional costs to satisfy national 
technical requirements; 
(c) technical/functional specifications - the use of technical rather than functional 
specifications mitigates against the use of innovative (often lower cost) solutions; 
(d) supply chain structure - the nature of national supply chain structures often restricts 
price savings to intermediaries rather than end-purchasers; 
(e) exchange rates - exchange rate movements create artificial price advantages of a 
temporary or permanent nature and result in a climate of commercial uncertainty. 
Within the EU the above factors, particularly imperfect competition throughout the EU, have 
individually and collectively contributed to a situation in which there has been no observable 
price convergence. 
Regarding commodity products, the dominant factor has been the supply-chain structure where 
these products are almost exclusively purchased locally from national (private sector) 
suppliers. These suppliers are normally intermediaries, who source their purchases 
internationally on (ex-factory) price - as illustrated by the increases in trade since 1987 - and 
sell at national price levels. This also reflects the completion of the single market programme. 
In general, these observations are consistent with the high levels of indirect import penetration 
for commodity products. This is illustrated by filing cabinets being 36% more expensive in the 
UK than the cheapest Member State, although the UK was the largest exporter of filing 
cabinets to the rest of Europe in 1994, reflecting the change in the terms of trade due to 
exchange rate movements. 
In addition, there is little competition in these products with minimal tendering resulting from 
misinterpretation of the aggregation rules, whereby the focus is on contracts rather than 
aggregated annual expenditure. This might also explain the lack of price convergence and the 
high levels of price disparities in these areas. 
Regarding strategic products, they are considered to fall into two categories: 
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(a) those with common technical specifications, such as medical equipment, vehicles and 
office machinery, 
(b) those with significantly different technical requirements due to incompatibility of 
systems between Member States, as illustrated by differences in national railway, and 
power distribution systems. 
Although there have been recession-induced price reductions for strategic purchases, no real 
price convergence has occurred, with the exception of cardiac monitors, buses and office 
machinery, which can be explained by: 
(a) their relatively more transparent markets with few European players, 
(b) the products requiring little to no adaptation for different EU markets. 
The fact that there has been no price convergence for the other strategic products reflects: 
(a) their being 'bespoke' in nature and manufactured to satisfy widely differing national 
technical standards, 
(b) supplier strategies of having a local presence (as generally preferred by the purchasers), 
resulting in a national cost base and pricing to national markets. 
This is supported by the fact that for these strategic purchases, direct public-sector import 
penetration is low compared to indirect imports. 
Rationalization and restructuring 
In all procurement-sensitive sectors there has been significant supply-side rationalization, 
reflected in reduced employment and productivity improvements. 
In the 'commodity' areas, despite significant recession-induced price reductions in national 
markets, any change cannot be attributed to the procurement legislation since: 
(a) there has been no price convergence, reflecting the supply-chain structure (purchasing 
from national wholesalers) and the bulk of the public-sector imports being indirect; 
(b) there has been significant non-publication both in terms of number of entities publishing 
(an estimated 14% of the potential published) and the underpublication of above-
threshold procurement (as illustrated by the example of the typical sub-central 
government entity, which published an estimated 25-30% of their purchasing of works 
and supplies). 
In the strategic areas, there has not only been a recession-induced reduction in employment, 
but also a (public-sector) market-induced restructuring, which has resulted in: 
(a) the creation of a small number of global players in telecommunications, power 
generation equipment and railway rolling stock; 
(b) significantly increased intra- and extra-EU trade, the bulk of which has been in indirect 
imports reflecting the strategies of these global players to have local manufacturing 
(assembly) capabilities in key European markets; 
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Table 1.6. Economic indicators 
Sector/product 
Low-tech products 
Office furniture 
Uniforms 
Printing and paper 
High-tech products: 
common technical specs. 
Motor vehicles 
Office machinery 
Medical equipment 
High-tech products: 
different tech. specs. 
Telecommunications 
equip.*** 
Power generating equip.*** 
Power distribution equip.*** 
Railway rolling stock*** 
Boilers 
Works 
Construction/civil eng. 
Services 
Engineering consultancy 
Public-sector import 
penetration' 1994 (%) 
direct 
5 
3 
<1 
3-4 
4 
5-6 
6-8 
6-7 
6-7 
10-11 
4 
3 
1 
indirect 
8 
13 
17-19 
16-19 
22-29 
19-21 
18-22 
11-14 
11-14 
19-21 
9-10 
4-7 
5-6 
Price 
convergence 
1987-932 
N 
n/a 
N 
N/S* 
S 
N/S** 
N 
N 
N 
N/S 
N 
n/a 
n/a 
Trade 
change 
1988-923 
++ 
++ 
+ 
++ 
++ 
++ 
+ 
++ 
++ 
++ 
-
+ 
+ 
Production 
% change 
1988-92" 
+2.3 
+1.2 
+3.5 
+0.1 
+6.5 
n/a 
-1.5 
+2.7 
+2.7 
+6.6 
+ 1.2 
-
Employment 
change 
1988-925 
+ 1 
-17 
-3 
-18 
-13 
n/a 
-18 
-19 
-19 
-5 
-9 
+7 
n/a 
Notes: N = none; S = some; n/a = not available; ++ = strong increase; + = increase; - = decrease. 
* buses; ** cardiac monitors;*** single market (public-sector) induced restructured industries. 
Sources: ' Table 1.1.31 in the unpublished Annex to this report. 
2 Tables 15.5 and 15.6. 
3 Tables 14.1-14.20. 
"Tables 16.1-16.10. and 22.1. 
5 Tables 16.1-16.10. 
(c) no apparent price convergence, largely reflecting the additional costs associated with: 
(i) complying with national technical standards, 
(ii) the use of local production facilities, 
(iii) the general resistance of public bodies in certain Member States to innovative 
technology. For example, in one of the large Member States with in excess often 
purchasing entities in a sector, only one had purchased a high-cost strategic 
product based on a new and proven technology from another large Member State 
at a third of the national price level. 
Despite the lack of price convergence, since 1990 suppliers in high-cost strategic product areas 
have been forced by public purchasers to reduce their prices by 20-40%, reflecting the 
recession and squeeze on public spending. According to interviews with market leaders, the 
public sector has used the procurement legislation to bring down national price levels in 
national markets by threatening traditional suppliers that they would award contracts to new, 
lower priced competitors. In practice, there have been occasional contracts awarded to non-
domestic players, resulting in lower prices but no appreciable change in market shares. 
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1.9.4. Downstream impacts - public-sector cost-benefit analysis 
For strategic products with common technical specifications, the identified price convergence 
between 1987 and 1994, implies the achievement of savings in the less competitive Member 
States. Particularly in the telecommunications area, the in-depth interviews showed that the 
public sector has enjoyed significant technology-related savings, reflecting the liberalization of 
the European telecommunications market. 
Elsewhere in the strategic areas, the absence of price convergence implies that any national 
price savings can only be attributed to the recession. 
The introduction of the public procurement legislation has caused some purchasers to put 
more calls for competition in the OJ, particularly in the area of 'commodity' products. This 
has resulted in 9-13% of all suppliers to the public sector winning at least one new contract, 
which would not have been identified otherwise. Since both demand and supply sides 
confirmed that contracts in these areas are in the main awarded on the basis of price, this 
implies that the public sector has experienced some price savings due to application of the 
legislation. 
This conclusion is consistent with the demand-side survey results where a minority of the 
central and sub-central government claimed some degree of price savings due to opening their 
procurement markets. 
There are two principal sources of price savings in terms of increased direct competition from: 
(a) domestic suppliers, 
(b) other EU suppliers. 
Although there were a number of central and sub-central government bodies reporting price 
savings resulting from the implementation of the public procurement legislation, this was the 
exception rather than the rule. 
In terms of direct competition from other EU suppliers, estimated total intra-EU direct import 
penetration rose from 1.4% in 1987 to 3% in 1994 - an increase of 1.6% - which, due to its 
low weighting in total public-sector purchasing, could not have resulted in significant price 
savings. 
Similarly, there is a consensus of opinion of those surveyed in the demand-side survey that the 
application of the legislation has created additional administration costs. 
As the Utilities Directive has only been in force for most Member States since January 1993 
(for supplies and works) and the Services Directive for the public sector since July 1993 and 
for utilities since July 1994 (in most Member States), it could be argued that, realistically, the 
timescales are too short to expect the legislation to have fully achieved its objectives. Since the 
public-sector Supplies and Works Directives have been in force since January 1989 and July 
1990 respectively in most Member States - a period of some six to seven years - it would be 
reasonable to expect a high degree of compliance with the legislation, a necessary condition 
for achieving the downstream gains. However, a combination of related demand-side (Chapter 
12), supply-side (Chapters 13 and 17-22) and legal factors (Chapters 5-9) have hampered the 
achievement of these gains. 
Summary 39 
Overall, it is important to note that, as a consequence of the implementation of the public 
procurement legislation: 
(a) there have been instances where purchasing entities have achieved considerable savings 
on individual procurements, which, coupled with the continued existence of substantial 
intra-EU price differences, support the hypothesis that there is potential for significant 
public-sector savings; 
(b) when new suppliers responded positively to public-sector opportunities, a high 
proportion were successful, implying that the purchasing entity had benefited from a 
more 'economically advantageous' offer. 
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2. Introduction 
2.1. Background 
The single European market (SEM) was conceived in the first half of the 1980s to combat the 
economic threat to Europe posed by the USA and Japan in high technology and by the newly 
industrializing countries (NICs) in assembly industries. 
The Commission's 1985 White Paper, Completing the internal market, focused the attention 
of Member States on the formal and informal barriers to intra-EU trade, the removal of which 
would create the environment for the development of European industries capable of 
competing in global markets. The 1987 Single European Act established a legislative 
programme of some 300 directives designed to remove these barriers, which were classified 
under three headings: 
(a) physical barriers, associated with frontier inspections; 
(b) technical barriers, causing legal and regulatory obstacles; 
(c) fiscal barriers, epitomized by differences in indirect taxes and excise duties. 
After adjustments, the SEM programme comprised 282 directives designed to create: 
(a) a new Community standards policy, 
(b) a common market for services, 
(c) conditions for industrial co-operation, 
(d) a single public procurement market, 
(e) plant and animal health controls. 
The directives are either horizontal (industry independent) or vertical (industry specific) in 
nature. Examples of horizontal directives include the removal of border controls and the 
harmonization of indirect taxation, and one example of a vertical directive is mutual 
recognition in the pharmaceuticals industry. 
The 1988 Cecchini Report provided the economic justification for completing the internal 
market and highlighted the interdependence of its various 'components'. At a conference on 
public procurement immediately preceding the report's press launch in London in January 
1988, Lord Cockfield, then vice-president of the European Commission responsible for the 
internal market programme, described: 
(a) the aim of the SEM as 'to create the environment in which European business can 
flourish'; 
(b) the opening-up of public procurement as one of the cornerstones of the SEM 
programme, without which the internal market would not be complete. 
The removal of the formal and informal barriers to intra-EU trade is clearly the most important 
factor in creating 'the environment in which business can flourish'. The economic impact will 
be the extent to which the wealth-generating sectors of the economy have taken advantage of 
the 'new business environment'. 
42 Public procurement 
2.2. Public procurement before the single market 
The Cecchini Report described public-sector markets in the EUR-12 as closed and generally 
uncompetitive, with: 
(a) widely different design standards in certain key high technology sectors, such as 
defence, power generation, telecommunications and railways, making intra-EC trade 
costly; 
(b) governments promoting competition between alternative national suppliers, reflected in 
sub-optimal - globally uncompetitive - businesses; 
(c) distorted markets due to government subsidies; 
(d) R&D effort dissipated - where in the USA and Japan there were 3-5 major (global) 
companies in a sector, in Europe there were often 15-20 sub-optimal players; 
(e) little incentive to invest in new technology to confront the competition from non-EC 
firms; 
(f) a lack of product specialization, such that even large EC firms had uneconomically wide 
product ranges and uneconomic production runs. 
Although EC directives on public procurement have been in force since 1971 for works and 
since 1977 for supplies, prior to the SEM legislation, transparency and fairness in terms of 
equal opportunity to submit offers and win contracts were strictly limited, with non-domestic 
suppliers almost completely excluded from national markets. 
In addition to deliberately ignoring the existence of the legislation and favouring national 
suppliers as a matter of official policy, purchasing entities circumvented the rules by a range of 
measures, for example: 
(a) splitting contracts into lots to avoid the publications thresholds, 
(b) specifying national technical standards and proprietary products, which favoured the 
domestic supplier, 
(c) requiring special financial or technical capacities of foreign suppliers, 
(d) allowing inadequate response times for first-time bidders, 
(e) classifying contracts as 'continuations' or 'emergencies' to take advantage of the 
directives' exclusions and, in defence procurement, as 'warlike', regardless of the 
function of the supply. 
2.3. Ex ante hypothesis 
2.3.1. The legislation's aims 
Between 1988 and 1993, a family of directives was adopted by the Council of Ministers 
defining the scope of public procurement and regulating the ways in which public and other 
covered purchasing entities procure works, supplies and services. The aim of the legislation 
was to provide a framework for, and climate of, openness and fairness. The expectation - and 
desire - was that this would lead to: 
(a) increased competition between European companies, 
(b) improved industrial efficiency and competitiveness of European companies in global 
markets, 
(c) reduced public-sector/utilities purchasing costs. 
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2.3.2. Measures of success 
The success of the SEM in public procurement should be measured by the extent to which: 
(a) public entities and utilities are open (transparent) in informing potential suppliers of: 
(i) a commercial opportunity 
(ii) the criteria by which their offers will be judged 
(iii) the results of the competition; 
(b) public entities and utilities are fair in awarding contracts in terms of: 
(i) specifying objective award criteria which do not provide any potential supplier 
with an unfair technical or commercial advantage; 
(ii) assessing tenders objectively in accordance with these criteria; 
(c) supplying industries have adapted to meet the challenge of the new purchasing 
environment in terms of: 
(i) responding to extra-national opportunities 
(ii) restructuring to improve competitiveness and, generally, take advantage of trade 
liberalization afforded by the SEM; 
(d) the public sector and utilities have experienced a reduction in purchasing costs. 
Factors (a) and (b) are concerned with measuring the extent to which the directives and 
national transposing legislation are flawed in: 
(a) requiring entities covered to be open (transparent) and fair in their tendering process; 
(b) providing a climate encouraging compliance by those entities covered. 
Factors (c) and (d) measure the supply and demand-side response to the new purchasing 
environment created and to other drivers of change, including the SEM per se, economic 
performance, privatization, globalization of key industries, mergers and acquisitions, 
information technology, telecommunications, etc. 
2.3.3. Economic impact 
In 1987 it was assumed that liberalization of public procurement in Member States would 
result in: 
(a) increased competition for public contracts with the most competitive suppliers winning, 
(b) a reduction in prices paid by public bodies for works, supplies and services. 
The introduction of new competitive suppliers into previously closed markets was forecast to 
result in: 
(a) a convergence of prices paid by the public sector to those of the most competitive 
suppliers - (short-term) price effect; 
(b) rationalization of production to achieve a better utilization of resources to fund price 
reductions - (medium-term) competition effect; 
(c) reorganization of certain strategic industries along pan-European lines via joint ventures, 
mergers and acquisitions, and alliances to create global players capable of benefiting 
from the SEM and competing with the US and Japanese giants - (long-term) 
restructuring effect. 
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The public sector would benefit from all three effects through being able to procure the 
economically most advantageous works, supplies and services. Within the private sector, there 
would be a redistribution of market shares and a more efficient use of productive resources, 
which, in the short term, would lead to employment reductions among uncompetitive players. 
Overall, the EU would benefit from the creation of strong European companies in strategic 
industries capable of competing with US and Japanese players in world markets. 
2.3.4. Key considerations 
The opening up of EU public procurement markets should be viewed as a necessary but not 
sufficient condition for achieving the SEM's economic aims. In this context, the legislation 
should be seen as a catalyst, designed to create the environment in which the desired change 
could and would occur. 
In assessing the SEM in public procurement, it is important to understand that the legislation 
places no obligation on: 
(a) the entities covered to be efficient purchasers, 
(b) suppliers to respond to business opportunities in other Member States of the European 
Union. 
A lack, or limited achievement, of these two outcomes should not automatically be construed 
as an indicator of failure of the legislation. The legislation could be achieving its aims of 
openness and fairness, but its desired impact on purchasers and suppliers may not have been 
achieved due to: 
(a) the shortness of timescale between the directives coming into force and the timing of the 
mid-term assessment, 
(b) a lack of suppliers' awareness/understanding of the new EU purchasing environment, 
(c) supply-side scepticism of the fairness of the award process in other Member States, 
(d) inadequate supply-side knowledge of demand-side requirements in other Member States, 
(e) limited incentive and skills at the level of purchasing officers to correctly define award 
criteria which will result in the selection of the 'economically most advantageous' 
supplier. 
2.4. Report structure 
This report has been divided into a number of sections which lead the reader sequentially and 
logically through to a final impact assessment section: 
SECTION A- The public procurement market in 1987 (base case) describes the situation 
in 1987 which subsequent legal measures were put in place to overcome, and provides the 
starting points for subsequent comparisons and evaluations; 
SECTION Β - Legal measures review describes the measures put in place at a European 
level to overcome the problems identified in 1987, and assesses the legislation itself, the 
manner in which it has been transposed in Member States, and the way in which measures are 
enforced; 
SECTION C - Public procurement market contours in 1994 provides an overview of the 
market in 1994, and highlights major changes; 
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SECTION D - Market perceptions provides an insight into the experiences and views of 
both purchasers (the demand side) and suppliers (the supply side) of the impact of the public 
procurement legislation; 
SECTION E - Economic analysis outlines trends in a number of key indicators in relation to 
'procurement-sensitive' supply sectors; 
SECTION F - Case studies examines in detail six sectors which were identified as being 
most likely to have been impacted by the creation of a single market in public procurement; 
SECTION G - Impact assessment which draws together the findings and results of all 
previous sections to arrive at an assessment of the extent to which the ex ante hypotheses in 
relation to the legislation have been realized in relation to both purchasers (the demand side) 
and their key supplying sectors (the supply side), and the reasons for this. 
Each chapter, with the exception of those dealing with legal issues, contains an overview 
which describes: 
(a) the ex ante hypothesis for the particular issues being considered - what might have been 
expected to happen if the measures put in place are working; 
(b) coverage - the nature and scope of the specific issues addressed; 
(c) data - a description of sources of information and methodologies used, together with any 
constraints, and the ways in which they have been addressed; 
(d) key findings. 
Given the complex nature of the subject of public procurement, and the different inputs into 
the assessment of its impact (described above), no single output can be treated in isolation. 
While each chapter's key findings are valid in their own right, it is only their interaction and 
relationships which, combined, present the complete picture. Although there are references 
within chapters to other study chapters, it should be noted that, in general, there is 
intentionally no interpretation of key findings within chapters. This is carried out in Section G. 
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3. Study approach 
3.1. Key principles 
The study's overall approach was driven by the limited availability of reliable and complete 
statistical data on the public procurement market. 
As a result, considerable importance was placed on two pieces of primary research: 
(a) a survey of suppliers to the public sector/utilities, which was structured to allow 
inferences to be made about the total supply-side population; 
(b) a survey of a cross-section of purchasers subject to the directives. 
Since the study considered the public procurement market from all key perspectives using a 
wide range of sources (in addition to the primary research), it has been possible to take into 
account the results of a number of qualitative, quantitative and quali-quantitative analyses to 
arrive at an assessment of the impact of the legislation which is: 
(a) consistent, 
(b) plausible, 
(c) coherent. 
In some areas it has not been feasible to arrive at a definitive quantitative assessment due to a 
lack of suitable data (at a sufficient level of detail), or the existence of contradictory 
information/analyses. In such instances, arguments and hypotheses have been developed by 
working from first principles to arrive at a reasoned (quali-quantitative) conclusion. 
The study also focused on procurement-sensitive products and sectors on the basis that, if 
change had occurred, it would have been in these areas. 
Given the issue of data quality, each chapter contains a brief section which describes: 
(a) sources of information, 
(b) any particular characteristics of the data which should be noted, 
(c) any specific methodologies used to arrive at conclusions - where particularly technical 
approaches have been adopted. 
A final, and key, consideration has been the fact that no individual analysis holds the answer 
to whether the public procurement legislation has achieved its aims. It is only the combination 
of the results of all individual analyses (which themselves reflect a range of information 
sources) that can provide this overall assessment. Consequently - as emphasized in Section 
2.4 - each section or chapter generally analyses a key issue(s) in isolation of other chapters 
and analyses, with Chapter 23 drawing them together. 
3.2. Approach overview 
Although, as described in Section 3.1, each chapter describes its sources, Table 3.1 gives an 
overview of the range of information sources used in relation to individual measures/outputs. 
As will be seen, in some instances, outputs from one analysis form an input into others. 
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Table 3.1. Study outputs and sources overview 
Measure/output 
Section A - Public procurement in 
1987 
Section Β - Legal measures review 
Section C - Public procurement 
market contours in 1994 
Section D - Market perceptions 
Section E - Economic analysis 
Section F - Case studies 
Section G - Impact assessment 
Primary sources/inputs 
The cost of non-Europe in public sector procurement (European Commission. 
1988) and other European Commission studies 
National accounts 
Member State and European public procurement law experts 
European Commission - DG XV/B 
National accounts 
Demand-side survey results (for utilities) 
Member State statistical returns 
EAP database 
European Commission public procurement studies 
Tenders Electronic Daily (TED) database 
Member State officials responsible for public procurement 
Office for Official Publications of the EC 
Survey of 1,608 EUR-15 suppliers to the public sector/utilities 
Survey of 698 EUR-15 central and sub-central government bodies and utilities 
Comext, Eurostat trade statistics 
DEBA, Eurostat production and employment statistics 
Enterprises in Europe, Eurostat 
Supply-side survey 
Eurostat price survey indices 
European Commission procurement and single market studies 
EuroStrategy Consultants price survey 
Industry interviews 
Comext, Eurostat trade statistics 
DEBA, Eurostat production and employment statistics 
Industry publications 
Company accounts 
Eurostat 
Sections A-F 
Section A: The public procurement market in 1987 49 
SECTION A 
The public procurement market in 1987 
This section describes the situation in 1987, which subsequent legal measures were put in 
place to overcome, and provides the starting point for subsequent comparisons and 
evaluations. 
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4. Public procurement in 1987 
4.1. Overview 
4.1.1. Coverage 
This chapter describes the European procurement markets in 1987 in terms of: 
(a) demand-side structure and characteristics; 
(b) public procurement procedures and practices; 
(c) supply-side structure and characteristics, with particular reference to: 
(i) supplier perceptions (of public-sector purchasers), 
(ii) cross-border trade, 
(iii) price differences. 
4.1.2. Data 
The prime data source for the description of the public procurement markets in 1987 was the 
Cecchini study on the cost of non-Europe in public-sector procurement (European 
Commission, 1988). Market-size statistics from the Cecchini study were supplemented by data 
from the Commission's 1992 study on the implications of opening up public procurement in 
the excluded sectors in Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain. 
To allow this description of the European public procurement market in 1987 to serve as a 
benchmark against which to measure change, it is necessary to define public procurement in a 
consistent fashion over time, in terms of entities and purchases covered. To this end, the 
Cecchini study estimates of the size and structure of the public-sector market in 1987 have 
been adjusted to reflect purchasing entities and products covered by today's consolidated 
directives: 
(a) Public Supplies (93/36/EEC), 
(b) Public Works (93/37/EEC), 
(c) Public Services (92/50/EEC), 
(d) Utilities (93/38/EEC). 
Public entities and 'products' covered in the Cecchini study which are not covered by today's 
directives are: 
(a) nationally-owned civil airlines and their purchases; 
(b) fuel used for power generation (coal, gas, nuclear material); 
(c) 'warlike' materials (nuclear missiles, ships, aircraft, tanks, guns, ammunition, etc.). 
The market size statistics in the Cecchini report have been adjusted to reflect the differences in 
coverage. 
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4.2. The European public procurement market in 1987 
4.2.1. Coverage 
This section describes the size and structure of the public procurement market in the 15 
countries now members of the European Union in 1987 in terms of: 
(a) macro-economic importance, 
(b) main purchasing entities, 
(c) purchases by type of contract, 
(d) purchases by supplying sector, 
(e) number of contracts published in the OJ. 
4.2.2. Macro-economic importance 
In 1987 public spending represented between 40% and 60% of Member States' gross domestic 
product (GDP) - some ECU 4,100 billion - covering everything from salaries and social 
welfare to purchases of works, supplies and services. The macro-economic importance of 
public purchasing in individual Member States is shown in Table 4.1. 
In 1987, public spending represented a relatively high share of GDP in: 
(a) Sweden (59.6%), 
(b) the Netherlands (59.5%), 
(c) Belgium (59.1%), 
(d) Denmark (55.7%). 
In the larger Member States, the public sector accounted for a smaller percentage of GDP, 
varying from 41% in Spain and the UK, to 47% in Germany, and 51% in France and Italy. 
After adjusting for the coverage of the directives, the EUR-15 public procurement market in 
1987 represented a very significant proportion of EUR-15's GDP, an estimated 12% (ECU 
476 billion). However, national shares varied significantly between Member States, from 9.9% 
in Germany to 16.5% in the UK. 
In 1987, of all 15 countries, the UK had the largest public procurement market, amounting to 
almost ECU 99 billion, followed by Germany (ECU 95 billion) and France (ECU 88 billion). 
Combined, the four largest Member States accounted for almost 75% of the total market. 
4.2.3. Nature of contracts 
For all 15 Member States, it is estimated that supplies contracts accounted for nearly 40% 
(ECU 180 billion) of total spending on works, supplies and services in 1987. Works accounted 
for approximately a third of total spending (ECU 160 billion) and service contracts for 28% 
(ECU 135 billion). 
This breakdown by type of contract also indicates what the coverage of today's directives 
would have been in 1987. 
Public procurement in 1987 
Table 4.1. 
Belgium 
Denmark 
France 
W. Germany 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
Spain 
UK 
EUR-12 
Austria 
Finland 
Sweden 
EUR-15 
Macro-
GDP1 
121.1 
88.8 
770.2 
960.8 
40.1 
26.2 
658.2 
5.3 
188.7 
31.8 
254.2 
599.3 
3744.7 
101.8 
77.3 
139.4 
4063.2 
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-economic importance of public purchasing in 1987 (ECU billion) 
Total government 
expenditure2 
71.5 
49.5 
398.2 
450.4 
19.1 
13.4 
330.6 
2.9 
112.2 
13.7 
103.7 
244.5 
1809.8 
53.6 
35.4 
83.1 
1981.9 
Total public 
procurement5 
15.4 
10.3 
88.3 
94.8 
6.3 
3.0 
68.4 
0.6 
21.9 
4.6 
26.4 
98.9 
438.9 
11.9 
9.0 
16.3 
476.1 
Government 
expenditure/GDP 
(%) 
59.1 
55.7 
51.7 
46.9 
47.7 
51.3 
50.2 
54.1 
59.5 
43.1 
40.8 
40.8 
48.3 
52.7 
45.8 
59.6 
48.8 
Public 
procurement/GDP 
(%) 
12.7 
11.6 
11.5 
9.9 
15.7 
11.5 
10.4 
11.3 
11.6 
14.5 
10.4 
16.5 
11.7 
11.7 
11.6 
11.7 
11.7 
Sources: Eurostat. 
" General government receipts, expenditure and gross debt, European Commission, DG II, 1995. 
3 B, D, F, I and UK: The cost of non-Europe in public sector procurement, European Commission, 1988. 
E, GR, P: Opening up public procurement in the excluded sectors, European Commission, 1992. 
Other countries: EuroStrategy Consultants estimates. 
4.2.4. Purchasing entities 
Overview 
The structure of the public sector and organization of public purchasing vary significantly 
between the Member States. In general, some of the key characteristics influencing structure 
and organization include: 
(a) degree of decentralization, the number of individual purchasing entities and the size of 
contracts; 
(b) allocation of responsibilities for purchasing between central and local authorities, in 
particular for roads, public works, health and public order; 
(c) the size, number and constitution of utilities, combined with the degree of government 
control over management and purchasing activities; 
(d) the nature and extent of legal restrictions and central control over public-sector 
purchasing procedures and policy. 
The breakdown of the public procurement markets between central government, other 
government and utilities for the largest Member States reflects these differences in structure. 
In Italy, for example, most public purchasing in 1987 was carried out at regional and local 
government levels, whereas in the UK the larger part of the procurement market was 
accounted for by central government. 
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Table 4.2. Public procurement by nature of contract in 1987 (ECU billion) 
UK 
W. Germany 
France 
Italy 
Spain 
Netherlands 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Greece 
Portugal 
Ireland 
Luxembourg 
EUR-12 
Sweden 
Austria 
Finland 
EUR-15 
Percentage of total 
Works 
25.9 
28.8 
33.3 
29.4 
8.9 
7.3 
6.4 
3.4 
2.1 
1.5 
1.0 
0.2 
148.3 
5.5 
4.0 
3.0 
160.8 
33.8% 
Supplies 
44.4 
37.7 
28.2 
20.5 
10.1 
8.3 
8.1 
3.9 
2.4 
1.7 
1.2 
0.2 
166.8 
6.2 
4.5 
3.4 
180.9 
38.0% 
Services 
28.7 
28.3 
26.8 
18.5 
7.5 
6.2 
0.9 
2.9 
1.8 
1.3 
0.9 
0.2 
123.9 
4.6 
3.4 
2.6 
134.5 
28.2% 
Total 
98.9 
94.8 
88.3 
68.4 
26.4 
21.9 
15.4 
10.3 
6.3 
4.6 
3.0 
0.6 
439.0 
16.3 
11.9 
9.0 
476.2 
100% 
Sources: B, D, F, I and UK: The cost of non-Europe in public sector procurement, European Commission, 1988. 
E, GR, P: Opening up public procurement in the excluded sectors, European Commission, 1992. 
Other countries: EuroStrategy Consultants estimates. 
Table 4.3. Estimated share of public purchasing by entity type in the four largest 
Member States in 1987 
France 
W. Germany 
Italy 
UK 
Weighted average 
Central government 
(%) 
30.7 
35.6 
22.4 
39.7 
33.2 
Other government 
(%) 
36.7 
34.8 
50.9 
23.3 
34.7 
Utilities 
(%) 
32.6 
29.6 
26.8 
37.0 
32.1 
Total 
(%) 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
Sources: The cost of non-Europe in public sector procurement, European Commission, 1988. 
EuroStrategy Consultants estimates. 
Individual Member States 
France, with around 50,000 purchasing entities, had decentralized local government and 
dispersed central government purchasing, but strong central policy-making and monitoring of 
public purchasing. Additionally, local authorities were increasingly forming purchasing 
consortia to pool resources and achieve economies of scale. There was also strong central 
purchasing in the key sectors of power, gas, coal, railways, airlines, telecommunications, and 
defence, with some 58% of government contract purchasing carried out by the Defence and 
public telephone operator agencies. 
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In 1987 Germany had one of the most decentralized public-sector structures in Europe, with 
around 20,000 purchasing entities. Central purchasing only applied to railways, 
telecommunications and defence. Many municipal and infrastructural activities were in the 
hands of local companies, usually with public ownership. Purchasing in the utilities sectors, 
mainly infrastructural activities, was very dispersed. In terms of procurement value, however, 
over 50% of total German procurement was accounted for by the Ministries of Defence, 
Transport and the Interior, the railways, post and telecommunications, and three large Länder. 
Italy had a complex public-sector structure in 1987 with around 20,000 entities. Although as 
decentralized as Germany, it did have centralized power generation. Public ownership was 
widespread, also covering commercial activities, with expenditure spread across a number of 
agencies. 
The UK had a more centralized structure, with around 700 entities. It had fewer and larger 
local government authorities, some of which had started grouping into purchasing consortia. 
Five powerful central purchasing entities (including Defence and the former Department of 
Health and Social Security) accounted for over 50% of total procurement in 1987. Electricity 
and water were distributed by large regional bodies under commercial regimes; rail, power 
generation, gas and telecommunications were nationally organized. 
In common with Italy, Spain had a complex public-sector structure covering an estimated 
15,000 purchasing entities, with the majority of purchasing carried out at central and regional 
government levels. The utilities were predominantly in public ownership, with purchasing 
dispersed among a number of smaller regional and local agencies, particularly in the water, 
energy and transport sectors. 
Belgium had moderately decentralized local government spending, including health, local 
roads and utilities. The main national services, however, were under direct Ministry control, 
including railways, telecommunications and several other public bodies. In general, the 
Belgian public sector covered around 1,000 purchasing entities, with total expenditure spread 
widely among them. 
Of the other Member States, many of the smaller, northern European countries, like Denmark, 
the Netherlands, Sweden and Finland, had a public-sector structure which was broadly similar 
to that in Belgium. 
The other two southern European Member States, Greece and Portugal, had a small number of 
public enterprises which controlled purchasing in the utility sectors, with the exception of 
water, which was controlled by local authorities. Both Greece and Portugal had also 
centralized government purchasing. 
4.2.5. Supplying sectors 
At a NACE 1 level, building and construction was the largest supplying sector, representing 
nearly 34% of all public purchases (ECU 160 billion). Combined with services and equipment 
goods these three sectors accounted for an estimated 65% of total procurement in 1987. Table 
4.4 shows estimates of market size by principal supplying sector. 
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Table 4.4. 
Country 
UK 
W. Germany 
France 
Italy 
Spain 
Netherlands 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Greece 
Portugal 
Ireland 
Luxembourg 
EUR-12 
Sweden 
Austria 
Finland 
EUR-15 
% of total 
Public procurement market size by supplying sector 
Building/ 
construe. 
25.9 
28.8 
33.3 
29.5 
8.9 
7.3 
6.4 
3.4 
2.1 
1.5 
1.0 
0.2 
148.3 
5.5 
4.0 
3.0 
160.8 
33.8% 
Services 
21.3 
22.6 
18.5 
14.2 
5.6 
4.7 
0.8 
2.2 
1.3 
1.0 
0.6 
0.1 
92.9 
3.0 
2.2 
1.6 
100.8 
21.2% 
Equip, 
goods 
20.9 
16.1 
14.7 
9.0 
4.8 
4.0 
5.1 
1.9 
1.1 
0.8 
0.6 
0.1 
79.1 
3.5 
2.5 
1.9 
85.8 
18.0% 
Consumer 
goods 
11.4 
8.5 
6.8 
4.9 
2.4 
2.0 
1.6 
0.9 
0.6 
0.4 
0.3 
0.1 
39.9 
0.8 
0.6 
0.5 
43.4 
9.1% 
Transport/ 
coram. 
7.4 
5.7 
8.3 
4.3 
1.9 
1.6 
0.1 
0.7 
0.4 
0.3 
0.2 
0.0 
30.9 
1.5 
1.1 
0.8 
33.7 
7.1% 
Energy/ 
water 
5.6 
4.7 
4.8 
3.1 
1.4 
1.1 
0.6 
0.5 
0.3 
0.2 
0.2 
0.0 
22.5 
1.2 
0.9 
0.6 
24.5 
5.1% 
Interm. 
goods 
6.2 
7.3 
1.4 
2.7 
1.3 
1.1 
0.8 
0.5 
0.3 
0.2 
0.1 
0.0 
21.9 
0.8 
0.6 
0.4 
23.8 
5.0% 
3ublic procurement 
in 1987 (ECU billion) 
Agr./Fish 
Forestry 
0.4 
1.1 
0.5 
0.7 
0.2 
0.1 
0.1 
0.1 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
3.2 
0.1 
0.1 
0.1 
3.4 
0.7% 
Sources: B, D, F, I and UK: The cost of non-Europe in public sector procurement, European Commission 
E, GR, P: Opening up public procurement in the excluded sectors, European Commission, 1992 
Other countries: EuroStrategy Consultants estimates. 
Total 
98.9 
94.8 
88.3 
68.5 
26.4 
21.9 
15.4 
10.3 
6.3 
4.6 
3.0 
0.6 
439.1 
16.3 
11.9 
9.0 
476.2 
100% 
%of 
total 
20.8 
19.9 
18.5 
14.4 
5.5 
4.6 
3.2 
2.1 
1.3 
1.0 
0.6 
0.1 
92.2 
3.4 
2.5 
0.9 
100 
, 1988. 
The principal supplying sectors to central and local government, nationalized industries and 
other state-owned or controlled bodies are broken down as follows. 
(a) Building and construction covers the provision of new, and maintenance of existing, 
infrastructure (roads, ports, airports, railways, bridges, tunnels, sewers, etc.), offices, 
factories, warehouses, sports centres, and so on, the bulk of which is purchased by 
central and local government. 
(b) Services covers the purchase of advertising, public relations management and other 
consulting, legal and auditing services, software development, travel, cleaning and 
catering. Ministries and state-owned industry are the main purchasers of all services, 
except cleaning and catering services, whose customers are principally local, health and 
educational authorities. 
(c) Equipment goods covers the purchase of power generating and distribution equipment, 
central heating systems, mining machinery, railway rolling stock, computers, furniture, 
motor vehicles, and so on. In addition to the specialized purchases of the nationalized 
industries, all public bodies tend to buy most forms of capital equipment. 
(d) Consumer goods covers the purchase of radios, televisions, videos, food, beverages 
(including alcohol), sports equipment, newspapers, and so on. Consumer electronics are 
principally purchased by schools and hospitals, sports equipment by schools, and other 
products by most public bodies. 
(e) Transport and communications covers the purchase of transport and communications 
services, including air and rail fares, contract car hire, telephone, telex, fax and post. All 
public bodies are major customers of this supply sector. 
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(f) Energy and water covers the purchase of coal, gas and petroleum products (with the 
exception of fuels used for power generation), as well as electricity and water. 
(g) Intermediate goods covers the purchase of 'products' which form part of an end 
product, for example, crude oil, mechanical or electrical components (nuts and bolts, 
circuit boards, silicon chips, etc.). 
(h) Agriculture, fisheries and forestry covers the purchase of crops, livestock, fish and 
forestry products by the public sector. The principal customers are Ministries of 
Agriculture and Fisheries. 
4.2.6. Number of contracts published in the Official Journal 
A key measure of openness is the number of contracts published in the OJ in relation to the 
total number of contracts covered by the directives. 
No statistics exist on the total number of contracts covered by the directives in 1987. It is 
generally accepted, however, that the number of notices published represented only a small 
proportion of contracts covered. 
Table 4.5. Number of tender notices published in the Official Journal of the European 
Communities (1987) 
Belgium 
Denmark 
France 
W. Germany 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
Spain 
UK 
EUR-12 
Works 
168 
38 
1,547 
820 
131 
23 
1,517 
16 
193 
89 
666 
1,469 
6,677 
Supplies 
147 
89 
1,148 
581 
33 
30 
1,010 
6 
55 
28 
548 
932 
4,607 
Total 
315 
127 
2,695 
1,401 
164 
53 
2,527 
22 
248 
117 
1,214 
2,401 
11,284 
Source: TED database. 
4.3. Public procurement procedures and practices in 1987 
4.3.1. Background 
Since the inception of the European Economic Community in 1957, trade between Member 
States has risen considerably, despite numerous physical, technical and fiscal barriers. For 
each of the four major economies - Germany, France, Italy and the UK - which accounted 
together for about 75% of Community's GDP, the other 'eleven' represent their most 
important export market. 
In contrast, the Cecchini report found that public entities in all Member States exhibited a 
clear national preference. Works, supplies and services were purchased almost exclusively 
from national suppliers which, wherever possible, provided a national 'product'. This was 
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despite the Commission's attempts in the 1970s to introduce competition in the Community's 
public procurement markets through: 
(a) Directive 71/305/EEC, which had been in force since 1971, covering works contracts, 
and was amended by Directive 78/669/EEC in 1978; 
(b) Directive 77/62/EEC, which had been in force since 1977, covering supplies contracts, 
and was amended by Directive 80/767/EEC in 1980 to bring it into line with the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).10 
Both directives were intended to force Member States to open up their procurement to foreign 
competition by: 
(a) requiring a summary invitation to tender (in a model format) to be published in the 
Official Journal of the European Communities (OJ) with set time limits for tendering; 
(b) prohibiting technical specifications which named proprietary goods or purchases, or 
restricted bids to certain suppliers; 
(c) establishing 'open' tendering (whereby any supplier may submit a bid) or 'restricted' 
tendering (whereby there is a pre-qualification stage for which any supplier may submit 
a pre-qualification document) as procedures to limit use of single sourcing and 
negotiated procedures, which were considered to be anti-competitive. 
4.3.2. Procurement practices in 1987 
Despite the existence of these directives, public procurement markets in 1987 were relatively 
closed. Public bodies perceived their resources to be too limited to permit active sourcing and 
evaluation of international bids for all contracts. As a consequence, they circumvented the 
rules laid down in the directives by, for example: 
(a) splitting contract into lots below the value threshold required for publishing calls for 
tender in the OJ; 
(b) detailing technical specifications - sometimes including proprietary products - which 
favoured particular (national) suppliers; 
(c) specifying inadequate response times for first-time bidders; 
(d) requiring special technical or financial capacities of foreign bidders; 
(e) classifying contracts as 'continuations' or 'emergencies' to take advantage of the 
directives' exclusions, and, in defence purchasing, as 'warlike', regardless of the 
function of the products. 
In addition, national suppliers were favoured - often as a matter of official policy - by public 
bodies in the former excluded sectors: 
(a) energy, 
(b) transport, 
(c) telecommunications, 
(d) drinking water supply. 
10 Seenöte 8, p. 16. 
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As shown in Section 4.2, these utilities accounted for a large share of public purchasing in 
1987, ranging from 25-35% of total procurement, but were still excluded from the directives' 
coverage. 
Finally, the limited impact of the procurement legislation and, as a consequence, a closed and 
non-transparent European procurement market, was also a result of: 
(a) Member State politicians having no clear understanding of the issues at stake, in terms 
of: 
(i) the cost to the Exchequer of pursuing nationalistic purchasing policies, 
(ii) the negative impact on global competitiveness of European industries, particularly 
in high technology sectors; 
(b) different and complex national procurement procedures complicating the transposition 
of the directives into national law; 
(c) the absence of legal means of enforcing the provisions of the directives; 
(d) the drive for increased efficiency - and cost savings - within the public sector not yet 
having got under way. 
4.3.3. Reasons for nationalistic purchasing 
In general, the nationalistic purchasing practices pursued by the public sector in 1987 were 
often a result of, either: 
(a) perceived administrative and practical pressures, or 
(b) political considerations. 
Administrative and practical considerations, such as lack of resources to consider a large 
number of bids or unfamiliarity with foreign specifications, were common reasons for public 
purchasers, particularly in local government, to buy locally. As a result, local (domestic) 
suppliers were considered to provide: 
(a) greater value for money, reflecting lower transportation and marketing costs; 
(b) better after-sales service due to their proximity; 
(c) faster delivery times, leading to lower stocks and inventory costs; 
(d) products more suited to local tastes, environment, techniques and methods; 
(e) more flexible quality assurance, particularly where this involved inspection of suppliers' 
premises; 
(f) local distribution facilities enabling efficient delivery to end users, such as schools and 
hospitals; 
(g) products and services without the added complications of customs procedures and 
language difficulties; 
(h) a more responsive and interested service. 
In addition to these administrative and practical considerations, public purchasing was also 
used by EU Member States at a national level as a policy instrument to support national firms 
or industries, either: 
(a) for strategic reasons, in terms of security or maintaining leading edge technologies and 
skills bases; 
(b) to support employment in declining industries, like railway rolling stock and defence; 
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(c) to compensate local communities near environmentally damaging public industries such 
as mining and nuclear power generation; 
(d) to support (emerging) high-technology industries, including telecommunications, 
electronics and biotechnology. 
4.4. Supply-side structure and characteristics 
4.4.1. Coverage 
This section describes the impact of nationalistic purchasing practices in 1987 in terms of: 
(a) supply-side structure characteristics, 
(b) supply-side perceptions of non-domestic procurement markets, 
(c) participation of small and medium-sized enterprises in public procurement markets, 
(d) levels of cross-border trade in the public sector, 
(e) differences in price levels for common public-sector purchases. 
4.4.2. Supply-side characteristics 
One of the main consequences of closed and protective public purchasing was that in certain 
key, high-technology supplying sectors - notably capital equipment for defence, power 
generation, telecommunications and railways - public-sector markets were the 'province' of 
several major national players in the Member States studied, which: 
(a) were heavily reliant on the national public sector, 
(b) competed outside Europe principally only in developing countries, 
(c) were on average considerably smaller than their Japanese and US competitors. 
In addition, the key supplying industries to the public sector in 1987 were characterized by: 
(a) widely differing national design standards, for example, in railways and power 
generation, which also created a barrier to the trade in the goods and services supplied to 
the public sector, with widespread repercussions on transport and communications and, 
hence, the efficiency of European industry; 
(b) firms with short-sighted marketing and production strategies. In key sectors such as 
office machinery, telecommunications and motor vehicles, US and Japanese firms, as 
well as other non-EU firms, were making increasing inroads into the EU market by 
adopting European marketing strategies, while EU firms sheltered behind their national 
public-sector customers and looked outward only towards Third World markets; 
(c) the absence of incentives to invest in new technology to confront the competition from 
non-EU firms; 
(d) distorted national markets as a result of government subsidies, R&D support and 
artificially high prices; 
(e) duplicated, dispersed and sub-optimal R&D efforts; 
(f) governments attempting to enforce competition between alternative national suppliers 
which directly led to sub-optimal plant sizes, and to support for inefficient firms which 
would otherwise have had to improve performance or go out of business; 
(g) a lack of product specialization, resulting in uneconomically wide product ranges and 
short production runs, even within large EU firms. 
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4.4.3. Supply-side perceptions 
In addition to this degree of sub-optimization, Europe's supplying industries to the public 
sector showed a general lack of interest in non-domestic public procurement markets, due to: 
(a) currency risks and administrative burdens; 
(b) limitations imposed by marketing agreements or exclusive dealerships eliminating any 
possibilities of tendering abroad; 
(c) a hesitancy to enter into competitive bidding, also as a result of a regular flow of 
domestic contracts; 
(d) an unwillingness to break up 'cosy' cartels, whereby prices and margins were controlled 
by a few large suppliers; 
(e) calls for tender not being perceived as serious, but merely as complying with the 
legislation; 
(f) a general lack of information on opportunities abroad, particularly in the case of SMEs. 
4.4.4. SME participation 
The dominance of several large national players in certain segments of the public procurement 
market had a direct impact on the participation of SMEs. 
In terms of size of suppliers, large (national) companies accounted for an estimated 70% of all 
public procurement in the EU in 1987. European SMEs, which accounted for over 65% of 
total European turnover, supplied only 30% of public purchases, representing some ECU 165 
billion. Public procurement markets represented only 1.6% of European SMEs' turnover, 
compared with 7.3% for large European companies. 
In contrast, SMEs accounted for a far larger share (40%) of the public procurement markets in 
the USA and Japan. 
Table 4.6. European market breakdown by enterprise type (1990) 
Total EU turnover (%) 
Total EU public purchasing (%) 
Importance of public purchasing as a percentage of 
company's turnover 
Large enterprises 
(>500 employees) 
35 
70 
7.3 
SMEs 
(<500 employees) 
65 
30 
1.6 
Source: SMEs' participation in public procurement, European Commission, 1990. 
4.4.5. Cross-border trade 
As a consequence of nationalistic purchasing practices, in 1987 the level of direct and indirect 
import penetration in the public sector compared to that in the economy as a whole was 
minimal. 
In Belgium, public-sector import penetration in 1987 was estimated at half the national level, 
in Italy at 5% of the national level and in the UK at 20% of the national level. 
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In France and Germany, public-sector import penetration was slightly higher due to a bilateral 
trade agreement in defence products, and estimated at 80% and 52% of their national levels 
respectively. Excluding the defence trade, public-sector import penetration was similar to that 
of the UK. 
Table 4.7. Direct and indirect public-sector import penetration (% of purchases by 
value in ECU, 1987) 
Direct EU 
Direct non-EU 
Indirect 
Total public-sector import penetration3 
National import penetration 
Belgium' 
0.6 
2.0 
10.0 
13 
43 
France2 
0.6 
0.5 
4.3 
6 
20 
Germany2 
1.0 
0.8 
2.0 
5 
22 
Italy' 
0.3 
-
0.7 
1 
19 
UK' 
0.2 
0.2 
4.0 
4 
22 
EUR-15 
0.6 
0.7 
4.8 
6 
1 Adjusted for different coverage under the current directives. 
2 Adjusted for French-German trade agreement on defence materials and different coverage under the current 
directives. 
3 Total public-sector import penetration covers direct imports (from foreign suppliers) and indirect imports 
of goods manufactured abroad but sold via a domestic sales office/agent. 
Source: The cost of non-Europe in public sector procurement, European Commission, 1988, Tables 1.6.2.9 and II, p. 175. 
Public-sector imports from third countries accounted for a relatively large share of public-
sector import penetration in 1987, suggesting that foreign suppliers were considered only in 
cases where no domestic alternatives were available. This was mainly in the areas of office 
machinery, telecommunications equipment and nuclear technology, where European industries 
were lagging behind their American and Japanese counterparts. 
4.4.6. Price differences 
In 1987, partly as a consequence of nationalistic procurement practices, large price differences 
between and within Member States for public-sector procurements were common with: 
(a) prices for strategic public-sector purchases between Member States showing differences 
of over 200%; 
(b) price differences within Member States, particularly for local authority procurement of 
as much as 100% or more. 
Table 4.8 shows the most significant differences in price levels between Member States for 
common public-sector purchases. 
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Table 4.8. Price indices in 
Fixed armchair 
Filing cabinet 
Shelf,? 
School desk 
Onice desk 
Typewriter 
Power cable 
Transformer 
Telephone handset 
Cardiac monitor 
X-ray machine 
Average of car 
Vanb6 
Vanb7 
Busd8 
Busdl4 
Goods wagon 
Uniform 
Copier paper 
Belgium 
118 
126 
227 
201 
197 
101 
150 
100 
207 
108 
133 
100 
100 
100 
n/a 
100 
121 
215 
115 
1987 (100 = lowest price) 
France 
133 
154 
165 
187 
211 
117 
105 
117 
300 
114 
155 
109 
102 
134 
113 
151 
100 
131 
142 
Germany 
162 
132 
163 
283 
256 
100 
101 
117 
355 
119 
153 
103 
119 
111 
101 
110 
136 
83 
153 
Italy 
100 
183 
110 
126 
100 
146 
105 
102 
183 
118 
217 
116 
122 
122 
129 
n/a 
112 
154 
100 
UK 
141 
100 
100 
100 
174 
144 
100 
154 
100 
100 
100 
119 
122 
122 
100 
133 
117 
100 
118 
Source: The cost of non-Europe in public sector procurement, European Commission, 1988, Tables II.3.1 and II.3.2. 
4.4.7. Case-study sectors in 1987 
Table 4.9 provides a brief outline of the situation in 1987 for each of the selected case study 
sectors and the potential impact of the procurement liberalization. 
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Table 4.9. Case-study sectors in 1987 
Description 
Electrical engineering 
- power generation 
Telecommunications 
Railway rolling stock 
Uniforms 
Sector characteristics in 1987 
Public sector is the key purchaser 
Historically nationalistic purchasing due to 
heritage of equipment and standards 
Domestic market demand fluctuates. Significant 
dependence on exports to developing countries 
Many European producers linked to boiler 
manufacturers, which are in turn linked to large 
electrical engineering groups 
Threats from Japanese (and potentially South 
East Asian) producers 
Public sector - national PTTs - is sole purchaser. 
Sector is seen as strategic industry, with public-
sector purchasing crucial to development 
Foreign companies have entered EU markets, but 
indigenous manufacturers are dominant 
Procurement policies are a barrier 
Technology is critical (digital switches), with 
non-EU companies (AT&T, Northern Telecom) 
as acknowledged market leaders 
Public sector is the dominant (sole) purchaser -
sector highlighted as area in which nationalistic 
purchasing is most applicable 
Sector operating sub-optimally/below capacity 
(50%), with significant scope for economies of 
scale 
Product development and technical innovation 
crucial 
Member States locked into a heritage of 
standards, operating systems and engineering 
traditions 
EC manufacturers do not compete in one 
another's markets 
The public sector is an insignificant purchaser of 
clothing, with the exception of uniforms 
(military, emergency services, etc.) 
Potential impact of procurement 
liberalization 
Possible economies of scale in production 
Perception that opening up of procurement 
would make little difference since national 
preference is strong, and other EU 
purchasers are seen to prefer US to other 
EU suppliers 
Standards are a major problem, although 
less so for non-EU suppliers used to 
working with foreign standards 
Transnational mergers and rationalization 
expected, although only as an indirect 
impact of the single market 
Possible economies of scale in production 
and R&D 
Restructuring of EU supplier base expected 
(and already begun in some Member 
States) 
Increase in import penetration expected 
Railways expected to become more open in 
procurement, but market opening expected 
to result largely from technological 
developments 
No short-term change in intra-EC trade 
expected, but there could be increased 
imports of diesel (not electric) locomotives 
from the US, Japan and South Korea 
Collaboration and mergers likely, with 
rationalization of product lines 
Increased trade expected, with number of 
manufacturers reducing by about one third 
Although a highly priced competitive 
sector, significant price disparities exist, 
with minimal cross-border trade 
There is no restriction on scale of 
production, with SMEs (<500 employees) 
active and important 
(Continued) 
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Description 
Building/construction 
Engineering 
consultancy 
Sector characteristics in 1987 
Public sector is a major purchaser, with 
construction accounting for some 30% of total 
procurement 
Potential for increased trade is generally limited 
by distance. Trade is further restricted by on-site 
nature of most work, limited mobility of labour 
and the cost of transporting building materials 
The public sector is a major purchaser of 
services, but general trade in services is weak 
(low tradability) since close supplier/customer 
proximity is crucial, especially in utilities 
(power, water), although this does not prevent 
foreign ownership 
For most business services, language and 
knowledge of local laws, customs and 
circumstances is main barrier to trade, but not 
linked to procurement. Business is generally 
through local representative offices 
Potential impact of procurement 
liberalization 
Given these limitations, opportunities are 
seen: 
• in border areas 
in specialist areas (e.g. tunnelling) 
where there are local areas of high 
construction activity and low 
construction activity, leading to 
differential profit margins, so that firms 
with low orders have an incentive to 
bid in the high demand areas 
Subject to sectoral characteristics, most 
impact is considered to fall within high 
value added sub-sectors 
Engineering consultancy closely linked to 
construction. Also a sector which has a 
tradition of 'exporting' to Third World, 
developing countries 
Source: The cost of non-Europe in public procurement, Part II: Case Studies, European Commission, 1988. 

Section B: Legal measure review 67 
SECTION Β 
Legal measure review 
This section describes the measures put in place at a European level to overcome the problems 
identified in 1987, and assesses the legislation itself, the manner in which it has been 
transposed in Member States, and the way in which measures are enforced. 
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5. Legal measures overview 
5.1. Background and ex ante hypothesis 
As a result of the findings of the 1987 study into the cost of non-Europe, a number of 
amendments were made to the original Works and Supplies Directives (adopted in 1971 and 
1977 respectively) to improve their effectiveness by closing 'loopholes' which had been used 
by purchasing entities to circumvent the directives' aims (see Section 4.3.2). 
The scope of the public procurement rules was also subsequently extended to embrace: 
(a) utilities, 
(b) services (purchased by both the public sector and utilities), 
(c) a system of remedies (to ensure suppliers had a rapid and effective system of obtaining 
redress in instances when they have been treated unfairly). 
As well as intra-EU legislation, a number of international agreements giving third country 
firms and products access to public and utilities procurement have been concluded, the 
principal of which are: 
(a) the European Economic Area (EEA) Agreement, 
(b) the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA), 
(c) bilateral agreements with the USA; 
(d) Association Agreements with Central and Eastern Europe. 
In view of these amendments and extensions in scope, a coherent and comprehensive legal 
framework should have ensured that: 
(a) the possibilities for non-compliance were limited, 
(b) suppliers would have available effective systems of redress within Member States. 
5.2. Coverage 
This section contains the following chapters: 
Chapter 6. Community legislative framework overview, which describes the legal context 
for the public procurement legislation, as well as highlighting a problems. 
Chapter 7. National transposition, which describes the status as at the end of 1995 of 
Member States' transposition into national law of the directives, their legal effectiveness, and 
a summary of any national procurement rules and regulations; 
Chapter 8. Remedies and enforcement, which describes the Community and Member State 
arrangements for redress, sanctions and enforcement, and an assessment of the arrangements 
for ensuring enforcement of procurement provisions; 
Chapter 9. Measures affecting third country access, which describes the nature and scope 
of international agreements on access to procurement markets, as well as the situation when no 
agreements apply. 
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5.3. Data 
The results of this section are based on: 
(a) analysis and interpretation by national and European public procurement legislation 
experts; 
(b) interviews with European Commission services responsible for drafting, monitoring and 
enforcing the public procurement legislation. 
5.4. Key findings 
Community legislative framework 
In many important areas the legislation's requirements are not clear, including, in particular: 
(a) boundaries between works and supply/services contracts; 
(b) operation of the 'aggregation rules' (both regarding which products or services should be 
aggregated, and the treatment of discrete operating units within the same entity); 
(c) use of 'framework agreements' in the public sector; 
(d) permissible criteria for shortlisting in the public sector; 
(e) extent to which renewals, extensions or amendments to existing contractual agreements 
constitute new contracts; 
(f) extent to which alterations to bids are permitted in open and restricted procedures. 
These problems have been perpetuated in national transposing legislation, which has, in 
general, not provided any interpretation of the directives. 
The directives also contain a number of drafting errors, inconsistencies and omissions, some 
minor, some more serious. 
As at the end of 1995, no European Union guide to the interpretation of the directives exists, 
although several are being prepared. However, the extent to which these will clarify areas 
which are unclear is not known. 
National transposition 
As at 31 December 1995, all public procurement directives in force had not been transposed 
into national law in all Member States, but where transposition had taken place, it was largely 
effective in legal terms. 
There is considerable variance between the date of entry into force of the directives in Member 
States, with, for example, directives only having come into force in Austria, Finland and 
Sweden in 1994 (under the EEA Agreement, now superseded by their membership of the EU 
from 1 January, 1995), and the Utilities Directives yet to come into force in Greece, Portugal 
and Spain. 
Remedies and enforcement 
In most Member States there are two principal problems hindering effective relief (under the 
Remedies Directives): 
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(a) the inability to obtain remedies with sufficient rapidity, 
(b) a lack of clarity in the manner in which damages are calculated or can be obtained. 
At the Member State level, a range of institutions deals with public procurement, none of 
which appears to police and actively enforce the legislation. 
At a Community level, enforcement is limited to the Commission which, under the general 
provisions of the Treaty of Rome, pursues infringements of its own initiative, including 
proceedings relating to incorrect and/or late Member State transposition, or actions brought to 
its attention by an aggrieved party. 
Measures affecting third country access 
The EU public procurement markets are open to a number of non-EU countries enjoying the 
benefits of multilateral and bilateral agreements. The most important is the WTO Agreement 
on Government Procurement, but the scope of agreements is far from universal, with 
derogations in relation to all sectors and third countries. 
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6. Community legislative framework overview 
6.1. The sources of Community rules on procurement 
Public procurement is regulated to some extent by the general principles of the Community 
Treaties (see Section 6.9). Since these principles alone are insufficient for open procurement 
markets, the Communities have adopted directives which regulate award procedures for major 
contracts.11 These are divided into two groups: 
(a) the Public Sector Directives, 
(b) the Utilities Directives. 
6.2. The Public Sector Directives 
The public-sector directives mainly cover procurement by public authorities. They could also 
cover private-sector procurement with reference to bodies governed by public law and cases 
where the purchaser is subsidized by a public authority or holds a concession. At present, there 
are four key directives: 
(a) Council Directive 93/36/EEC of 14 June 1993, OJ L 199/1, co-ordinating procedures for 
the award of public supply contracts (the Supplies Directive); 
(b) Council Directive 93/37/EEC of 14 June 1993, OJ L 199/54, co-ordinating procedures 
for the award of public works contracts (the Works Directive); 
(c) Council Directive 92/50/EEC of 18 June 1992, OJ L 209/1, procedures for the award of 
public service contracts (the Services Directive); 
(d) Council Directive 89/665/EEC of 21 December 1989, OJ L 395/33, on remedies (the 
Public Sector Remedies Directive). 
The Works and Supplies Directives were originally adopted in 1971 and 1977 respectively.12 
They were amended to make them more effective in 1989 and 1988 respectively, in the drive 
to complete the single market by 1993. The main changes introduced by these amending 
directives, can be summarized as follows: 
(a) the definition of authorities covered was made more comprehensive; 
(b) the definitions of works and supply contracts.were clarified and extended; 
(c) the threshold for works contracts was raised (which, in contrast with most of the change, 
marks a limitation rather than an extension of the rules); 
(d) rules were introduced on aggregation of certain works contracts; 
(e) legal obligations were applied for the first time to the award of works concession 
contracts, works contracts by persons holding public works concessions who are not 
themselves contracting authorities, and works contracts subsidized by contracting 
authorities; 
(f) the scope of certain exclusions from the directives was clarified and restricted; 
n 
12 
Another relevant piece of legislation is the 'IT Standards Decision' (Council Decision 87/95/1987 OJ L 36/31). 
See note 8, p. 16. 
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(g) a requirement to publish indicative notices was introduced for works, and for central and 
federal government supplies (extended to all supplies in 1993); 
(h) provision was made for a negotiated procedure subject to a limited degree of regulation, 
and in some cases involving an advertisement and competition for many cases which 
were previously wholly excluded from the directives; 
(i) the time limits for response to contract notices and invitations were extended; 
(j) slight amendments were made to the rules on abnormally low bids; 
(k) more detailed rules on use of standards were introduced, in particular a requirement to 
use European standards where relevant; 
(1) an obligation to publish contract award notices was introduced; 
(m) an obligation was introduced for works contracts to inform providers of the reasons for 
decisions (extended to supplies in 1993); 
(n) obligations to keep records and make statistical reports for the Commission were 
extended or introduced. 
The 1993 directives are, for the main part, merely consolidated versions of this earlier 
legislation. However, the Supplies Directive also introduced some changes, some of which 
have already been referred to above, which, in particular, aligned the rules more closely with 
those on works. The 1993 directives replace the previous directives. Directive 92/50 on 
services had already been modelled on the existing directive on public works, and following 
the 1993 consolidation, which was largely based on the Works Directive, the three public-
sector directives were thus largely aligned. 
The adoption in 1992 of a directive to regulate services, and in 1989 of one on remedies, were, 
like the 1989/88 amendments to the original Works and Supplies Directives, part of the 
programme to complete the single market by 1993. Prior to 1992 there was no secondary 
legislation on services (although the Treaty principles applied). Prior to the 1989 Remedies 
Directive there were no specific provisions on remedies in procurement, although the 
procurement rules could be enforced using general Community law principles on remedies. 
The rules under the Works, Supplies and Services Directives are almost identical. The rules on 
remedies under the Remedies Directive are similar to those for the utilities sector. 
6.3. The Utilities Directives 
The Directives on Utilities regulate bodies engaged in certain activities in the sectors of water, 
transport, energy and telecommunications ('utility activities'). Bodies whose procurement is, 
in general, covered by the Public Sector Directives are covered by the Utilities Directives 
where they engage in utility activities. However, the Utilities Directives are not confined to the 
public sector, but also apply to a number of other bodies engaged in 'utility' activities, 
including many in the private sector. 
The award procedures for all contracts in the utilities sector - for works, supplies or services -
are regulated by Council Directive 93/38/EEC of 14 June 1993, OJ L 199/84. Works and 
supplies procurement in the utilities sector were first regulated by Directive 90/531/EEC, 
1990, OJ L 297/1 (as amended by Council Directive 94/22/EC, 1994, OJ L 164/3 (the Utilities 
Directive)). Prior to that, contracts in these sectors were generally not regulated at all, even 
when carried out by public-sector bodies (with a few exceptions). Services were covered for 
the first time by the 1993 directive. This also replaces the 1990 directive, so that the rules on 
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works, supplies and services in the utilities sector are all consolidated in a single directive. The 
other relevant directive is Council Directive 92/13/EEC, 1992, OJ L 76/14, on remedies (the 
Utilities Remedies Directive). 
The entities and contracts covered by the Utilities Directive, and the award procedures, differ 
significantly from those in the public sector. 
6.4. Amendments to the directives 
The directives are likely to be amended, since the WTO Agreement on Government 
Procurement came into effect on 1 January 1996. This governs the access to public and utility 
markets between the EC Member States and certain third countries, and in some respects its 
rules are more favourable than those under the EC regime, for example, central government 
services contracts must be advertised at a lower threshold than under the directives. To avoid 
applying more liberal rules to third countries than apply between the EC Member States, the 
Commission has put forward a proposal (COM(95) 107 final) for amending the directives to 
ensure that they are as stringent as the GPA. The proposal also includes other amendments 
going beyond those required to align the EC rules with the GPA. 
6.5. Problems with the drafting of the procurement legislation 
A major problem for the implementation and application of the procurement legislation arises 
from the way in which the directives are drafted. 
In many important areas their requirements are not clear. The major areas of uncertainty 
include, in particular: 
(a) the boundaries between works and supply/services contracts; 
(b) the operation of the 'aggregation rules' (both regarding which products or services 
should be aggregated, and the treatment of discrete purchasing units within the same 
entity); 
(c) the use of 'framework agreements' in the public sector; 
(d) the permissible criteria for shortlisting in the public sector; 
(e) the extent to which renewals, extensions or amendments to existing contractual 
agreements constitute new contracts; 
(f) the extent to which alterations to bids are permitted in open and restricted procedures. 
There are also a number of drafting errors, inconsistencies and omissions, some minor, some 
more serious. A minor point, for example, without any substantial consequences, is the fact 
that the model notices in the Annexes to the directives do not always make reference to all the 
information which is required by the directives to be included in the notices, which may 
mislead anyone relying on the models. A more significant example is that the Supplies 
Directive omits obligations found in the Works and Services Directives concerning the 
manner in which bids are invited in negotiated procedures and the information to be included 
in invitations.13 Other gaps are: 
13 It is also worth pointing out that some of the information referred to in the Works and Services Directives is not 
appropriate for negotiated procedures. 
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(a) rules on criteria and evidence for assessing qualification in the utilities sector apply to 
qualification procedures in some circumstances but not others, without apparent 
justification; 
(b) a requirement in the utilities sector to give a low bidder reasonable time to respond to a 
request for explanation, but no such express requirement in the public sector. 
No doubt many of the anomalies and omissions will be resolved through judicial 
interpretation; but in the meantime some uncertainties and difficulties prevail. Further, there 
are some anomalies which are clear in the text and cannot really be removed judicially: for 
example, the fact that an advertisement is required in a negotiated procedure for a study 
contract under the Works Directive, but not under the Supplies Directive. Many other 
examples of these kinds of problems could be given. 
6.6. The obligation to implement the directives 
Member States must implement directives into their national systems. The Community law 
principle of effectiveness requires them to provide national measures which are effective to 
secure the objectives of the directive. Precisely what is required depends on the exact nature of 
the directives, and of the national systems in question. 
Where the directives intend to give legal rights to third parties, a method of implementation is 
required which provides for this effect within the domestic system. Generally, this will entail 
legislation, although this is not necessary if existing legal rules already provide adequately for 
the measures required,14 for example, where there is existing enforceable legislation providing 
for the same obligations. Other methods of implementation, such as through administrative 
circulars of a type which are not enforceable by third parties within that legal system, are not 
adequate in these cases.15 The rules in the procurement directives on award procedures are 
clearly intended to confer rights on third parties, and thus must be implemented by a means 
which provides for such rights.16 
Implementing measures must also enable parties to know their position. Where directives lay 
down precise and specific rights or obligations, whose scope and application can be 
ascertained from the directive itself, it is adequate under Community law for these rules to be 
implemented 'by reference', i.e. by adopting legislation which simply provides that the rules in 
the directive are to be applicable and enforceable in national law. This is generally adequate 
for the rules on procurement procedures. Several states have chosen this method of 
implementation for these rules. Other states have chosen to implement the rules largely by 
repeating them verbatim in the national legislation. Others have, to a greater or lesser extent, 
14 Case 29/84 Commission ν Germany [1985] ECR 1661. 
15 For example, Case 239/85 Commission ν Belgium [1986] ECR 3645; Case C-59/89 Commission ν Germany [1991] 
ECR 1-2607. 
16 Case C-433/93 Commission ν Germany, [1995] ECR 1-2303. In some cases rules in directives may become legally 
binding and enforceable by affected parties, even where they have not been implemented by domestic legislation. 
Broadly, this applies (once the date for implementation has passed) where a directive's rules are clear and precise, and 
unconditional. (In such a case they are said to have 'direct effect'.) However, the fact that rules have direct effect does 
not obviate the obligation under EC law for states to implement those rules by a means which gives third parties 
enforcement rights within the domestic legal system (as confirmed by Case C-433/93, above). 
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chosen to reorganize and rephrase the rules in their own national legislation, and/or to explain 
or elaborate on some of the requirements. 
It should be stressed that even if the rules on award procedures have not been properly 
implemented, they may nevertheless still be enforced by affected firms, by virtue of the 
Community principle of direct effect. However, where the rules have not been properly 
implemented, firms are less likely to know of, and rely on, their rights. In addition, it is not 
clear whether direct effect applies to all entities covered by the procurement directives, for 
example, to some of the utilities in the private sector. 
On the other hand, where the extent of rights or obligations is not certain from the directive, it 
is necessary to adopt detailed national rules. This is the position with the procurement rules on 
remedies. For example, they provide for damages to be awarded, but do not state how 
damages are to be calculated, nor from which body they are to be obtained. Often, legislation 
is needed for this kind of case. However, this is not necessary where clear national rules on 
such issues already exist, which satisfy the requirements of the directive and are sufficiently 
certain in their content. In the area of remedies several states have relied on national measures 
already in place. 
Where directives are not intended to confer rights on third parties, implementation through 
various methods such as administrative circulars is acceptable, provided that this is the normal 
way of giving effect to such rules within that system. Certain rules in the procurement 
directives are of this kind. For example, it is unlikely that it was intended that persons should 
have legal rights to enforce the obligations to provide statistical information to the 
Commission, or to enforce the requirement for states to make available an attestation system. 
In this case the enforcement method need not include a legal right of enforcement for third 
parties, but may simply involve the state taking practical steps to ensure that the information/ 
system is provided. 
6.7. The different methods of implementation 
Section 6.6 considered the nature of the legal obligation to implement the directives, but the 
question also arises of the practical effectiveness of the different implementation techniques, 
in particular, implementation by reference, as contrasted with detailed implementation. 
Detailed implementation has a number of potential advantages. First, it allows for clarification 
of ambiguities in the directives. However, when the meaning of the directives is unclear 
because significant ambiguities have not yet been clarified by the European Court of Justice, 
as with the procurement directives, clarification is problematic, and, further, any interpretation 
attempted by Member States may actually be misleading to affected parties, if it turns out to be 
incorrect. Member States have not in fact attempted clarification to any significant extent. A 
second possible advantage is that, for those states with domestic rules on procurement, it 
allows for the Community rules to be integrated into the domestic system, to clarify the 
relationship between the two and make the law more accessible. However, the lack of clarity 
in the Community provisions again makes this difficult, and substantial integration has not 
generally been attempted. Third, detailed implementation provides an opportunity to improve 
the presentation of the text by using concepts familiar in the domestic system, and be re-
arranging, indexing etc. the legislative text. Fourth, the process of adopting detailed national 
legislation often involving consultation, may result in greater publicity for the relevant 
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Community rules. Finally, a national legislative text may be more accessible in physical terms 
to those from the states concerned. 
There are, on the other hand, some potential disadvantages with detailed implementation. 
First, as noted above, attempts to clarify provisions which are ambiguous may in fact result in 
legislation which is in fact misleading to affected parties. Second, detailed implementation 
means that parties will often feel the need to look at two texts - the national text (for example, 
to see if there are any relevant additional obligations or if any of the exclusions allowed under 
the directives have been omitted), and also the Community text (in case the directive has not 
been properly implemented). This is a particular problem with legislation which is complex 
and unclear - as with the procurement rules - and it may be especially burdensome for foreign 
providers who are less familiar with the features of domestic legislation (but who are the very 
persons whom the procurement rules are intended to benefit). For states with no substantial 
existing procurement law, this problem can be avoided by using implementation by reference. 
Finally, detailed implementation, simply by repeating the provisions of the directive itself, is 
problematic in states (notably the common law states) where the style of legislative drafting is 
different from the Community style; but the lack of clarity in the Community provisions may 
make verbatim transposition unavoidable if detailed legislation is to be adopted. 
The merits of detailed implementation thus depend to a great extent on the nature of the 
directive, and the characteristics of the particular national system, in particular whether there is 
already significant domestic legislation requiring integration with the Community rules. With 
the substantive procurement directives, it appears that given the uncertainty of many of their 
obligations, implementation by reference may be a method of implementation which is as 
effective, if not more so, than detailed legislation for certain states. 
6.8. Guidance on the procurement legislation 
The Commission published the Guide to the Community rules on open procurement,17 
covering the original Supply and Works Directives, 71/305 and 77/62. However, this has not 
been revised to cover amendments to those directives and the Services, Utilities and Remedies 
Directives, nor to incorporate the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice since 1987 (which is of 
much significance). The guide also fails to go much beyond paraphrasing the directives: it 
does not tackle most areas of uncertainty - such as shortlisting - and, in particular, does not 
deal with rules which are implicit rather than expressly stated in the directives. A number of 
new guides are understood to be in preparation, but the extent to which these will clarify areas 
which are unclear is not known. 
Other documents have also been published by the Commission which have been used by 
industry in interpreting the rules, although they have no formal legal effect. 
17 Guide to the Community rules on open procurement, 1987, OJ C358/1. 
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These include a number of guidelines discussed and (in some cases) approved by Advisory 
Committees operating in the field of procurement,18 and Commission Communications.19 
Council Minute Statements also exist on some aspects of the rules, but have not been made 
publicly available. 
6.9. Application of the Community Treaties 
Certain general principles in the Community Treaties have significance for procurement. 
These supplement the rules in the directives, and also apply to contracts outside the directives, 
such as those below threshold. 
The most significant provisions are those concerned with free movement. Under the EC 
Treaty20 these are found in Articles 30, 52 and 59. 
6.9.1. Article 30 
This article forbids measures which hinder or discourage free trade in goods, including 
measures which restrict access of goods to government contracts. It applies, first, to measures 
which discriminate directly between domestic and imported products. For example, in Case 
263/85 Commission ν Italy,21 the Court of Justice ruled unlawful measures requiring Italian 
authorities to purchase motor vehicles of domestic manufacture, as a condition of eligibility 
for certain subsidies. Regional preference policies are also precluded by this rule,22 as they 
discriminate against imports. Article 30 also covers measures which apply equally to domestic 
and imported products, but which have the effect of favouring domestic products, such as the 
use of national standards in contract specifications.23 
6.9.2. Article 52 
This article is concerned with 'freedom of establishment' - the right for firms from one state 
to set up and carry on a business in other Member States on a permanent basis. This covers 
18 Policy guidelines on the interpretation of the obligation to refer to European standards in the framework of the Public 
Procurement Directives, CC/91/61 (rev. 2) final; Policy guidelines on defining the term 'product area' in periodic 
indicative notices for Directive 93/38; Policy guidelines on standards having currency in the Community, CC/92/80 
final; Policy guidelines on contracts awarded by separate units of a contracting entity under Directive 90/531/EEC, 
CC/92/87 final; Policy guidelines on non-relevant airport activities under the 'Utilities Directive' 90/53I/EEC, 
CC/92/24 (rev. 1) final. 
19 See, in particular, Public procurement: regional and social aspects, COM(89) 400 final, Commission Communication 
of 22 September 1989, OJ C311/7. 
2 0 These provisions apply to products covered by the EC and Euratom Treaties where there is no conflict with those 
Treaties. Relevant provisions under those Treaties are Articles 4 and 86 ECSC and Article 93 Euratom (dealing with 
free movement of goods under those Treaties); and Article 97 Euratom (supplementing Articles 52 and 59 EC in 
relation to the Euratom Treaty). 
2 1 Judgment of 16 May 1991, [1991] ECR 1-2457. 
2 2 Case 21/88 Du Pont de Nemours Italiana SpA ν USL No. 2 di Carrara [1990] ECR 1-889, confirmed in Case 351/88 
Laboratori Bruneau Sri ν USL RM/24 di Monterolondo [1991] ECR 1-3641. On Article 30 in procurement see also 
Case C-243/89 Commission ν Denmark, [1993] ECR 1-3353. 
2 3 Article 30 also prohibits the use of standards which are neither directly nor indirectly discriminatory, but which 
nevertheless amount, actually or potentially, to restrictions upon intra-Community trade in goods. 
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restrictions on access to government contracts which affect the activities of non-nationals 
established in the state in question. 
6.9.3. Article 59 
This article deals with restrictions on those who wish to provide services on a temporary basis 
in another Member State, including persons wishing to participate in contracts for services 
awarded by government. Like Article 30 it covers measures which discriminate directly and 
indirectly. An illustration is Re data processing,24 which concerned Italian legislation limiting 
participation in certain data processing contracts to firms wholly or mainly in Italian public 
ownership. This contravened Articles 52 and 59: although non-Italian firms could be owned 
by the Italian government, in practice all data processing firms in Italian public ownership 
were Italian, and the provision thus discriminated against non-nationals, both those established 
in Italy (Article 52) and those in other Member States (Article 59). 
An unresolved question is whether these provisions apply to single contract awards, or only 
when the act in question is, or is a manifestation of, a general practice in procurement. It is 
also not clear how far the Treaty rules apply to bodies outside the traditional public sector - to 
the private sector bodies covered by the Utilities Directive because they enjoy special or 
exclusive rights. These are important issues for contracts outside the directives, including 
those below the thresholds. 
The most significant exemption from the Treaty for procurement is an exemption for military 
hardware, deriving from Article 223(l)(b) EC which generally exempts from the Treaty all 
trade measures relating to such hardware. The Article provides for the Council to draw up a 
list of products covered, and this was done in 1958 (although the list has not been formally 
published). It is generally considered that this permits states to exempt from the Treaty all 
procurements of relevant military products, participation in which may thus be limited to 
domestic firms or products (although an argument can be made, based on the wording of 
Article 223, that the exemption will only apply if such restrictive measures are based on 
security, rather than economic grounds). Whilst the Treaty may not apply, however, it can be 
noted that the Member States have agreed informally to open up their military hardware 
contracts of ECU 1 million or more, under the European Defence Equipment Market (EDCM) 
programme, operated by the Western European Armaments Group within the context of the 
Western European Union. 
The Community rules on competition law also have a potential application to public 
procurement, although this has not yet been tested in the Court of Justice.25 
2 4 Case 3/88 Commission ν Italy [1989] ECR 4035. See also Case C-272/9I Commission ν Italy (the Lottomatica case) 
[1994 ECR 1-1409, [1995] 2 CMLR 504. 
2 5 For example, long-term supply agreements could be caught as restrictive agreements under Article 85 EC, or by Article 
86 where they were induced by a supplier abusing a dominant market position. 
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7. National transposition 
7.1. Timing 
Directives governing the award of works and supplies contracts were originally adopted in 
1971 and 1977 respectively. The Cecchini report concluded that these directives were 
insufficient to ensure an open and fair market for public procurement, and they were 
subsequently amended, as described in Section 6.2. The scope of the legislation regulating 
public procurement was also subsequently extended to cover: 
(a) utilities (which were excluded from the legislation's requirements at the time of 
Cecchini study); 
(b) services (purchased by both the public sector and utilities); 
(c) a system of remedies (to ensure suppliers had a rapid and effective system of obtaining 
redress in instances when they have been treated unfairly). 
The timing of these new directives varied, and an overview of their entry into force is shown 
in Table 7.1. The key feature of the timing of the entry into force of public procurement 
directives is the greater time given to Spain, Greece and Portugal for implementation. The 
majority of the directives came into force in Austria, Finland and Sweden in 1994 under the 
terms of the EEA Agreement, although this has now been superseded by their membership of 
the European Union from 1 January 1995. 
Table 7.1. Entry into force of post-1987 public procurement directives 
Works 89/440 
Supplies 88/295 
Supplies 93/36 
Services 92/50 
Remedies 89/665 
Utilities 90/531 
Utilities (Services) 93/38 
Utilities Remedies 92/13 
1989 
EUR-12 
except 
E,GR,P 
1990 
EUR-12 
except 
E,GR,P 
1991 
EUR-12 
1992 
E 
GR 
Ρ 
E 
GR 
Ρ 
EUR-12 
except 
E,GR,P 
1993 
EUR-12 
EUR-12 
except 
E,GR,P 
1994 
A 
S 
FIN 
A 
S 
FIN 
EUR-15 
A 
S 
FIN 
A 
s 
FIN 
EUR-15 
except 
E,GR,P 
A 
s 
FIN 
1995 
E 
1996 
E 
1997 
E 
GR 
Ρ 
1998 
GR 
Ρ 
GR 
Ρ 
Source: Directives. 
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An overview of the extent to which Member States have put in place national legislation for 
transposition of the directives is shown in Table 7.2. 
Table 7.2. Status of Member State transposition of directives (excluding remedies) 
(1995) 
Works 89/440 
Date of entry into force 
Date of implementation 
Supplies 88/295 
Date of entry into force 
Date of implementation 
Supplies 93/36 
Date of entry into force 
Date of implementation 
Services 92/50 
Date of entry into force 
Date of implementation 
Utilities 90/531 
Date of entry into force2 
Date of implementation 
Utilities (Services) 93/38 
Date of entry into force 
Date of implementation 
Β 
7/90 
8/90 
1/89 
1/89 
6/94 
X 
7/93 
X 
7/92 
9 94 
7/94 
X 
D 
7/90 
* 
1/89 
* 
6/94 
* 
7/93 
** 
7/92 
* 
7/94 
χ 
DK 
7/90 
8 90 
1/89 
12 91 
6/94 
6/94 
7/93 
7/93 
7/92 
1/93 
7/94 
7/94 
E 
3/92 
5/95 
3/92 
5/95 
6/94 
5/95 
7/93 
5/95 
1/96 
χ 
1/97 
n/a 
F 
7/90 
9/90 
1/89 
4/89 
6/94 
χ 
7/93 
χ 
7/92 
8/93 
7/94 
χ 
GR 
3/92 
2/93 
3/92 
9/95 
6/94 
9/95 
7/93 
χ 
1/98 
n/a 
1/98 
n/a 
• 
7/90 
12 91 
1/89 
8/92 
6/94 
χ 
7/93 
5/95 
un 
5/95 
7/94 
5/95 
IRL 
7/90 
2/92 
1/89 
2 92 
6/94 
9/94 
7/93 
7/93 
7/92 
4/93 
7/94 
2/95 
L 
7/90 
8/92 
1/89 
8/92 
6/94 
χ 
7/93 
1/94 
7/92 
3/93 
7/94 
χ 
NL 
7/90 
10/91 
1/89 
1/92 
6/94 
6/94 
7/93 
7/93 
7/92 
4 93 
7/94 
7/94 
Ρ 
3/92 
12/93 
3/92 
2/92 
6/94 
3/95 
7/93 
3/95 
1/98 
n/a 
1/98 
n/a 
UK 
7/90 
12/91 
1/89 
12 91 
6/94 
2/95 
7/93 
1/94 
7/92 
1/93 
7/94 
χ 
A1 
1/94 
1/94 
1/94 
1/94 
7/94 
χ 
7/94 
χ 
1/94 
1/94 
7/94 
χ 
FIN 
1/94 
1/94 
1/94 
1/94 
7/94 
3/95 
7/94 
7/94 
1/94 
1/94 
7/94 
7/94 
s 
1/94 
1/94 
1/94 
1/94 
7/94 
7/94 
7/94 
1/94 
1/94 
1/94 
7/94 
7/94 
Notes: * Formal measures in government regulations, but it is not clear that these confer subjective rights and therefore 
they may not be a legally adequate method of implementation. 
** Contracting entities have been instructed to comply via unpublished circulars. 
Italics Official circulars (or equivalent) published to ensure compliance in absence of implementing legislation, 
χ No implementing legislation as at the end of 1995 (although planned in most Member States). 
' Member State level only. 
2 7/92 deadline for national implementing measures to be in place, but not in force until 1/93. 
3 A, FIN and S required to make adjustments by 1 January 1995 on EU accession. 
Source: National legal experts. 
As Table 7.2 shows, at the end of 1995: 
(a) the European legal framework had not been fully transposed, with a number of key gaps 
where Member States had failed to introduce national transposing measures, particularly 
in relation to the public-sector Services Directive 92/50 (Austria, Belgium, France, 
Greece and Austria) and Utilities Services Directive 93/38 (Austria, Belgium, Germany, 
France, Luxembourg and the UK); 
(b) numerous examples of late transposition for all directives; during this period the 
directives (with the exception of those on remedies) were effective by 'direct effect'; 
(c) a number of Member States where national transposition was late, but where 
instructions, such as circulars/administrative orders were in place requiring contracting 
entities to comply with directives, particularly in relation to the public-sector Works 
Directive 89/440 (Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands and the UK), and public-sector 
Supplies Directive 88/295 (Denmark, Ireland and the UK). 
The status of transposition of the remedies directives and its legal effectiveness are described 
in Chapter 8. 
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7.2. Legal effectiveness of national transposing measures 
7.2.1. Overview 
The existence of national legislation does not mean per se that, from a legal perspective, 
Member States have made a correct transposition of the directives. By the same token, it 
should be noted that the absence of effective legal transposition does not necessarily mean that 
the legislation is not having, or has not had, a practical impact, principally that entities are 
publishing. For example, despite the absence of transposing measures described in Section 7.1 
(Table 7.2) notices are being published by entities. 
Table 7.3 gives an overview of the status of national transposing legislation from the 
perspective of the European Commission unit responsible for ensuring correct transposition 
(DG VX/B/3). 
Table 7.3. European Commission evaluation of the status of Member State 
transposition of directives (1995) 
Works 89/440 
Supplies 89/225 
Supplies 93/36 
Services 92/50 
Remedies 
89/665 
Utilities 90/531 
Utilities 
(Services) 93/38 
Utilities 
Remedies 92/13 
Β 
A 
Β 
Β 
A 
A 
A 
D 
A 
A 
Β 
Β 
A 
A 
Β 
A 
DK E 
C 
C 
c 
c 
A 
D 
n/a 
D 
F 
C 
Β 
Β 
Β 
Α 
GR 
Β 
Α 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
I 
Β 
C 
C 
C 
A 
IRL 
C 
C 
c 
A 
L 
C 
NL 
C 
Ρ 
c 
A 
C 
C 
A 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
UK 
C 
c 
A 
Β 
A 
A 
C 
c 
D 
D 
C 
C 
D 
D 
FIN 
C 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
s 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
Notes: A Community infringement procedure for incorrect transposition commenced/proposed. 
Β Community infringement procedure for non-communication in effect. 
C National implementing measures being analysed by the European Commission. 
D National implementing measures not communicated to the European Commission. 
n/a National implementing measures not yet required. 
Source: European Commission, DG XV/B/3, January 1996. 
In broad terms, however, Member States with transposing legislation have transposed the key 
elements of the public sector and utilities directives in a legally effective (correct) manner. 
(The effectiveness of arrangements for meeting the requirements of the Remedies Directives -
89/665 and 92/13 - is discussed in Chapter 8). 
7.2.2. Effectiveness of public-sector directives transposition 
According to the analyses carried out by national legal experts on the situation in Member 
States as at the end of 1995, in relation to the key elements of the public sector directives, 
most Member States with transposing legislation have merely repeated exactly what is stated 
in the directives themselves (either in a detailed fashion or 'by reference'). As a consequence, 
incorrect transposition tends to be minimal, and although there are minor discrepancies, the 
following highlights the most significant exceptions to this 'general rule': 
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(a) bodies covered - some lack of clarity in Austria regarding public enterprise coverage; 
inadequate public-sector coverage in Belgium (although to be corrected by forthcoming 
legislation); inadequate public enterprise coverage in France; 
(b) definition of works, supply and service contracts - the definition of a works contract is 
inadequate in Germany; 
(c) thresholds - unclear whether UK regulation on discrete operating units (DOUs) is 
acceptable (for the purposes of aggregation); 
(d) award procedures - minor defects in the use of the negotiated procedure by public-sector 
entities in Finland; incorrect transposition of use of the negotiated procedures for 
supplies contracts by public-sector entities in Germany; incorrect ability for public-
sector entities to negotiate post-tender for restricted procedure services and supplies 
contracts, and wrong implementation of accelerated restricted procedures for public-
sector entities in Portugal; 
(e) rules on qualification - the recognition system for works contracts does not allow 
unlisted providers to qualify in time in Belgium; incorrect implementation of rules on 
participation in Finland; the requirement for domestic firms to be on approved lists may 
be an infringement in Spain; it is unclear whether UK rules on 'ability' of service 
providers comply; 
(f) use of framework agreements - UK advice promotes their use in the public sector, and it 
is not clear that this is permitted. 
7.2.3. Effectiveness of utilities directives transposition 
According to the analyses carried out by national legal experts on the situation in Member 
States as at the end of 1995, in relation to the key elements of the utilities directives, most 
Member States with transposing legislation have merely repeated exactly what is stated in the 
directives themselves (either in a detailed fashion or 'by reference'). As a consequence, 
incorrect transposition tends to be minimal, and although there are minor discrepancies, the 
following highlights the most significant exceptions to this 'general rule': 
(a) bodies covered - incomplete coverage in Belgium (although to be corrected by 
forthcoming legislation); slight defect in coverage in Germany; 
(b) activities covered - minor omissions in Finland; possible incorrect approach to the 
telecommunications exemption in the UK (to be corrected in future legislation); 
(c) thresholds - unclear whether UK regulation on DOUs is acceptable (for the purposes of 
aggregation); 
(d) award procedures and choice of procedure - minor defect in time limits for restricted 
and negotiated procedures in Finland. 
7.2.4. Approach to transposition - implications for effectiveness 
Member States have adopted a detailed approach to transposition, with the exception of 
Denmark, Ireland and the Netherlands (with the exception of central government works 
contracts), which have, in general, transposed 'by reference'. A common characteristic of both 
approaches has been the general absence of interpretation by Member States of ambiguous 
features of the directives highlighted in Section 6.5. Nor has detailed interpretative guidance 
been issued. The ambiguity of the directives means that there are significant uncertainties over 
issues, such as: 
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(a) boundaries between works and supplies/services contracts, 
(b) operation of the 'aggregation rules', 
(c) use of 'framework agreements' in the public sector, 
(d) permissible criteria for shortlisting in the public sector, 
(e) extent to which renewals, extensions or amendments to existing contractual 
arrangements constitute new contracts, 
(f) extent to which alterations to bids are permitted in open and restricted procedures. 
7.3. Member State specific procurement rules and regulations and contracting entity 
characteristics 
7.3.1. Domestic procurement rules 
Most Member States have domestic legislation to regulate public procurement procedures 
which apply not merely to contracts covered by the directives, but also to contracts below the 
directives' thresholds. This applies in Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Greece, Luxem-
bourg, Spain, Sweden and Portugal. 
Germany also has formal and detailed regulatory provisions governing public contracting, 
although these do not confer subjective rights on bidders. Generally, the domestic rules require 
advertisement of contracts - although for contracts outside the scope of the directives this is 
generally in national publications rather than the OJ - and fair and transparent award 
procedures. The entities covered are not always identical to those covered by the directives, 
especially in Member States where the national provisions pre-dated the directives. 
Italy has a number of additional rules in the area of works procurement, namely anti-Mafia 
laws, regional legislation and contract law. These are expressly required not to conflict with 
European rules. 
The UK, Ireland, the Netherlands and Denmark do not have any comprehensive national legal 
provisions to regulate procurement. In the UK there are legal rules to regulate the award of 
certain services contracts by local authorities, but only where there is participation by an in-
house bidder (under compulsory competitive tendering (CCT) rules) and not in other cases 
(where merely the local authority's standing orders apply). In the Netherlands there are rules 
regulating central government works contracts. 
7.3.2. Structural Funds 
It is a Community requirement that contracts let for projects funded by the Structural Funds 
comply with the procurement rules. Contracts let are checked for compliance by the European 
Commission prior to the contract award. 
7.3.3. Privatization 
The nature of ownership of a contracting entity, particularly in the area of utilities where some 
Member States have carried out extensive privatization programmes, is irrelevant from a legal 
perspective. An entity is covered if it carries out particular activities under particular 
circumstances. As such, privatization per se has not had an impact on the application of the 
procurement rules. However: 
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(a) a number of previously 'excluded' sectors, particularly those whose operators compete 
and trade in international markets, consider it inappropriate that they should be treated 
like public-sector entities, albeit with directives which allow them considerably more 
flexibility than the public sector; 
(b) private-sector contracting entities subject to 'market forces' are arguably more likely to 
be actively looking to take advantage of the rules, and any subsequent benefits. The 
extent to which this is borne out in reality is explored in demand-side subsequent points 
of the report, including the case studies (Section F) and demand-side survey results 
(Chapter 12). 
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8. Remedies and enforcement 
8.1. Community level redress, sanctions and enforcement 
At Community level, the European Commission is responsible for ensuring the correct 
implementation and application of directives and other measures by Member States. 
8.1.1. Article 169 proceedings 
Article 169 proceedings consist of an administrative stage (prior to litigation), followed, where 
necessary, by legal proceedings. 
At the administrative stage, the Member State concerned is required to comment on the fact 
and points of law on which the Commission bases its decision to institute an infringement 
procedure. The Member State is required to reply to the Commission's letter of formal notice, 
which requires a submission of the Member State's observations within a specified period. 
On the basis of the Member State's response, the Commission may decide to deliver a 
Reasoned Opinion, which calls upon the Member State to comply with Community law within 
a further specified period. In most cases this is two months. The Commission may also deliver 
a Reasoned Opinion if the Member State has not replied to the initial letter of formal notice 
(within the time specified). At this stage, the Commission has the ability to decide not to take 
further action. 
This first administrative stage is an essential precondition for any subsequent referral to the 
European Court of Justice. 
If the Commission does decide to instigate legal proceedings (after non-compliance with the 
Reasoned Opinion), it may then bring the matter before the European Court of Justice by 
submitting an application. 
The proceedings are concluded when the Court of Justice makes its judgment as to whether an 
infringement has taken place. The Court's judgments are declaratory in nature. If the Court 
does find against a Member State, the latter is required by Article 171 EC to take the necessary 
measures to comply with the judgment, especially by resolving the original conflicts which 
gave rise to the procedure. However, the Court may not: 
(a) declare void a national provision which does not comply with Community law; 
(b) currently order a Member State to pay damages to an individual who has suffered from 
an infringement (where the Commission is pursuing an action brought to its attention by 
an aggrieved party). 
The procedure under Article 169 EC is the same, irrespective of whether the Commission is 
pursuing an infringement of its own initiative, which includes proceedings relating to incorrect 
and/or late transposition or pursuing an action brought to its attention by an aggrieved party. 
From the perspective of an aggrieved party, instigating an action via the Commission has three 
key attractions: 
(a) the Commission guarantees anonymity when dealing with Member State authorities. 
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(b) the action is free, 
(c) in many cases the Commission succeeds in negotiating a settlement. 
However, the average length of proceedings is over 20 months. 
Detailed information on the number and nature of complaints brought by aggrieved suppliers 
and pursued by the Commission is not provided since it is considered that statistics on the 
number and nature of cases are misleading, and that cases do not necessarily represent 
fundamental problems associated with the legislation. However, an increasing number of 
suppliers are making use of this means of pursuing a complaint. In addition, most complaints 
with which the Commission deals are not trivial, with the majority being justified and 
resulting in positive outcomes for the aggrieved supplier. Most cases which have come to 
court have related to: 
(a) abuse of the negotiated procedure, 
(b) general non-publication, 
(c) breach of the free movement provisions. 
8.1.2. Remedies Directives rules 
There is express provision in both Remedies Directives for the Commission to act on its own 
initiative if it concludes that there is a 'clear and manifest' breach of the law (except once a 
contract has been concluded). In such circumstances, it must notify the relevant Member State 
and the purchaser of its reasons and request a correction. The Member State must reply within 
21 days and either confirm that the infringement has been corrected or explain why not (unless 
the procedure has been suspended, in which case it must simply notify the Commission of 
this). Failure to do so does not, however, attract any sanctions. The Commission is not given 
any special enforcement powers, and the rules do not restrict or replace its powers under 
Article 169. As a result, if a satisfactory reply is not received, the Commission will simply 
continue proceedings under Article 169 (see above). 
The Commission is not required to take action against a Member State, even if there is a 
genuine infringement. Hence, an aggrieved firms with a genuine complaint may not 
necessarily have the case pursued by the Commission. 
8.1.3. Surveillance 
To support its enforcement activities, the Commission also carries out surveillance to 
determine the extent to which contracting entities are: 
(a) publishing notices in the OJ, 
(b) using the appropriate procedures. 
Its key sources ofinformation are: 
(a) the OJ/TED (and, ultimately, the Information System for Public Procurement, SIMAP), 
(b) the EAP database of contracting entities (currently being created). 
The Commission also receives and analyses statistical reports from Member States required by 
the directives: 
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(a) annual reports on the total value of below-threshold procurement by utility type; 
(b) reports produced every two years on above-threshold works contracts (the reports are 
required to cover number and value of contracts, procedure used, supplier nationality, 
specific details on negotiated procedure contracts); 
(c) reports produced every two years on above-threshold supplies and contracts made by 
entities not covered by the 1988 GATT Agreement on Public Procurement (GPA); in 
essence this covers all non-central government bodies, and annual reports for above- and 
below-threshold supplies contracts for entities covered by the GPA, in essence central 
government (as for works, the reports are required to cover number and value of 
contracts, procedure used, supplier nationality, specific details on negotiated procedure 
contracts); 
(d) reports produced every two years on above-threshold service procurement. (As for 
works, the reports are required to cover number and value of contracts, procedure used, 
supplier nationality, specific details on negotiated procedure contracts.) 
In terms of enforcement, as described in Section 8.1.1, the Commission currently adopts a 
proactive approach in ensuring legislation is correctly transposed, and a more reactive 
approach to enforcement. 
8.2. Member State level redress, sanctions and enforcement 
8.2.1. Redress and sanctions 
The issue of remedies is highly complex, and a detailed description of the system of remedies 
(being put) in place in each Member State was provided by relevant national legal experts, 
together with an assessment of their sufficiency/effectiveness. 
With the exceptions of Denmark and Sweden, national legal experts have identified problems 
with arrangements in all Member States. At the highest level, there are two principal areas 
hindering effective relief: 
(a) the inability to obtain remedies with sufficient rapidity, 
(b) a lack of clarity in the manner in which damages are calculated/can be obtained. 
The situation at Member State level varies: 
(a) Austria - that damages are available only for tender costs, and firms may be required to 
pay compensation if a case is unsuccessful, are probably unacceptable; 
(b) Belgium - the system may not be sufficiently rapid, and there is no implementation of 
the special utilities rules on tender costs; 
(c) Finland - it is questionable whether remedies are available with sufficient rapidity; 
(d) France - the level of damages which could be recovered is unclear; 
(e) Germany - in addition to a number of other defects, the absence of the granting of 
subjective rights to tenderers is a major implementation issue, whilst damages for the 
loss of profits are only available if it can be shown that a firm would almost certainly 
have won the disputed contract; 
(f) Greece - remedies are not available with sufficient rapidity to ensure effective relief, and 
damages for lost profits are unduly difficult to obtain because of a requirement on the 
applicant to prove it would have won the disputed contract; 
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(g) Italy - remedies do not seem to be available with sufficient rapidity to ensure effective 
relief; 
(h) Luxembourg - remedies are not available with sufficient rapidity to ensure effective 
relief, and there has been no implementation of the special provision on the utilities 
sector for the recovery of tender costs; 
(i) Netherlands - it is unclear whether the Raad van Arbitrage has the competency to make 
reference to the European Court of Justice under Article 177 EEC; damages for lost 
profits are unduly difficult to obtain because of a requirement on the applicant to prove 
that they would have won the disputed contract; there has been no implementation of the 
special provision on the utilities sector for the recovery of tender costs; 
(j) Portugal - interim relief is difficult to obtain; damages for lost profits are unduly 
difficult to obtain because of a requirement on the applicant to prove that they would 
have won the disputed contract, and the system is too slow to ensure effective relief; 
(k) Ireland - remedies are not available with sufficient rapidity to ensure effective relief; 
(1) Spain - remedies are not available with sufficient rapidity to ensure effective relief, and 
damages for lost profits are unduly difficult to obtain because of a requirement on the 
applicant to prove that they would have won the disputed contract; 
(m) UK - it is difficult to obtain interim measures, remedies are not clearly available with 
sufficient rapidity, and the system may be defective in being less favourable than 
remedies to enforce domestic rules. 
8.2.2. Enforcement 
Member States have units with responsibility for transposition of directives and the fulfilment 
of requirements of Member States within the directives, particularly in relation to the 
provision of statistics. However, with the exception of the Committee for Public Procurement 
(Nemden for Offentlig Upphandling (NOU)) in Sweden - which has been created as a 
supervisory body, as well as to provide advice and information on procurement - the 
Interministerial Commission of Inquiry for Procurement in France, the Committee for Public 
Procurement in relation to public works contracts in Italy, and, arguably, the Tender 
Commission in Luxembourg, Member States do not have independent enforcement/ 
supervisory institutions with a remit to (actively) enforce compliance with the directives' 
requirements (as transposed in national law). In general, reliance is on the existence of 
national laws and suppliers' willingness to make use of national systems of remedies. 
This general absence of national enforcement bodies is in contrast to almost all other areas of 
European legislation, such as the environment, health and safety, and financial services, where 
national bodies take responsibility for ensuring the rules are adhered to by the firms subject to 
legal requirements. The situation is clearly not directly comparable, since the' procurement 
rules regulate the state, rather than, as above, the private sector (where the state acts as an 
'independent' enforcer), although clearly, in many instances, public-sector organizations are 
equally subject to these rules. 
8.3. Sufficiency of arrangements for ensuring enforcement of procurement provisions 
Present arrangements for enforcement of procurement provisions at both Community and 
Member State levels are generally insufficient for a number of key and interrelated reasons: 
(a) a dependence on the supply side to, in effect, police its customers; 
(b) current lack of suitably effective national systems of redress; 
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(c) the (poor) quality of information currently available to the Commission (as the 
Community's only principal enforcement body) and the perceived remit and resources 
available within the Commission to carry out the role of enforcement; 
(d) the perpetuation of key ambiguities within the directives in Member State transpositions; 
(e) demand-side mentality. 
8.3.1. Supply-side dependence 
All current enforcement arrangements (with the exception of the European Commission) rely 
upon suppliers to identify an infringement, such as non-publication or incorrect application of 
procedures. This presupposes a high level of supplier awareness of relatively complex 
regulations which affect their customers. Whilst an in-depth understanding of customer 
requirements is a commercial necessity, the extent to which suppliers should be expected to be 
aware of such technical issues is questionable. A number of other factors mitigate against this 
dependence: 
(a) results of the supply-side survey (Chapter 13) indicated that awareness of the core output 
from the directives - the requirement to publish in the OJ - is far from universal, 
particularly among small firms; 
(b) the level of resources required to understand the practical implications of the directives' 
requirements for customers is unlikely to be available, particularly within SMEs; 
(c) proving non-compliance is complicated, since suppliers are unlikely to have sufficient 
knowledge to be able to judge whether an infringement has taken place, whilst 
ambiguities in the directives mean that contracting entities can justify actions which are, 
at a minimum, against the 'spirit' of the directives; 
(d) regardless of the effectiveness of national and European remedies processes, firms are, 
in general, loath to instigate proceedings against a (potential) customer. 
8.3.2. Member State systems of redress 
As described in Section 8.2, with only few exceptions, there are problems with present 
national remedies systems. The inability to obtain remedies sufficiently quickly (from both a 
legal and practical perspective) and a lack of clarity with regard to damages are likely to be 
significant disincentives to firms considering pursuing a case. 
(This state of affairs may be a contributory factor to a growing number of firms pursuing 
complaints through the Commission under Article 169. This hypothesis is further supported by 
the fact that the Commission's powers in this respect are not publicized and, as a consequence, 
are not widely known.) 
8.3.3. Quality ofinformation and Commission resources 
Active enforcement by the Commission of non-compliant contracting entities is currently 
restricted by a lack of reliable and consistent market information on which to base decisions, 
and finite staff resources to deal with complaints. 
The information and data sources available to the Commission to carry out surveillance 
activities (to determine the need for enforcement) are highly fragmented. As a result, there are 
no 'benchmarks' against which compliance (or its absence) can be measured. Key missing 
'benchmarks' are as follows. 
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(a) The actual size (value) of the respective public-sector markets in each Member 
State. Member States do submit statistical returns, but these are historic. For example, 
the most recent figures for bodies not subject to the GPA (in essence, local and regional 
public-sector bodies) are for 1992. Even so, not even half the Member States are 
covered, and nor is the information presented in a consistent format. Furthermore, 
Member State returning bodies for statistics are dependent on figures provided by the 
contracting entities themselves. 
(b) The number of contracting entities in each Member State which are covered by the 
directives and which, in principle, should be publishing notices in the OJ. As a 
result, although the monitoring of notices published in the OJ does highlight contracting 
entities which are not technically complying by, for example, use of an incorrect 
procedure, they are at least trying to comply. The creation of the EAP database is an 
initial step towards filling this gap, and output from the database has been used and is 
commented upon in Section 10.6. 
(c) The number of notices which should (reasonably be expected to) be published. 
Previous Commission analyses have indicated that the number of notices published is far 
below what might sensibly be expected, particularly in relation to supplies contracts. 
Unlike market size and number of contracting entities, there is unlikely to be a 
'benchmark' for this measure. (An analysis of notice publication is contained in Chapter 
11, and our evaluation of the levels of publication, and the complex points surrounding 
this issue, are presented in Chapter 23.) However, it is likely that a lower than expected 
level of notices can be explained by contracting entities' (deliberate) misinterpretation of 
ambiguous elements of the directives which would allow them not to have to publish, 
notably: 
(i) the boundaries between works and supply/services contracts - given the 
significantly higher threshold for works, 'defining' a supply/service as a work 
increases the likelihood that publication will be unnecessary; 
(ii) 'aggregation rules' - whilst the level at which aggregation should take place is 
clear for PINs, this is not the case elsewhere. Contracting entities justifiably 
highlight the need to aggregate at a pragmatic operational level, but if this is done 
at too low a NACE/CPC/CPV level, a purchaser in essence splits contracts, 
prevention of which was one of the directives' principal objectives; 
(iii) the extent to which renewals, extensions or amendments to existing contractual 
arrangements constitute new contracts, requiring a new tender. 
8.3.4. Ambiguities in directives 
There are a number of crucial ambiguities in the directives which, as described in Section 
8.3.3, have significant implications for the directives' coverage in terms of the number of 
entities publishing, and the number of notices they publish. 
The use of directives as the legal instrument to introduce the procurement framework means 
there will continue to be areas open to interpretation. 
8.3.5. Demand-side 'mentality' 
Although there are ambiguities in the directives, their overall objectives are, however, clear. It 
is also self-evident that even a 'perfect' piece of legislation will not work if a contracting 
entity sets out deliberately to avoid complying, or complies to the letter, but not the spirit, of 
the law. 
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An analysis of purchasing entities' response to, and views of, the procurement legislation is 
contained in Chapter 12. 
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9. Measures affecting third country access 
9.1. International agreements on access to procurement 
A number of international agreements giving third country firms and products access to public 
and utilities procurement have been concluded, the principal of which are: 
(a) the European Economic Area (EEA) Agreement, 
(b) the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA), 
(c) bilateral agreements with the USA, 
(d) Association Agreements with Central and Eastern Europe. 
9.1.1. The European Economic Area Agreement 
The European Economic Area (EEA) Agreement26 brought members of the European Free 
Trade Association (EFTA) and the Community within a single market regime based on that of 
the Community itself. When it was signed the members of EFTA were Austria, Finland, 
Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland. However, Switzerland rejected it in 
a referendum, and did not participate, and Sweden, Finland and Austria joined the EU from 
1 January 1995. Thus it is now relevant only to Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway. 
The Agreement requires states to open their procurement to each other under the rules that 
apply within the Community. They must follow general principles on free movement of goods, 
freedom to provide services and freedom of establishment which parallel those in the 
Community Treaties, and must also provide access to public procurement markets in 
accordance with the rules in the directives (including remedies).27 
9.1.2. The World Trade Organization Agreement on Government Procurement 
The original Agreement on Government Procurement28 was negotiated under the auspices of 
GATT and came into force on 1 January 1981.29 However, it only covered supplies contracts 
and central/federal entities. In parallel with the Uruguay Round a more extensive agreement 
2 6 European Economic Area Agreement, 1994, OJ L 1/1 was concluded on 2 May 1992. See also EEA Joint Committee 
Decision 7/94, 1994, OJ L 160/1 (incorporating Directives 92/13, 92/50, 93/36, 93/37 and 93/38, which were adopted 
after the Agreement was concluded); and EEA Council Decision 1/95, 1995, OJ L 86/58 (concerning the accession of 
Liechtenstein). 
2 7 The EEA Agreement provides for adaptation of the EC rules to cover EEA states, since they are worded on the 
assumption that they only apply to EC Member States. Certain general ('horizontal') adaptions are contained in 
Protocol 1 to the Agreement and the procurement rules must be read in light of these adaptations. For example, it is 
stated that if a rule in a Community measure is directed at an EC Member State - such as the obligation to publish 
notices under the procurement rules - it applies also to participating EFTA states, and where it is stated that a rule 
confers a right on a Member State or a national of that state, the same right applies in respect of participating EFTA 
states and their nationals. There are also some special provisions modifying, in the context of the EEA, the usual 
application of the rules; for example, EFTA states may not send procurement notices to the OJ in their own language, 
but must use one of the official languages of the EC. They also need to apply the rules in the Utilities Directive 
restricting access of third country products. 
2 8 Approved on behalf of the EC by Council Decision 80/271/EEC of 10 December 1979, OJ L 71/1. 
2 9 The Agreement was slightly amended in 1987 by a Protocol, approved on behalf of the EC by Council Decision 
87/565/EEC of 16 November 1987, OJ L 345/24, which came into force on 14 February' 1988. 
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was concluded, which is contained in Annex IV to the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
Agreement. This took effect for Community Member States on 1 January 1996,30 superseding 
the old Agreement for the parties to it. It is a 'plurilateral' agreement, meaning that WTO 
members may choose whether to participate. The current parties to the Agreement are: 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
(d) 
(e) 
(f) 
(g) 
(h) 
the Community and its Member States, 
Norway (a member of the EEA), 
Canada, 
Israel, 
Japan, 
South Korea, 
the USA, 
Switzerland.31 
For the European Communities, the GPA covers all 'contracting authorities' under the public-
sector directives. In the utilities sector it applies to entities carrying out listed activities which 
are either 'public authorities' or 'public undertakings' under the Utilities Directive. It does not, 
on the other hand, cover entities which are subject to the directive merely because they enjoy 
'special and exclusive rights'. The relevant activities covered by the GPA are: 
(a) activities connected with the provision of water through fixed networks, 
(b) activities concerned with the provision of electricity through fixed networks, 
(c) provision of terminal facilities to carriers by air, 
(d) provision of terminal facilities to carriers by sea or inland waterway, 
(e) operation of public services in the field of transport by automated systems, tramway, 
trolley bus, or bus or cable. 
In principle, public transport by rail is included, but there is an exclusion for certain entities, 
intended to remove non-urban services from its coverage. Activities covered by the Utilities 
Directive, but excluded from the GPA are: 
(a) distribution of gas or heat, 
(b) fuel extraction, 
(c) telecommunications. 
The threshold for the application of the GPA by Member States to works contracts is SDR 
5 million, for all entities. For supplies and services it is SDR 130,000 for central 
government;32 SDR 200,000 for local government; and SDR 400,000 for utilities. 
3 0 See Council Decision of 22 December 1994 concerning the conclusion on behalf of the European Community, as 
regards matters within its competence, of the agreements reached in the Uraguay Round multilateral negotiations 
(1986-1994) (94/800/EC), 1994, OJ L 336/1. 
3 ' These are the same as the parties to the old agreement except that South Korea was not formerly a party and Hong Kong 
and Singapore, who did sign the previous agreement, have dropped out of the new one. 
3 2 EC Annex I. 
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The above coverage is qualified by important derogations.33 For central/federal government 
works and supply contracts, generally the agreement applies in respect of all other signatories 
to all central government works and supplies contracts (except those falling within the general 
exclusions or below the thresholds). However, for services, certain utilities contracts, and 
contracts awarded by other levels of government (such as local and regional authorities, 
including the state governments in federal states), it is more complex. This arises because 
some signatories have been unwilling to offer coverage of all entities or contracts. Given the 
divergence, coverage based on what each signatory state was able to offer was unacceptable, 
since this would have produced great imbalances between states. On the other hand, to define 
coverage on the basis of the minimum common denominator would have resulted in an 
agreement of very narrow scope. Thus, it was decided that each signatory should negotiate 
with each of the others to agree coverage on a bilateral basis. 
As a result, the wide coverage of Community entities and activities is limited in respect of 
many of the signatory states by a list of derogations. The most significant derogations, as 
stated in the GPA Annexes, can be summarized as follows: 
(a) For entities in Annex II, which mainly covers local government, regional government, 
and certain bodies covered by public law, the rules do not apply to Canada and the USA. 
There are also some limitations applying to Japan, Israel, Korea and Switzerland (for 
entities in Annex II, para. 2), applying until the EC is satisfied these states have offered 
complete coverage of sub-federal entities. 
(b) For the water sector, the rules do not apply to Canada and the USA. 
(c) For the electricity sector, the rules do not apply to Canada, Japan and the USA. 
(d) For airports, the rules do not apply to Canada, Korea and the USA. 
(e) For ports, the rules do not apply to Canada and the USA. 
(f) For urban transport, the rules do not apply to Canada, Israel, Japan, Korea and the USA; 
(g) For services contracts, the rules apply to providers from third countries only where those 
countries afford access to the category of services in question under their own Annexes 
(many states have opened up their markets only in limited services). 
(h) For Israel, Japan and Korea, the EC is to apply higher thresholds for contracts where 
these countries themselves provide higher thresholds in their Annexes than does the EC. 
(i) For Israel, Korea, Canada and the USA, there are derogations for certain types of 
equipment applicable until the EC is satisfied that these states provide access to the EC 
for the markets concerned, 
(j) The EC need not provide for enforcement of the rules by small and medium-sized 
enterprises from Japan, Korea and the USA until those states drop their own policies of 
favouring small and minority businesses. 
The above derogations generally do not apply, however, once it has been accepted that the 
parties concerned give comparable and effective access to EU firms in the relevant markets. In 
the case of the USA, such access has been provided for some of the relevant sectors under the 
EC-US bilateral agreements (see Section 9.1.3). 
3 3 As well as the specific derogations there are exceptions based on national defence and security, and also for measures to 
protect 'public morals, order or safety, human, animal or plant life or health, [or] intellectual property' or measures 
relating to the products or services of handicapped persons, philanthropic institutions or prison labour. 
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There are also derogations for the EC in respect of certain contracts exempt from the 
directives but not covered by more general exemptions in the GPA, such as contracts for the 
purchase of energy for fuel, or for entities exempt from the Utilities Directive under the 
various exemptions designed to cover entities which operate in a competitive market. Further, 
the GPA does not apply to services contracts in the utilities sector in Spain or Greece until 
1 January 1997 and 1 January 1998 respectively. 
The approach to regulation is similar to the Community regime. Article III contains certain 
general principles, primarily that parties must: 
(a) give to providers and the products and services34 of other signatory states the same 
treatment as is afforded to national providers and products; 
(b) give to the providers and the products and services of other parties treatment no less 
favourable than that afforded to other parties.35 
Thus providers of third country signatories must be able to take advantage of the procedures in 
the procurement regulations implementing the Community regime - which are available to 
national firms and firms from other Member States. Article III also prohibits discrimination 
against local firms based on the degree of foreign affiliation or ownership, or based on the 
country of production of the goods or services where these have been produced in one of the 
states which is party to the Agreement. The Agreement also requires states to follow 
transparent award procedures, as laid out in the Agreement. 
Article 111(3) makes it clear that access to procurement is subject to the rules which govern 
access to the general market of the signatory states. For example, products imported for a 
government procurement are subject to relevant customs duties. 
Article XX requires states to give providers a right to enforce the rules, and lays down certain 
minimum standards for national remedies systems. It appears that Community Member States 
must apply the Community's own rules on remedies to third country firms in contracts 
covered by the GPA, because of the national treatment and non-discrimination obligations in 
Article III. 
9.1.3. The bilateral agreements with the USA 
The EU Member States and the USA are both party to the old GATT procurement agreement 
and also to the new GPA (see Section 9.1.2). 
3 4 To apply these provisions it is necessary to decide whether products and services are 'of a particular third country. 
Rules governing this question in international trade are generally referred to as 'rules of origin'. These are dealt with in 
Article IV of the GPA, providing that parties 'shall not apply rules which are different from the rules of origin applied 
in the normal course of trade and at the time of importation to imports of the same products or services from the same 
Parties'. Rules on the origin of goods are not required in Community law itself since the principle of free movement of 
goods under Article 30 (which fulfils the function of the GPA requirement to treat products of third countries no less 
favourably than national products) applies not only to goods originating in other Member States but to all products 
from those states regardless of origin. 
3 5 This does not have a parallel in Community law. where there is nothing to prevent states from treating third countries 
more favourably than fellow Member States. In practice, this is unlikely to happen, since if national films are given the 
favourable treatment afforded to third countries, it must then be applied to firms from other Member States because of 
the effective requirement to treat those firms as favourably as national firms. 
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In April 1993, a bilateral agreement was concluded providing for mutual access to: 
(a) major central/federal contracts, whereby the EC extended the benefit of the public-sector 
directives for central/federal contracts; 
(b) works and supply contracts in the electricity sector, whereby the 'EC extended access 
under the rules in Directive 90/531 for contracts in this sector.36 
This ceased to have effect as from 1 January 1996, since when similar access is provided 
under the terms of the new GPA instead. 
In April 1994, a further bilateral Agreement was concluded for extensions to the coverage 
originally negotiated for the GPA in December 1993, as set out above,37 which provided for: 
(a) a degree of liberalization of sub-federal procurement, 
(b) substantial mutual access in the ports sector, 
(c) access to services in the electricity sector. 
The agreements concluded have not resolved all difficulties. US complaints over restrictions 
on access to contracts not covered by them have led the US to impose sanctions on 
Community industry under Title VII of the US 1988 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act. 
Not wishing to undermine the access agreements already concluded, the USA confined these 
sanctions to federal contracts not covered by existing agreements, i.e. those of a low value. In 
retaliation the Community imposed similar sanctions under Regulation (EEC) No 1463/93. 
They apply to works, supplies and services contracts awarded by central government entities,38 
but only to supplies contracts below the thresholds of the current GPA (i.e. the old GATT 
Agreement), and to services and works contracts below the thresholds of the EC Directives 
(except in the case of services contracts for 'non-priority' services under the Directive, to 
which the sanctions apply whatever their value). For these contracts the sanctions require 
exclusion of all firms established in, and operating from, the USA. 
9.1.4. Association Agreements with Central and Eastern Europe 
Association Agreements which deal expressly with the issue of procurement are presently in 
force with: 
(a) Hungary and Poland (from 1 February 1994), 
3 6 This Agreement was in the form of a Memorandum of Understanding, approved by Council Decision 93/323, 1993, OJ 
L 125/1. 
3 7 Approved by Council Decision 95/215/EC. 1995, OJ LI34/25. The Agreement also improves transparency, by 
providing for both sides to ensure that contract notices indicate clearly where the GPA applies to a procurement. 
3 8 Coverage is set out in Article 1 of the Regulation. Article 2 provides for exceptions for certain reasons of public 
interest. 
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(b) the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic, Romania and Bulgaria (from 1 February 
1995).39 
Similar Agreements were concluded on 12 June 1995 with Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, but 
these await ratification and are not yet in force (in the meantime Free Trade Agreements exist 
with these states - see Section 9.1.5). 
In relation to trade in goods, they provide for the Community to abolish quantitative 
restrictions and measures of equivalent effect, with respect to most products originating in the 
association states.40 Restrictions on access to government procurement are covered by this 
since they are measures equivalent to quantitative restrictions; thus exclusion of association 
states' products or any other discrimination against such products in procurement is 
prohibited. In addition, the Agreements provide for companies from the association states to 
be given access to contract award procedures pursuant to Community procurement rules, 
under conditions no less favourable than Community companies.41 Thus companies from these 
states wishing to supply goods to Member States can rely on the rules in the directives to 
obtain access. In return, Community companies are generally to be given access to award 
procedures in the association states within ten years (or earlier, if possible). Community firms 
established in the association states have immediate access. It is not clear how these provisions 
fit with the rules in Article 36 of the Utilities Directive which provides for certain preferences 
for Community products (see Section 9.2.1). The directive provides for the Council to 
disapply the preference rules for products from states which agree to give 'comparable and 
effective' access to Community products in that sector. However, this does not apply to the 
association states since the Europe Agreement provisions do not provide for immediate 
Community access to contracts of these states.42 Thus it would appear that amendment to the 
directive is required to give access to these states.43 The reference in the Europe Agreements 
to Community treatment for firms from the association states suggests that the EC has an 
obligation to make such an amendment. 
In relation to services, the Agreements provide for the Association Council to take, 
progressively, the measures necessary to open up markets between the Community, on the one 
hand, and the association states, on the other. Where access to government procurement 
services is concerned, companies may also rely on the provisions just discussed, giving access 
3 9 See Council and Commission Decisions 93/742/Euratom, ECSC, EC approving the Europe Agreement (Hungary), 
1993, OJ L 347/1; 93/743/Euratom, ECSC, EC (Poland), 1993, OJ L 348/1; 94/907/Euratom, ECSC, EC (Romania), 
1994, OJ L 357/1; 94/908/Euratom, ECSC, EC (Bulgaria), 1994, OJ L 358/1; 94/909/Euratom, ECSC, EC (Slovak 
Republic), 1994, OJ L 359/1; 94/910/Euratom, ECSC, EC (Czech Republic), 1994, OJ L 360/1. The texts of the 
Agreements are published in the Official Journal in annex to the relevant decisions. 
4 0 The provision covers all products listed in Chapters 25 to 97 of the combined nomenclature, except for products listed 
in Annex I, and also textiles and ECSC products, which are subject to special arrangements. 
4 1 These are defined as companies/firms set up in accordance with the law ofthat state, and which have either their central 
administration or principal place of business in that state, or have their registered office in that state, and also a 'real and 
continuous link' with the economy ofthat country. 
4 2 Once the transitional period has expired, however, access is likely to be comparable and effective, since both states will 
have, in effect, legislative codes prescribing fair and open award procedures for major procurements, similar to those of 
the EC. 
4 3 The same would apply in relation to future measures giving access to developing states in order to aid their 
development. 
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to contract award procedures. Thus, firms from the association states may, effectively, take 
advantage of the directives' rules in relation to provision of works and other services (whilst, 
as with goods, EC firms must wait for access to markets of those states, unless they are 
established there). However, access is subject to the general restrictions on freedom to provide 
services. 
These rules on access are enforceable in the courts of Member States, which are obliged to 
provide the same remedies as under the Community's internal rules on remedies. 
9.1.5. Other agreements 
Other agreements concluded by the Community which contain provisions on free trade may 
also affect procurement, even though it is not dealt with expressly. There are a number of 
agreements (for example, the Free Trade Agreements with Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania44) 
which prohibit quantitative restrictions and measures of equivalent effect, and this includes 
procurement practices which discriminate against products from those states within the scope 
of the Agreements. The Association Agreement concluded with Turkey also contains general 
provisions on free movement and freedom to provide services which operate to prohibit 
discrimination in procurement against firms and products from that state. It is expected that 
more specific provisions on access to procurement will be included in the revised version of 
that Agreement, to bring it into line with the more recent Association Agreements. 
9.2. The position where no agreements apply 
Third country access issues may also arise where there are no relevant agreements in relation 
to: 
(a) third country products, 
(b) third country services and service providers. 
9.2.1. Third country products 
Provisions in the Community directives 
There are no provisions in the public-sector directives on third country products. Thus, they do 
not themselves prevent states from excluding such products. However, it is not permitted to 
apply a price preference against such products, since the origin of the products is not a 
permissible award criterion. 
4 4 Agreement on free trade and trade-related matters between the European Community, the European Atomic Energy 
Community, the European Coal and Steel Community, of the one part, and the Republic of Estonia, of the other part 
(OJ L 373, 31.12.1994, p. 1); Agreement on free trade and trade-related matters between the European Community, the 
European Atomic Energy Community, the European Coal and Steel Community, of the one part, and the Republic of 
Latvia, of the other part - Agreement betweeen the European Economic Community and the Republic of Latvia on 
trade in textile products- Final act (OJ L 374. 31.12.1994, p. 2), and Agreement on free trade and trade-related matters 
between the European Community, the European Atomic Energy Community, the European Coal and Steel 
Community, of the one part, and the Republic of Lithuania, of the other part - Agreement betweeen the European 
Economic Community and the Republic of Lithuania on trade in textile products - Final act (OJ L 375, 31.12.1994, 
p. 2), 
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The Utilities Directive, however, includes specific rules, in Article 36. This provides that 
purchasers: 
(a) may reject third country offers, i.e. those which offer products which originate more than 
50% in certain third countries; 
(b) must reject such offers where the price advantage of this offer over the next best offer is 
less than 3% (provided that next best offer is equally advantageous in features other than 
price). 
These provisions were adopted to secure the Community's bargaining position in negotiations 
for access based on reciprocity. 
Since the public-sector directives do not themselves forbid exclusion of third country 
products, and the Utilities Directive expressly allows it in certain cases, it may appear that 
Member States retain considerable discretion over treatment of such products. It might also be 
that states enjoy this discretion for contracts not covered by the directives. However, this 
apparent discretion is probably limited by the Treaty's free movement provisions, and/or by 
the provisions giving the Community power in external trade relations. 
Impact of Article 30 EC 
Article 30 EC prohibits discrimination not only against products originating in the EC but 
against any product in 'free circulation' within the Community, even though originally 
imported from a third country. 
It appears, therefore, that states may not refuse to purchase third country products in free 
circulation within the EC, even where their freedom to do so is not restricted by the directives. 
Since the Community itself is bound by the free movement principle, it is doubtful that the 
position is any different even when the discrimination appears to be authorized by the 
Community itself.45 Thus, to the extent that it appears to allow states to exclude third country 
offers, the validity of Article 36 of the Utilities Directive is questionable. 
The question also arises as to the position of common commercial policy measures taken by 
the Community itself under its powers in Article 113 EC, i.e. measures whereby the 
Community adopts its own common policy on third country products, rather than allowing a 
discretion to Member States. The provision in Article 36 of the Utilities Directive which 
requires third country offers to be rejected where there is less than 3% price difference is a 
measure of this kind. It is arguable that this measure, also, is not lawful since it purports to 
require rejection even of products within free circulation in the EC. If measures of this kind 
are prohibited, restrictions on third country access in goods will need to be directed at third 
country firms (who are most likely to supply such goods) - the approach adopted in imposing 
sanctions against the USA (see Section 9.1.3) - rather than at third country products as such. 
4 5 The need for state measures in procurement to comply with Article 30 was recognized in the Council Resolutions 
referred to below. Authorization under those measures was intended to be confined to those authorized under an 
exception to Article 30 provided in Article 115, which authorizes exceptions to Article 30 to prevent deflection of trade 
caused by differing national policies. However, this situation appears to have no relevance to procurement. 
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Impact of Article 113 EC on the powers of Member States 
The power to take measures relating to external trade in goods belongs exclusively to the 
Community under Article 113 EC. Member States may not take such measures themselves, 
even where no Community measures have been adopted46 unless the Community itself has 
authorized states to take their own measures. It is arguable - although this specific point has 
not been tested before the Court of Justice - that this rule precludes Member States from 
discriminating against third country products in procurement, at least where this is done for 
trade reasons, unless so authorized. 
Two existing measures might be relied upon to provide authorization. One is the provision in 
Article 36 of the Utilities Directive, authorizing rejection of third country offers, referred to 
above. The other is the Council Resolution of 1980,47 which provides that states may apply . 
existing commercial policy measures relating to third country products in public supply 
(although not works and services) contracts, pending adoption of a common policy. 
If Article 30 EC in any case prohibits discrimination in procurement against third country 
products in free circulation, these authorizations are of little importance. 
9.2.2. Third country services and service providers 
The public sector 
The public-sector directives do not contain any rules on services originating in third countries. 
It appears that Member States may exclude such services (although as with goods a preference 
policy cannot be implemented since the origin of services is not a relevant award criterion). 
For contracts not covered by the directives, third country services and providers may be 
excluded or subjected to a preference policy. 
Article 113 EC does not generally apply to trade in services,48 and probably this includes 
measures relating to services procurement.49 If this is the case, the discretion of Member States 
in services procurement is unaffected by the provision. 
The utilities sector 
Under the Utilities Directive there are no provisions authorizing or requiring rejection of third 
country services or providers (since discrimination against the Community by third countries 
4 6 It may be noted that Article 113 in fact imposes a duty to adopt common policy measures relating to trade in goods. As 
explained above, however, whilst reciprocal access agreements on procurement have been concluded with major trading 
partners, no comprehensive common policy has yet been adopted on access of third country products to procurement. 
The Council Resolution of 1980 referred to in the next note calls upon the Commission to put forward proposals for 
such a policy; but this has still not happened. 
4 7 Council Resolution of 22 July 1980, OJ C211. This superseded a previous Resolution of 21 December 1976. 1977. OJ 
Cl 1/1. 
4 8 Opinion 1 /94 of 15 November 1994. 
4 9 Another view, however, is that the ruling in Opinion 1/94 does not apply to measures on services procurement, since 
these are always subject to general national rules governing the provision of services across borders, and are therefore 
not within the principle on which the ruling was based, which was a concern to preserve states' freedom in transactions 
involving movement of persons across borders. 
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was seen as less of a problem than in the case of goods). However, Article 37 EC provides for 
the Commission to make proposals for taking action against a third country50 where 
Community undertakings do not enjoy national treatment in that country, where undertakings 
of another state receive more favourable treatment than those of the Community,51 or where 
Community undertakings do not enjoy 'effective' access 'comparable' to that given by the 
Community. 
This provision probably constitutes a common policy in the field of services which precludes 
Member States from discriminating outside its field of application. 
5 0 Article 37(3) specifies the precise action which may be taken. The Council acts by qualified majority in deciding what 
action, if any, to take. To assist the Commission in its role, states must inform it about any difficultés their undertakings 
encounter in third countries. 
5 ' Where this applies, in practice the national treatment will also generally be breached in practice. 
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SECTION C 
Public procurement market contours in 1994 
This section provides an overview of the market in 1994 and highlights major changes. 
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10. Public procurement market contours in 1994 
10.1. Overview 
10.1.1. Coverage 
The market contours provide an outline of the structure and characteristics of the EU public 
procurement market in 1994, in terms of: 
(a) market size, 
(b) market size by type of contract, 
(c) market size by type of purchasing entity, 
(d) above- and below- threshold procurement, 
(e) number of purchasing entities. 
Additionally, an analysis is provided, where possible, of any changes in the structure and size 
of the market since the Procurement Directives came into force. 
10.1.2. Data 
Procurement market size 
Since no reliable data exist on the size of the EUR-15 public procurement market in 1994, 
estimates of the market size were made using a combination of a top-down and bottom-up 
analysis in each Member State, with: 
(a) the top-down analysis based on: 
(i) current price data on GDP and public expenditure of general government from 
national accounts, 
(ii) utilities purchasing as a share of GDP, using estimates from: 
- the Excluded Sectors report (European Commission, 1992), 
- the EC-US procurement study (European Commission, 1994a); 
(b) the bottom-up analysis providing, where possible, a more detailed estimate of public 
purchasing based on 'grossed up' estimates of total procurement expenditure using 
results of the demand-side survey carried out as part of this study. 
Government procurement 
The demand-side survey results proved an inadequate base for making reliable bottom-up 
central and sub-central government estimates, due to: 
(a) an overall response rate of 62%, less than the required 90-95%; 
(b) low response rates for some Member States, particularly France, Germany and Spain; 
(c) some responses missing estimates of total procurement, reflecting: 
(i) confidentiality considerations, 
(ii) problems obtaining information from different (autonomous) departments; 
(d) some respondents returning only above-threshold procurement values, as they did not 
consider below-threshold procurement of any interest to the Commission study. 
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Estimates of government procurement of works, goods and services were, therefore, based on 
the top-down analysis, which used national accounts on general government spending and 
summed entries under the following line headings: 
(a) purchases of goods and services, 
(b) gross fixed capital formation. 
This total was adjusted to remove defence spending on 'warlike' materials (Article 223 
materials), which are not covered by the directives. These 'warlike' estimates were derived 
from national accounts statistics on defence spending and estimates of the share of 'warlike' 
materials from The costs of non-Europe in defence procurement study (European 
Commission, 1994b). 
Utilities procurement 
Estimates of utilities procurement were based on a combination of top-down and bottom-up 
analysis results. It was possible to use utilities' returns from the demand-side survey for 
making bottom-up estimates, since: 
(a) compared to the public sector, far fewer entities accounted for a large share of total 
utilities procurement; 
(b) responses were obtained from around 90% of all European utilities operating in the key 
sectors of power, gas, coal, oil and gas exploration/extraction, rail transport and 
telecommunications ; 
(c) completed questionnaires were returned via their European associations (which were 
briefed separately on the scope and objectives of the survey), ensuring standardized 
information covering their total annual procurement; 
(d) a large number of entities are separate companies (either state- or privately-) owned, 
operating as 'private sector' businesses and, therefore, more likely to have a 
comprehensive view of their total purchases and annual capital expenditure. 
Market size by contract type 
The market breakdown by contract type (works, supplies and services) was based on: 
(a) the EC-US procurement study (European Commission, 1994a) for central and sub-
central government, under the assumption that the 1994 breakdown was not significantly 
different from that in 1993; 
(b) the demand-side survey results for utilities. 
Market size by entity type 
Primary data sources for the breakdown of the market by principal entity type were: 
(a) the OECD (1995) national accounts for central and sub-central government, 
(b) the bottom-up analysis of utilities procurement using the demand-side survey results. 
Where possible, the breakdowns provided by the OECD national accounts were cross-
referenced with the results from the EC-US procurement study. 
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Above- and below-threshold procurement 
The only available data sources on the split between above- and below-threshold procurement 
were: 
(a) Member State returns to the Commission, 
(b) the EC-US procurement study. 
In the 1988 Cecchini report, the concept of above- and below-threshold procurement was not 
considered. The report focused on 'contract purchasing', concluding that entities were splitting 
contracts into lots to avoid the then directives' thresholds, which led to the introduction of 
rules on aggregation. There was no ex ante expectation of the percentage of total procurement 
which would, as a result, be above threshold (and therefore covered by the directives), 
although it is understood that a level of at least 50% was considered most likely. 
The complexity and sensitivity of this issue is demonstrated by: 
(a) the significant differences between the estimates from these two data sources, 
(b) the lack of any other reliable statistics. 
Given this, we have deliberately avoided making any additional estimates, but have instead 
highlighted a number of key issues and put forward hypotheses in this chapter, which are 
further developed in the final impact assessment in Chapter 23. 
Number of contracting entities 
A characteristic of the public-sector and, to a lesser extent, utilities markets has been the lack 
of a comprehensive description (single database) of the number of entities covered by the 
directives that are capable of letting above-threshold contracts, where a 'contract' is defined in 
the context of the aggregation rules. 
This lack of market knowledge has had implications for: 
(a) suppliers, in targeting potential customers; 
(b) the Commission in being able to determine whether entities that should be publishing 
notices are, in fact, doing so. 
In 1993, the European Commission's Directorate-General for the Internal Market and 
Financial Services (DG XV) launched a tender to identify these entities, with the intention of 
integrating the results into the Information System for Public Procurement (SIMAP), pilot 
projects of which are currently underway. 
When launching the study, the Commission estimated there were between 400,000 and 
500,000 entities and their devolved or decentralized establishments or offices which would 
be subject to the directives in the then EUR-12. Of these, it was estimated that some 20% 
(80,000-100,000) would be capable of letting above-threshold contracts (in the context of the 
aggregation rules). 
The total initial estimate of the number of entities in the EUR-12 made by the firms selected to 
carry out the study was some 390,000. After the first stage of the project, this was reduced to 
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about 159,500. This difference in itself highlights the difficulties and complexities of 
characterizing the market in this way. 
This chapter does, however, make use of the EAP database subsequently created since it is not 
only the sole source of the data required, but also the only source for which information has 
been collected in a systematic and consistent manner across the Member States. It is 
recognized that the database will be subject to further refinement, and whilst we have 
examined its content in a critical fashion, it would seem that the current figures are reasonable 
- if not conservative - estimates. 
Information for Austria, Finland and Sweden was obtained via their national procurement 
representatives. 
10.1.3. Key findings 
The estimated size of the EUR-15 public procurement market in 1994, based on a combination 
of top-down and bottom-up analyses, is ECU 721 billion (11.2% of EUR-15 GDP). As a share 
of GDP, this represents a reduction in most Member States, which is compensated for by a 
significant increase in Germany due to unification. 
The overall decrease in size of the public procurement market is likely to reflect the general 
decrease in public expenditure as a result of Member State policies to reduce budget deficits. 
In terms of procurement by entity type, sub-central government entities accounted for almost 
half of total EUR-15 public procurement in 1994, followed by central government (29%) and 
utilities (24%). Individual Member States showed significant variances due to the institutional 
differences in public-sector structure and the impact of austerity budgets. Compared to 1987, 
sub-central government procurement had increased, whereas central government and utilities 
purchasing had decreased slightly, reflecting: 
(a) decentralization in purchasing from central to regional and local government; 
(b) privatization of utilities. 
In terms of procurement by contract type, supplies accounted for nearly 40% of total 
purchasing in 1994, with the remainder split equally between works and services. Compared 
to 1987 no significant change in breakdown had taken place. 
Estimates of above-threshold procurement based on Member State returns for central 
government and the EC-US procurement study range from 25% to 60% of total procurement. 
National estimates vary from 16% in Denmark to 93% in France. 
The key determinant of above-threshold purchasing for supplies and services is the definition 
of 'like' products or services for the purposes of aggregation. If, under the Supplies Directive 
'like products' are defined at the level of'vehicles', 'stationery', 'IT hardware', etc. and, under 
the Services Directive at the level described in Annex A to the directive, it is inconceivable 
that central government purchasing entities spend less than approximately ECU 130,000 
annually under each of these general headings. Therefore, these estimates are likely to 
understate the level of above-threshold purchasing, other than for France, which reported 93% 
of total government purchasing above threshold. 
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The estimated total number of entities covered by the legislation and letting contracts above 
threshold is around 111,000 in 1995, half of which are sub-central government entities. 
10.2. Total market size in 1994 
10.2.1. Estimated total market size 
In 1994, public spending represented between 41% and 63% of the Member States' GDP -
some ECU 6,300 billion - covering everything from salaries and social welfare to purchases of 
works, supplies and services. The macro-economic importance of public purchasing in 
individual Member States is shown in Table 10.1. 
Table 10.1. Top-down estimate of public purchasing in 1994 (ECU billion) 
Belgium 
Denmark 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
Spain 
UK 
EUR-12 
Austria 
Finland 
Sweden 
EUR-15 
GDP1 
203.5 
123.3 
1,120.9 
1,725.3 
96.7 
44.4 
856.7 
278.4 
74.0 
407.0 
860.5 
5,790.7 
195.9 
95.1 
194.4 
6,276.1 
Total government 
expenditure1 
111.8 
77.3 
621.0 
850.6 
46.5 
18.3 
463.5 
153.7 
32.4 
194.5 
371.7 
2,941.2 
102.3 
57.3 
137.0 
3,237.8 
Total public 
procurement2 
11.7-15.1 
13.6-13.6 
114.4-120.1 
223.7-232.4 
6.3-7.9 
3.9-4.4 
73.6-82.5 
23.6-25.1 
8.5-8.9 
38.2-40.3 
123.6-125.0 
642.6-673.8 
22.8-23.6 
10.2-11.7 
28.5-28.6 
704.1-737.6 
Government 
expenditure/GDP 
(%) 
54.9 
62.7 
55.4 
49.3 
48.1 
41.1 
54.1 
55.2 
43.8 
47.8 
43.2 
50.8 
52.2 
60.2 
70.5 
51.6 
Public 
procurement/GDP 
(%) 
5.8-7.2 
11.0-11.1 
10.2-10.7 
13.0-13.5 
6.5-8.2 
8.7-9.8 
8.6-9.6 
8.5-9.0 
11.4-12.0 
9.4-9.9 
14.4-14.5 
11.1-11.6 
11.6-12.0 
10.8-12.3 
14.6-14.7 
11.2-11.8 
Sources: General government receipts, expenditure and gross debt, European Commission, 1995. 
" Opening up public procurement in the excluded sectors, European Commission, 1992; 
EC-US procurement, European Commission, 1994a; 
The costs of non-Europe in defence procurement, European Commission, 1994b; 
EuroStrategy Consultants estimates. 
In the following Member States total public expenditure represented a relatively high share of 
GDP in 1994: 
(a) Sweden (70.2%), 
(b) Denmark (62.7%), 
(c) Finland (60.2%), 
(d) Belgium (55.6%). 
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In the larger Member States, the share of GDP accounted for by the public sector varied from 
43% in the UK, to 47% in Germany and 55% in France and Italy. On average, total govern-
ment expenditure accounted for nearly 52% (ECU 3,240 billion) of total EUR-15 GDP in 
1994. 
In all Member States, public procurement in 1994 represented a very significant proportion of 
GDP. In the EU overall, this was an estimated 11% (ECU 704-738 billion). 
Variances in public procurement as a share of GDP between Member States were significant. 
In Belgium, Greece and, to a lesser extent, the Netherlands, the national shares are low 
compared to the EUR-15 average. They appear to reflect: 
(a) institutional differences in public-sector structure; 
(b) the impact of austerity budgets. 
Discounting Belgium, Greece and the Netherlands, 1994 estimates of national procurement 
markets as a share of GDP varied from 9.1% in Italy and 9.6% in Spain to 13.2% in Germany 
and 14.4% in the UK. 
Of all 15 Member States, Germany had by far the largest public procurement market, 
amounting to an estimated ECU 228 billion (32% of total EUR-15 procurement), followed by 
the UK (ECU 124 billion) and France (ECU 117 billion). Overall, the five largest Member 
States accounted for over 80% of the total EU public procurement market in 1994. 
10.2.2. Market size comparison between 1987 and 1994 
Government expenditure 
Between 1987 and 1994, the share of GDP accounted for by government expenditure 
increased from 48.8% to 51.6% for the EUR-15 countries, reflecting the cost of the sharp rise 
in unemployment. 
Figure 10.1 shows the changes in total government expenditure as a share of GDP between 
1987 and 1994 for each Member State and for the EU as a whole. 
General factors underlying changes in individual Member States include: 
(a) privatization of public services (utilities); 
(b) institutional changes in the public-sector structure, such as contracting out of non-core 
services; 
(c) annual variances in expenditure, particularly in the smaller Member States, where large 
infrastructure projects can have a significant impact on government expenditure. 
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Figure 10.1. Government expenditure as a share of GDP in 1987 and 1994 
Sources: Tables 4.1 and 10.1. 
Public purchasing 
Between 1987 and 1994, total EUR-15 public procurement in value terms increased by 51%, 
from an estimated ECU 476 billion in 1987 to ECU 721 billion in 1994. 
Figure 10.2 shows the top-down estimates of the changes in total public purchasing for each 
Member State between 1987 and 1994. 
Figure 10.2. Total procurement in 1987 and 1994 (ECU billion) 
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Note: 1994 figures are based on mean values. 
Sources: Tables 4.1 and 10.1. 
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Between 1987 and 1994, France, Germany, Italy and the UK increased their relative share of 
the EUR­15 public procurement market, with their combined share rising from 73% in 1987 to 
76% in 1994. Germany was the largest contributor to this increase with its share of the total 
market growing disproportionately as a result of reunification. 
Figure 10.3 shows the estimated changes between 1987 and 1994 in public purchasing as a 
share of national GDP for each Member State and the EU as a whole. 
Figure 10.3. Procurement as a share of GDP in 1987 and 1994 
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Sources: Tables 4.1 and 10.1. 
The total EU procurement market as a share of GDP showed no significant change between 
1987 and 1994. However, discounting the expansion of the German procurement market 
following unification, public purchasing as a share of GDP decreased in all Member States, 
with the exception of Finland where the overall market size showed no significant change. 
The overall decrease in size of the public procurement market is likely to reflect the general 
reduction in public expenditure as a result of Member State policies to reduce budget deficits. 
10.3. Market size by entity type 
10.3.1. Estimated market size by entity type 
Table 10.2 shows the breakdown of the procurement market by principal purchasing entity 
type for each Member State. Table 10.3 shows the value of the procurement for government 
and utilities in each Member State. 
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Table 10.2. Shares of public purchasing by entity type in 1994 
Belgium/Lux. 
Denmark 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
Spain 
UK 
EUR-12 
Austria 
Finland 
Sweden 
EUR-15 
Central 
government1 
(%) 
38.8 
-
22.7 
5.2 
-
22.5 
22.0 
25.0 
43.3 
18.4 
53.6 
30.3 
15.8 
-
-
28.8 
Sub-central 
government1 
(%) 
26.5 
-
50.6 
73.6 
-
49.7 
50.3 
43.2 
29.0 
56.8 
24.7 
45.4 
60.1 
-
-
47.1 
General 
government2 
(%) 
65.2 
72.2 
73.3 
78.8 
68.8 
72.3 
72.2 
68.2 
72.3 
75.2 
78.3 
75.7 
75.9 
80.4 
79.3 
75.9 
Utilities2 
(%) 
34.8 
27.8 
26.7 
21.2 
31.2 
27.7 
27.8 
31.8 
27.7 
24.8 
21.7 
24.3 
24.1 
19.6 
20.7 
24.1 
Total 
(%) 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
Sources: ' Breakdown based on OECD national accounts, 1995. 
" E, GR, P: Opening up public procurement in the excluded sectors, European Commission, 1992. 
Other countries: EuroStrategy Consultants estimates. 
Table 10.3. Total public procurement market estimates in 1994 (ECU billion) 
Belgium/Lux. 
Denmark 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
Spain 
UK 
EUR-12 
Austria 
Finland 
Sweden 
EUR-15 
Total government 
procurement! 
8.8 
9.8 
85.9 
179.8 
4.9 
3.0 
56.4 
16.6 
6.3 
29.5 
97.3 
498.4 
17.6 
8.8 
22.7 
547.4 
Total utilities 
procurement1 
2.9-6.3 
3.8-3.8 
28.5-34.2 
43.9-52.6 
1.4-3.0 
0.9-1.4 
17.2-26.1 
7.0-8.5 
2.2-2.6 
8.7-10.8 
26.2-27.7 
144.3-175.4 
5.2-6.0 
1.4-2.9 
5.8-5.9 
156.7-190.2 
Total public 
procurement 
11.7-15.1 
13.6-13.6 
114.4-120.1 
223.7-232.4 
6.3-7.9 
3.9-4.4 
73.6-82.5 
23.6-25.1 
8.5-8.9 
38.2-40.3 
123.6-125.0 
642.6-673.8 
22.8-23.6 
10.2-11.7 
28.5-28.6 
704.1-737.6 
Total procurement as 
% of GDP 
5.8-7.2 
11.0-11.1 
10.2-10.7 
13.0-13.5 
6.5-8.2 
8.7-9.8 
8.6-9.6 
8.5-9.0 
11.4-12.0 
9.4-9.9 
14.4-14.5 
11.1-11.6 
11.6-12.0 
10.8-12.3 
14.6-14.7 
11.2-11.8 
Sources: ' General government receipt, expenditure and gross debt. European Commission, 1995. 
2 EuroStrategy Consultants estimates. 
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In 1994, general government, including central, regional and local government, accounted for 
an estimated 76% (ECU 547 billion) of public purchasing split between: 
(a) central government, representing an estimated 29% of total procurement, 
(b) sub-central government, representing 47%. 
The utilities accounted for the remaining 24% (ECU 157-190 billion). 
Variances in the percentage breakdown by purchasing entity type between Member States 
were significant, particularly in Belgium, Greece and, to a lesser extent, the Netherlands where 
the share of total procurement accounted for by the utilities is considered to be high (>30%). 
These and other variances appear to reflect: 
(a) institutional differences in public-sector structure, 
(b) the impact of public-sector austerity budgets. 
Discounting Belgium, Greece and the Netherlands, 1994 estimates of procurement accounted 
for by the utilities varied from around 20% in Finland and Sweden to nearly 28% in Italy. 
At a general government level, the split between central and sub-central government showed 
even more significant variances, reflecting: 
(a) the differences in national public-sector structures, 
(b) the degree of decentralization. 
Estimates for central government purchasing in 1994 varied from 5% of total procurement in 
Germany to over 50% in the UK. 
10.3.2. Market size by entity type comparison between 1987 and 1994 
The estimated change between 1987 and 1994 in the breakdown of the EU procurement 
market by entity type is shown in Figure 10.4. 
Figure 10.4. Procurement by entity type in 1987 and 1994 (%) 
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Note: 1987 breakdown based on the weighted average of the four largest Member States. 
Sources: Tables 4.3 and 10.2. 
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A comparison of the Cecchini study estimates of the share of the procurement market in 1987 
with those made for 1994 shows the following differences: 
(a) central government: 33% (Cecchini), 29% (1994); 
(b) sub-central government: 35% (Cecchini), 47% (1994); 
(c) utilities: 32% (Cecchini), 24% ( 1994). 
The majority of these apparent changes reflect the difference in coverage of the Cecchini 
report and that of the current directives, with the former including: 
(a) 'warlike materials' in central government procurement; 
(b) entities and purchases not covered by the current directives, such as purchases made by 
airlines, and purchases of fuel used for power generation. 
Other factors likely to be reflected in these changes are: 
(a) a degree of decentralization in purchasing from central government to regional and local 
government; 
(b) privatization of utilities. 
10.4. Market size by nature of contract 
The breakdown of the public procurement market in 1994 by contract type, i.e. works, 
supplies and services, for the Member States available is shown in Figure 10.5. 
Figure 10.5. Estimated public procurement by contract type in 1994 (%) 
B DK D IRL I* NL* UK' EUR-12 
* Breakdown based on utilities procurement only. 
Sources: EC-US procurement study, European Commission, 1994a. 
Bottom-up analysis for utilities procurement. 
On average, purchasing of supplies accounted for the largest share of the procurement market 
in 1994, with an estimated 38% of the total, followed by works (33%) and services (29%). 
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Significant differences existed between Member States with: 
(a) smaller Member States showing large variances between the different contract types, 
which are likely to reflect substantial one-off contracts; 
(b) larger Member States showing a similar breakdown with the exception of France, where 
works contracts accounted for most procurement. 
The total EU procurement market breakdown by contract and entity type is shown in Table 
10.4. 
Table 10.4. Estimated total public procurement by contract and entity type in 1994 
Entity type 
Central government1 
Sub-central government1 
Utilities2 
Total 
Works 
(%) 
23.8 
41.3 
25.9 
32.6 
Supplies 
(%) 
39.7 
29.6 
50.7 
38.3 
Services 
(%) 
36.5 
29.1 
23.4 
29.1 
Total 
(%) 
100 
100 
100 
100 
Sources: ' EC-US procurement study, European Commission, 1994a. 
2 Bottom-up analysis for utilities procurement. 
Table 10.4 shows that: 
(a) works contracts accounted for the largest share of total sub-central government 
purchasing (40%), compared with supplies being the largest purchasing area for central 
government and utilities, which taken in conjunction with the information in Figure 10.4 
indicates that in the EUR-15 the majority of infrastructure expenditure is carried out at a 
sub-central government level; 
(a) central government is, in relative terms, the largest purchaser of services - 37% of the 
total - compared with 29% for sub-central government and 23% for utilities; 
(a) over half of total utilities procurement is spent on supplies contracts, reflecting the 
nature of their business. 
The changes between 1987 and 1994 in the procurement market segmentation by contract type 
is shown in Table 10.5. 
Table 10.5. Procurement by contract type in 1987 and 1994 
1987 
1994 
Works 
(%) 
33.8 
32.6 
Supplies 
(%) 
38.0 
38.3 
Services 
(%) 
28.2 
29.1 
Total 
(%) 
100 
100 
Sources: Tables 4.2 and 10.4. 
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Table 10.5 shows that there has been no significant shift in the breakdown by contract type 
since the implementation of the directives. 
10.5. Above- and below-threshold procurement 
10.5.1. Member State returns 
Based on the statistical returns from the Member States to the Commission, as required by the 
directives, a segmentation between above- and below-threshold purchasing was obtained, 
assuming full reporting of all public purchasing covered by the directives. 
Since only detailed Member State returns for central government purchasing for 1992 were 
available, a breakdown by above- and below-threshold purchasing was based solely on central 
government purchasing in 1992 as shown in Table 10.6 for each of the 12 reporting Member 
States. 
Table 10.6. Above- and below-threshold central government purchasing in 1992 
Belgium 
Denmark 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
Spain 
UK 
EUR-12 
Source: Member States'stati 
Above threshold 
(%) 
58.9 
16.3 
92.6 
68.0 
39.8 
21.0 
63.9 
31.1 
51.9 
39.9 
44.0 
61.2 
60.5 
stical reports, DG XV, 1995. 
Below threshold 
(%) 
41.1 
83.7 
7.4 
32.0 
60.2 
79.0 
36.1 
68.9 
48.1 
60.1 
56.0 
38.8 
39.5 
Total 
(%) 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
In 1992, reported above-threshold purchasing varied significantly between Member States 
from nearly 93% of total central government purchasing in France to around 16% in Denmark. 
On average, an estimated 60% of all central government purchasing was reported to be above 
threshold in 1992. 
In general, the larger Member States reported a higher share of central government 
procurement to be above threshold than the smaller Member States, which may be explained 
by, on average, the former's procurement contracts being larger. Additionally, central 
government in Member States where the directives had been implemented recently, i.e. 
Greece, Portugal and Spain, and which are, therefore, expected to be less familiar with the 
legislation, reported a lower share of above-threshold purchasing in 1992. 
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However, the large differences between the Member States where the directives have been in 
effect for several years cannot be explained by Member State size alone. Other possible factors 
contributing to these variances are: 
(a) the structure of the public sector, and in particular, the degree of decentralization; 
(b) the extent of autonomy given to individual departments within a purchasing entity in the 
context of the definition of discrete operating units (DOUs); 
(c) national differences in interpretation and application of the directives' aggregation and 
publishing requirements. 
The issue of familiarity with the procurement directives and the changes in procurement 
practices is also demonstrated by the change in the split between above- and below-threshold 
central government purchasing between 1990 and 1992. Figure 10.6 shows the change in 
above-threshold central government procurement for the 12 reporting Member States between 
1990 and 1992. 
Figure 10.6. Change in reported above-threshold central government purchasing 
EUR-12 
Source: Member States ' statistical reports, DG XV, 1995. 
Between 1990 and 1992, the reported share of above-threshold purchasing increased from an 
estimated 45% in 1990 to over 60% of total EUR-12 central government purchasing. Similar 
increases were reported for the four larger Member States and the smaller northern European 
Member States, indicating changes in procurement practices at a central government level 
following the aggregation and publishing requirements, as laid down in the directives. 
10.5.2. EC-US procurement study 
Table 10.7 shows the estimated split between above- and below-threshold procurement for 
total EUR-15 procurement based on the findings of the survey carried out as part of the EC-
US procurement study (European Commission, 1994a). Above-threshold procurement is 
expressed both as a share of: 
(a) total procurement under contract or 'contract purchasing', which was estimated to 
represent around 55% of total procurement in the Cecchini study; 
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(b) annual expenditure on procurement under contract. 
Table 10.7. Total above-threshold procurement 
Entity type 
Central government 
Sub-central government 
Utilities 
Total 
Above threshold as a share of 
total procurement under contract 
(%) 
55 
34 
57 
46 
Above threshold as a share of 
annual expenditure on procurement 
under contract 
(%) 
23 
26 
26 
25 
Sources: EC-US procurement study, European Commission, 1994a, and Tables 10.2 and 10.3. 
The EC-US procurement study found that, on average, 46% of total contract purchasing and 
25% of annual contract procurement expenditure was above threshold. For total contract 
purchasing, this varied from an expected lower share for sub-central government purchasing, 
34%, to around 55% for central government and utilities. 
Total above-threshold procurement 
These estimates of above-threshold procurement are significantly different from the reported 
values of above-threshold procurement - an estimated 25% compared to a reported 61% of 
total central government being above threshold. 
For the purposes of assessing the level of above-threshold purchasing and, in consequence, 
whether there is significant under-publication of notices, it is necessary to consider 
expenditure on works, supplies and services at the level of the DOU. For certain supplies and 
services, notably vehicles, stationery, office furniture, IT hardware and software, the DOU is 
clearly: 
(a) the ministry (or some central purchasing function) for central government procurement; 
(b) the local authority for sub-central government; 
(c) the utility. 
If the level of aggregation within a DOU is defined as 'vehicles', 'stationery', Office 
furniture', etc., it is inconceivable that central government ministries in all Member States, and 
sub-central government entities serving populations of 50,000 or more do not enter into 
contracts totalling more than ECU 130,000 and ECU 200,000 respectively for a wide range of 
supplies and services. 
For example, Table 10.8 shows the expenditure breakdown of a typical EU sub-central 
authority, serving a population of 400,000. 
In this case, only 12 tender notices, with an estimated value of around ECU 18 million, were 
published in the OJ for annual purchasing of over ECU 100 million, nearly all of which is 
likely to be above threshold. 
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Table 10.8. Gross capital expenditure for a typical EU local authority (1995/96) 
Capital expenditure 
Land and buildings 
Information technology and communications 
Vehicles 
Other plant and equipment 
Total 
Total population 
ECU (million) 
45.7 
40.7 
14.8 
1.3 
102.5 
414,000 
Invitations to tender 
published 
4 
0 
4 
4 
12 
Source: Internal information on gross fixed capital formation provided to EuroStrategy Consultants. 
Even in the event the DOU serves a smaller population, or a more detailed level of aggregation 
is applied, it is still inconceivable that annual expenditure under each (high level) aggregation 
heading is below the thresholds laid down in the directives. 
Given that 80% of procurement is accounted for by the ministries, sub-central bodies and 
utilities in the demand-side sample (see Chapter 12) and the quoted example is for an entity at 
the bottom end of this sample, it is unlikely that these entities have purchasing budgets, under 
the aggregated expenditure headings, which are below the thresholds laid down in the 
directives. 
Therefore, in line with the directives' intention regarding above-threshold procurement, the 
estimated 25% or the reported 61% above-threshold procurement probably understate the 
percentage of total procurement that should be classified as above threshold. 
10.6. Market size - number of contracting entities 
Based on the Commission's EAP database, Table 10.9 shows the numbers of entities which 
are: 
(a) covered by the directives, 
(b) capable of letting above-threshold contracts. 
It should be noted that these numbers reflect entities which are legally entitled to let contracts. 
In 1995, an estimated 111,000 entities were covered by the legislation and should be 
publishing in the OJ. At an individual Member State level, the number of entities vary 
significantly, irrespective of population size, reflecting institutional differences in public-
sector structure. 
Excluding Italy and the Netherlands, sub-central government entities accounted for the 
majority of entities covered, at nearly 75%. Central government entities represented 9% and 
utilities 18% of the total number. Large variations between Member States exist, with: 
(a) Germany and Denmark having a disproportionately large number of utilities, the 
majority of which represent small water companies; 
(b) a relatively small number of sub-central government entities in the UK and Spain, 
reflecting the centralized public-sector structure. 
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Table 10.9. Entities covered and capable of letting above-threshold contracts (1995) 
Member State 
Belgium 
Denmark 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy1 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands1 
Portugal 
Spain 
UK 
Austria 
Finland2 
Sweden3 
Total 
Central 
226 
177 
1,625 
733 
660 
129 
n/a 
320 
n/a 
433 
1,010 
841 
200 
150 
900 
Sub-central 
1,926 
6,480 
14,854 
18,580 
2,549 
227 
n/a 
178 
n/a 
1,349 
5,097 
7,884 
1,000 
524 
3,075 
Utilities 
72 
2,999 
138 
10,850 
241 
173 
n/a 
37 
n/a 
112 
289 
351 
100 
550 
54 
Total 
2,224 
9,656 
16,617 
30,163 
3,450 
529 
23,512 
535 
472 
1,894 
6,396 
9,076 
1,300 
1,224 
4,029 
111,077 
1 Total number of entities covered by legislation; no breakdown available by entity type at time of analysis. 
2 Sub-central includes regional and local government plus bodies governed by public law. 
3 Sub-central includes utilities owned by sub-central government entities. 
Sources: EUR-12: EAP database, European Commission, 1996 (subject to revision). 
Austria; national public procurement representative estimates. 
Finland; Ministry of Trade and Industry estimates. 
Sweden: National Board for Public Procurement estimates. 
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11. Publication in the Official Journal 
11.1. Overview 
11.1.1. Ex ante hypothesis 
A key measure of openness in the European public procurement markets is the number of 
tender notices published in the Official Journal of the European Communities (OJ) since 
1987, in terms of: 
(a) changes in general publication rates, 
(b) entity types (central government, sub-central government and utilities), 
(c) type of contract (works, supplies and services/combined contracts), 
(d) types of procedure used, 
(e) total number of entities publishing. 
General publication rates 
It is expected that, since 1987: 
(a) the total number of notices published in the OJ would have increased significantly in all 
Member States; 
(b) the increase in publication levels would have levelled off in recent years, reflecting 
familiarity with the publication requirements in the directives, except where: 
(i) the directives came into force only recently, notably the Utilities and Services 
Directives, 
(ii) Member States had derogations, notably Greece, Spain and Portugal; 
(c) familiarity with the publication requirements in the directives would also have resulted 
in contract award notices being published for all contracts awarded. 
Publication by entity type 
It is expected that: 
(a) the increase in publication levels for central and sub-central government would have 
levelled off in recent years, reflecting familiarity with the publication requirements in 
the directives, except where Member States had derogations, notably Greece, Spain and 
Portugal; 
(b) the number of tender notices published by utilities would have increased substantially 
following the implementation of the Utilities Directive for supplies and works in 1993, 
and for services in 1994. 
Type of procedure 
It is expected that central and sub-central government for all Member States would be 
predominantly using open and (since 1993) restricted procedures, whereas utilities would also 
have made use of the negotiated procedure and qualification systems. 
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Publication by contract type 
It is expected that publication levels would have increased equally for all types of contracts, 
other than works, bearing in mind the raising of the threshold from ECU 1 million to 
ECU 5 million in 1990. 
Entities publishing 
It is expected that, since the implementation of the legislation, the estimated number of entities 
publishing in the OJ would correspond in broad terms with the number of entities covered by 
the legislation and which should be publishing in the OJ. 
11.1.2. Coverage 
This section describes: 
(a) overall changes in publication rates between 1987 and 1995, by: 
(i) Member State, 
(ii) entity type, 
(iii) type of contract; 
(b) nature of publication of tender notices in 1995 by: 
(i) contract award notices published, 
(ii) entity type, 
(iii) procedure used, 
(iv) type of contract; 
(c) the number of entities publishing in the O J in 1995. 
11.1.3. Data 
Prime data sources are: 
(a) the TED database archives for the years 1993 to 1995, 
(b) statistics published by the Office for Official Publications of the European Communities 
for the years prior to 1993. 
Analysis of the publishing entities focused on: 
(a) central government (including TED categories 'central government' and 'armed forces'), 
(b) sub-central government (TED category 'local authorities'), 
(c) utilities (TED category 'water, energy, transport and telecommunications sectors'). 
The following types of award procedures were considered, using the TED database 
categorization: 
(a) open, 
(b) open recurring, 
(c) restricted, 
(d) accelerated restricted, 
(e) negotiated, 
(f) accelerated negotiated. 
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For the purpose of the analysis, tender notices were considered synonymous with invitations to 
tender. In addition, notices published regarding the existence of a qualification system were 
also classified as a tender notice, since this type of notice can be used by utilities to inform 
prospective suppliers of opportunities. 
The following types of contracts were covered: 
(a) works, 
(b) supplies, 
(c) services (including also the TED category 'combined contracts', which represents less 
than 2% of the total notices published). 
In terms of number of entities publishing in the OJ, an analysis was carried out by Member , 
State and entity type using the 'stat=report' function in the TED database. Due to double 
counting problems, the number of entities publishing have been presented in a range whereby: 
(a) the upper limit represents the raw number obtained from the TED database; 
(b) the lower limit represents the number of entities after adjusting for double counting as a 
result of: 
(i) spelling differences and input errors, 
(ii) different departments publishing within one entity. 
The actual number of entities publishing in the OJ is considered likely to lie between the upper 
and lower limits. 
11.1.4. Key findings 
There has been a significant overall increase in the total number of notices published in the O J 
since 1987. However, Member State increases varied from 300% to 1,000%. 
The number of notices for supplies and works contracts in the nine Member States subject to 
the Supplies and Works Directives since 1989 is still growing substantially. 
There is a low level of compliance with the requirement to publish contract award notices 
(CANs) with, on average, only one CAN for every two tender notices. 
Sub-central government accounted for the majority of notices published in 1995, although 
there were differences between Member States, reflecting roles and responsibilities. 
In general, central government bodies complied with the directives' requirements in relation to 
use of procedures, with the exception of Italy, where accelerated restricted was used for over 
60% of tenders. A number of Member States also made noticeably high use of the negotiated 
procedure. 
In general, sub-central government bodies complied with the directives' requirements in 
relation to use of procedures, with the exception of Italy, where accelerated restricted was used 
for some 38% of tenders. Noticeably, high use of the negotiated procedure was also made in 
several Member States. 
In general, utilities predominantly used the negotiated and restricted procedures, although a 
number did make significant use of the open procedure. 
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In 1995, between 15,000 and 18,500 entities published notices in the OJ, with sub-central 
bodies making up about 75% of the total. 
11.2. Change in publication levels 
Between 1987 and 1995 the number of published notices increased from around 12,000 to 
nearly 90,000, representing a more than sevenfold rise (Figure 11.1). 
Figure 11.1. Total number of notices published in the OJ by nature of contracts 
between 1987 and 1995 
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Sources: TED database, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. 
The change in total number of notices published between 1987 and 1995 shows: 
(a) a progressive increase in number of notices published for supplies contracts, particularly 
between 1992 and 1994, reflecting the coming into force of the Utilities Directives and 
the completion of the single market on 1 January 1993; 
(b) a constant increase in number of notices published for works contracts, with the 
exception of a small decrease in 1991; 
(c) relatively smaller increases in the number of service contract notices between 1987 and 
1992, followed by a progressive increase after 1993 when the Services Directives came 
into force. 
The share of supply contracts in the total number of notices published increased from nearly 
40% in 1987 to over 45% in 1995. The share of the total number of notices published 
accounted for by service contracts rose from 3% in 1987 to 28% in 1995. The share of works 
related notices decreased to 27% of the total number of notices published in 1995, and would 
be less without Germany distorting the breakdown as a result of a large number of works 
contracts, post-unification (Figure 11.2). 
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Figure 11.2. Total number of notices published in the OJ by nature of contract, 1987 
and 1995 
1987 1995 
Supplies 
40% 
Services 
3% 
Works 
57% Supplies 
45% 
Services/ 
combined 
28% 
Works 
27% 
12,211 notices 95,291 notices 
Sources: TED database, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. 
In general, these significant increases in total number of notices published and the changes in 
breakdown by type of contract between 1987 and 1995 reflected: 
(a) the implementation of the Utilities Directives in 1993 resulting in an increase in notices 
published for all types of contracts; 
(b) the implementation of the Services Directives in 1993 resulting in the large increase in 
publication levels of service contract notices; 
(c) increased publication rates for supplies contracts following implementation of the new 
Supplies Directive in 1989; 
(d) relatively smaller increases in publication rates for works contracts, partly due to the 
raising of the threshold for works contracts from ECU 1 million to ECU 5 million in 
1990. 
Figure 11.3 shows the total number of tender notices published for the individual Member 
States in 1995 compared to 1987. 
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Figure 11.3. Total number of tender notices by Member State for 1987 and 1995 
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Note: No 1987 data are available for Austria, Sweden and Finland. 
Sources: TED database, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. 
As expected, all Member States have published significantly more tender notices, but changes 
varied from a twofold increase in France, Italy and Spain, to ninefold increases or more in 
Germany, Ireland and Denmark. 
The extent to which the implementation of the Services and Utilities Directives have 
contributed to these increases is shown in Tables 11.1 and 11.2 which outline the total number 
and the annual increases in notices published by entity type and type of contract between 1993 
and 1995. 
Table 11.1. Total number of notices published by entity type and nature of contract 
Entity type 
Central government 
Sub­central government 
Utilities 
Total1 
Nature of contract 
Works 
Supplies 
Services/combined 
Total central government 
Works 
Supplies 
Services/combined 
Total sub­central government 
Works 
Supplies 
Services/combined 
Total utilities 
Works 
Supplies 
Services/combined 
Total 
1993 
1,933 
9,062 
1,157 
12,152 
13,319 
13,375 
4.079 
30,773 
1,968 
4,983 
343 
7,294 
17,376 
27,529 
5,879 
50,784 
1994 
1.681 
10,369 
3,622 
15,672 
15,735 
17,703 
10,542 
43,980 
2,659 
8,789 
1,672 
13,120 
21,688 
37,415 
16,620 
75,723 
1995 
1,637 
11,535 
5,387 
18,559 
17,820 
21,006 
15.099 
53,925 
3,853 
10,361 
3.878 
18,092 
24,808 
44.238 
26.114 
95,160 
1 Total notices include also some notices published by other entity types. 
Source: TED database. 
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Table 11.2. Annual change in number of notices published by entity type and nature of 
contract (%) 
Entity type 
Central government 
Sub-central government 
Utilities 
Total' 
Nature of contract 
Works 
Supplies 
Services/combined 
Total central government 
Works 
Supplies 
Services/combined 
Total sub-central government 
Works 
Supplies 
Services/combined 
Total utilities 
Works 
Supplies 
Services/combined 
Total 
1994 
-13 
14 
213 
29 
18 
32 
158 
43 
35 
76 
387 
80 
25 
36 
183 
46 
1995 
-3 
11 
49 
18 
13 
19 
43 
23 
45 
18 
132 
38 
14 
18 
57 
25 
1 Total notices include also some notices published by other entity types. 
Source: TED database. 
Tables 11.1 and 11.2 show that: 
(a) the overall increases in notices published are high - 46% in 1994 and 25% in 1995; 
(b) the increase in total notices published is highest for service contracts (183% in 1994 and 
57% in 1995), reflecting the implementation of the Services Directives; 
(c) the increase in total notices published is the lowest for works contracts (25% in 1994 
and 14% in 1995); 
(d) utilities accounted for a relatively larger increase in publication of contract notices than 
central or sub-central government, reflecting the implementation of the Utilities 
Directives - central government publishing increased at the lowest rate; 
(e) in the areas where the directives have been in force since 1989, i.e. central and sub-
central government for works and supplies, increases are still high, in the range of 11% 
to 32% in 1995, with the exception of works contract notices which decreased slightly. 
The extent to which individual Member States contributed to the increases in total publication 
rates is shown in Table 11.3. 
In terms of total notices published by Member State: 
(a) annual increases were, relatively, highest in Austria, Finland and Sweden, reflecting 
their recent admission to the European Union; 
(b) on average, annual increases were high for most other Member States varying from 15% 
in Italy to 83% in Spain, with the exception of Greece, Luxembourg and the UK where 
there was no significant increase in the publication of notices. 
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Table 11.3. Change in number of notices by Member State, entity type and type of 
contract between 1994 and 1995 (%) 
Procedure 
Central 
Works 
Supplies 
Services/comb 
Total increase 
Sub-central 
Works 
Supplies 
Services/comb 
Total increase 
Utilities 
Works 
Supplies 
Services/comb 
Total increase 
Total 
Works 
Supplies 
Services/comb 
Total increase 
Β 
111 
14 
86 
28 
17 
24 
64 
28 
-4 
48 
103 
44 
121 
129 
178 
133 
D 
-64 
4 
-29 
-25 
20 
25 
58 
23 
56 
52 
92 
56 
120 
131 
151 
125 
DK 
30 
-21 
17 
-11 
-25 
30 
184 
69 
-9 
-17 
85 
-4 
-15 
2 
137 
31 
E 
-37 
34 
431 
79 
11 
63 
426 
84 
186 
240 
-40 
135 
1 
57 
473 
83 
F 
45 
14 
138 
32 
-7 
24 
90 
27 
57 
1 
142 
26 
5 
17 
105 
28 
GR 
49 
12 
87 
27 
-55 
20 
-8 
-10 
69 
-3 
575 
68 
-30 
16 
44 
6 
I 
-28 
3 
-45 
-9 
17 
2 
21 
Π 
82 
20 
176 
39 
30 
8 
24 
15 
IRL 
n/a 
57 
83 
68 
-16 
43 
34 
20 
-35 
11 
224 
34 
-15 
33 
86 
33 
L 
25 
10 
33 
18 
-18 
13 
11 
-13 
33 
-30 
-33 
-23 
-5 
0 
14 
-1 
NL 
31 
21 
73 
38 
-5 
10 
29 
12 
8 
-7 
138 
17 
5 
9 
62 
23 
Ρ 
-7 
28 
109 
31 
56 
4 
68 
36 
267 
-21 
-
10 
28 
23 
92 
32 
UK 
35 
12 
36 
22 
-27 
-17 
1 
-10 
-5 
-12 
107 
16 
-9 
-5 
24 
5 
A 
39 
-17 
500 
-3 
189 
161 
1100 
194 
183 
285 
1020 
281 
170 
96 
963 
142 
S 
50 
33 
74 
44 
2 
72 
95 
75 
194 
173 
380 
222 
39 
73 
106 
80 
FIN 
-77 
-30 
36 
-37 
167 
130 
605 
160 
23 
152 
300 
149 
28 
101 
380 
111 
EUR-
15 
-3 
11 
49 
18 
13 
19 
43 
23 
45 
18 
132 
38 
14 
18 
57 
25 
Source: TED database. 
In terms of notices published for the different types of contracts 
(a) 
(b) 
the largest increase was for service contracts for all Member States, reflecting the impact 
of the Services Directive. Excluding the recently entered Member States, increases in 
total notices published for service contracts varied from 14% in Luxembourg to almost 
475% in Spain; 
the number of notices published for works contracts showed the lowest increases, in 
most Member States. 
In terms of the entities publishing: 
(a) notices published by the utilities showed the largest increases in seven of the 15 Member 
States. With the exception of Denmark and Luxembourg, utilities published more 
notices in all Member States, varying from a 10% increase in Portugal to 281% in 
Austria; 
(b) the overall number of notices published by central government increased for most 
Member States, with the exception of Austria, Denmark, Germany and Italy. Similarly, 
the notices published by sub-central government increased for most Member States, with 
the exception of Greece, Luxembourg and the UK. 
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11.3. Nature of publication 
11.3.1. Publication of contract award notices 
Table 11.4. Comparison of contract award notices to total tenders published by 
Member State 
Belgium 
Denmark 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
Spain 
UK 
EUR-12 
Austria 
Finland 
Sweden 
EUR-15 
CAN/tender 
1993 
0.21 
0.55 
0.46 
0.49 
0.02 
0.33 
0.33 
0.44 
0.48 
0.07 
0.01 
0.50 
0.41 
0.52 
0.31 
0.50 
0.41 
CAN/tender 
1994 
0.29 
0.58 
0.54 
0.46 
0.04 
0.40 
0.48 
0.54 
0.49 
0.05 
0.02 
0.58 
0.47 
0.28 
0.28 
0.30 
0.46 
CAN/tender 
1995 
0.38 
0.58 
0.50 
0.48 
0.03 
0.54 
0.53 
0.47 
0.60 
0.03 
0.11 
0.57 
0.47 
0.39 
0.66 
0.71 
0.48 
Sources: TED database, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. 
The directives require that for each contract awarded a contract award notice (CAN) should be 
published. Table 11.4 shows that: 
(a) on average, for every two tender notices appearing in the OJ, only one contract award 
notice was published in 1995; 
(b) excluding Greece, Portugal and Spain, no large variations existed between Member 
States in the number of CANs compared to the number of tenders published, varying 
from 0.38 in Belgium to 0.71 in Sweden; 
(c) hardly any CANs were published in Greece, Portugal and Spain (0.03-0.11), whereby it 
should be noted that no derogations to the directives in terms of the publication of CANs 
exist in these countries; 
(d) between 1993 and 1995 slightly more CANs were published in relation to tender notices, 
increasing from 0.41 in 1993 to 0.48 in 1995. 
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Figure 11.4. Contract award notices in relation to tenders published by Member State 
and entity type (1995) 
central ¡ 
­j Q sub­cent ral ! 
B D DK E F GR I IRL L NL Ρ UK A S FIN EU 
Source: TED database. 
CANs should be published in equal numbers by all entities. Figure 11.4 shows that: 
(a) utilities, on average, published more CANs compared to the number of tender notices 
than the other entity types in 1995 (0.78). This can be explained by the fact that many 
utilities make use of qualification systems, which allow them to award numerous 
contracts without publishing separate tender notices, but for each of which a CAN has to 
be published; 
(b) central government published slightly more CANs compared to tender notices (0.49) 
than sub­central government (0.42) in 1995. 
Large differences existed between Member States in 1995 with: 
(a) central government publishing more CANs in comparison to total tenders than the other 
entity types in Denmark, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Austria and Sweden; 
(b) utilities publishing more CANs in comparison to total tenders than other entity types in 
Belgium, France, Ireland and the UK; 
(c) sub­central government publishing more CANs in comparison to total tenders than the 
other entity types in Spain and some of the smaller Member States, such as Greece, 
Luxembourg, Portugal and Finland. 
11.3.2. Publication by entity type 
The nature of publication of tender notices by Member State and entity type in 1995 is shown 
in Figure 11.5. 
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Figure 11.5. Total number of tenders by Member State and entity type (1995) 
10,000 
9,000 
8,000 
7,000 
6,000 
5,000 
4,000 
3,000 
2,000 
1,000 
0 
| g central 
li­i sub­cent ral 
I 
ir­jutilities 
¡■Trail 
Β D DK E F GR I IRL L NL Ρ UK A S FIN 
Sources: TED database; Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. 
Sub­central government, covering local and regional government bodies, accounted for the 
majority, around 63%, of tender notices published in 1995. The remainder was split roughly 
equally between central government (21%) and utilities (16%). 
Large variations existed between Member States, reflecting their public­sector structure and 
degree of decentralization. The Member States where central government accounted for the 
largest share of the total number of tender notices published in 1995, were: 
(a) Portugal (75%), 
(b) Luxembourg (63%), 
(c) the UK (42%), 
(d) the Netherlands (40%). 
Sub­central government bodies accounted for the majority of tender notices published in: 
(a) Germany (76%), 
(b) Sweden (74%), 
(c) Spain (73%), 
(d) Italy (71%), 
(e) Finland (69%), 
(f) Austria (67%), 
(g) France (67%). 
Excluding Greece, Portugal and Spain, where the Utilities Directive is not yet in force, 
publication of tender notices by the utilities was, for all Member States, around 20% of tender 
notices published, with the exception of: 
(a) France (10%), 
(b) Sweden (13%), 
(c) Luxembourg (8%). 
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11.3.3. Publication by procedure 
Member States 
Table 11.5. 
Procedure 
Qual. system 
Open 
Open recurring 
Restricted 
Ace. restricted 
Negotiated 
Ace. negotiated 
Total 
Source: TED 
Procedures used 
Β 
1.0 
?1|PÉ: 
0.0 
15.7 
2.5 
8.7 
0.0 
100 
D 
1.7 
66.7 
0.0 
11.5 
5.7 
12.2 
2.3 
100 
DK 
2.4 
20.3 
0.0 
59.0 
3.0 
15.2 
0.1 
100 
E 
0.0 
96Si:: 
0.0 
2.2 
0.7 
0.5 
0.0 
100 
in 1995 (%) 
F 
0.5 
60.5 
0.0 
29.6 
0.8 
8.7 
0.1 
100 
database. 
GR 
0.0 
77:4 
0.0 
21.7 
0.9 
0.0 
0.0 
100 
I 
2.5 
21.0 
0.0 
39;7 
■31 *;.;·: 
5.0 
03 
100 
IRL 
2.0 
50.4 
0.0 
18.4 
3.5 
u f i 
0.6 
100 
L 
0.0 
77. Î 
0.0 
11.0 
2.3 
9.6 
0.0 
100 
NL 
3.5 
37.8 
0.1 
43,2 
3.0 
12.2 
0.2 
100 
Ρ 
0.1 
96.8 
0.0 
19 
1.0 
0.1 
0.0 
100 
UK 
5.1 
191 
0.0 
5 7 1 
6.8 
11.4 
0.5 
100 
A 
2.5 
812 
0.0 
3.1 
1.1 
10.6 
1.6 
100 
s 
1.5 
74.0 
0.0 
10.5 
1.0 
12,8 
0.2 
100 
FIN 
1.5 
7:1.9 
0.0 
17.6 
0.6 
8.3 
0.0 
100 
EUR 
­15 
2.2 
50.8 
0.0 
mm 
7.7 
9.3 
0.7 
100 
For all Member States, the open procedure was used most often (51% of all tender notices 
published), followed by the restricted procedure (29%), negotiated (9%) and accelerated 
restricted (8%). 
The open procedure was used most often in the majority of Member States. In these Member 
States the use varied from 50% of all tender notices in Ireland to nearly 97% in Spain and 
Portugal. 
The Member States using different procedures were: 
(a) Denmark, the Netherlands and the UK, where the restricted procedure was used most 
often (59%, 43% and 57% of all tenders published respectively); 
(b) Italy, where the restricted and accelerated restricted procedure was used most often (40% 
and 31% respectively). 
Excluding Greece, Portugal and Spain where the Utilities Directive is not yet in force, the use 
of the negotiated procedure varied from 25% of all tender notices published in Ireland to 5% 
in Italy. Member States using the negotiated procedure relatively more often than other 
Member States included Germany, Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands and Sweden. 
Qualification systems are used in all Member States, with the exception of France. 
In terms of the procedures used for the different types of contract (works, supplies and 
services): 
(a) at an EU level, the open procedure was used for works and supplies contracts (67% and 
52% of all tender notices published respectively), with the restricted procedure used for 
the majority of services contracts (40%); 
(b) the negotiated procedure is used for all types of contracts, with an emphasis on services 
(14%) and supplies contracts (10%) compared to works contracts (6%); 
(c) qualification systems appear to be used mainly for supplies and services contracts. 
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Large variations existed between Member States with entities in: 
(a) Germany using the negotiated procedure for a high proportion of supplies (29%) and 
services tenders (50%); 
(b) Denmark using the restricted procedure most often for all types of contracts, and the 
negotiated procedure for a high proportion of works (15%) and supplies tenders (20.2); 
(c) Italy using the restricted and accelerated restricted procedure most often for all types of 
contracts; 
(d) Ireland using the negotiated for a high proportion of supplies contracts (28%) and the 
restricted and negotiated for the majority of the services contracts (65%); 
(e) the Netherlands using the restricted procedure for the majority of works contracts (21%) 
and the restricted and negotiated for the majority of the services contracts (68%); 
(f) the UK using the restricted procedure most often for all types of contracts and the 
negotiated for a significant proportion of works (16%) and services contracts (16%); 
(g) Austria using the negotiated procedure for a significant proportion of services contracts 
(23%); 
(h) Sweden using the negotiated procedure for a significant proportion of works (17%) and 
services contracts (15%); 
(i) Finland using the restricted procedure most often for works contracts (75%). 
Central government 
Table 11.6. Procedures used by central government in 1995 (%) 
Procedure 
Qual. system 
Open 
Open recurring 
Restricted 
Ace. restricted 
Negotiated 
Ace. negotiated 
Total 
Source: TED 
Β 
0.0 
84.3 
0.0 
14.2 
1.5 
0.0 
0.0 
100 
databa; 
D 
0.0 
48.9 
0.0 
26.7 
m 
4.9 
3.2 
100 
e. 
DK 
0.0 
17.2 
0.0 
73.8 
6« 
2.6 
0 0 
100 
E 
0.0 
96.6 
0.0 
2.1 
1.2 
0.1 
0.0 
100 
F 
0.0 
40,7 
0.0 
53.5 
1.6 
4.2 
0.0 
100 
GR 
0.0 
70 1 
0.0 
28.2 
1.7 
0.0 
0.0 
100 
I 
0.0 
2.5 
0.0 
35.6 
61.1 
0.3 
0.5 
100 
IRL 
0.0 
80.2 
0.0 
14.2 
5.7 
0.0 
0.0 
100 
L 
0.0 
73.5 
0.0 
2.0 
6.1 
18.4 
0.0 
100 
NL 
0.0 
50.1 
0.0 
43.5 
3.2 
2.8 
0.4 
100 
Ρ 
0.0 
98.6 
0.0 
1.2 
0.3 
0.0 
0.0 
100 
UK 
0.0 
:p2::-;: 
0.0 
74.0 
7 4 
5.9 
0.5 
100 
A 
0.0 
75.8 
0.0 
10.1 
2.7 
1.3 
10.1 
100 
s 
0.0 
71.0 
0.0 
15 4 
2.7 
10:2 
0.7 
100 
FIN 
0.0 
65.5 
0.0 
27.3 
5.5 
1.8 
0 0 
100 
EUR 
-15 
0.0 
39.9 
0.0 
47L9 
7;9 
3.9 
0.5 
100 
Open and restricted were the most used procedures by central government, with the exception 
of Italy where some 61% were accelerated restricted. 
Although the directives limit the use of the negotiated procedure by central and sub-central 
government to exceptional occasions, the negotiated procedure was used relatively often by 
central government, particularly in Luxembourg (18% of all tenders published), Sweden 
(10%), Germany (8%), the UK (6%) and France (4%). 
In terms of the procedures used by central government for different types of contract: 
(a) the open and restricted procedures were used equally by central government for works 
and supplies contracts (between 40-45% respectively of total tenders published); 
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(b) the restricted procedure was used more often for service contracts (56%). 
At Member State level, central government in: 
(a) Germany also used the negotiated procedure for services contracts; 
(b) Italy only used restricted and accelerated restricted procedures for supplies and services 
contracts; 
(c) the UK used the negotiated procedure extensively for works contracts and also, albeit 
less extensively, for services contracts; 
(d) Sweden also used the negotiated procedure for services contracts. 
Sub-central government 
Table 11.7. Procedures used by sub-central government in 1995 (%) 
Procedure 
Qual. system 
Open 
Open recurring 
Restricted 
Ace. restricted 
Negotiated 
Ace. negotiated 
Total 
B 
0.0 
72.8 
0.0 
19.7 
6.2 
1.2 
0.0 
100 
D 
0.1 
78.2 
0.0 
WÊB 
■sii! 
iWl 
2 8 
100 
DK 
0.2 
β | 
0.0 
69 8 
3.2 
2.6 
0 0 
100 
E 
0.0 
96.7 
0.0 
2.1 
0.5 
0.7 
0.0 
100 
F 
0.0 
74.1 
0.0 
19.7 
0.6 
mm 
0.1 
100 
GR 
0.0 
83.9 
0.0 
15.7 
0.4 
0.0 
0.0 
100 
I 
0.0 
25.8 
0.0 
36.1 
mm 
0.4 
0.1 
100 
IRL 
0.0 
67.4 
0.0 
16.3 
3.6 
111 
0.9 
100 
L 
0.0 
52.2 
0.0 
30.4 
0.0 
:Wm 
0.0 
100 
NL 
0.0 
41,3 
0.2 
50.1 
3.5 
4.6 
0.2 
100 
Ρ 
0.0 
97 1 
0.0 
1.2 
1.2 
0.4 
0.0 
100 
UK 
0.0 
ill! 
0.0 
54.6 
7.9 
sm 
0.2 
100 
A 
0.3 
93.1 
0.0 
1.5 
1.0 
3.4 
0.7 
100 
s 
0.0 
84.9 
0.0 
10.6 
0.9 
3.4 
0.2 
100 
FIN 
0.0 
81.2 
0.0 
18.0 
0.2 
0.6 
0.0 
100 
EUR 
­15 
0.0 
62,6 
0.0 
23,9 
; ; 9 : 4 Í K 
:<:3:;?:;.; 
0.9 
100 
Source: TED database 
For all Member States, the open and restricted procedures were used most often by sub­central 
government bodies, with the exception of Italy where the accelerated restricted was used the 
most. 
Apart from Italy, the accelerated restricted procedure was used relatively often in the UK 
(8%), Germany (6%) and Belgium (6%). 
Although the directives limit the use of the negotiated procedure for central and sub­central 
government to exceptional occasions, it is used relatively often by sub­central government in 
Luxembourg (17% of all tenders published), Ireland (12%), Germany (6%), the UK (6%), 
France (6%) and the Netherlands (5%). 
Several notices on the existence of a qualification system were published in Germany and 
Denmark. 
In terms of the procedures used by sub­central government bodies, the open procedure was 
most commonly used for all types of contracts, with the exception of services where the 
restricted and accelerated restricted procedures were used more often. 
At a Member State level, sub­central government in: 
(a) the UK mainly used the restricted procedure for works contracts; 
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(b) Italy only used restricted and accelerated restricted procedures for supplies and services 
contracts; 
(c) Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, the UK and Austria also used the negotiated procedure 
for services contracts. 
Utilities 
Table 11.8. 
Procedure 
Qual. system 
Open 
Open recurring 
Restricted 
Ace. restricted 
Negotiated 
Ace. negotiated 
Total 
Source: TED 
Procedures used by utilities in 
Β 
5.8 
29.9 
0.0 
17.0 
0.0 
:*11Ι 
0.0 
100 
D 
9.1 
27.5 
0.0 
11.1 
0.0 
52.2 
0.0 
100 
database. 
DK 
11.4 
8.3 
0.0 
14.8 
0.0 
65.S 
0.0 
100 
E 
0.0 
83 8 
0.0 
16.2 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
100 
F 
4.6 
148 
0.1 
4L25; 
0 1 
39,3 
0.0 
100 
GR 
0.0 
697 
0.0 
30.3 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
100 
I 
12.5 
9.7 
0.0 
mm 
0.1 
23.2 
0.1 
100 
1995 (%) 
IRL 
7.1 
11.6 
0.0 
12.9 
0.0 
Mm 
0.0 
100 
L 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
■β: · · ί 
0.0 
100 
NL 
15 6 
14.2 
0.0 
29.1 
0.0 
41.2 
0.0 
100 
Ρ 
4.5 
mm. 
0.0 
13.6 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
100 
UK 
MM: 
1.9 
0.0 
20.1 
0.0 
442 
0.0 
100 
A 
11.8 
WB. 
0.0 
3.1 
0.0 
42.4 
0.0 
100 
s 
12.1 
15.6 
0.0 
3.6 
0.0 
68.7 
0.0 
100 
FIN 
7.2 
38.6 
0.0 
17.5 
0.0 
36.7 
0.0 
100 
EUR 
-15 
143 
,P$Ë 
0.0 
25;:4:::: 
0.0 
429 
0.0 
100 
In general, the negotiated procedure was used most often by utilities (43% of all tender notices 
published), followed by the restricted procedure (25%) and the open procedure (17%). Notices 
on the existence of a qualification system accounted for 14% of all tender notices published. 
Contrary to central and sub-central government, the negotiated procedure was used most often 
in the majority of Member States, varying from 100% of all tender notices published in 
Luxembourg to 41% in the Netherlands. 
The Member States where utilities used different procedures included: 
(a) Spain, Greece and Portugal where the open procedure was predominant (84%, 70% and 
82%, respectively); 
(b) Austria and Finland, where the open procedure was used most often (43% and 39%, 
respectively); 
(c) Italy and France, where the restricted procedure was used most often (55% and 41%, 
respectively). 
Qualification systems were used extensively in most Member States (with the exception of 
Greece, Portugal and Spain), but particularly so in the UK and the Netherlands. 
At an EUR-15 level, in terms of the procedures used by utilities for the different types of 
contract: 
(a) the negotiated procedure was used extensively by utilities for supplies and services 
contracts (48% and 45% respectively of total tenders published), whereas for works 
contracts the open or restricted procedure were used (35% or 32%); 
(b) qualification systems were used by utilities mainly for supplies and services contracts. 
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At a Member State level, utilities in all Member States used the negotiated procedure 
extensively, with the exception of Greece, Portugal and Spain. 
Differences existed between Member States, particularly in France, Italy and the UK where 
utilities only used the restricted and negotiated procedures for all types of contracts. 
11.4. Number of entities publishing 
Table 11.8. Number of entities publishing in the Official Journal (1995) 
Member State 
Belgium 
Denmark 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
Spain 
UK 
Austria 
Finland 
Sweden 
Total 
Central 
government 
27-48 
16-28 
287-402 
84-118 
48-86 
26-46 
93-130 
9-16 
51-71 
25-45 
34-48 
266-372 
20-36 
12-22 
51-92 
1,049-1,560 
Sub-central 
government 
98-144 
355-523 
2,878-3,094 
4,274-4,595 
167-246 
63-93 
2,084-2,240 
8-12 
236-254 
60-88 
458-492 
973-1,046 
176-259 
134-197 
442-651 
12,407-13,934 
Utilities 
44-77 
64-112 
123-226 
855-1,567 
19-33 
19-33 
185-339 
2-4 
65-120 
6-10 
3-5 
167-306 
46-80 
35-61 
69-120 
1,704-3,093 
Total 
169-269 
435-663 
3,289-3,722 
5,214-6,280 
234-365 
108-172 
2,362-2,709 
19-32 
353-445 
91-143 
495-545 
1,406-1,724 
242-375 
181-280 
562-863 
15,159-18,587 
Source: TED database. 
In 1995, the total number of European entities publishing in the O J was between 15,000 and 
18,600. 
Sub-central government bodies accounted for the majority of this total, roughly 75%, whereas 
utilities accounted for 15% and central government bodies for the remaining 10%. 
Germany has the largest number of entities publishing with around 5,200 to 6,300, followed 
by France (3,300-3,750), Italy (2,350-2,700) and the UK (1,400-1,750). 
Differences between Member States in the number of central and sub-central government 
bodies publishing, reflect the structure of the public sector, with: 
(a) a more decentralized structure in Germany, Italy, Spain and the new Member States; 
(b) a more centralized structure in Belgium, France, Greece, Ireland, the Netherlands, 
Portugal and the UK. 
Germany and the Netherlands had a relatively large number of utilities publishing, suggesting 
a highly fragmented utilities structure. 
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SECTION D 
Market perceptions 
This section provides an insight into the experiences and view of both purchasers (the demand 
side) and suppliers (the supply side) of the impact of the public procurement legislation. 
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12. Demand side 
12.1. Overview 
12.1.1. Ex ante hypothesis 
Given the legislation' requirements, and assuming a positive supply-side response to new 
opportunities, it might be expected that purchasing entities will have: 
(a) moved towards publishing in the OJ; 
(b) experienced changes in the composition of their supplier bases, with an increase in the 
number of EU firms acting as suppliers; 
(c) experienced procurement savings. 
12.1.2. Coverage 
This chapter provides an analysis of the results of a survey carried out over a four-month 
period to determine purchasing entities' experience of the public procurement legislation. 
Specifically, the survey asked entities to describe: 
(a) changes in publication habits; 
(b) changes in use of tendering procedures; 
(c) the nature of any changes on the supply-side; 
(d) the nature of any changes in procurement practices and results, and the extent to which 
the legislation was seen to have played a part in any changes. 
12.1.3. Data 
Some 698 purchasing entities were targeted by the survey, covering: 
(a) central government ministries; 
(b) sub-central government bodies, including: 
(i) regional and local government bodies, 
(ii) uniformed services (fire and police), 
(iii) purchasing consortia, 
(iv) health bodies; 
(c) utilities: 
(i) water, 
(ii) energy (covering coal, and oil and gas exploration and extraction, electricity and 
gas generation and distribution), 
(iii) transport (covering airports, ports, rail and urban transport), 
(iv) telecommunications. 
Central and sub-central government bodies were approached via a fax questionnaire 
accompanied by a letter from the Director-General of the European Commission's Directorate-
General for the Internal Market and Financial Services, which explained the study's 
objectives, and requested the organization's assistance. For central government bodies, the 
official with overall responsibility for departmental/ministerial purchasing was targeted. Given 
the more fragmented nature of purchasing at a sub-central level, to ensure the most appropriate 
official assumed responsibility for the questionnaire's completion, a body's most senior 
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official was sent the questionnaire. For all utilities, a direct approach was made to the sector's 
European representative body, again to explain the survey's objectives, and secure their co-
operation. In almost all instances, we were given considerable assistance, with a number of 
associations distributing the questionnaires to their members on our behalf. 
A total of 502 questionnaires were returned by 429 entities. The larger number of responses is 
the result of organizations of all types distributing questionnaires to internal departments with 
autonomous purchasing responsibility. In terms of entities targeted, this represented a response 
rate of 62% although, as shown in Table 12.1, there were variations in Member States' 
responses. There were a particularly low number of responses from: 
(a) central government ministries in Germany, France and Spain; 
(b) Greece and Germany in general. 
A number of Greek returns were received too late for inclusion. A review of these 
questionnaires indicated that they did not contradict the general findings and conclusions 
observed in the other 14 Member States. 
Table 12.1. Member State and entity type responses 
Belgium/Luxembourg 
Germany 
Denmark 
Spain 
France 
Greece 
Italy 
Ireland 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
United Kingdom 
Austria 
Sweden 
Finland 
Total 
Central 
government 
9 
2 
22 
2 
1 
0 
6 
6 
5 
3 
9 
4 
3 
10 
82 
Sub-central 
government 
13 
18 
22 
23 
41 
2 
42 
9 
27 
10 
53 
6 
12 
8 
286 
Utilities 
10 
7 
10 
21* 
7 
0* 
9 
7 
9 
5* 
25 
10 
7 
7 
134 
Total 
32 
27 
54 
46 
49 
2 
57 
22 
41 
18 
87 
20 
22 
25 
502 
Note: Since utilities in Greece, Spain and Portugal(*) were not subject to the Utilities Directive at the time of the survey, 
the questionnaire asked them for their experiences since 1990 and their intentions post-transposition (rather than 
pre- and post-directive) as for the other Member States. 
The survey sample was drawn on a constrained Pareto basis. The approach was to target 
purchasers representing 80% of procurement at each level of government and utility type in 
each Member State. Hence for any Member State, the survey targeted: 
(a) central government ministries representing an estimated 80% of central government 
procurement, covering in the main ministries responsible for: 
(i) defence, 
(ii) public works, 
(iii) transport, 
(iv) education, 
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(v) interior/home office, 
(vi) health, 
(vii) post and telecommunications; 
(b) purchasing entities at a regional level accounting for an estimated 80% of total regional 
procurement in the regions representing 80% of national GDP; 
(c) bodies representative of total local government procurement within sub-regions 
representing 80% of GDP or population of the regions described at (b); 
(d) the largest utilities representing 70-80% of procurement in the each of the sub-sectors as 
defined in Annexes I to X to the Utilities Directive. 
As a result, the survey covered a wide range of: 
(a) entity sizes - ranging from large spending central government ministries, such as the 
Ministry of Defence, to local authorities and local fire services and, in a number of 
cases, independent purchasing units within local bodies; 
(b) purchasers focusing on works, supplies and services. 
For the purposes of our analysis: 
(a) all returns have been taken into consideration; 
(b) an entity's focus of procurement has been defined as the element (works, supplies, 
services) which accounts for 70% or more of its purchasing. 
The survey's results have been used as indicators of changes, employing a combination of 
direct comparisons (pre- and post-directive experience) and scoring systems, which are 
described in the appropriate sections. As highlighted above, although responses in some areas 
were disappointing, the quality and number of responses overall were sufficient to be 
considered reliable and indicative for qualitative inferences to be drawn, particularly since the 
results are consistent: 
(a) within and between Member States, 
(b) with those from the supply-side survey, 
(c) with implicit expectations based on previous studies in this area. 
The results are also considered of particular value since, despite gaps, only those with 
responsibility for procurement can really know: 
(a) what has happened in practice; 
(b) their experiences and views of the legislation. 
The information obtained from returned questionnaires was also supplemented and 
corroborated by: 
(a) interviews with some 80 entities which were re-contacted to clarify their responses; 
(b) a number of written submissions from entities (including some which declined to 
complete the questionnaire) and, in the case of utilities, their representative bodies which 
took up the questionnaire's invitation to provide additional comments. 
Each section analyses the responses to a specific question(s) and, as such, has value in its own 
right. Nevertheless, individual section results should not be considered in isolation. Where 
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feasible, sections have been cross-referenced, but the overall conclusions have been arrived at 
by taking an holistic view of all results. These are described in the following section. 
12.1.4. Key findings 
Despite expected differences between Member States, types of purchasers and types of 
procurement, a number of consistent messages emerged from the survey. 
At a global level the survey showed that the legislation has had a significant impact, but that 
whilst there have been a number of benefits, these are currently seen by purchasers to be 
outweighed by associated 'costs'. 
The legislation has resulted in increased openness, with most respondents reporting having 
published more notices and now using the OJ. 
The survey's results indicated that: 
(a) without the legislation, there would have been a more restrictive approach to purchasing; 
(b) there are still high levels of non-compliance, with sub-central government entities, in 
particular, considered only to be starting to fulfil the directives' requirements. 
Whilst there were indications of continued non-compliance with the legislation's 
requirements, there were also entities which had been genuinely disappointed by the supply-
side's response (to notices published in the OJ). 
In general, whilst purchasing entities had a reasonable 'feel' for their domestic suppliers, their 
knowledge in relation to non-domestic suppliers, was very low, implying that, for most, any 
increases in non-domestic penetration have been minimal. This was confirmed by entities 
which were able to provide such information. 
In relation to sub-central government's experiences, a number of entities in some of the largest 
Member States: 
(a) expressed disappointment at the lack of response to notices published; 
(b) reported that, despite the directives having been in force for almost seven years in 
relation to supplies, only recently had there been evidence of (any) new suppliers 
responding to calls for competition; 
(c) awareness of the rules at this level is still low. (The structure of sub-central government 
in Member States is likely to exacerbate non-publication, particularly where procure-
ment is devolved to (small) independent units, whose procurement is not aggregated). 
The 'cost' element of the legislation was most associated with: 
(a) more complex procurement, 
(b) more time-consuming procurement. 
This 'cost' element of the legislation was exacerbated by generally perceived increases in both 
the total number of firms, and the number of non-domestic firms, submitting tenders not 
having, in general, been translated into changes in supplier bases, with: 
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(a) only a minority of entities reporting real benefits - primarily lower contract prices - and 
even in such instances, this perception was based on 'exceptional' cases, such as: 
(i) two instances where, in a strategic area, an innovative technical solution from a 
new non-domestic supplier resulted in savings of 50%, 
(ii) purchase of railway rolling stock from a previously unknown EU supplier as the 
direct result of a notice placed in the O J; 
(b) the legislation's impact on any changes in supplier behaviour, such as improved service, 
perceived as minimal. 
The lack of lower prices indicated that, despite an increase in new firms submitting tenders, 
they were: 
(a) either not competitive, or not competing on price; 
(b) pricing to national markets (minimizing any cost saving potential for the purchaser); 
(c) not selling across border (exporting direct) - the price reduction examples quoted above 
were, significantly, from suppliers selling direct from another Member State; 
(d) not stimulating competition (for the above and other reasons, such as domestic supplier 
apathy, lack of awareness and lack of concern). 
An additional key finding not specifically covered by the survey, but consistently raised by 
entities which submitted additional comments, was the threat of legal action by suppliers. As a 
consequence of this and the legislation's lack of clarity, entities have adopted a literal (and 
defensive) approach to implementation of the rules. However, by applying the directives' 
requirements 'to the letter' rather than their 'spirit' in relation to, for example, supplier 
qualification: 
(a) administrative costs have increased, 
(b) potential new suppliers are (seen to be) deterred by the costs of completing extensive 
qualification documentation. 
With the exception of some entities with a focus on works procurement, 'economically most 
advantageous' was the preferred award criterion for all types of entity in all Member States. 
However, the nature of award criteria used indicated that, despite claiming to be awarding on 
the basis of 'economically most advantageous', in most cases, purchasers chose on the basis of 
lowest price. 
A number of utilities, particularly those operating in international markets, emphasized that, 
since they had been purchasing internationally prior to the directives, the legislation had only 
increased costs and the threat of legal action (see above). In addition, several also raised areas 
of 'difficulty' in relation to services, particularly in highly technical or specialist areas, such as 
certain types of insurance. 
12.2. Nature of tendering 
12.2.1. Impact of directives on means of advertising notices 
Purchasing entities were asked where calls for tender were published pre- and post-1987 in 
terms of: 
(a) the OJ, 
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(b) international press, 
(c) national press, 
(d) local press, 
(e) trade publications, 
(f) others, 
(g) nowhere. 
The key finding was a major shift towards use of the O J. In particular: 
(a) the majority of utilities had moved from publishing nowhere pre-directive; 
(b) the number of central and sub-central entities which had also published nowhere pre-
directive had decreased, reflecting the broader scope of the legislation and, arguably, a 
greater awareness of the legislation's requirements. 
The importance of the OJ as an advertising medium was highlighted by the fact that in the 
majority of Member States: 
(a) no entities had published, or were publishing, in the international press; 
(b) entities have, in general, not extended the range of publications in which they advertise 
(with the exception of the OJ). 
12.2.2. Impact of directives on volume of notice publication 
The general trend across entities in all Member States was for more calls for tender to have 
been published since the directives had come into force. 
Table 12.2. Number of notices published after entry into force of EU directives -
central government 
More 
Same 
Fewer 
Base 
B/L 
1 
5 
8* 
D 
1 
1 
2 
DK 
13 
7 
20 
E 
1 
1 
2 
F 
1 
1 
GR 
0** 
I 
3 
3 
6 
IRL 
4 
1 
5 
NL 
4 
1 
5 
Ρ 
2 
1 
3 
UK 
6 
3 
9 
A 
1 
3 
4 
S 
2 
1 
3 
FIN 
5 
5 
10 
* Balance of two are 'don't knows'. 
** No responses were received from Greek central government ministries. 
In most Member States 
more notices. 
, the majority of central government respondents reported publishing 
Table 12.3. Number of notices published after entry into force of EU directives - sub-
central government 
More 
Same 
Fewer 
Base 
B/L 
4 
9 
13 
D 
6 
11 
1 
18 
DK 
12 
6 
18 
E 
7 
14 
21 
F 
25 
16 
41 
GR 
2 
2 
I 
23 
17 
40 
IRL 
4 
4 
8 
NL 
18 
9 
27 
Ρ 
4 
5 
9 
UK 
31 
18 
3 
52 
A 
2 
4 
6 
S 
10 
2 
12 
FIN 
5 
3 
8 
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In general, the majority of sub-central government purchasing entities in the larger Member 
States reported publishing more notices. 
The range of entities contacted during the survey meant that, in view of the size of small 
entities' procurement budgets, some considered only a very few of their purchases were above 
threshold. This was also reflected by a number of entities which declined to participate on the 
basis that their purchasing budget was so small that none of their contracts came above the 
threshold. The extent to which this is correct, or whether it reflects a lack of understanding of 
the directives' aggregation rules is unclear. A number of respondents also highlighted that 
internal rules had required publication of contracts prior to the directives, and that since these 
covered contracts below the legislation's thresholds, the number of notices published had not 
changed, but above-threshold contracts were now published in the OJ. 
Given this, it is not surprising that a large number of entities reported no change in their 
publication of tender notices. 
Table 12.4. Number of notices published after entry into force of EU directives -
utilities 
More 
Same 
Fewer 
Base 
B/L 
7 
2 
9 
D 
5 
2 
7 
DK 
7 
2 
9 
E 
5 
13 
18 
F 
5 
2 
7 
GR 
0* 
I 
6 
3 
9 
IRL 
4 
3 
7 
NL 
7 
2 
9 
Ρ 
1 
3 
4 
UK 
22 
3 
25 
A 
3 
6 
9 
S 
3 
3 
1 
7 
FIN 
7 
7 
* No responses were received from Greek utilities. 
Since the majority of utilities did not publish calls for tender anywhere prior to entry into force 
of the Utilities Directive, it was expected that the majority of them would report an increase in 
publication. The situation in Spain and Portugal reflects the fact that: 
(a) the Utilities Directive had yet to come into force at the time of the survey; 
(b) a large number of small utilities responded to the survey in Spain, all of which were 
predominantly works focused, and had contracts below the ECU 5 million threshold. 
12.2.3. Change in use of procedures and preferred procedure 
A scoring system has been used to create an indicator of the way in which purchasers have 
changed their usage of different types of procedure since the directives came into force. Scores 
have been calculated by: 
(a) taking the pre- from the post-percentage use of a procedure by a purchaser; 
(b) dividing the difference by 5 to give a score (whereby the maximum score can be +/-20, 
namely+/-100/5); 
(c) summing individual scores and dividing by the number of purchasers to arrive at an 
average score. 
As a result, within any Member State the sum of scores is zero. 
150 Public procurement 
To put any shifts into context, an additional table has been created which shows the currently 
most used procedure(s). (Analysis of actual publication procedures used is contained in 
Chapter 11.) 
Table 12.5. Change in the use of tendering procedures by central government 
Open 
Restricted 
Accelerated restricted 
Restricted using a 
qualification system 
Negotiated 
Negotiated using a 
qualification system 
Single tender 
Other** 
Base 
B/L 
0.07 
0.00 
0.00 
0.07 
0.00 
0.00 
1.20 
(1.33) 
6 
D 
2*** 
DK 
(1.00) 
2.97 
0.00 
0.25 
(1.97) 
0.00 
(0.08) 
(0.17) 
12 
E 
2*** 
F 
1*** 
GR* 
0 
ι 
0.00 
0.20 
(0.13) 
0.43 
0.17 
(0.67) 
0.00 
0.00 
6 
IRL 
2.00 
(2.00) 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
6 
NL 
(2.60) 
2.64 
1.40 
0.00 
(0.32) 
(0.20) 
(0.52) 
(0.40) 
5 
Ρ 
(0.07) 
0.00 
(3.20) 
0.00 
2.60 
0.00 
0.67 
0.00 
3 
UK 
1.20 
0.96 
0.60 
(1.52) 
(0.40) 
0.60 
(1.44) 
0.00 
5 
A 
0.55 
(0.55) 
0.05 
0.00 
(0.05) 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
4 
S 
4.53 
12.33 
0.00 
0.00 
(11.5) 
0.00 
(0.33) 
(6.00) 
3 
FIN 
2.49 
(0.49) 
(1.46) 
0.03 
(0.43) 
0.00 
(0.43) 
0.00 
7 
* No responses were received from Greek central government ministries. 
** Includes 'unclassified' percentage returns, and combinations of different procedures - primarily the three types of 
restricted procedure. 
*** Responses from Germany, France and Spain have not been reported as the small number of respondents is 
unrepresentative. 
The principal shift in the use of tendering procedures at a central government level was 
towards more open procurement, with a move from negotiated and single tender to open and 
restricted. This move was most evident in the EU's more recent members (Austria, Sweden, 
Finland and Spain). 
Other noticeable shifts were seen in: 
(a) Denmark, with a move toward the restricted procedure, away from both open and 
negotiated; 
(b) Italy, with a move toward the restricted procedure away from the negotiated; 
(c) the Netherlands, with a move towards the restricted procedure, principally at the expense 
of the open procedure; 
(d) Belgium and Portugal, where a surprising shift towards the negotiated and single tender 
procedures was reported. 
The most used procedure tended to mirror the shifts recorded, although it was surprising that 
in almost all Member States, at least one body's most used procedure was either single tender 
or negotiated, particularly in Belgium. The reasons for this are unclear, since although some of 
the respondents were surprisingly small, there were also a number of significant purchasers 
where these 'exceptional' procedures were most used. 
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Table 12.6. Most used tendering procedure in 1994 - central government 
Open 
Restricted 
Accelerated restricted 
Restricted using a 
qualification system 
Negotiated 
Negotiated using a 
qualification system 
Single tender 
Other** 
Base 
B/L 
1 
3 
3 
7 
D 
2*** 
DK 
4 
12 
2 
1 
12 
E 
2*** 
F 
1*** 
GR* 
0 
I 
1 
2 
1 
2 
6 
IRL 
3 
2 
1 
6 
NL 
2 
1 
1 
1 
5 
Ρ 
1 
1 
1 
3 
UK 
7 
1 
1 
9 
A 
3 
1 
4 
S 
1 
2 
3 
FIN 
4 
3 
1 
8 
* No responses were received from Greek central government ministries. 
** Includes 'unclassified' percentage returns, and combinations of different procedures - primarily the three types of 
restricted procedure. 
*** Responses from Germany, France and Spain have not been reported as the small number of respondents is 
unrepresentative. 
Table 12.7. Change in the use of tendering procedures by sub-central government 
Open 
Restricted 
Accelerated restricted 
Restricted using a 
qualification system 
Negotiated 
Negotiated using a 
qualification system 
Single tender 
Other* 
Base 
B/L 
0.16 
(0.66) 
0.00 
0.00 
(1.42) 
0.00 
0.10 
1.82 
10 
D 
1.36 
0.21 
0.00 
0.00 
0.03 
0.00 
(1.60) 
0.00 
15 
DK 
3.41 
2.71 
(0.11) 
0.00 
(3.50) 
(1.99) 
(0.53) 
0.00 
19 
E 
1.89 
(0.19) 
0.00 
0.00 
(1.43) 
0.00 
(0.28) 
0.00 
13 
F 
1.25 
(1.05) 
(0.21) 
(0.02) 
0.07 
(0.01) 
(0.02) 
0.00 
30 
GR 
** 
I 
2.43 
(1.53) 
0.82 
(0.15) 
(1.09) 
(0.41) 
(0.04) 
(0.03) 
39 
IRL 
4.22 
(2.56) 
0.56 
0.00 
(0.02) 
(1.78) 
(0.42) 
0.00 
9 
NL 
2.34 
(0.03) 
0.10 
0.73 
(3.04) 
0.00 
(0.10) 
0.00 
22 
Ρ 
0.50 
(0.10) 
0.05 
0.00 
0.53 
(0.03) 
(0.95) 
0.00 
8 
UK 
0.86 
0.28 
0.11 
(0.23) 
(0.45) 
(0.01) 
(0.31) 
(0.29) 
48 
A 
0.17 
(0.17) 
0.00 
0.83 
(1.00) 
0.17 
0.00 
0..00 
6 
S 
11.00 
(0.29) 
0.09 
0.00 
(10.4) 
(0.36) 
(0.04) 
0.00 
11 
FIN 
4.17 
(3.83) 
0.00 
(0.40) 
0.07 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
6 
* Includes 'unclassified' percentage returns, and combinations of different procedures - primarily the three types of 
restricted procedure. 
** Responses from Greece have not been reported as the small number of respondents is unrepresentative. 
At the sub-central government level, there was a common shift towards use of the open 
procedure in all Member States, although the following had also seen a move towards use of 
the restricted procedure: 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
(d) 
(e) 
(f) 
Belgium, 
Denmark, 
Italy, 
the Netherlands, 
the UK, 
Austria. 
In common with central government, sub-central government entities in Portugal also 
indicated a move towards an increased use of the negotiated procedure. 
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Table 12.8. Most used tendering procedure in 1994 - sub-central government 
Open 
Restricted 
Accelerated restricted 
Restricted using a 
qualification system 
Negotiated 
Negotiated using a 
qualification system 
Single tender 
Other* 
Base 
B/L 
5 
3 
1 
1 
10 
D 
2 
3 
6 
5 
16 
DK 
4 
12 
1 
1 
1 
19 
E 
12 
2 
1 
13 
F 
29 
5 
7 
1 
40 
GR 
2** 
I 
8 
17 
6 
3 
4 
1 
39 
IRL 
7 
2 
9 
NL 
6 
11 
6 
3 
22 
Ρ 
1 
6 
1 
1 
8 
UK 
17 
18 
6 
1 
1 
4 
47 
A 
3 
3 
6 
S 
10 
2 
12 
FIN 
3 
3 
2 
1 
7 
* Includes 'unclassified' percentage returns, and combinations of different procedures - primarily the three types of 
restricted procedure. 
** Responses from Greece have not been reported as the small number of respondents is unrepresentative. 
Although, as indicated by Table 12.8, the majority of sub-central government bodies used the 
open and restricted procedures most, a noticeable number were also using 'exceptional' 
procedures (negotiated, negotiated using a qualification system and single tender) most often, 
particularly in: 
(a) Germany, 
(b) France, 
(c) Italy, 
(d) the Netherlands. 
Table 12.9. Change in the 
Open 
Restricted 
Accelerated restricted 
Restricted using a 
qualification system 
Negotiated 
Negotiated using a 
qualification system 
Single tender 
Other** 
Base 
B/L 
(1.98) 
0.00 
0.00 
2.10 
0.10 
0.74 
(0.96) 
0.00 
10 
D 
(0.46) 
(0.89) 
0.00. 
0.14 
1.49 
(0.74) 
0.46 
0.00 
7 
use of tendering procedures by utilities 
DK 
0.67 
(1.76) 
0.18 
0.00 
0.84 
0.73 
(0.67) 
0.00 
9 
E 
1.71 
(0.25) 
0.53 
(0.71) 
(2.29) 
0.01 
(0.33) 
1.33 
15 
F 
0.03 
(1.03) 
(0.33) 
(1.33) 
0.70 
2.33 
(0.37) 
0.00 
6 
GR* 
0 
I 
4.00 
(2.75) 
(0.25) 
1.00 
(2.38) 
1.25 
(0.88) 
0.00 
8 
IRL 
0.11 
(3.86) 
(0.71) 
0.200 
3.91 
0.63 
(0.14) 
(0.14) 
7 
NL 
0.11 
0.60 
0.00 
1.43 
(3.57) 
2.37 
(0.94) 
0.00 
7 
Ρ 
0.60 
(0.53) 
(0.07) 
0.00 
0.00 
0.33 
(0.33) 
0.00 
3 
UK 
0.00 
(1.37) 
0.47 
1.57 
0.46 
2.73 
(1.17) 
(0.89) 
18 
A 
0.13 
(0.69) 
0.00 
0.00 
0.89 
0.22 
(0.56) 
0.00 
9 
S 
(0.40) 
0.00 
0.00 
0.40 
(2.00) 
1.60 
0.00 
0.00 
5 
FIN 
1.25 
1.00 
0.00 
0.00 
(2.25) 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
4 
* No responses were received from Greek utilities. 
** Includes 'unclassified' percentage returns, and combinations of different procedures - primarily the three types of 
restricted procedure. 
Although there were some Member States where a noticeable shift towards the open procedure 
was reported (Spain, Italy and Finland), the major movements were towards combinations of 
the restricted and negotiated procedures, with and without qualification systems: 
(a) Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands and the UK - restricted and negotiated with qualification 
systems; 
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(b) Denmark and France - negotiated and negotiated with a qualification system; 
(c) Germany and Ireland - negotiated; 
(d) Spain - restricted and restricted with a qualification system. 
Table 12.10. Most used tendering procedure in 1994 - utilities 
Open 
Restricted 
Accelerated restricted 
Restricted using a 
qualification system 
Negotiated 
Negotiated using a 
qualification system 
Single tender 
Other** 
Base 
B/L 
3 
1 
2 
2 
1 
2 
2 
10 
D 
5 
2 
7 
DK 
1 
2 
3 
1 
1 
1 
9 
E 
7 
4 
1 
1 
1 
1 
15 
F 
2 
1 
2 
3 
7 
GR* 
0 
I 
3 
1 
1 
4 
8 
IRL 
3 
2 
2 
7 
NL 
1 
2 
3 
2 
1 
7 
Ρ 
2 
1 
1 
3 
UK 
1 
6 
5 
6 
8 
2 
23 
A 
3 
1 
5 
1 
10 
S 
2 
4 
1 
6 
FIN 
3 
2 
1 
4 
* No responses were received from Greek utilities. 
** Includes 'unclassified' percentage returns, and combinations of different procedures - primarily the three types of 
restricted procedure. 
In general, the most used procedure reflected the shifts in Table 12.9, although it was 
noticeable that there were still a number of utilities where 'single tender' was the most used 
procedure. 
12.3. Preferred purchasing procedures 
12.3.1. Preferred tendering procedure 
Under procurement legislation: 
(a) entities covered by the Supplies, Works and Services Directives (central and sub-central 
government) may use the open and restricted procedure as a general rule, and the 
negotiated in 'exceptional' circumstances; 
(b) entities covered by the Utilities Directive (utilities) have, in essence, a free choice of 
procedures. 
There was no discernible trend at a central government level in terms of the use of procedure. 
The reasons for preferring a particular procedure are described in the next section, but the 
range seen in Table 12.11 is likely to reflect the different types of procurement made by 
central government ministries, ranging from the Ministry of Defence, to ministries responsible 
for major IT procurement and projects. It is possible that use of the open procedure in Austria 
is a result of national legislation which has a preference for this procedure (although, as 
described above, entities do have a broader choice under the directives). 
154 Public procurement 
Table 12.11. Preferred tendering procedure for making strategic purchases - central 
government 
Open 
Restricted 
Negotiated 
Base 
B/L 
1 
3 
3 
7 
D 
1* 
DK 
3 
16 
2 
21 
E 
2* 
F 
1* 
GR 
0** 
I 
1 
4 
1 
6 
IRL 
4 
1 
5 
NL 
3 
3 
Ρ 
1 
1 
UK 
8 
I 
9 
A 
4 
4 
S 
2 
1 
3 
FIN 
3 
5 
8 
* Responses from Germany, France and Spain have not been reported as the small number of respondents is 
unrepresentative. 
** No responses were received from Greek central government ministries. 
Table 12.12. Preferred tendering procedure for making strategic purchases - sub-
central government 
Open 
Restricted 
Negotiated 
Base 
B/L 
5 
7 
1 
13 
D 
5 
4 
1 
10 
DK 
5 
16 
1 
22 
E 
19 
1 
20 
F 
34 
6 
40 
GR 
2* 
I 
14 
28 
42 
IRL 
6 
2 
8 
NL 
13 
10 
2 
25 
Ρ 
10 
10 
UK 
15 
31 
4 
50 
A 
5 
1 
6 
S 
6 
1 
5 
12 
FIN 
5 
1 
2 
8 
* Responses from Greece have not been reported as the small number of respondents is unrepresentative. 
In terms of sub-central government entities surveyed, there were preferences for: 
(a) the open procedure in Spain, France, Ireland, Portugal, Austria and Finland; 
(b) the restricted procedure in Belgium, Denmark, Italy and the UK. 
There was no clear preference in Germany, Greece and the Netherlands between open and 
restricted. 
In view of the size of some sub-central bodies, such as purchasing consortia, large admini­
strations and police and health authorities, some preference for the negotiated procedure for 
certain strategic purchases was expected. However, the extent to which such purchases fulfil 
the strict 'exceptions' criteria set out in the directives is unclear. 
Table 12.13. Preferred tendering procedure for making strategic purchases -
Open 
Restricted 
Negotiated 
Base 
B/L 
2 
3 
5 
10 
D 
6 
6 
DK 
1 
5 
4 
10 
E 
10 
6 
3 
19 
F 
2 
6 
8 
GR 
0* 
I 
1 
3 
5 
9 
IRL 
3 
4 
7 
NL 
1 
3 
5 
9 
Ρ 
3 
2 
5 
UK 
8 
17 
25 
A 
4 
2 
4 
10 
- utilities 
S 
2 
4 
6 
FIN 
3 
1 
3 
7 
* No responses were received from Greek utilities. 
As expected, utilities expressed a general preference for the negotiated procedure. 
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12.3.2. Reasons for preferred tendering procedure 
Purchasers were able to select a range of reasons for their preferred tendering procedure when 
making a strategic purchase. These have been prioritized (1 to 3) by: 
(a) calculating the percentage of all purchasers selecting a particular reason; 
(b) allocating 1 to the highest percentage; 
(c) grouping percentages within a 10% range ­ hence a reason with 90% is grouped with 
one with 83%. 
The reasons for preferring a particular procedure did vary. However, common to all was the 
importance of price, or, more precisely, that the preferred procedure was the best way to 
achieve better prices and value for money. 
Table 12.14. Ranking of reasons for preferring the open procedure 
Better prices/value for 
money 
Access to a wider range 
of suppliers 
Easier administration 
More flexibility in 
specifications 
Technological 
complexity 
Faster and more efficient 
supplier selection 
Base 
B/L 
2 
¡|f % 
3 
8 
D 
2 
ÉÉÉ 
6 
DK 
1= 
Sil 
2= 
2= 
3 
9 
E 
2= 
: 'iV 
2= 
3 
31 
F 
; $§ | | 
II 
3 
1 
GR 
!!Ì| 
111, ■ 
16 
I 
2= 
ïSI 
3 
2= 
1 
IRL 
3 
2 
I 
14 
NL 
" I ­ : 
w$ 
2 
14 
Ρ 
1­
liii 
3= 
3= 
2= 
2= 
15 
UK 
1­
1É¡¡ 
2 
3 
13 
A 
2 
íill! 
3 
6 
S 
3 
BmB 
2 
11 
FIN 
2 
iiii 
3= 
3= 
11 
Note: 1 : most important, 2: second most important, 3: third most important. 
'Access to a wider range of suppliers' was the most important reason for choosing the open 
procedure in all Member States except Ireland, although its choice of 'technological 
complexity' could be interpreted as a variation on the same theme. 
'Better prices and value for money' was the next most important reason selected, with 'faster 
and more efficient supplier selection' the third most selected reason. 
Although, as for the other procedures, 'better prices and value for money' was an important 
reason for preferring the restricted procedures (see Table 12.15), its choice is driven more by 
'faster and more efficient supplier selection'. The directives covering central and sub­central 
government originally required entities to use the open procedure as a rule, with the restricted 
and negotiated procedures only permitted in special circumstances, which an entity had to 
record in order to justify its use. They were amended in 1993 to allow restricted to be used on 
an equal footing with the open procedure. It is important to distinguish between use of the 
restricted procedure by utilities and central and sub­central government entities. 
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Table 12.15. Ranking of reasons for preferring the restricted procedure 
Better prices/value for 
money 
Access to a wider range of 
suppliers 
Easier administration 
More flexibility in 
specifications 
Technological complexity 
Faster and more efficient 
supplier selection 
Base 
B/L 
2 
3 
¡!|i! 
12 
D 
ti 
111 
2= 
2= 
MB:. 
4 
DK 
] = 
1= 
3 
"'if·''· 
37 
E 
3= 
3= 
1 : y: 
2 
7 
F 
I 
3 
2 
7 
GR 
1 
1 
I 
íèf. 
W 
3 
2 
35 
IRL 
3= 
2= 
3= 
2= 
lil 
6 
NL 
2 
3= 
3= 
3= 
1 
16 
Ρ 
2= 
2= 
: ■ ! , ' . . 
2= 
2 
UK 
I* 
3 
île­;? 
2 
1* 
47 
A 
2= 
2= 
i­
.1=::::. 
2= 
3 
S 
2 
3= 
3= 
1 
3= 
5 
FIN 
t« 
2 
1 ­
Í * 
7 
Note: 1: most important, 2: second most important, 3: third most important. 
(a) A utility may use the restricted procedure without a specific call for competition in the 
OJ if it is operating a supplier qualification system (which must have been advertised in 
the OJ). 
(b) A central or sub­central government body may use the restricted procedure, but only 
with a call for competition in the OJ (although it may also maintain a list of 
'approved/qualified' suppliers). This approach has the benefit of informing all interested 
suppliers of an opportunity (meeting the legislation's aims) as well as, theoretically, 
giving a purchasing entity the ability to minimize effort by only inviting 'appropriate' 
firms to submit tenders (meeting practical/administrative constraints). However, as 
highlighted in Chapter 6, the issue of shortlisting is far from clear. As a practical 
consequence, many entities are loath to reduce the number of suppliers invited to submit 
tenders, obviating the benefits of the procedure. 
Table 12.16. Ranking of 
Better prices/value for 
money 
Access to a wider range of 
suppliers 
Easier administration 
More flexibility in 
specifications 
Due to technological 
complexity 
Faster and more efficient 
supplier selection 
Base 
B/L 
3 
I 
2 
9 
reasons for preferring the negotiated procedure 
D 
''i:-"'"r 
3 
2= 
i ­
2= 
7 
DK 
lili 
3 
2 
7 
E 
IIII 
I 
3 
F 
lii? 
3 
2 
6 
GR 
­
I 
ι 
3 
2 
6 
IRL 
1~ 
3 
2= 
1= 
2= 
4 
NL 
2= 
2= 
lili 
3 
7 
Ρ 
1 = 
1~ 
2 
UK 
I ­
3= 
3= 
2= 
1= 
2= 
22 
A 
1 
2= 
2= 
3 
4 
S 
T= 
3 
2= 
I ­
2= 
10 
FIN 
umB 
3 
2 
5 
Note: 1 : most important, 2: second most important, 3: third most important. 
As can be seen from Tables 12.10 and 12.13, utilities are the principal users of the negotiated 
procedure. (This is also to be expected since central and sub­central government entities may 
only award a contract using the negotiated procedure in exceptional cases.) As confirmed by a 
number of interviews and previous studies, the negotiated procedure is seen by purchasers not 
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only as the best way to achieve better prices and value for money, but reflects the more 
sophisticated, higher value strategic purchases made by utilities. 
12.3.3. Award procedure and criteria 
Preferred award procedure 
All entities subject to the directives have a free choice when evaluating submissions according 
to: 
(a) lowest price, 
(b) 'economically most advantageous' tender. 
The choices made by each purchasing entity type are described below. However, a consistent 
preference for 'economically most advantageous' was reported across Member States and 
purchasing entity types. 
Table 12.17. Preferred award procedure - central government 
Lowest price 
Economically most 
advantageous 
No preference 
Contract dependent 
Base 
* No responses were 
B/L 
3 
4 
7 
D 
2 
2 
DK 
4 
15 
2 
21 
E 
2 
2 
F 
1 
1 
GR 
0* 
I 
4 
1 
1 
6 
received from Greek central government ministrie 
IRL 
1 
5 
6 
NL 
5 
5 
Ρ 
3 
3 
UK 
9 
9 
A 
4 
4 
S 
3 
3 
FIN 
9 
9 
Most central government respondents expressed a preference for 'economically most 
advantageous', with the exception of some from Belgium, Denmark and Italy. 
The result in Italy, as for sub-central government, reflects a greater emphasis on works 
contracts within the entities which responded, where national legislation requires lowest price 
to be used. 
Table 12.18. Preferred award procedure - sub-central government 
Lowest price 
Economically most 
advantageous 
No preference 
Contract dependent 
Base 
B/L 
6 
5 
1 
1 
13 
D 
1 
16 
17 
DK 
1 
19 
2 
22 
E 
1 
19 
2 
22 
F 
3 
36 
2 
41 
GR 
2 
2 
I 
20 
18 
3 
1 
42 
IRL 
1 
8 
9 
NL 
3 
19 
3 
1 
26 
Ρ 
10 
10 
UK 
6 
46 
1 
53 
A 
6 
6 
S 
12 
12 
FIN 
7 
7 
As for central government, the majority of entities expressed a preference for most 
economically advantageous, with the exception of Italy. 
158 Public procurement 
Table 12.19. Preferred award procedure - utilities 
Lowest price 
Economically most 
advantageous 
No preference 
Contract dependent 
Base 
B/L 
1 
7 
2 
10 
D 
6 
1 
7 
DK 
1 
9 
10 
E 
3 
16 
2 
21 
F 
7 
7 
GR 
0* 
I 
4 
4 
1 
9 
IRL 
1 
6 
7 
NL 
1 
8 
9 
Ρ 
5 
5 
UK 
24 
1 
25 
A 
2 
7 
1 
10 
S 
6 
6 
FIN 
6 
1 
7 
* No responses were received from Greek utilities. 
Utilities similarly expressed a preference for economically most advantageous. Those that 
expressed a preference for lowest price were generally entities whose focus of procurement 
was works. 
Award criteria when using economically most advantageous 
Respondents were asked to rank the criteria used when making major strategic purchases from 
1 to 3, with 1 the most important, 2 the second most important and 3 the third most important. 
Scores were calculated by: 
(a) ascribing 3 to the most important criterion, 2 to the second most important criterion, and 
1 to the third most important criterion; 
(b) summing the scores for each criterion and dividing the total by the number of entities. 
As a result, the maximum score for any criterion is 3, and any score greater than 1.5 is of 
above average importance. 
The criteria respondents chose from were: 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
(d) 
(e) 
(f) 
(g) 
(h) 
(i) 
price, 
compatibility, 
whole life cost, 
technical performance, 
after sales service, 
financial capacity, 
quality, 
compliance with specification, 
other. 
Purchasers have a free choice of award criteria, provided they relate to the performance of the 
specific contract. 
Discussions with purchasers raised a number of key issues in relation to use of the 
economically most advantageous procedure. 
(a) The difference between an award criterion (against which a submission is evaluated) and 
a pre-qualification criterion (essentially factors which determine whether a supplier 
should be invited to submit a tender at all). It is for this reason that 'compliance with 
specification' was included as an option. However, we would contend, as do a number 
of entities interviewed, that this is an exclusion, and not an award criterion. It could be 
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argued that, since all specifications which comply with the directives are functional, 
rather than technical, it is feasible that the extent of compliance might be scored using a 
series of sub-criteria. Again, it is our experience that this level of sophistication is not 
common, and that 'technical performance' is the criterion under which such an 
evaluation would take place, 
(b) The quantification of award criteria. Although award criteria are required to be applied 
objectively, some criteria commonly used, such as 'quality', were considered by 
respondents to be impossible/difficult to evaluate in an objective fashion. As a result, 
subjective (and potentially biased) views are taken into account which can, albeit 
unwittingly, go against the legislation's requirements. 
Table 12.20. Award criteria when judging major strategic purchases on the basis of 
'economically most advantageous' - central government 
Price 
Compatibility 
Whole life cost 
Technical performance 
After sales service 
Financial capacity 
Quality 
Compliance with 
specification 
Base 
B/L 
1.33 
1.33 
6 
D 
2.00 
1.50 
1.50 
2.50 
3.00 
2 
DK 
1.52 
1.57 
21 
E 
2.00 
2.50 
2 
F 
3.00 
1 
GR 
0* 
I 
2.80 
5 
IRL 
2.20 
1.80 
5 
NL 
1.80 
1.80 
5 
Ρ 
1.67 
2.00 
3 
UK 
1.56 
1.56 
2.00 
9 
A 
2.00 
4 
S 
1.67 
1.67 
3 
FIN 
2.11 
9 
Note: Belgium's highest scores have been included for comparative purposes and are indicated in italics. 
* No responses were received from Greek central government ministries. 
If 'compliance with specification' is excluded on the basis that it is a rejection rather than 
award criterion, the most important award criterion was 'price' for: 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
(d) 
(e) 
(f) 
Italy, 
Finland, 
Spain, 
Ireland, 
the Netherlands, 
Portugal. 
For the other Member States, price was not the sole determinant, indicating a more sophisti­
cated approach to submission evaluation. 
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Table 12.21. Award criteria when judging major strategic purchases on the basis of 
'economically most advantageous' - sub-central government 
Price 
Compatibility 
Whole life cost 
Technical performance 
After sales service 
Financial capacity 
Quality 
Compliance with 
specification 
Base 
B/L 
1.92 
1.58 
12 
D 
1.81 
1.63 
16 
DK 
1.55 
22 
E 
1.91 
22 
F 
1.77 
40 
GR 
2.00 
3.00 
2 
I 
2.62 
39 
IRL 
1.44 
9 
NL 
1.50 
2.25 
24 
Ρ 
1.60 
1.70 
13 
UK 
1.88 
1.33 
1.55 
49 
A 
2.33 
6 
S 
1.50 
2.17 
12 
FIN 
2.25 
1.50 
8 
Note: Ireland's highest score has been included for comparative purposes and is indicated in italics. 
If 'compliance with specification' is excluded on the basis that it is a rejection rather than an 
award criterion, the most important award criterion was 'price' for: 
(a) Belgium, 
(b) France, 
(c) Italy, 
(d) Ireland, 
(e) Austria. 
For other Member States, 'quality' and/or 'price' were the most important criteria, with the 
exception of Sweden, where 'whole life cost' was most important. 
Table 12.22. Award criteria when judging major strategic purchases on the basis of 
'economically most advantageous' - utilities 
Price 
Compatibility 
Whole life cost 
Technical performance 
After sales service 
Financial capacity 
Quality 
Compliance with 
specification 
Base 
B/L 
1.70 
2.00 
10 
D 
1.43 
1.57 
7 
DK 
1.80 
10 
E 
1.62 
21 
F 
2.00 
7 
GR 
0* 
I 
2.56 
9 
IRL 
1.71 
7 
NL 
1.56 
9 
Ρ 
2.60 
5 
UK 
1.88 
1.60 
25 
A 
2.00 
1.50 
8 
S 
2.20 
1.80 
5 
FIN 
1.57 
7 
* No responses were received from Greek utilities. 
If 'compliance with specification' is excluded on the basis that it is not an award criterion, the 
most important award criterion was 'price' for: 
(a) Belgium; 
(b) Denmark; 
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(c) Italy; 
(d) Ireland. 
Compared to central and sub-central government, 'whole life cost' was a more often quoted 
criterion by utilities, reflecting the more strategic nature of much of their procurement. 
12.3.4. Reasons for rejection of tenders 
Respondents were asked to rank (1 to 3) the most common reasons for rejecting tenders, with 
1 the most common. Scores were then calculated, whereby: 
(a) the maximum score for any factor was 3, 
(b) any score in excess of 1.5 was of greater than average importance. 
The reasons respondents chose from were that the tender(er): 
(a) was too expensive, 
(b) was submitted in a foreign language, 
(c) did not meet specifications, 
(d) could not provide after-sales support, 
(e) refused to accept terms and conditions, 
(f) had insufficient financial capacity, 
(g) did not meet other non-technical requirements. 
Although the purchasing entities were able to choose from all the above reasons, there was an 
almost complete focus on: 
(a) price (tenders being too expensive), 
(b) failure to meet specifications. 
The importance attached to the other reasons was minimal, with: 
(a) submissions in a foreign language and failure to meet other non-technical requirements 
not highlighted at all; 
(b) the inability to provide after-sales support only important in Germany (central 
government) and Austria (supplies); 
(c) refusal to accept terms and conditions highlighted by Germany (central government), 
Greece (sub-central government) and Austria (works); 
(d) insufficient financial capacity only in Greece (sub-central government). 
However, the result was consistent with the information in Section 12.3.3, which 
demonstrated the emphasis placed by purchasers across the EU on the 'award' criteria of: 
(a) price, 
(b) compliance with specification. 
The importance given to price was an expected response, and corroborates that given by 
suppliers in the supply-side survey in relation to their failure to win new business, both 
domestically and in other Member States (although in this instance, other factors were also 
considered to have played an equally important part). 
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Table 12.23 Reasons for rejection of tenders - price 
Purchasing entity 
Central government 
Sub-central government 
Utilities 
Procurement focus 
Works 
Supplies 
Services 
B/L 
1.88 
1.67 
2.60 
2.22 
1.50 
2.00 
D 
2.50 
2.43 
2.71 
3.00 
1.71 
3.00 
DK 
2.48 
1.86 
2.30 
2.50 
2.17 
2.80 
E 
3.00 
1.62 
2.50 
2.18 
2.00 
F 
3.00 
2.40 
2.43 
2.54 
2.40 
GR 
2.00 
2.00 
I 
2.00 
1.91 
2.14 
IRL 
2.17 
2.22 
2.29 
1.67 
2.00 
3.00 
NL 
2.20 
2.44 
1.87 
1.80 
Ρ 
2.10 
1.80 
1.75 
2.50 
2.67 
UK 
1.78 
2.56 
2.36 
2.33 
2.44 
2.60 
A 
2.50 
3.00 
2.20 
2.25 
2.67 
S 
2.33 
1.92 
1.83 
3.00 
1.60 
3.00 
FIN 
2.67 
2.50 
2.43 
3.00 
2.57 
2.00 
Table 12.24. Reasons for rejection of tenders - failure to meet specifications 
Purchasing entity 
Central government 
Sub-central government 
Utilities 
Procurement focus 
Works 
Supplies 
Services 
B/L 
2.38 
2.25 
2.00 
1.67 
2.88 
2.00 
D 
3.00 
2.14 
1.71 
DK 
1.95 
2.24 
2.40 
2.50 
2.08 
E 
1.60 
3.00 
F 
2.00 
2.05 
2.43 
1.93 
2.60 
3.00 
GR 
2.00 
2.00 
I 
2.20 
1.58 
2.33 
1.64 
1.86 
2.67 
IRL 
2.17 
2.33 
2.57 
2.67 
2.80 
2.00 
NL 
2.35 
2.00 
2.20 
1.60 
3.00 
Ρ 
2.67 
2.40 
2.80 
2.75 
2.50 
2.67 
UK 
2.78 
2.04 
2.40 
1.78 
2.25 
2.10 
A 
2.25 
1.83 
2.30 
1.75 
2.00 
S 
2.33 
2.50 
2.50 
2.00 
2.50 
2.00 
FIN 
2.33 
2.00 
1.71 
2.50 
The emphasis placed by purchasers on 'failure to meet specifications' was unexpected, and 
represents a strong (implied) criticism of the quality of (potential new) suppliers. 
Given the directives' requirements, and the fact that, as is discussed in subsequent sections of 
this chapter, more suppliers are, in general, submitting tenders, the need to administer poor 
submissions is likely to be seen as a negative feature of the legislation. The results of the 
supply-side survey in relation to those firms which had failed to win new business in other EU 
Member States also indicated some of the likely reasons for this, particularly: 
(a) lack of local presence, 
(b) inadequate marketing. 
Both the above reason are likely to contribute to a poor comprehension of a purchaser's 
requirements. 
The counter arguments to this, which were again highlighted by unsuccessful firms trying to 
sell to other EU Member States, are: 
(a) purchasers' resistance to new ideas and suppliers (and their way of addressing terms of 
reference); 
(b) the continued use of technical, as distinct from functional specifications, and national 
standards. 
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12.4. Changes in supplier response since the directives came into force 
12.4.1. Overview 
The following section looks at purchasing entities' perceptions of the way in which suppliers 
have responded to the opportunities published in the OJ from a number of perspectives, 
namely changes in the: 
(a) number of firms expressing interest in becoming suppliers, and in those actually 
submitting tenders; 
(b) nationality of firms submitting tenders; 
(c) types of firm submitting tenders. 
12.4.2. Numbers of firms expressing interest and submitting tenders 
Table 12.25. Changes 
Central government 
More 
Fewer 
No change 
Sub-central government 
More 
Fewer 
No change 
Utilities 
More 
Fewer 
No change 
B/L 
3 
4 
3 
10 
9 
1 
in the number of firms expressing ι 
D 
1 
1 
5 
12 
6 
1 
DK 
11 
8 
11 
1 
9 
7 
3 
E 
1 
1 
7 
15 
9 
10 
F 
1 
8 
33 
4 
2 
GR 
2 
I 
4 
2 
24 
17 
5 
4 
IRL 
4 
2 
5 
I 
4 
7 
nterest in 
NL 
1 
4 
14 
1 
12 
9 
Ρ 
3 
2 
2 
7 
2 
2 
becoming 
UK 
5 
4 
37 
13 
20 
5 
A 
2 
2 
2 
4 
5 
1 
suppliers 
S 
2 
1 
7 
5 
6 
4 
FIN 
2 
7 
3 
4 
6 
I 
Overall, most purchasing entities had experienced more firms expressing interest in becoming 
suppliers. In broad terms, the number of entities reporting more expressions of interest was 
similar to the numbers which reported publishing more notices since the directives came into 
force, with the principal exception of sub-central government bodies in France. The focus of 
procurement in French sub-central government bodies was primarily works, with officials to 
whom we spoke quoting a lack of interest on behalf of contractors (even those nearby) to bid. 
Most utilities, in particular, reported an increase, reflecting: 
(a) their lack of publication pre-directive; 
of qualification systems (requiring suppliers to express their 
mlifipH and nrMpH tn a liot r\f nntf»ntin1 tpnrlprprc^ 
(b) the operation by many υι iu uuri i ^r u 
ι being qualified and added to a list of potential tenderers). interest prior to 
It was to be expected that the number of purchasers reporting an increase in the actual number 
of firms submitting tenders would be lower than those reporting an increase in firms 
expressing interest. This was, in general, the case, although it was more pronounced in: 
(a) central government in Denmark (4 versus 11 ), 
(b) sub-central government and utilities in the UK (18 versus 37 and 5 versus 20). 
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Table 12.26. Changes 
Central government 
More 
Fewer 
No change 
Sub-central government 
More 
Fewer 
No change 
Utilities 
More 
Fewer 
No change 
B/L 
2 
6 
2 
1 
10 
8 
2 
in the number of firms submitting 
D 
2 
2 
1 
13 
6 
1 
DK 
4 
2 
13 
10 
Π 
4 
1 
5 
E 
1 
1 
5 
18 
10 
9 
F 
1 
14 
27 
4 
3 
GR 
2 
I 
4 
1 
24 
1 
16 
4 
5 
IRL 
3 
3 
5 
4 
7 
tenders 
NL 
2 
I 
2 
10 
2 
15 
6 
3 
Ρ 
3 
2 
1 
7 
2 
2 
UK 
2 
7 
18 
3 
30 
5 
20 
A 
2 
2 
2 
4 
4 
1 
5 
S 
3 
5 
1 
6 
3 
3 
FIN 
1 
9 
3 
4 
4 
3 
12.4.3. Changes in the nationality of firms submitting tenders 
The following section looks at purchasing entities' perceptions of the extent to which there 
have been increases in the nationality of firms submitting tenders, the nationalities being 
classified as: 
(a) EU, 
(b) non-EU, 
(c) domestic. 
Table 12.27. Increases in the nationality of firms submitting tenders - central 
government 
EU firms* 
Non-EU firms* 
Domestic firms 
No change 
Base 
B/L 
1 
7 
9 
D 
2 
2 
DK 
2 
2 
4 
14 
22 
E 
2 
2 
F 
1 
1 
GR 
0 
I 
1 
4 
1 
6 
IRL 
2 
4 
4 
6 
NL 
1 
1 
1 
3 
5 
Ρ 
3 
3 
UK 
1 
2 
6 
9 
A 
2 
1 
2 
4 
S 
3 
3 
FIN 
1 
9 
10 
* Includes representative and sales offices. Individual responses do not add to base as respondents could select more 
than one option, and some did not respond. 
Most central government ministries reported no change in the nationality of firms submitting 
tenders. This is likely to reflect the fact that central government purchasing entities: 
(a) had been subject to the rules for longest, with some of them applying the pre-1987 rules; 
(b) were more likely to have already been targeted by new suppliers due to their high 
visibility. 
Although the majority of sub-central government purchasers reported no change, a consistent 
proportion had received more tenders from: 
(a) EU firms, 
(b) non-EU firms, 
(c) domestic firms. 
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Table 12.28. Increases in the nationality of firms submitting tenders - sub-central 
government 
EU firms* 
Non-EU firms* 
Domestic firms 
No change 
Base 
B/L 
2 
1 
1 
11 
13 
D 
4 
1 
2 
14 
18 
DK 
3 
5 
5 
16 
22 
E 
4 
1 
3 
15 
23 
F 
11 
1 
7 
27 
41 
GR 
2 
1 
2 
I 
5 
1 
16 
23 
42 
IRL 
3 
6 
9 
NL 
6 
3 
5 
16 
27 
Ρ 
1 
3 
6 
10 
UK 
14 
6 
15 
27 
53 
A 
4 
2 
6 
S 
2 
3 
10 
12 
FIN 
1 
1 
3 
4 
8 
* Includes representative and sales offices. Individual responses do not add to base as respondents could select more 
than one option, and some did not respond. 
Table 12.29. Increases in the nationality of firms submitting tenders - utilities 
EU firms* 
Non-EU firms* 
Domestic firms 
No change 
Base 
B/L 
7 
3 
2 
3 
10 
D 
4 
2 
3 
3 
7 
DK 
5 
4 
5 
10 
E 
3 
5 
14 
21 
F 
5 
3 
2 
7 
GR 
0 
I 
2 
4 
5 
9 
IRL 
6 
3 
1 
1 
7 
NL 
5 
1 
1 
3 
9 
Ρ 
2 
1 
1 
2 
5 
UK 
6 
2 
5 
16 
25 
A 
6 
1 
4 
10 
S 
3 
2 
3 
7 
FIN 
5 
1 
1 
3 
7 
* Includes representative and sales offices. Individual responses do not add to base as respondents could select more 
than one option, and some did not respond. 
The majority of utilities in most Member State had experienced an increase in EU firms 
submitting tenders. Spain and Portugal, which were not covered by the directives at the time 
of the survey, had a less positive experience. The high number of utilities in the UK which 
reported 'no change' reflects the views of operators in the oil and gas exploration and 
extraction sector since they reported having been operating and sourcing internationally before 
the Utilities Directive came into force. 
12.4.4. Changes in the nature of firms submitting tenders 
The following section looks at purchasing entities' perceptions of the extent to which there 
have been increases in different types of Organizations' submitting tenders, the organizations 
being classified as: 
(a) large firms, 
(b) SMEs, 
(c) international consortia, 
(d) domestic consortia. 
The majority of central government ministries had perceived no change in the nature of firms 
submitting tenders. 
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Table 12.30. Increase in the nature of firms submitting tenders - central government 
Large firms 
SMEs 
International consortia 
Domestic consortia 
No change 
Base 
B/L 
1 
1 
6 
9 
D 
2 
2 
DK 
2 
6 
1 
3 
12 
22 
E 
1 
1 
2 
F 
1 
1 
GR 
0 
I 
2 
3 
1 
1 
3 
6 
IRL 
2 
4 
6 
NL 
5 
1 
5 
Ρ 
1 
2 
3 
UK 
1 
8 
9 
A 
1 
1 
1 
2 
4 
S 
3 
3 
FIN 
1 
2 
1 
1 
7 
10 
Note: Figures in columns do not add to base since positive responses are not mutually exclusive. 
Table 12.31 Increase in the nature of firms submitting tenders - sub-central 
government 
Large firms 
SMEs 
International consortia 
Domestic consortia 
No change 
Base 
B/L 
1 
1 
12 
13 
D 
4 
4 
13 
18 
DK 
7 
8 
3 
4 
12 
22 
E 
2 
5 
1 
17 
23 
F 
7 
8 
1 
30 
41 
GR 
1 
1 
1 
2 
I 
8 
15 
1 
10 
15 
42 
IRL 
3 
1 
2 
5 
9 
NL 
8 
6 
1 
3 
13 
27 
Ρ 
1 
3 
1 
1 
5 
10 
UK 
18 
8 
2 
4 
29 
53 
A 
6 
6 
S 
2 
3 
8 
12 
FIN 
2 
1 
1 
5 
8 
Note: Figures in columns do not add to base since positive responses are not mutually exclusive. 
As for central government purchasers, the majority of sub-central entities had perceived no 
change in the nature of firms submitting tenders, with the exceptions of: 
(a) Italy - large firms, SMEs and domestic consortia, 
(b) the Netherlands - large firms and SMEs, 
(c) Portugal - SMEs. 
In broad terms, however, both large firms and SMEs appear to have responded in all Member 
States. 
Table 12.32. Increase 
Large firms 
SMEs 
International consortia 
Domestic consortia 
No change 
Base 
B/L 
5 
3 
4 
1 
4 
10 
in the nature of firms submitting tenders - utilities 
D 
5 
3 
1 
2 
7 
DK 
6 
4 
I 
4 
10 
E 
8 
2 
5 
7 
21 
F 
4 
3 
2 
3 
7 
GR 
0 ι 
I 
1 
1 
7 
9 
IRL 
5 
3 
1 
1 
7 
NL 
6 
3 
3 
4 
4 
9 
Ρ 
5 
UK 
8 
3 
4 
3 
15 
25 
A 
3 
1 
6 
10 
S 
3 
2 
2 
7 
FIN 
4 
2 
1 
2 
7 
Note: Figures in columns do not add to base since positive responses are not mutually exclusive. 
In contrast to both central and sub-central government, the majority of utilities had perceived 
changes in the nature of firms submitting tenders, with the exceptions of: 
(a) Italy, 
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(b) the UK (although this again reflects the views of the exploration sector), 
(c) Austria. 
As might have been expected, more large firms had submitted tenders than any other type of 
supplier (corroborating the findings of the supply-side survey in sectors with a utilities focus). 
However, there had been perceived increases across all types of supplier, including SMEs. 
International and domestic consortia were more in evidence among utilities than for central 
and sub-central government, reflecting the size and nature of their procurement. 
12.5. Changes in supplier base 
12.5.1. Overview 
The following section looks at purchasing entities' perceptions of the way in which changes in 
the profile of firms submitting tenders in response to opportunities published in the OJ had 
been translated into changes in the composition of their supplier bases. This is considered in 
terms of the: 
(a) nationality of firms, 
(b) nature of firms. 
12.5.2. Nationality 
Table 12.33. Changes 
Domestic suppliers 
More 
Fewer 
Same 
Don't know 
Sales/rep office of an 
EU supplier 
More 
Fewer 
Same 
Don't know 
Sales/rep office of a 
non-EU supplier 
More 
Fewer 
Same 
Don't know 
Suppliers from another 
EU Member State 
More 
Fewer 
Same 
Don't know 
Non-EU suppliers 
More 
Fewer 
Same 
Don't know 
Base 
B/L 
6 
3 
6 
3 
1 
8 
4 
5 
3 
6 
9 
to the nationality mix of 
D 
2 
DK 
1 
2 
15 
4 
1 
8 
13 
1 
6 
15 
2 
8 
12 
1 
7 
14 
22 
E 
2 
F 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
GR 
0 
supp 
I 
2 
4 
1 
5 
1 
5 
2 
2 
2 
1 
5 
6 
ier base -
IRL 
1 
5 
1 
1 
4 
1 
1 
4 
4 
2 
2 
4 
6 
NL 
5 
2 
2 
1 
1 
3 
1 
1 
3 
1 
4 
1 
5 
central government 
P 
5 
1 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
UK 
1 
8 
1 
8 
1 
5 
5 
1 
4 
4 
1 
4 
4 
9 
A 
4 
2 
2 
1 
3 
1 
1 
2 
1 
1 
2 
4 
S 
3 
3 
2 
1 
2 
1 
2 
1 
3 
FIN 
1 
6 
3 
1 
4 
5 
1 
3 
6 
1 
3 
7 
10 
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The responses from central government were consistent across most Member States. 
The majority of entities had a good feel for the domestic element of their supplier base, with 
most having perceived no change in the number of such suppliers, although in both Italy and 
the UK several ministries reported a reduction in domestic suppliers. 
In contrast knowledge of the number of non-domestic suppliers was very low. Some entities 
advised that they: 
(a) either did not segment their supplier base in this way (they were 'nationality blind'); 
(b) or that they found it difficult to categorize suppliers by nationality. 
A number of purchasers also pointed out that, in a global economy, such an exercise was 
pointless, since even if a supplier was recognized as being domestic, the origin of any goods 
could be any number of countries. 
Of those entities which had a feel for this, a noticeable minority considered that they now had 
more non-domestic suppliers than before the directives came into force. 
Table 12.34. Changes to the nationality mix of 
Domestic suppliers 
More 
Fewer 
Same 
Don't know 
Sales/rep office of an 
EU supplier 
More 
Fewer 
Same 
Don't know 
Sales/rep office of a 
non-EU supplier 
More 
Fewer 
Same 
Don't know 
Suppliers from another 
EU Member State 
More 
Fewer 
Same 
Don't know 
Non-EU suppliers 
More 
Fewer 
Same 
Don't know 
Base 
B/L 
12 
1 
2 
7 
4 
6 
7 
1 
6 
6 
7 
6 
13 
D 
2 
16 
2 
8 
8 
1 
7 
10 
1 
6 
11 
7 
11 
18 
DK 
2 
2 
18 
4 
5 
13 
9 
13 
3 
5 
14 
1 
6 
15 
22 
E 
1 
14 
8 
3 
5 
15 
4 
19 
1 
3 
19 
4 
19 
23 
F 
2 
1 
36 
2 
2 
14 
25 
8 
33 
3 
9 
29 
1 
10 
30 
41 
GR 
2 
supplier base -
I 
1 
7 
26 
8 
8 
5 
29 
4 
2 
36 
2 
4 
36 
2 
2 
38 
42 
IRL 
2 
7 
7 
2 
1 
3 
5 
2 
2 
5 
2 
7 
9 
NL 
2 
24 
1 
7 
7 
13 
10 
17 
5 
8 
14 
10 
17 
27 
sub-central government 
Ρ 
2 
7 
1 
1 
4 
5 
2 
8 
1 
1 
8 
1 
9 
10 
UK 
2 
8 
36 
7 
9 
2 
16 
26 
3 
18 
32 
5 
15 
33 
2 
14 
37 
53 
A 
6 
6 
2 
4 
1 
4 
1 
2 
4 
6 
S 
1 
11 
2 
9 
1 
1 
9 
2 
6 
6 
7 
5 
12 
FIN 
7 
1 
1 
4 
3 
4 
4 
1 
3 
4 
3 
5 
8 
In common with central government, the majority of sub-central entities had a good feel for 
the domestic element of their supplier base. In contrast to central government most Member 
States had a number of entities which reported: 
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(a) a decrease in the number of domestic suppliers; 
(b) increases in both sales/representative offices of EU suppliers and suppliers from other 
EU Member States. 
A number of entities reported an increase in non-EU suppliers, but this was generally confined 
to larger entities in the larger Member States. 
Table 12.35. Changes to the nationality mix of 
Domestic suppliers 
More 
Fewer 
Same 
Don't know 
Sales/rep office of an 
EU supplier 
More 
Fewer 
Same 
Don't know 
Sales/rep office of a 
non-EU supplier 
More 
Fewer 
Same 
Don't know 
Suppliers from another 
EU Member State 
More 
Fewer 
Same 
Don't know 
Non-EU suppliers 
More 
Fewer 
Same 
Don't know 
Base 
B/L 
2 
1 
7 
4 
1 
5 
1 
5 
4 
4 
5 
1 
1 
7 
2 
10 
D 
3 
4 
2 
4 
1 
3 
4 
2 
4 
1 
2 
4 
1 
7 
DK 
1 
2 
6 
1 
2 
3 
5 
1 
3 
6 
1 
4 
5 
4 
6 
10 
E 
I 
3 
12 
5 
5 
5 
11 
1 
3 
17 
3 
3 
15 
5 
16 
21 
F 
3 
2 
2 
1 
1 
1 
4 
3 
4 
3 
2 
2 
4 
3 
7 
GR 
0 
I 
1 
supp 
1 
1 
1 
6 
1 
2 
2 
5 
2 
7 
1 
1 
4 
3 
1 
3 
5 
9 
ier base -
1RL 
2 
5 
2 
4 
1 
3 
4 
4 
1 
1 
1 
1 
3 
3 
7 
NL 
2 
7 
1 
1 
5 
2 
1 
5 
3 
4 
4 
1 
5 
4 
9 
utilities 
Ρ 
3 
2 
3 
3 
3 
1 
4 
5 
UK 
4 
19 
2 
3 
1 
14 
7 
2 
1 
13 
9 
2 
16 
7 
2 
16 
7 
25 
A 
3 
7 
2 
6 
2 
5 
5 
2 
5 
3 
8 
2 
10 
S 
2 
4 
1 
3 
3 
1 
3 
4 
4 
3 
5 
-2 
7 
FIN 
2 
4 
1 
1 
4 
2 
5 
2 
2 
3 
2 
5 
2 
7 
In common with both central and sub-central government entities, the majority of utilities had 
a good feel for the domestic element of their supplier base. In common with sub-central 
government most Member States reported: 
(a) a decrease in the number of domestic suppliers, 
(b) increases in both sales/representative offices of EU suppliers and suppliers from another 
EU Member State. 
There was little reported change in respect of non-EU suppliers. 
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12.5.3. Changes in the nature of companies 
Table 12.36. Changes 
Multinational companies 
More 
Fewer 
Same 
Don't know 
Large national firms 
More 
Fewer 
Same 
Don't know 
SMEs 
More 
Fewer 
Same 
Don't know 
National consortia 
More 
Fewer 
Same 
Don't know 
International consortia 
More 
Fewer 
Same 
Don't know 
Base 
B/L 
6 
3 
5 
4 
9 
2 
7 
2 
7 
9 
to the company mix 
D 
2 
2 
2 
DK 
7 
15 
1 
9 
12 
1 
13 
8 
1 
7 
14 
4 
18 
22 
E 
2 
2 
2 
1 
1 
2 
2 
F 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
of su 
GR 
0 
ipplier base - central government 
I 
1 
5 
5 
1 
4 
2 
3 
3 
6 
6 
IRL 
3 
3 
4 
2 
5 
1 
3 
4 
1 
5 
6 
NL 
1 
3 
1 
3 
2 
2 
3 
4 
1 
4 
1 
5 
Ρ 
1 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
3 
3 
3 
UK 
8 
1 
1 
8 
1 
7 
1 
1 
4 
4 
1 
3 
5 
9 
A 
1 
2 
1 
2 
2 
1 
3 
1 
3 
2 
2 
4 
S 
2 
1 
2 
1 
3 
1 
2 
1 
2 
3 
FIN 
5 
5 
4 
6 
3 
7 
3 
7 
3 
7 
10 
As described in Section 12.4.3 the majority of central government ministries had perceived no 
change in the nature of firms submitting tenders. Only a few entities had perceived changes to 
their supplier bases: 
(a) an increase in SMEs in Denmark; 
(b) some increase in multinational (large) companies in Italy; 
(c) increases in large firms and multinational companies in the Netherlands. 
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Table 12.37. Changes 
Multinational companies 
More 
Fewer 
Same 
Don't know 
Large national firms 
More 
Fewer 
Same 
Don't know 
SMEs 
More 
Fewer 
Same 
Don't know 
National consortia 
More 
Fewer 
Same 
Don't know 
International consortia 
More 
Fewer 
Same 
Don't know 
Base 
B/L 
5 
8 
9 
4 
1 
9 
3 
6 
7 
4 
9 
13 
to the company mix 
D 
1 
7 
10 
1 
6 
11 
1 
15 
2 
5 
13 
5 
13 
18 
DK 
2 
11 
9 
1 
12 
9 
1 
1 
15 
4 
1 
11 
10 
9 
35 
22 
E 
1 
12 
12 
3 
1 
10 
9 
1 
12 
10 
1 
1 
6 
15 
4 
19 
23 
F 
2 
12 
27 
4 
2 
22 
13 
4 
1 
25 
11 
7 
34 
1 
4 
37 
41 
of supplier base - sub-central 
GR 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
2 
I 
6 
8 
28 
4 
2 
21 
15 
7 
3 
21 
11 
2 
10 
30 
1 
4 
37 
42 
IRL 
4 
5 
2 
1 
6 
1 
3 
5 
1 
8 
1 
8 
9 
NL 
3 
10 
14 
3 
1 
19 
4 
2 
2 
22 
1 
5 
22 
3 
24 
27 
Ρ 
2 
4 
4 
2 
6 
2 
2 
7 
1 
1 
1 
8 
10 
10 
UK 
11 
21 
21 
11 
1 
28 
13 
3 
5 
29 
16 
4 
1 
16 
32 
2 
2 
11 
38 
53 
government 
A 
4 
2 
5 
1 
6 
3 
3 
3 
3 
6 
S 
1 
10 
1 
1 
11 
2 
9 
1 
5 
7 
5 
7 
12 
FIN 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
1 
7 
8 
Although, with the exceptions of Italy, the Netherlands and Portugal, most sub-central entities 
had not perceived any changes in the nature of firms on their supplier basis, in most Member 
States some entities reported an increase in the number of multinational companies and large 
national firms. 
Similarly, most Member States had entities which reported an increase in the number of SMEs 
on their supplier bases, although there were also a number which reported a decrease. 
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Table 12.38. Changes 
Multinational companies 
More 
Fewer 
Same 
Don't know 
Large national firms 
More 
Fewer 
Same 
Don't know 
SMEs 
More 
Fewer 
Same 
Don't know 
National consortia 
More 
Fewer 
Same 
Don't know 
International consortia 
More 
Fewer 
Same 
Don't know 
Base 
B/L 
1 
8 
1 
1 
8 
1 
1 
8 
1 
1 
6 
3 
1 
6 
3 
10 
to the company mix 
D 
3 
4 
2 
4 
1 
7 
6 
1 
5 
2 
7 
DK 
3 
3 
4 
4 
1 
2 
3 
3 
6 
1 
1 
5 
4 
1 
2 
7 
10 
E 
3 
7 
11 
2 
12 
7 
2 
10 
9 
1 
4 
16 
3 
4 
14 
21 
F 
1 
4 
2 
2 
3 
2 
5 
2 
1 
2 
4 
2 
1 
4 
7 
of supplier base - utilities 
GR 
0 
I 
6 
3 
7 
2 
1 
4 
4 
1 
1 
I 
6 
1 
8 
9 
IRL 
I 
6 
1 
6 
1 
6 
4 
3 
1 
4 
2 
7 
NL 
3 
5 
1 
2 
1 
6 
2 
1 
6 
2 
4 
3 
2 
3 
4 
9 
Ρ 
2 
3 
1 
1 
3 
1 
1 
3 
1 
4 
1 
4 
5 
UK 
5 
18 
2 
4 
4 
16 
1 
1 
5 
18 
1 
4 
8 
13 
6 
7 
12 
25 
A 
1 
6 
3 
9 
1 
1 
8 
1 
6 
4 
1 
3 
6 
10 
S 
5 
2 
1 
4 
2 
1 
4 
2 
3 
4 
2 
5 
7 
FIN 
2 
3 
2 
2 
3 
2 
4 
3 
3 
4 
4 
3 
7 
The main change identifiable in respect of utilities was the increase in most Member States of 
multinational companies. Although there were also increases reported in large national firms 
and SMEs in half the Member States, half also reported decreases. 
12.6. Factors contributing to changes in procurement practices and results 
The following section analyses the factors which purchasing entities considered to be most 
important in terms of changes in their procurement: 
(a) practices - the way procurements are made, 
(b) results - what is purchased. 
Each factor is considered by: 
(a) purchasing entity type (central government, sub-central government, utilities), 
(b) the focus of an entity's purchasing (works, supplies, services). 
Respondents were asked to rank, 1 to 3, the importance of a series of factors, with 1 being the 
most important. Scores were then calculated, whereby: 
(a) the maximum score for any factor was 3, 
(b) any score in excess of 1.5 was of greater than average importance. 
Respondents chose from: 
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(a) publishing in the OJ, 
(b) EU procurement legislation, 
(c) national public procurement legislation, 
(d) economic performance, such as recessions, 
(e) internal organizational changes, such as restructuring, 
(f) the completion of the single European market, 
(g) the GATT Agreement/trade liberalization, 
(h) supplier restructuring, 
(i) increased product/project complexity, 
(j) changes in product technology/innovation. 
Specific changes to both practices and results are described in Section 12.7. 
Although respondents were able to choose from any of the above reasons, there was an almost 
complete focus on: 
(a) publishing in the OJ, 
(b) EU procurement legislation, 
(c) national public procurement legislation, 
(d) economic performance, such as recessions. 
The importance attached to the other factors was minimal, with: 
(a) internal organizational changes, such as restructuring, important for only central 
government in the UK (1.63), sub-central government in Greece (1.5), services 
procurement in Germany (2.0) and Spain (3.0), and supplies procurement in Greece (1.5) 
and Italy (2.0); 
(b) the completion of the single European market, highlighted only by central government in 
Germany (1.5), works procurement in Ireland (1.67) and Finland (2.0), and supplies 
procurement in Austria (2.0); 
(c) the GATT Agreement/trade liberalization, highlighted by only central government in 
Germany (1.5); 
(d) supplier restructuring, highlighted by utilities in France (3.0 practices and 2.0 results), 
works procurement results in Germany (1.5) and Austria (1.5), and supplies procurement 
results in Austria (2.3); 
(e) increased product/project complexity, which was highlighted only for works 
procurement practices in Sweden (3.0); 
(f) changes in product technology/innovation, which was highlighted for central 
government results in Finland (1.5) and utilities practices and results in Spain (2.0). 
Publication in the OJ, although only an element of the procurement legislation's requirements, 
was considered separately since it is core to the success of a single market in public 
procurement. If an entity does not publish, (new) suppliers cannot, by definition, respond. 
Although, as might be expected, the requirement was seen by more entities as having more 
importance for their practices, the importance ascribed to it by some utilities, in particular, 
indicates that publication alone is of benefit. 
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Table 12.39. Importance of publishing in the Official Journal for procurement practices 
and results - purchasing entity type 
Central government 
Practices 
Results 
Sub-central government 
Practices 
Results 
Utilities 
Practices 
Results 
B/L 
1.60 
1.90 
1.50 
D 
1.50 
2.00 
DK 
1.63 
1.71 
E 
2.00 
F 
1.71 
GR 
1.50 
1.50 
I IRL 
1.56 
1.57 
NL Ρ UK A 
2.25 
S 
2.17 
2.00 
FIN 
1.67 
Table 12.40. Importance of publishing in the Official Journal for procurement practices 
and results - focus of procurement 
Works 
Practices 
Results 
Supplies 
Practices 
Results 
Services 
Practices 
Results 
B/L 
1.60 
1.83 
2.00 
1.50 
D 
2.00 
DK E F GR 
1.50 
1.50 
I IRL 
2.67 
NL 
1.80 
Ρ 
1.50 
UK A 
2.00 
S FIN 
3.00 
3.00 
Similarly, the importance of the publication requirement was greater for practices than results 
when considered by type of procurement. 
Table 12.41. Importance of EU procurement legislation for procurement practices and 
results - purchasing entity type 
Central government 
Practices 
Results 
Sub-central government 
Practices 
Results 
Utilities 
Practices 
Results 
B/L 
1.60 
1.67 
2.00 
1.67 
D 
3.00 
DK 
2.07 
1.53 
2.00 
1.62 
2.50 
2.29 
E 
1.50 
F 
3.00 
2.00 
GR 
2.00 
2.00 
I 
1.80 
2.00 
2.21 
1.63 
2.00 
IRL 
2.80 
1.50 
1.67 
2.29 
2.00 
NL 
3.00 
2.00 
1.71 
2.67 
Ρ UK 
1.96 
1.71 
A 
1.50 
1.67 
1.70 
S 
1.92 
FIN 
1.67 
EU legislation was of higher than average importance in most Member States for all types of 
purchasing entity type in terms of practices. There were, however, a number of Member 
States where national procurement legislation was considered to be more important (Table 
12.44): 
(a) Germany - utilities, 
(b) Spain - central and sub-central government, 
(c) France - central government, 
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(d) Portugal - central and sub-central government, and utilities, 
(e) Sweden - central government and utilities. 
EU legislation was of greater than average importance in fewer Member States in terms of 
results. There were again a number of Member States where national procurement legislation 
was considered to be more important (Table 12.44): 
(a) Spain - sub-central government, 
(b) France - sub-central government, 
(c) Ireland - sub-central government, 
(d) Portugal - central and sub-central government, 
(e) Austria - sub-central government, 
(f) Sweden - sub-central government and utilities, 
(g) Finland - utilities. 
Table 12.42. Importance of EU procurement legislation for procurement practices and 
results - focus of procurement 
Works 
Practices 
Results 
Supplies 
Practices 
Results 
Services 
Practices 
Results 
B/L 
1.71 
2.33 
2.50 
D 
1.71 
DK 
2.50 
1.40 
2.10 
2.00 
1.67 
1.67 
E 
2.00 
F 
3.00 
GR 
2.00 
2.00 
I 
1.80 
2.00 
2.71 
1.71 
1.60 
IRL 
2.00 
2.80 
2.00 
2.00 
2.00 
NL 
2.00 
2.00 
3.00 
3.00 
Ρ 
1.67 
1.50 
2.00 
UK 
1.56 
1.73 
A 
1.50 
2.00 
S 
1.70 
3.00 
3.00 
FIN 
2.00 
2.17 
2.00 
EU legislation was of above average importance in most Member States for all types of 
procurement in respect of practices. There were, however, a number of Member States where 
national procurement legislation was considered more important (Table 12.44): 
(a) Germany - works, 
(b) Spain - works and services, 
(c) France - work and supplies, 
(d) Portugal - supplies and services, 
(e) Austria - works, 
(f) Sweden - works. 
EU legislation was of above average importance in fewer Member States in respect of results. 
There were again a number of Member States where national procurement legislation was 
considered to be more important (Table 12.44): 
(a) Germany - works, 
(b) Spain - works and services, 
(c) France - work and supplies, 
(d) Portugal - supplies and services, 
(e) the UK - supplies, 
(f) Austria - works, 
(g) Finland - works and supplies. 
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Table 12.43. Importance of national procurement legislation for procurement practices 
and results - purchasing entity type 
Central government 
Practices 
Results 
Sub-central government 
Practices 
Results 
Utilities 
Practices 
Results 
B/L 
1.56 
1.57 
1.50 
D 
1.57 
DK E 
3.00 
2.40 
2.25 
F 
3.00 
3.00 
2.25 
2.04 
GR 
1.50 
1.50 
I 
2.20 
2.67 
1.63 
1.50 
IRL 
1.50 
1.33 
NL 
1.75 
1.75 
Ρ 
2.67 
3.00 
1.86 
2.00 
2.00 
UK A 
2.50 
2.50 
1.83 
1.70 
S 
2.67 
2.25 
1.82 
2.00 
2.00 
FIN 
2.00 
1.71 
National procurement legislation was of above average importance in most Member States for 
all purchasing entity types in respect of practices. Its importance in Austria, Sweden and 
Finland is likely to reflect these countries' more recent coverage by EU rules, whilst 
Portuguese utilities are not, in any case, subject to the Utilities Directive until 1998. 
National procurement legislation was of higher than average importance in most Member 
States for all purchasing entity types in respect of results. This was particularly so at sub-
central government level. 
Table 12.44. Importance of national procurement legislation for procurement practices 
and results - focus of procurement 
Works 
Practices 
Results 
Supplies 
Practices 
Results 
Services 
Practices 
Results 
B/L 
1.57 
1.50 
D 
1.50 
2.00 
DK 
1.67 
2.33 
E 
1.69 
1.73 
3.00 
3.00 
F 
2.24 
2.13 
2.60 
2.20 
GR 
1.50 
1.50 
I 
1.80 
1.83 
1.86 
2.00 
IRL 
3.00 
NL Ρ 
2.00 
1.50 
2.67 
3.00 
3.00 
3.00 
UK 
2.00 
1.78 
A 
2.50 
1.75 
2.33 
S 
2.00 
2.20 
2.00 
2.00 
FIN 
3.00 
2.33 
1.67 
National procurement legislation was of above average importance in most Member States for 
all types of procurement in respect of both practices and results. 
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Table 12.45. Importance of economic performance, such as recessions, for procurement 
practices and results - purchasing entity type 
Central government 
Practices 
Results 
Sub-central government 
Practices 
Results 
Utilities 
Practices 
Results 
B/L 
2.25 
D 
2.50 
1.70 
DK E 
1.50 
1.50 
F 
1.71 
GR 
1.50 
1.50 
I IRL NL Ρ UK A 
2.25 
2.00 
1.80 
S FIN 
2.00 
1.86 
Table 12.46. Importance of economic performance, such as recessions, for procurement 
practices and results - focus of procurement 
Works 
Practices 
Results 
Supplies 
Practices 
Results 
Services 
Practices 
Results 
B/L D 
1.50 
3.00 
DK E F GR 
1.50 
1.50 
I IRL NL 
2.00 
2.00 
Ρ UK 
1.56 
A 
1.50 
2.33 
S FIN 
1.50 
2.00 
The economy's performance was of above average importance in only a few Member States, 
mostly relating to results: 
(a) Belgium - central government, 
(b) Germany - central and sub-central government, works and services, 
(c) Spain - central and sub-central government, 
(d) France - utilities, 
(e) Greece - sub-central government and supplies, 
(f) the Netherlands - services, 
(g) the UK - works, 
(h) Austria - central and sub-central government, utilities, works and supplies, 
(i) Finland - sub-central government and utilities, supplies and services. 
12.7. Nature of changes and the impact of legislation 
The following section: 
(a) looks at changes which purchasing entities had experienced since the directives came 
into force; 
(b) examines the extent to which the EU legislation was perceived by purchasing entities to 
have contributed to such changes. 
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The following possible changes, which are a combination of potential demand­side and 
supply­side responses to the legislation's requirements, are covered: 
(a) wider choice of suppliers, 
(b) increased number of tenderers, 
(c) improvement in tender quality, 
(d) lower contract prices, 
(e) the advent of new technology, 
(f) more efficient procurement procedures, 
(g) lower cost of procurement, 
(h) improved quality, 
(i) more complex procurement, 
(j) improved supplier service, 
(k) more time­consuming procurement, 
(1) lack of serious responses and/or tenders. 
For any change experienced, the entity was asked to assess the extent to which the public 
procurement legislation had been the cause, namely: 
(a) none, 
(b) partly, 
(c) entirely. 
Table 12.47. The impact of public procurement legislation on choice of suppliers ­
purchasing entity type 
Central government 
Experienced 
Legislation's impact: 
None 
Partly 
Entirely 
Sub­central government 
Experienced 
Legislation's impact: 
None 
Partly 
Entirely 
Utilities 
Experienced 
Legislation's impact: 
None 
Partly 
Entirely 
B/L 
9 
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The number of entities which reported now having a wider choice of suppliers was broadly in 
line with that which had reported an increase in the number of firms submitting tenders (Table 
12.26). Without exception, the majority of these entities, independent of Member State or 
purchasing entity type, ascribed this increase to the EU procurement legislation either in part, 
or entirely. 
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Central government purchasers appeared to have experienced this less than sub­central 
government entities, with utilities most likely to have experienced it. As for other elements of 
the survey, this would seem to reflect the relative period for which the entities have been 
covered, as well as, in the case of central and sub­central government, the size and importance 
of their procurement. 
Table 12.48. The impact of public procurement legislation on number of tenders 
received - purchasing entity type 
Central government 
Experienced 
Legislation's impact: 
None 
Partly 
Entirely 
Sub­central government 
Experienced 
Legislation's impact: 
None 
Partly 
Entirely 
Utilities 
Experienced 
Legislation's impact: 
None 
Partly 
Entirely 
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The number of entities which reported receiving more tenders again broadly reflected that 
which had reported an increase in the number of firms submitting tenders since the directives 
came into force (Table 12.26). 
For the vast majority of entities of all types, this increase was ascribed partly or entirely to the 
legislation. 
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Table 12.49. The impact of public procurement legislation on tender quality -
purchasing entity type 
Central government 
Experienced 
Legislation's impact: 
None 
Partly 
Entirely 
Sub-central government 
Experienced 
Legislation's impact: 
None 
Partly 
Entirely 
Utilities 
Experienced 
Legislation's impact: 
None 
Partly 
Entirely 
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Fewer entities reported an improvement in tender quality than those which had experienced an 
increase in the number of tenders received. This was particularly so in relation to utilities. 
However, of those that had experienced an improvement, most attributed this in part, and a 
minority entirely, due to the legislation. 
Table 12.50. The impact of public procurement legislation on contract prices -
purchasing entity type 
Central government 
Experienced 
Legislation's impact: 
None 
Partly 
Entirely 
Sub­central government 
Experienced 
Legislation's impact: 
None 
Partly 
Entirely 
Utilities 
Experienced 
Legislation's impact: 
None 
Partly 
Entirely 
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In most Member States at all levels of purchasing entity type, a significant minority had 
experienced lower contract prices, although this was more noticeable among utilities than for 
central and sub­central government. In almost all cases, the majority of entities which had 
experienced lower prices ascribed this in part to the legislation. 
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Table 12.51. The impact of public procurement legislation on new technology -
purchasing entity type 
Central government 
Experienced 
Legislation's impact: 
None 
Partly 
Entirely 
Sub­central government 
Experienced 
Legislation's impact: 
None 
Partly 
Entirely 
Utilities 
Experienced 
Legislation's impact: 
None 
Partly 
Entirely 
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Only a minority of entities had experienced changes in technology, with this more important 
for utilities than for central and sub­central government. 
However, for those that had experienced changes in technology, in general most considered 
the legislation to have contributed in part, at least, to such developments. This was confirmed 
by a number of interviews where a number of purchasers had benefited from innovative 
approaches put forward by new suppliers. This had, in turn, resulted in considerable cost 
savings. 
Table 12.52. The impact of public procurement legislation on efficiency of procurement 
procedures - purchasing entity type 
Central government 
Experienced 
Legislation's impact: 
None 
Partly 
Entirely 
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Legislation's impact: 
None 
Partly 
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Legislation's impact: 
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Partly 
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At central government level only a minority of entities reported having experienced 
improvements to their procurement procedures, with these limited to seven Member States. 
However, most of those that had experienced such a change attributed it in part to the 
legislation. 
Although only a minority at sub­central government level reported having experienced 
improvements to their procurement procedures, in contrast to central government, this was 
common to all Member States (except Belgium). Again, most of those that had experienced 
such a change attributed this in part to the legislation, although a number in five Member 
States also attributed it entirely to the legislation. 
Again, only a minority of utilities considered that they now had more efficient procurement 
procedures, although, like sub­central government, at least one entity in each Member State 
(except Greece and Finland) reported this. Significantly, however, the vast majority of these 
utilities attributed efficiency improvements to the legislation in part. 
Table 12.53. The impact of public procurement legislation on the cost of procurement ­
purchasing entity type 
Central government 
Experienced 
Legislation's impact: 
None 
Partly 
Entirely 
Sub­central government 
Experienced 
Legislation's impact: 
None 
Partly 
Entirely 
Utilities 
Experienced 
Legislation's impact: 
None 
Partly 
Entirely 
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Only a very few central government entities had experienced lower costs of procurement, 
although they were spread across nine Member Statesi For the majority, procurement 
legislation was not a contributory factor. 
Although, similarly, only a minority of sub­central government entities had experienced lower 
costs of procurement, the majority considered the legislation to have been partly responsible. 
Although utilities in most Member States had experienced lower costs of procurement, only a 
minority considered the legislation to have been partly responsible. 
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Table 12.54. The impact of public procurement legislation on quality of tenders -
purchasing entity type 
Central government 
Experienced 
Legislation's impact: 
None 
Partly 
Entirely 
Sub­central government 
Experienced 
Legislation's impact: 
None 
Partly 
Entirely 
Utilities 
Experienced 
Legislation's impact: 
None 
Partly 
Entirely 
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Only a minority of central government entities had experienced an improvement in tender 
quality, with the majority of these ascribing any such change to factors other than the 
legislation. 
In contrast, whilst still only a minority of sub­central government entities and utilities had 
experienced an improvement in tender quality, the majority of them in both cases attributed 
this in part, or entirely, to the legislation. 
Table 12.55. The impact of public procurement legislation on the complexity of 
procurement - purchasing entity type 
Central government 
Experienced 
Legislation's impact: 
None 
Partly 
Entirely 
Sub­central government 
Experienced 
Legislation's impact: 
None 
Partly 
Entirely 
Utilities 
Experienced 
Legislation's impact: 
None 
Partly 
Entirely 
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A majority of entities at all levels in most Member States reported having experienced more 
complex procurement since the directives came into force, with the vast majority attributing 
this in part, or entirely, to the legislation. 
Table 12.56. The impact of public procurement legislation on supplier service ­
purchasing entity type 
Central government 
Experienced 
Legislation's impact: 
None 
Partly 
Entirely 
Sub­central government 
Experienced 
Legislation's impact: 
None 
Partly 
Entirely 
Utilities 
Experienced 
Legislation's impact: 
None 
Partly 
Entirely 
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Very few central government entities in seven of the Member States had perceived an 
improvement in supplier service, with legislation only an important factor for a minority of 
these. 
Although, at a sub­central government level, an improvement had been seen in most Member 
States, this was again only the case for a minority of entities. However, the majority of those 
that had experienced an improvement attributed it in part, or entirely, to the procurement 
legislation. 
Similarly, although at least one utility in most Member States had seen an improvement, this 
was only a minority in each Member State. However, in most cases, procurement legislation 
was considered to have been the cause or a contributory factor of this change. 
Demand side 185 
Table 12.57. The impact of public procurement legislation on procurement timescales 
purchasing entity type 
Central government 
Experienced 
Legislation's impact: 
None 
Partly 
Entirely 
Sub­central government 
Experienced 
Legislation's impact: 
None 
Partly 
Entirely 
Utilities 
Experienced 
Legislation's impact: 
None 
Partly 
Entirely 
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A majority of entities at all levels in all Member States (except the Spanish central 
government) reported having experienced more time­consuming procurement since the 
directives came into force, with the vast majority attributing this change in part, or entirely, to 
the legislation. 
Table 12.58. The impact of public procurement legislation on the seriousness of 
responses and/or tenders - purchasing entity type 
Central government 
Experienced 
Legislation's impact: 
None 
Partly 
Entirely 
Sub­central government 
Experienced 
Legislation's impact: 
None 
Partly 
Entirely 
Utilities 
Experienced' 
Legislation's impact: 
None 
Partly 
Entirely 
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Very few entities at central government level highlighted the issue of having to deal with a 
lack of serious responses and/or tenders, although of those that did, the majority attributed this 
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in part to the legislation. Although only a few entities at sub-central government level 
highlighted this as an issue, it was common to all Member States. 
Some utilities in most Member States highlighted this issue with, in common with central 
government, the majority attributing it in part, or entirely, to the legislation. 
Supply side 187 
13. Supply side 
13.1. Overview 
13.1.1. Ex ante hypothesis 
In 1987 it was assumed that: 
(a) the legislation would result in greater awareness of opportunities and more fairness in 
contract awards; 
(b) this would be reflected in penetration of previously closed markets - domestic and other 
EU - by competitive suppliers. 
13.1.2. Coverage 
This chapter provides an analysis of the results of a survey carried out to determine the extent 
to which suppliers perceive the barriers to open and fair procurement identified by the 
Cecchini study (European Commission, 1988) to have been overcome. Specifically, the survey 
determined the extent to which: 
(a) firms use the OJ or TED to identify business opportunities; 
(b) information in the OJ and TED related to domestic public-sector and utilities contracts 
has resulted in the identification of additional business opportunities, the degree and 
reasons for resultant successes or failures, and firms' intentions; 
(c) information in the OJ and TED related to public-sector and utilities contracts in other 
Member States has resulted in the identification of additional business opportunities, the 
degree and reasons for resultant successes or failures, and firms' intentions; 
(d) firms considered information on public-sector and utilities contracts (covered by the 
directives) to be adequate; 
(e) firms considered there to have been an increase in non-domestic players competing for 
and winning business from their domestic public-sector/utilities customers. 
13.1.3. Data 
Our approach was to: 
(a) focus our sample on the procurement-sensitive supplying sectors, accounting for some 
62% of the value of procurement; 
(b) ensure that the large Member States and major supplying sectors had adequate 
representation for the purposes of making inferences about the total population. 
Quota samples were drawn on a 4:1 basis from TED and Kompass and other business 
directories to ensure representation of all Member States and procurement-sensitive sectors. 
Random samples were drawn in each cell (Member State and supplying sector). In total 6,000 
companies were drawn from: 
(a) published CANs in 1994 and 1995, 
(b) Kompass and other business directories. 
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This approach yielded an effective sample of 1,608 companies, which was representative of 
the size of firms selling to the public sector/utilities within the quotas. 
Because telephone-based industrial market research response rates are difficult to predict due 
to the problem of finding the target respondent 'in and free', a target and minimum realized 
sample of 2,000 and 1,500 were set. A sample of 1,608 companies was realized (Table 13.1), 
covering a cross-section of company sizes, in particular SMEs, as well as companies which act 
as subcontractors to suppliers to the public sector/utilities (Table 13.2). 
In some instances, due to the manner in which firms responded: 
(a) sample sizes in some Member States became so small that estimated percentages would 
be misleading; 
(b) samples in other Member States, despite being relatively small, were considered since 
estimated percentages were consistent with the results where sample sizes were 
adequate. 
These are highlighted in the text where appropriate. 
A bias in the sample was identified in the form of the CANs-based sample containing 
approximately 50% more OJ/TED users than that drawn from Kompass and other business 
directories. For the bulk of the analysis this bias is irrelevant, since the focus is on those 
respondents who are users of the OJ/TED. 
However, since OJ/TED users had a higher propensity to win additional domestic and export 
business, the large number of OJ/TED users in the CANs-based sample would lead to an 
overstatement of any quantitative estimates of: 
(a) overall use of the OJ and TED (Figures 13.1 to 13.3); 
(b) overall success rates in relation to domestic business won as a result of the OJ and TED 
(Figures 13.11 to 13.13); 
(c) overall success rates in relation to non-domestic business won as a result of the OJ and 
TED (Figures 13.22 to 13.24). 
In these particular instances, bias in the CANs-based sample was removed by adjusting all 
values by the ratio: 
EL 
pi 
where p\ = the proportion of Kompass-based respondents reading the OJ/TED and pi - the 
proportion of CANs-based respondents reading the OJ/TED. 
Estimates oïp\ andpj based on the sample averages were 0.41 and 0.62 respectively, yielding 
an average adjustment factor of 0.66 (0.41/0.62). 
With market research surveys of this nature, there are two approaches to the treatment of 
'don't know's: 
(a) classifying them as 'no'; 
(b) allocating them pro-rata between 'yes' and 'no'. 
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In all questions, it is far from clear whether some of the 'don't know's could really be 'yes's. 
Given this, we have adopted a conservative approach and classified them as 'no's, accepting 
that, in some cases, this may result in an extremely small underestimate. 
The central selection criterion for firms surveyed was that they should, at a minimum, be 
selling to the public sector and/or utilities in their own Member State. 
Survey respondents were managers with specific responsibility for public-sector/utilities 
markets. 
Table 13.1. 
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11 
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83 
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Is were lost. 
Total 
200 
200 
197 
211* 
153 
100 
98 
65 
61 
53 
50 
100 
70 
50 
1,608 
To assist readers, Appendix A gives the sectors corresponding to the NACE codes in the 
tables and figures. 
Table 13.2. Company size and subcontractor coverage 
Company characteristics 
Small (less than 100 employees) 
Medium (101-250 employees) 
Large (251+ employees) 
Total 
Subcontractors 
Number 
817 
298 
493 
1,608 
655 
Percentage 
51 
19 
31 
100 
41 
13.1.4. Key findings 
Supply-side structure 
Across all Member States, and within most sectors, there were a significant number of non-
domestic subsidiaries selling to the public sector/utilities. 
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Overall, 40% of firms surveyed were selling, or had tried to sell, to other (non-domestic) EU 
markets in various ways, of which: 
(a) 31% were currently selling to public-sector/utilities customers in other EU Member 
States; 
(b) 9% had tried to sell to public-sector/utilities customers in other EU Member States (but 
were not now doing so). 
37% of firms surveyed had not tried to sell to other Member States. Some 35% of these firms 
(13% of all firms surveyed) reported identification of opportunities as a key problem. 
Overall outcome from use of the O J and TED 
Overall, 41% of all firms surveyed had obtained information from the OJ and TED, although 
there were differences between Member States, and a significantly higher percentage of large 
firms (69%) obtained information from the O J and TED than medium-sized (53%) and small 
(34%) companies. 
As a result of opportunities identified from the OJ and TED, 13% of all firms surveyed had 
won additional domestic business. 
Overall, some 30% of firms which used the OJ and TED had identified additional business 
opportunities in other EU Member States, and almost 10% of firms which used the OJ and 
TED had won additional business as a result, some 4% of all firms surveyed. 
Large firms had been most successful in obtaining additional new business in both domestic 
and non-domestic markets as a result of opportunities identified in the O J and TED. However, 
those small and medium-sized firms which had used the OJ and TED, were as successful as 
large companies in winning business. 
The OJ and TED were seen in a positive fashion by those firms which had obtained 
information from them, with over 80% intending/expecting to submit at least as many tenders 
in response to notices in the future. 
Impact of publication and notification requirements for domestic business 
Of the firms which had obtained information from the OJ and TED, almost half had identified 
additional domestic business opportunities. 
Response rates to new opportunities were very high, with over 90% having submitted tenders, 
and more than 70% of those submitting having won business as a result. 
Of those firms which had won business as a result of the OJ and TED, success was generally 
size- and sector-independent. 
Price was the major reason given by firms for failing to win additional business from 
opportunities identified in the OJ and TED. Whilst demand-side barriers were perceived to 
play a role - particularly reluctance on behalf of purchasers to accept new suppliers and ideas 
- this was offset by an acknowledgement of insufficient local presence and inadequate 
marketing. 
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Of the firms which had identified additional domestic business opportunities, 85% intended to 
submit at least as many tenders in the future. 
Impact of publication and notification requirements for non-domestic business 
A significantly higher percentage of firms reading the OJ/TED sell to other EU Member States 
than those not reading the OJ/TED. 
The higher percentage readership of the OJ and TED in a Member State, the higher the 
percentage of firms selling to other EU Member States. 
A significantly higher percentage of larger companies had won business than medium-sized 
and small companies. 
Response rates, in common with those for additional domestic opportunities, were high, with 
over 80% of those which had identified new opportunities having submitted tenders. Of these, 
44% had subsequently won business. 
Firms attributed their success to a range of factors. Whilst price was important, equal 
importance of service, quality and technical innovation indicated: 
(a) successful non-domestic bidders were not succeeding on price alone; 
(b) purchasers were awarding contracts on the basis of the 'economically most advan-
tageous' tender. 
The most important reason for failing to win business was purchasers' reluctance to take new 
suppliers seriously, but firms also acknowledged price and insufficient local presence as 
contributory factors. 
Most firms considered the cost of submitting tenders for non-domestic business to be greater 
than for domestic business. Marketing and bid preparation itself were the most important 
additional costs. 
Over 80% of all firms which had identified additional non-domestic opportunities intended to 
submit at least as many tenders in the future. 
Adequacy ofinformation 
Of those firms which reported using the OJ and TED, some 67% (32% of all firms 
interviewed) considered the information contained in notices adequate for business purposes. 
At a general level, the quality of information provided was seen to be lacking, since: 
(a) 9% of all firms interviewed had tried to sell to other EU Member States, but were not 
now doing so; 
(b) of the 58% of firms which had not tried to sell to other EU Member States, the principal 
reasons given were difficulty in identifying opportunities (13%) and the complexity of 
administrative procedures (10%). 
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Perceived increase in competition from non-domestic firms 
Overall, 36% of all firms surveyed had noticed an increase in non-domestic firms competing 
for, and winning, business from their own public-sector and utilities customers. 
This perception was supported by other survey results, principally that: 
(a) 31% of all firms surveyed were currently selling to public-sector/utilities customers in 
other EU Member States; 
(b) 21% of all firms surveyed were selling through offices/companies based in other 
Member States (although clearly there is a degree of overlap, and the extent to which 
firms actually know whether competitors in their own markets are non-domestic 
subsidiaries is debatable). 
13.2. Overall awareness 
From a supply-side perspective the key measure of increasing awareness of public 
procurement opportunities is the extent to which suppliers use the OJ or its electronic version, 
TED. Fairness and transparency are crucial once a tender process has commenced. However, if 
a potential supplier is unaware of the opportunity in the first place, fairness and transparency 
are, in essence, academic. If a notice published in the OJ is unfair, a supplier does have the 
ability to challenge it, but if it does not appear, the supplier can do nothing. 
Some 41% of all firms surveyed reported that they obtained information on business 
opportunities from the OJ or TED, although there were variations between Member States, 
sectors and company sizes. 
Figure 13.1. Use of the OJ and TED - Member State 
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Sample: All companies selling to the public sector/utilities (1,608) adjusted to remove CANs bias. 
The percentage of firms which reported that they obtained information from the OJ and TED 
ranged from 20% in Greece to 63% in Finland. 
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Figure 13.2. Use of the OJ and TED - sector 
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Sample: All companies selling to the public sector/utilities (1,608) adjusted to remove CANs bias. 
From a sectoral perspective, differences were less pronounced, ranging from 26% of paper and 
stationery (NACE 471/2) and medical equipment (NACE 37) firms and 31% of boiler and 
metal structures firms (NACE 315); to 52% of business services firms (NACE 83). 
Figure 13.3. Use of the OJ and TED - company size 
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Sample: All companies selling to the public sector/utilities (1,608) adjusted to remove CANs bias. 
There were significant differences in the size of companies which reported obtaining 
information from the OJ and TED, with a higher percentage of large firms (69%) than of small 
(27%) and medium-sized companies (47%). 
This lower level of SME usage is likely to reflect their: 
(a) acknowledged lower general levels of awareness, 
(b) lesser involvement (and ability to be involved) in major public-sector contracts. 
An additional reason is likely to be that neither the OJ nor TED is provided free (although 
Community-funded bodies, such as Euro Info Centres (EICs), do provide information services 
at reduced prices). For an SME, the cost of subscribing to the O J or TED could be a barrier. 
The annual subscription to the OJ has more than doubled since 1992 (Figure 13.4). 
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Figure 13.4. Annual subscription to 'S' series of the Official Journal, 1992-96 
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Source: 'S ' Series Official Journal (1992-96). 
13.3. Impact of publication requirements with regard to domestic public-sector markets 
The 1988 report, The cost of 'non-Europe ' in public procurement, showed that in addition to a 
lack of intra-European (cross-border) trade, domestic public-sector markets were often as 
insular, with, for example, purchasers in neighbouring regions paying significantly different 
prices for the same or similar products. As a result, the opening up of public procurement was 
also thought likely to lead to an increase in inter-Member State trade. 
The OJ/TED is the only universal source of information on public-sector/utilities opportunities 
in a Member State. The aim of the survey was to determine whether firms using this source 
have identified opportunities which they would not otherwise have identified, a subset of 
which resulted in 'additional business'. This 'additional' business is considered over and 
above any increase in business through historic channels. 
13.3.1. New opportunity identification 
Of all firms which reported having obtained information from the OJ or TED, almost half had 
identified additional domestic opportunities as a result. This represented 23% of all firms 
interviewed. 
Figure 13.5. Additional domestic opportunities from the OJ and TED - Member State 
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Sample: All companies selling to the public sector/utilities (1,608), and all companies selling to the public sector/utilities 
and obtaining information from the OJ and TED (775). 
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With the exception of Italy, where only 19% of OJ/TED users had identified additional 
domestic opportunities, the levels of identification ranged from 35% in Sweden to around 80% 
in Greece and Ireland. 
Considered as a percentage of all firms surveyed, however, a different picture emerged, 
reflecting the lower usage of the OJ and TED described in Section 13.2.1: 
(a) Greece 16%, 
(b) Portugal 15%, 
(c) Austria 14%, 
(d) Spain 12%, 
(e) Sweden 10%. 
Figure 13.6. Additional domestic opportunities from the OJ and TED - sector 
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Sample: All companies selling to the public sector/utilities (1,608), and all companies selling to the public sector/utilities 
and obtaining information from the OJ and TED (775). 
In contrast, from a sectoral perspective - as for the use of the OJ and TED in general - there 
were less pronounced differences between sectors in terms of those firms which did obtain 
information from the O J and TED, with most on or around 40%, representing around 23% of 
all firms surveyed 
Least successful were paper and stationery firms (NACE 471/2), where only 33% had 
identified additional opportunities, representing only 11% of all firms surveyed. This situation 
is likely to reflect both the commodity nature of these products, and the dominance of SME 
suppliers focusing on local markets. 
Most successful were firms in the office machinery (NACE 33) and business services (NACE 
83) sectors, where around 60% of firms using the OJ and TED had identified new 
opportunities, representing some 33% of all firms surveyed. 
Although 39% of firms using the O J and TED in the medical equipment (NACE 37) and 
clothing (NACE 453) sectors had identified additional opportunities, this represented only 
14% and 16% respectively of all firms surveyed. 
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Figure 13.7. Additional domestic opportunities from the OJ and TED - company size 
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Sample: All companies selling to the public sector/utilities (1,608), and all companies selling to the public sector/utilities 
and obtaining information from the OJ and TED (775). 
For firms which obtained information from the OJ and TED, the percentages that had 
identified additional opportunities were broadly size-independent (around 50%). As a 
percentage of all firms surveyed, however, a higher percentage of large firms (33%) had 
identified opportunities than had medium-sized (26%) and small (17%) firms. 
13.3.2. Response to new opportunities 
The overall response to additional domestic business opportunities was very positive, with 
90% of firms which had identified new opportunities submitting tenders. This represented 
44% of all finns which obtained information from the OJ and TED, and 21% of all firms 
surveyed. 
Figure 13.8. Positive response to additional domestic opportunities identified from the 
OJ and TED - Member State 
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Sample: All companies selling to the public sector/utilities (1,608), and all companies selling to the public sector/utilities 
and obtaining information from the OJ and TED (775). 
The response rate to additional domestic business opportunities was equally high across all 
Member States, with most between 30 and 45%, although they did range from 17% of Italian 
and 22% of Swedish firms, to between 60% and 70% of French, Greek, Irish and UK firms. 
Considered as a percentage of all firms surveyed, however, a different picture emerged, 
reflecting the level of usage of the OJ and TED described in Section 13.2.1. The highest were: 
Supply side 197 
(a) UK 39%, 
(b) France 28%, 
(c) Finland 26%. 
The lowest were: 
(a) Greece 14%, 
(b) Austria 12%, 
(c) Italy 11%, 
(d) Portugal 10%, 
(e) Spain 10%, 
(f) Sweden 7%. 
Figure 13.9. Positive response to additional domestic opportunities identified from the 
OJ and TED - sector 
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Sample: All companies selling to the public sector/utilities (1,608), and all companies selling to the public sector/utilities 
and obtaining information from the OJ and TED (775). 
The sectoral response rate to additional domestic business opportunities varied less than by 
Member State, ranging from 57% to 29%: 
(a) 55-57%: boilers and metal structures (NACE 315), office machinery (NACE 33), and 
business services (NACE 83); 
(b) around 40%: telecommunications equipment (NACE 344), office furniture (NACE 316), 
railway rolling stock (NACE 362); 
(c) 35-37%: medical equipment (NACE 37), clothing (NACE 453), power generation/ 
distribution equipment (NACE 341/2), construction (NACE 502); 
(d) 29%: paper and stationery (NACE 471/2). 
In contrast to Member States, considered as a percentage of all firms surveyed, differences 
were less pronounced: 
(a) 29%: office machinery (NACE 33) and business services (NACE 83); 
(b) 19-21%: construction (NACE 502), boilers and metal structures (NACE 315), railway 
rolling stock (NACE 362), telecommunications equipment (NACE 344); 
(c) 17-19%: motor vehicles (NACE 351), power generation/distribution equipment (NACE 
341/2), office furniture (NACE 316); 
(d) 13-15%: medical equipment (NACE 37), clothing (NACE 453); 
(e) 10%: paper and stationery (NACE 47112). 
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Figure 13.10. Positive response to additional domestic opportunities identified from the 
OJ and TED - company size 
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Sample: All companies selling to the public sector/utilities (1,608), and all companies selling to the public sector/utilities 
and obtaining information from the OJ and TED (775). 
There was little difference between company sizes, with around 43% of firms using the OJ and 
TED submitting tenders. As a percentage of all firms surveyed, a higher percentage of large 
companies submitted tenders ­ 29% versus 22% of medium­sized and 15% of small 
companies. 
13.3.3. Results of tenders submitted in relation to additional domestic business opportunities 
The overall success rate in relation to additional domestic business opportunities was positive, 
with over 70% of firms which had submitted tenders in response to new opportunities 
identified from the OJ and TED winning new business. This represented 32% of all firms 
which obtained information from the OJ and TED, and 13% of all firms surveyed. 
Figure 13.11. Success rates from tenders submitted in respect of additional domestic 
business opportunities in the OJ and TED - Member State 
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Sample: All companies selling to the public sector/utilities (1,608), and all companies selling to the public sector/utilities 
and obtaining information from the OJ and TED (775) adjusted to remove CANs bias. 
As a percentage of firms which obtained information from the OJ and TED, most Member 
States had a success rate of around 30%, but: 
(a) the most successful were the UK (53%), Ireland (52%), France (44%), Greece (40%); 
(b) the least successful were Sweden (13%), Italy (10%), Austria (5%). 
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As a percentage of all firms surveyed, however, success rates were lower, and also showed a 
wider and more differentiated range: 
(a) UK: 27%, 
(b) Ireland, Finland: 21%, 
(c) Belgium, France: 18%, 
(d) Netherlands, Germany : 1 P I 6%, 
(e) Italy, Denmark: 9-10%, 
(f) Spain, Greece, Portugal, Austria, Sweden: 2-8%. 
Figure 13.12. Success rates from tenders submitted in respect of additional domestic 
business opportunities in the OJ and TED - sector 
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Sample: All companies selling to the public sector/utilities (1,608), and all companies selling to the public sector/utilities 
and obtaining information from the OJ and TED (775) ) adjusted to remove CANs bias. 
The variation in reported success rates by sector was similar to that reported by Member State. 
As a percentage of firms which obtained information from the OJ and TED, the most 
successful sectors were business services (NACE 83), boilers and metal structures (NACE 
315), office machinery (NACE 33), medical equipment (NACE 37) and telecommunications 
equipment (NACE 344) with between 33% and 43% having won business. Other sectors had 
success rates of between 22% and 29%. 
As a percentage of all firms surveyed, however, success rates were lower, and showed a 
different profile: 
(a) business services (NACE 83) firms led, with a success rate of 22%; 
(b) office machinery (NACE 33) with a success rate of 17%; 
(c) remaining sectors having success rates of between 9% and 14%, with the exception of 
paper and stationery firms (NACE 471/2) with only a 6% success rate. 
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Figure 13.13. Success rates from tenders submitted in respect of additional domestic 
business opportunities in the OJ and TED - company size 
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Sample: All companies selling to the public sector/utilities (1,608), and all companies selling to the public sector/utilities 
and obtaining information from the OJ and TED (775) ) adjusted to remove CANs bias. 
As a percentage of firms which obtained information from the OJ and TED, there was no 
appreciable difference between the success rates of large (34%), medium-sized (31%) and 
small (30%) firms, but as a percentage of all firms surveyed, differences in success rates were 
more pronounced: 
(a) large - 23%, 
(b) medium-15%, 
(c) small - 8%. 
13.3.4. Reasons for failure to win business 
Figure 13.14. Reasons for failure to win new additional domestic business 
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Sample: All firms which had failed to win business having submitted tenders in response to notices in the OJ/TED (69). 
The predominant reason given for failure to win new domestic business, irrespective of 
Member State, sector or company size was price. 
Firms which had failed to win new business also acknowledged their own inadequacies: 
(a) insufficient local presence (20%), 
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(b) inadequate marketing (9%). 
By the same token, a number of 'non-tariff barriers' were also identified, namely purchaser 
reluctance to accept: 
(a) new ideas (19%), 
(b) potential new suppliers (26%). 
From a sectoral perspective, price was given as the principal reason for failing to win new 
business. 
13.3.5. Intentions 
Figure 13.15. Intentions with regard to the submission of tenders in response to future 
domestic business opportunities identified in the OJ or TED 
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Sample: All firms which had identified additional business opportunities in the OJ/TED (373). 
Overall, the vast majority of firms (85%) which had already identified new domestic 
opportunities reported intending to submit at least as many tenders in the future in response to 
additional business opportunities identified in the OJ or TED, irrespective of Member State, 
sector and company size. 
This represented 41% of all firms which had obtained information from the O J and TED, and 
20% of all firms surveyed. 
13.4. Impact of publication requirements with regard to non-domestic Member State 
public-sector markets 
13.4.1. New opportunity identification 
Of the firms which reported using the OJ and TED to obtain information on public-
sector/utilities business, some 30% had identified additional opportunities in other EU 
Member States as a result. 
A significantly higher percentage of firms using the OJ and TED sell to other EU Member 
States than those not using the OJ and TED. 
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Table 13.3. Relationship between OJ and TED usage and firms selling to other EU 
Member States - company size 
Company size 
Large 
Medium 
Small 
Use OJ/TED 
Firms selling to other 
EU Member States 
169(50%) 
60 (38%) 
85(31%) 
Base (100%) 
338 
159 
278 
Do not use OJ/TED 
Firms selling to other 
EU Member States 
37 (30%) 
33 (28%) 
87(17%) 
Base (100%) 
122 
118 
518 
A significantly higher proportion of large than medium, and medium than small, firms, which 
are users of the OJ and TED, sell to other EU Member States. 
Independent of company size, a significantly higher proportion of OJ/TED users than non 
OJ/TED users sell to other EU Member States. 
Table 13.4. Relationship between OJ and TED usage and firms selling to other EU 
Member States - Member State 
Member state 
Belgium/Luxembourg 
Germany 
Denmark 
Spain 
France 
Greece 
Italy 
Ireland 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
United Kingdom 
Austria 
Sweden 
Finland 
Use OJ/TED 
Firms selling to other 
EU Member States 
27 (49%) 
55 (52%) 
12 (32%) 
17(38%) 
44 (47%) 
1 (10%) 
37(31%) 
9 (39%) 
19(34%) 
2(12%) 
48(41%) 
15(38%) 
13 (57%) 
15(45%) 
Base (100%) 
55 
106 
37 
45 
94 
10 
119 
23 
56 
17 
118 
39 
23 
33 
Do not use OJ/TED 
Firms selling to other 
EU Member States 
11 (24%) 
27 (35%) 
7 (26%) 
10(10%) 
19(21%) 
-
5 ( 7%) 
10(36%) 
11(31%) 
5 (12%) 
22 (26%) 
15(28%) 
13 (30%) 
3(19%) 
Base (100%) 
45 
77 
27 
101 
92 
40 
73 
28 
35 
41 
85 
54 
44 
16 
The level of OJ and TED usage in Member States was positively correlated with selling to 
other EU Member States; the greater the usage, the higher the number of firms selling to other 
EU Member States. 
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Figure 13.16. Additional opportunities in other EU Member States identified from the 
OJ and TED - Member State 
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Sample: All firms using the OJ/TED which had identified additional non-domestic opportunities (775). Greece and Portugal 
are not analysed since estimated percentages are not statistically significant. All Member States highlighted by * 
have samples which are small (between 5 and 13). They have been considered because the estimated percentages 
are statistically significant and consistent with the results of the other Member States where samples are adequate. 
The percentage of firms which had identified additional opportunities in other EU Member 
States from the OJ or TED ranged from Sweden (48%) and Belgium (44%), to the Netherlands 
(21%). 
For most Member States between 23% and 29% of firms had identified additional non-
domestic business opportunities. 
Figure 13.17. Additional opportunities in other EU Member States from the O J and 
TED - sector 
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Sample: All firms using the OJ/TED (775) which had identified additional non-domestic opportunities. 
Sectoral differences were more pronounced with regard to the identification of additional new 
business opportunities in other Member States: 
(a) no firms in the paper and stationery sector (NACE 471/2); 
(b) 15% of firms in the office machinery sector (NACE 33) and 18% of firms in the motor 
vehicles sector (NACE 351); 
(c) 26-30% of firms in the boilers and metal structures (NACE 315), office furniture 
(NACE 316), power generation/distribution equipment (NACE 341/2) and 
telecommunications equipment (NACE 344) sectors; 
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(d) 32-38% of firms in the medical equipment (NACE 37), clothing (NACE 453), business 
services (NACE 83) and construction (NACE 502) sectors; 
(e) 57% of firms in the railway rolling stock (NACE 362) sector. 
Figure 13.18. Additional opportunities in other EU Member States from the OJ and 
TED - company size 
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Sample: All firms using the OJ/TED (775) which had identified additional non-domestic opportunities. 
In terms of company size, large firms had been most successful with 36% identifying new 
opportunities. However, the difference between medium-sized and small companies was not 
significant - 26% compared to 24%. 
13.4.2. Response to new opportunities 
In common with additional domestic opportunities, the overall response to additional 
opportunities in other Member States was positive, with over 70% of firms having responded 
to calls for tender. This represented 21% of all firms which had obtained information from the 
OJ or TED. 
Figure 13.19. Positive response to additional opportunities in other EU Member States 
identified in the OJ and TED - Member State 
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Sample: All firms using the OJ/TED (775), and all firms which had identified additional non-domestic opportunities (232). 
Greece and Portugal are not analysed since estimated percentages are not statistically significant. All Member States 
highlighted by * have samples which are small (between 5 and 13). They have been considered because the 
estimated percentages are statistically significant and consistent with the results of the other Member States where 
samples are adequate. 
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The percentage of firms which had submitted tenders in response to additional non-domestic 
opportunities ranged from 55% in Sweden to 88% in Belgium with, in general, the larger 
Member States having higher response rates: 
(a) Germany: 86%, 
(b) Italy: 81%, 
(c) France: 76%, 
(d) Netherlands: 75%, 
(e) UK: 72%. 
The exceptions to this were Ireland and Finland, which had 80% and 69% response rates, and 
Spain, which had a 64% response rate. 
As percentages of all firms which had used the OJ and TED, a broadly similar profile was 
evident, with the exception of Sweden and Finland which had higher response rates (26% and 
27%) than all Member States other than Belgium (38%). 
Figure 13.20. Positive response to additional opportunities in other EU Member States 
identified in the O J and TED - sector 
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Sample: All firms using the OJ/TED (775) and all firms which had identified additional non-domestic opportunities (232). 
The response rate to additional opportunities was somewhat wider between sectors than 
between Member States, ranging from 0% for paper and stationery firms (NACE 471/2) -
reflecting the lack of any additional opportunities identified - to 50% for medical equipment 
firms (NACE 37) and 91% for firms active in the railway rolling stock sector (NACE 362). 
As percentages of all firms which had used the OJ and TED, however, response rates were 
broadly similar to those in the Member States in the range of 17% to 31%. The exception to 
this was railway rolling stock (NACE 362), where 54% of all firms which had used the OJ and 
TED had submitted tenders in other EU Member States. 
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Figure 13.21. Positive response to additional opportunities in other EU Member States 
identified in the OJ and TED - company size 
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Sample: All firms using the OJ/TED (775) and all firms which had identified additional non­domestic opportunities (232). 
A significantly higher percentage of large companies (80%) than medium­sized (73%) and 
small (60%) firms had submitted tenders in response to additional opportunities identified. 
As a percentage of all firms which had used the OJ and TED, this difference was more 
pronounced, with 29% of large companies having submitted tenders, in comparison with 19% 
and 15% for medium­sized and small firms respectively. 
13.4.3. Results of tenders submitted 
The overall success rate in relation to additional non­domestic business opportunities 
identified in the OJ and TED was positive, with some 44% of firms which had submitted 
tenders having won new business. This represented almost 10% of all firms which obtained 
information from the OJ and TED, and 4% of all firms surveyed. 
Figure 13.22. Success rates for tenders submitted in respect of additional business 
opportunities in other EU Member States identified in the OJ and TED · 
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Sample: All firms selling to other EU Member States (500). using the OJ/TED (775). and all firms which had identified 
additional non­domestic opportunities (232). Greece and Portugal are not analysed since estimated percentages are 
not statistically significant. All Member States highlighted by * have samples which are small (between 5 and 13). 
They have been considered because the estimated percentages are statistically significant and consistent with the 
results of the other Member States where samples are adequate. Results are adjusted to remove CAN bias. 
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Success rates for firms which had submitted tenders in response to additional non-domestic 
opportunities ranged from 0 to 54%, with, in general, firms from the larger Member States 
most successful: 
(a) 54%: Germany, 
(b) 41—45%: France, Netherlands, Belgium and Spain, 
(c) 33-34%: Italy, Denmark, 
(d) 17-21%: UK, Ireland, 
(e) 8%: Finland, 
(f) 0%: Sweden. 
As percentages of all firms which had used the OJ and TED, a broadly similar order was seen, 
although firms in Belgium (18%) were more successful than those in Germany (14%). As a 
percentage of all firms surveyed, a similar profile also emerged: 
(a) 9%: Belgium, 
(b) 7%: Germany, 
(c) 5%: France, Italy, Netherlands, 
(d) 3%: Denmark, Spain, UK, Austria, 
(e) 2%: Ireland, Finland, 
(f) 0%: Sweden. 
Figure 13.23. Success rates for tenders submitted in respect of additional business 
opportunities in other EU Member States identified in the OJ and TED 
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Sample: All firms selling to other EU Member States (500). using the OJ/TED (775), and all firms which had identified 
additional non­domestic opportunities (232). Results are adjusted to remove CAN bias. 
At a sectoral level, success rates varied from 0­52%: 
(a) 52%: telecommunications equipment (NACE 344), 
(b) 38%: boilers and metal structures (NACE 315), office machinery (NACE 33), 
(c) 33­35%: motor vehicles (NACE 351), railway rolling stock (NACE 362), power 
generation/distribution equipment (NACE 341/2), 
(d) 26%: construction (NACE 502), 
(e) 20­23%: medical equipment (NACE 37), clothing (NACE 453), business services 
(NACE 83), office furniture (NACE 316). 
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As percentages of firms which had used the OJ and TED, however, a different profile was 
seen: 
(a) 21 %: railway rolling stock (NACE 362), 
(b) 16%: telecommunications equipment (NACE 344), 
(c) 11%: boilers and metal structures (NACE 315), 
(d) 10%: power generation/distribution equipment (NACE 341/2), construction (NACE 
502), 
(e) 8%: clothing (NACE 453), business services (NACE 83), 
(f) 6%: office furniture (NACE 316), motor vehicles (NACE 351), medical equipment 
(NACE 37), office machinery (NACE 33). 
As percentages of all firms surveyed, a slightly different profile was seen: 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
(d) 
(e) 
10%: railway rolling stock (NACE 362), 
7%: telecommunications equipment (NACE 344), 
4%: boilers and metal structures (NACE 315), power generation/distribution equipment 
(NACE 341/2), clothing (NACE 453), construction (NACE 502), business services 
(NACE 83), 
3%: office machinery (NACE 33), motor vehicles (NACE 351), 
2%: medical equipment (NACE 37), office furniture (NACE 316). 
Figure 13.24. Success rates for tenders submitted in respect of additional business 
opportunities in other EU Member States identified in the OJ and TED -
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Sample: All firms selling to other EU Member States (500), using the OJ/TED (775), and all firms which had identified 
additional non-domestic opportunities (232). Results are adjusted to remove CAN bias. 
A significantly higher percentage of large companies (40%) than medium-sized (26%) and 
small (24%) firms had won business resulting from tenders submitted in response to additional 
opportunities. 
As percentages of all firms which had used the OJ and TED, this difference was more 
pronounced, with 14% of large companies having won business, versus 6% for both medium-
sized and small firms. 
As percentages of all firms surveyed, successes resulting from using the OJ and TED 
accounted for 10% of large, 3% of medium-sized and 2% of small companies. 
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Whilst large companies' higher success rate is not unsurprising, given their greater resources, 
their more flexible approach to bidding for cross-border business is also likely to be a 
contributory factor. Only 38% of all large firms selling in other EU Member States did so 
individually (as a single supplier only) compared to 57% of small and 54% of medium-sized 
companies. Such an approach is more likely to overcome both the demand- and supply-side 
barriers to success described in Section 13.4.5. Further, 45% of all large firms selling in other 
EU Member States did so both as a single supplier and as part of a consortium, compared with 
25% of small and 31% of medium-sized suppliers. 
13.4.4. Reasons for success in winning new business 
No one particular reason emerged for winning new business, although the equal importance 
given to price, quality, service and technical innovation would seem to reflect: 
(a) the use of the 'economically most advantageous' award criterion (rather than lowest 
price); 
(b) the fact that successful cross-border suppliers are selling on a range of criteria, rather 
than looking to enter such markets solely on the basis of price. 
Figure 13.25. Reasons given for success in other EU Member States identified in the OJ 
and TED 
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Sample: All firms which had won additional business in other EU Member States as a result of opportunities identified in 
the OJ/TED (75). 
13.4.5. Reasons for failure to win new business 
Firms which had failed to win business in other EU Member States attributed this to a range of 
practical and administrative reasons associated with both their own business and purchasers 
(Figure 13.26). This indicates that barriers to selling cross-border are a combination of 
demand- and supply-side factors. 
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Figure 13.26. Reasons given for failure to win business in other EU Member States in 
respect of opportunities identified in the OJ and TED 
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Sample: All firms which had failed to win business as a result of opportunities identified in the OJ/TED (94). 
The most important factor highlighted by 43% of firms was the reluctance of purchasers to 
consider new suppliers seriously. At the same time, however, some 34% highlighted an 
insufficient local presence and 34% price as factors, both of which are likely to have 
contributed to demand-side reluctance to take them seriously. 
The reluctance by purchasers to accept new ideas (22%) and reference to national standards 
(24%) are clear demand-side barriers, but these are likely to be exacerbated by suppliers' 
acknowledged insufficient local presence (34%) and lack of sufficient resources to market 
effectively (18%). 
13.4.6. Resource requirements 
Over half (55%) of the firms submitting tenders in response to non-domestic EU business 
considered this more expensive than submitting in their own Member State. 
Figure 13.27. Reasons for higher cost of submitting tenders in other EU Member States 
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Sample: All firms which had identified additional non-domestic opportunities (232). 
The major additional costs identified by firms were marketing (58%) and actual bid 
preparation (60%), irrespective of Member State, sector and company size. 
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The issue of meeting different technical specifications was highlighted by 45% of firms, but 
was more important for medium-sized and large companies. Similarly, although minimizing 
currency risk was highlighted by 35% of firms, it was more important for large (39%) than 
medium-sized and small companies (27% and 33% respectively). This is likely to reflect the 
larger and more technically complex projects targeted by larger firms. 
Delivery was highlighted by 41% of firms, but was particularly important to companies in 
railway rolling stock (57%). 
13.4.7. Intentions 
The vast majority of firms (84%) which had already identified additional non-domestic 
opportunities reported their intention to submit at least as many tenders in the future in 
response to additional business opportunities identified in the OJ or TED, irrespective of 
Member State, sector and company size. 
Figure 13.28. Intentions with regard to the submission of tenders in response to future 
business opportunities in other EU Member States identified in the OJ and 
TED 
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Sample: All firms which had identified additional non-domestic opportunities (232). 
13.5. Adequacy of information 
The key determinant of the adequacy of the information provided in the O J and TED is the 
extent to which businesses are able to use it in a practical fashion. At one level, the fact that 
firms had submitted tenders, won business as a result, and intended to submit more tenders 
indicates that they had been able to use the information provided on contracts to make 
decisions. (The results of this are described in previous sections.) 
Of the firms which do obtain information from the OJ and TED, overall 67% considered the 
type of information which is provided by purchasing entities in notices to be adequate for their 
business purposes. This represented 32% of all firms surveyed. 
In addition, 23% of those firms, which had not tried to sell in other EU Member States quoted 
difficulty in identifying opportunities as a reason. 
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Figure 13.29. Adequacy of information provided in the OJ and TED - Member State 
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Sample: All companies selling to the public sector/utilities (1,608), and all companies selling to the public sector/utilities 
and obtaining information from the OJ and TED (775). 
The results at a Member State level indicated that, in general, firms do find the information 
given in notices valuable. This was reflected by the fact that the percentage of respondents 
saying they found information useful at least equals, and in most cases considerably exceeds, 
the percentage of firms which reported having identified additional opportunities. This implies 
that, at the very least, firms found the information useful, even if it served only to confirm 
existing market knowledge. 
Figure 13.30. Adequacy of information provided in the OJ and TED - sector 
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Sample: All companies selling to the public sector/utilities (1,608), and all companies selling to the public sector/utilities 
and obtaining information from the OJ and TED (775). 
At a sectoral level, the majority of all firms which had used the O J and TED considered the 
information they obtained adequate, ranging from 58% of firms in the paper and stationery 
sector (NACE 471/2) to 75% of those active in boilers and metal structures (NACE 315). 
However, when considered as a percentage of all firms surveyed: 
(a) those sectors which had been most successful in winning new business were more 
positive (office machinery, power generation/distribution equipment, telecom­
munications equipment, railway rolling stock, construction and business services); 
(b) paper and stationery firms, which had been least successful in relation to both domestic 
and non-domestic business, were least positive. 
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Figure 13.31. Adequacy ofinformation provided in the OJ and TED - company size 
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Sample: All companies selling to the public sector/utilities (1,608), and all companies selling to the public sector/utilities 
and obtaining information from the OJ and TED (775). 
As for both Member State and sector, a higher percentage of firms in each size category found 
OJ and TED information useful than had identified business opportunities. 
Whilst there was little difference between firms in each size category which did use the OJ and 
TED which found information adequate - large 65%, medium 70% and small 67% - as a 
percentage of all firms surveyed, small firms were at a clearer disadvantage - 23% versus 38% 
for medium-sized and 44% for large companies. 
13.6. Extent of new market entrants 
Overall, 36% of firms had noticed an increase in non-domestic companies bidding for and 
winning business from their own domestic public-sector/utilities markets. This level of 
'market penetration' is supported by the fact that 31% of all firms interviewed reported that 
they sold to the public sector/utilities in other Member States. 
Figure 13.32. Extent of new market entrants - Member State 
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Sample: All companies selling to the public sector/utilities (1.608). 
In general, around 40% of firms in most Member States had perceived an increase in 
successful non-domestic competition in their home markets, with the exceptions of: 
(a) Portugal (75%), 
(b) the UK (27%), 
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(c) Denmark (22%), 
(d) Sweden (13%). 
Figure 13.33. Extent of new market entrants - company size 
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Sample: All companies selling to the public sector/utilities (1,608). 
A higher percentage of large companies (43%) had perceived an increase in competition. This 
was reflected by the higher percentage of large companies selling to other EU Member States. 
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SECTION E 
Economie analysis 
This section outlines trends in a number of key indicators in relation to 'procurement 
sensitive' supply sectors. 
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14. Trade analysis 
14.1. Overview 
14 A A. Ex ante hypothesis 
In view of the very low levels of import penetration in the public sector compared to those in 
the private sector and the existence of large price differences for the same or similar products 
purchased by the public sector, the starting hypothesis was that the completion of the internal 
market in public procurement would lead to: 
(a) an increase in intra-European trade in products bought primarily by the public sector; 
(b) a higher share of total public purchases in Europe originating from non-domestic 
suppliers and/or manufacturers. 
14.1.2. Coverage 
This chapter provides estimates of the extent to which changes have taken place in cross-
border trade in selected 'procurement sensitive' sectors and products since the implementation 
of the procurement legislation. More specifically, the analysis was concerned with measuring 
change in: 
(a) intra- and extra-EU trade in 'procurement sensitive' sectors and products; 
(b) the share of imports, either direct or indirect, as a percentage of total public-sector 
purchases. 
The sector and product focus in the trade and import penetration analysis was primarily the 
shopping list of selected: 
(a) 'procurement-sensitive' sectors, which combined account for over 60% of total 
procurement; 
(b) indicator products within these sectors, which, in 1987 and 1990, demonstrated 
significant price differences. 
Additionally, the indicator products were considered in terms of their prime purchaser: 
(a) the public sector, for high-tech/strategic products, such as transformers, power cables 
and railway rolling stock; 
(b) the private sector, for low-tech products, such as office furniture, copier paper, uniforms 
and telephone handsets. 
This segmentation was introduced to take account of differences in distribution channels, with: 
(a) low-tech products often being purchased via intermediaries, such as local 
wholesalers/distributors, value-added resellers, importers, etc.; 
(b) high-tech products being purchased either directly from a manufacturer or as part of a 
large system. 
Although the visible trade analysis was, by definition, restricted to supplies, invisibles (works 
and services) were taken into account within: 
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(a) the analysis of public-sector import penetration by using the supply-side survey, which 
covered also construction and business services, as its primary data source (see below); 
(b) the case studies on construction (Chapter 22) and consulting engineering (Chapter 20). 
14.1.3. Data 
Trade flows 
The trade-flow analysis was based on data collected from the Comext database (Eurostat, 
1995) covering the EUR-12 Member States as reporting countries. 
Problems with the data were identified in the form of substantial discrepancies between the 
import figures recorded by an importing country and the export data of the relevant exporting 
country, which, according to Eurostat, was due to exports, in certain cases: 
(a) not being recorded in the imports of the trading partner because on arrival at their 
destination they were placed under a transit procedure or in a customs warehouse; 
(b) being recorded in the imports of the importing Member States with a different value, not 
only because of the rule 'exports-fob, imports-cif, but above all as a result of special 
situations such as trade between associated companies with revaluing of imports, 
inclusion or exclusion of monetary compensatory amounts on agricultural products, and 
declaration of the value to be used for calculating VAT as the statistical value; 
(c) being recorded in the imports of the trading partner: 
(i) during a later period (affects the overall figures and the figures by type of goods), 
(ii) under a different statistical heading (affects the figures by type by type of goods); 
(d) being recorded in the trading partner's imports according to different methods: 
(i) because not all the cases in which the Regulation may apply have been settled 
(ships' store, postal consignments, confidential data, aircraft maintenance, etc.), 
(ii) because it was impossible to eliminate all the errors in data returns or in the 
processing and forwarding of results, 
(iii) because there were still a certain number of fraudulent declarations. 
For the purpose of consistency, we have used EUR-12 export data to measure intra-EC 
imports on the basis that total intra-EC exports in a sector equal total intra-EC imports. 
Analysis at the intra-EC level covers the period 1988-92, since: 
(a) at the time of writing, 1995 product level trade data were not available; 
(b) the introduction of a new intra-EC data collection system in 1993 (Intrastat System) has 
made 1993 figures unreliable and 1994 figures not comparable with pre-1993 statistics. 
Even if 1995 data were available, an extended coverage to 1994 and 1995 would not be valid 
since: 
(a) the proportion of the unexplained variation associated with the trend analysis was 
generally of the order of 30%; 
(b) any new trend based on two points (1994 and 1995) would have no meaning. 
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Public-sector import penetration 
In general, there is no systematic recording or analysis of the national origin of purchases by 
entities despite the existence of reporting requirements for public-sector bodies and the 
utilities as laid down in the current directives. Although some Member States have submitted 
returns to the Commission on their procurement, the required level of detail is not available, 
since: 
(a) the coverage of the reporting requirements varies between the directives in terms of 
above- and below-threshold purchases. For example, utilities are only required to report 
below-threshold procurement; 
(b) only a small number of Member States have provided returns to the Commission; 
(c) returns are generally only available for central government bodies; 
(d) individual Member State returns are inconsistent in terms of segmentation and level of 
detail provided, and therefore not comparable; 
(e) the available Member State returns provide only an insight into direct purchases of 
foreign origin, and provide no information on indirect purchases. 
In addition, taking into account the problems concerning the application of aggregation rules, 
the definition of discrete operating units, etc. as discussed in Chapters 5 to 9, it is not 
surprising that the Member State returns with respect to above-threshold purchases vary from 
16 to 93% coverage (see Table 10.6). This, combined with the lack of necessary detail, calls 
into question their reliability. 
Therefore, no consistent data exist on the value of purchases from foreign suppliers nor of 
purchases of foreign origin from domestic suppliers. To provide this information at a 
sufficient level of detail for 1994 would require the entities participating in the demand-side 
survey to undertake a significant amount of work at an individual contract level, which was 
not feasible within the scope of this study. 
Since no data exist or are collectable on imports into the public sector below central 
government level and into the utilities in individual Member States, it was not possible to use 
demand-side data to make sound estimates of import penetration by supplying sector or in 
total for each Member State. 
A more reliable source of information is private-sector companies supplying the public sector 
or utilities, since they keep detailed records of their exports and imports. In general, this 
information is published in their annual reports at regional level, permitting identification of 
exports to the (rest of the) EU and third countries. 
The supply-side survey provides the following (high-quality) data on a representative sample 
of 1,608 suppliers to the public sector, broken down by Member State, supplying sector and 
company size: 
(a) total turnover, 
(b) percentage of turnover supplied to the domestic public sector, 
(c) percentage of turnover exported to the public sector in other EU Member States, 
(d) percentage of domestic public-sector sales imported. 
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Using the supply-side sample data (where possible, cross-referenced with the Member State 
returns), estimates of intra-EU direct and total indirect import penetration by supplying sector 
and Member State were made, based on the following assumptions: 
(a) the value of intra-EU public-sector exports in a sector is equal to that of intra-EU public-
sector imports; 
(b) the total value of sales to the public sector in the EU provides a good estimate of the 
value of EU public-sector consumption. 
The estimates of third country, direct import penetration for central government as contained 
in Member State returns have been used to estimate direct extra-EU public-sector import 
penetration. The problems described above with differences in coverage and level of detail of 
the Member State returns are of less importance when estimating direct extra-EU import 
penetration, since overall levels of direct extra-EU imports into the public sector are reported 
to be very low and, therefore, any inaccuracies will have little impact on the total estimates. 
14.1.4. Key findings 
Trade flows 
In terms of the strategic products analysed, which are primarily bought by the public sector, 
there has been an overall increase in trade at both intra- and extra-EC level, with the exception 
of locomotives and goods wagons. Extra-EC trade balances have been improving over the 
period 1988-92 with a particularly sharp rise in exports for transformers, X-ray apparatus, and 
telephonic and telegraphic switching apparatus. 
For these products, Germany, France and, to a lesser extent, the UK showed the largest 
increases in both intra-EC and extra-EC trade. 
Regarding the shopping-list products which are bought both by the public and the private 
sector, there has generally been a larger increase in trade at both intra-EC and extra-EC levels 
than for the strategic public-sector purchases. Computers and network servers represented the 
only exception within the overall trend of increasing trade, whereas uniforms showed a 
particularly sharp increase in extra-EC imports, mainly from low-wage countries. 
Generally, the UK and Italy have mostly benefited, while Germany and France experienced 
smaller increases. 
Public-sector import penetration 
In 1994, an estimated 96-98% of total EU public-sector purchases was procured from 
domestic suppliers. When indirect foreign purchases are included, i.e. purchases via domestic 
suppliers such as subsidiaries, agents or importers, an estimated 7-13% of total European 
public-sector purchases was of non-domestic origin. 
Of the direct imports into the public sector, other European suppliers accounted for an 
estimated 2-3% of total EU public-sector purchases in 1994. Third country suppliers 
accounted for less than 0.5%. 
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The level of public-sector import penetration showed large variations between the 
'procurement sensitive' sectors. In general, public-sector purchases, which are complex and 
have a relatively high technology content, such as medical equipment, railway rolling stock 
and office machinery, showed a high level of cross-border trade. 
At an individual Member State level, the larger Member States showed lower levels of public-
sector import penetration than the smaller Member States. 
Compared to 1987, public-sector import penetration increased from 6% to an estimated 
average of 10% in 1994. 
14.2. Trade flows 
14.2.1. Overview 
The trade flows analysis was aimed at highlighting the major changes in trade of 'procurement 
sensitive products' at intra-EC and extra-EC level for each of the EUR-12 countries. 
Changes and trends in trade flows were analysed in terms of: 
(a) intra-EC and extra-EC trade balances, 
(b) intra-EC and extra-EC imports. 
The analysed products were segmented into two major categories on the basis of the 
importance of the public sector relative to that of the private sector: 
(a) products mainly and/or exclusively bought by the public sector, such as: 
(i) telephonic and telegraphic switching apparatus, 
(ii) transformers, 
(iii) super-heated boilers, 
(iv) locomotives and goods wagons, 
(v) cardiac monitors and X-ray apparatus; 
(b) products primarily purchased by the private sector, such as: 
(i) network servers and personal computers, 
(ii) paper, 
(iii) metal furniture (filing cabinets, shelves, office desks and fixed armchairs), 
(iv) cars, buses and vans, 
(v) uniforms, 
(vi) telephone handsets. 
14.2.2. Products bought primarily by the public sector 
Table 14.1 shows the changes in trade flows of telephonic and telegraphic switching apparatus 
identified within the combined nomenclature code 851730000. 
This product is principally purchased by national telecommunications network operators 
directly from manufacturers. 
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Table 14.1. Telephonic and telegraphic switching apparatus1 ('000 ECU in current 
prices) 
EUR-12 B/L D DK GR IRL NL UK 
INTRA-EC 
Trade balance 
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1988 
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. : Λ ++ 
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(18,746) 
12,557 
18,816 
(40,795) 
(1.471) 
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EXTRA­EC 
Trade balance 
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1993 
Trend" 
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1988 
1993 
Trend' 
259,100 
9l>7 019 
125,645 
208,035 
7,193 
7,901 
1,535 
27,056 
193,315 
tÜÜÉf 
13,901 
¡lie 
PPP 
9,804 
(254) 
196 
2,769 
(3,630) 
127,239 
5,559 
25,417 
59,327 
1ÜU840 
6,017 
8,722 
(729) 
(2,321) 
736 
14,256 
1,303 
8,954 
1,273 
24,003 
9,804 
(254) 
1,131 
504 
50,667 
1,516 
6,297 
43,170 
(536) 
(1.548) 
667 
10,284 
(58,608) 
10,753 
88,333 
13,346 
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Notes: 
Source: 
1 Telephonic or telegraphic switching apparatus (CN 851730000). 
2 Positive trend: +(0.6 < r2 < 0.75), ++ (0.75 < r2 < 0.85), +++ (r2 > 0.85). 
Negative trend: * (0.6 < r2< 0.75), ** (0.75 < r2< 0.85), *** (r2 > 0.85). 
Comext database (Eurostat, 1995). 
Table 14.1 shows: 
(a) an increase in intra­EC trade, predominantly imports with the exception of Greece, 
showing a more consistent increase in extra­EC imports; 
(b) an increasingly dominant position of Germany and France at both intra­ and extra­EC 
level as shown by the positive trends and trade surpluses for both countries; 
(c) a significant improvement in the UK trade balance at intra­EC as well at extra­EC level, 
mainly due to reduced imports; 
(d) a significant increase in Dutch intra and extra­EC imports; 
(e) a substantial increase in the extra­EC trade balance mainly due to the dominant position 
of German and French exports; 
(f) a substantial increase in extra­EC imports for all the countries with the exception of the 
UK (decreasing imports) and France (static imports). 
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Table 14.2. Railway locomotive1 ('000 ECU in current prices) 
EUR-12 B/L D DK GR IRL NL UK 
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Trade 
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0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
(79,671) 
mmm*i: 
0 
79,671 
85 
149,240 
+ 
3 
167 
0 
(27) 
0 
27 
112 
565 
0 
0 
64 
(1) 
0 
1 
(20) 
(V- tM) 
20 
97,154 
0 
0 
0 
0 
(37) 
(470) 
37 
511 
EXTRA-EC 
Trade 
balance 
1988 
1993 
Trend" 
Imports 
1988 
1993 
Trend" 
210087 
18,925 
1,171 
27,761 
1 
0 
0 
0 
2,946 
18686 
0 
27,761 
0 
0 
0 
0 
(171) 
0 
171 
0 
206,683 
24 
1,000 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1595 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
628 
215 
0 
0 
Notes: Rail locomotive powered from an external source of electricity. 
2 Positive trend: +(0.6 < r~< 0.75), ++ (0.75 < /·"< 0.85), +++ (r > 0.85). 
Negative trend: * (0.6 < Ρ 0.75), ** (0.75 < r2< 0.85), *** (r2 > 0.85). 
3 1992 value. 
Source: Comext database (Eurostat, 1995). 
Table 14.2 refers to the trade flows of railway locomotives. Due to the nature of the product it 
is not possible to spot trends since there are big fluctuations in value on an annual basis. 
Table 14.2 shows: 
(a) an increase in intra-EC trade mainly related to Dutch and Spanish imports; 
(b) Germany and France are the leading exporters in the EC with significant positive intra-
and extra-EC trade balance; 
(c) intra-EC imports in Spain have increased considerably over the period 1988-92. 
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Table 14.3. Goods wagons1 ('000 ECU in current prices) 
EUR-12 B/L D DK E F GR I IRL NL Ρ UK 
INTRA­EC 
Trade balance 
1988 
1992 
Trend" 
Imports 
1988 
1992 
Trend" 
­
­
2,523 
6.09Í 
(305) 
6 UH 
351 
0 
786 
(34) 
335 
34 
0 
27 
0 
0 
(14) 
16 
14 
0 
312 
(S­076) 
981 
5,104 
0 
0 
0 
0 
(16) 
6 
50 
0 
(14) 
0 
14 
0 
(40) 
0 
41 
0 
14 
(16) 
0 
16 
(722) 
(941) 
736 
941 
EXTRA­EC 
Trade balance 
1988 
1993 
Trend" 
Imports 
1988 
1993 
Trend" 
5,345 
(5,449) 
412 
6,158 
3,959 
(3,245) 
0 
3,245 
992 
(2,187) 
101 
2 848 
4 
0 
0 
0 
0 
(6) 
0 
6 
2 
(36) 
0 
41 
0 
0 
0 
0 
(178) 
43 
382 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
566 
(18) 
9 
18 
Notes: ' Railway or tramway goods vans and wagons, covered and closed (excl. those specially designed for the 
transport of highly radioactive materials, tank wagons and the like and insulated, refrigerated or self­
discharging goods vans and wagons). 
2 Positive trend: +(0.6 < r2< 0.75), ++ (0.75 < r2< 0.85), +++ (r2 > 0.85). 
Negative trend: * (0.6 < r2< 0.75), ** (0.75 < r2< 0.85), *** (r2 > 0.85). 
Source: Comext database (Eurostat, 1995). 
Table 14.3 refers to the trade flows of goods wagons. Due to the nature of the product it is not 
possible to spot particularly significant trends since there are big fluctuations in value on a 
yearly basis. 
Table 14.3 shows: 
(a) a generally low level of trade at intra­EC and extra­EC level; 
(b) a negative extra­EC trade balance in 1993 largely composed of Germany and Belgian 
imports. 
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Table 14.4. Transformers1 ('000 ECU in current prices) 
EUR-12 B/L D DK E F GR I IRL NL Ρ UK 
INTRA­EC 
Trade balance 
1988 
1992 
Trend" 
Imports 
1988 
1992 
Trend" 
-
-
21,326 
33,657 
:m--mm 
(1,742) 
(1,766) 
3,876 
7,811 
Β "mWi 
(408) 
(1,652) 
8.412 
8,690 
(3,480) 
(2,743) 
3,530 
2,743 
(507) 
(6,466) 
638 
6,467 
Piei 
(165) 
820 
749 
3,685 
Plffli; 
(2) 
(588) 
2 
588 
4,130 
3,700 
40 
46 
(528) 
1 £ t ó > 
myy.: 
532 
1,288 
1,201 
902 
2,799 
2,256 
2.020 
3,880 
24 
53 
(250) 
2,855 
725 
27 
EXTRA­EC 
Trade balance 
1988 
1992 
Trend" 
Imports 
1988 
1992 
Trend" 
96,829 
225 911 
B y » 
21,756 
37,902 
25,335 
44,636 
mmm:: 
13 
1,836 
40,697 
48,954 
9,367 
12,115 
(5,225) 
(10,640) 
5,515 
10,642 
2,205 
3,687 
HIB; 
0 
93 
13,594 
77,872 
Β: ¿mm 
1,086 
2,104 
(1,335) 
0 
1,335 
0 
­­­;;.;'**;; 
10,221 
30,555 
+ 
448 
493 
0 
(968) 
** 
0 
968 
++ 
1,594 
12,677 
1,489 
0 
* 
817 
2,410 
ÄS:***; 
0 
733 
8,926 
16,728 
2,503 
8,918 
Notes: 
Source: 
1 Liquid dialectric transformers, having a power handling capacity > 10,000 kVA (CN 85042300). 
2 Positive trend: +(0.6 < r2< 0.75), ++ (0.75 < r2< 0.85), +++ (r2 > 0.85). 
Negative trend: * (0.6 < r2< 0.75), ** (0.75 < r2< 0.85), *** (r2 > 0.85). 
Comext database (Eurostat, 1995). 
Table 14.4 shows the changes in trade flows of transformers as identified in combined 
nomenclature code 85042300. 
Table 14.4 shows: 
(a) an increase in intra­EC trade with a particularly strong trend in import growth for Spain, 
Belgium­Luxembourg; 
(b) decreasing imports for the UK, Denmark and the Netherlands at intra­EC level; 
(c) a substantial rise in the UK intra­EC balance due to both export growth and import 
decline; 
(d) a strong positive trend in the extra­EC trade balance with substantial improvements for 
Belgium­Luxembourg, France, Italy and the UK; 
(e) a general increase in extra­EC imports with the exception of Greece and the 
Netherlands. 
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Table 14.5. Cable1 ('000 ECU in current prices) 
EUR-12 B/L D DK E F GR I IRL NL Ρ UK 
INTRA­EC 
Trade balance 
1988 
1992 
Trend" 
Imports 
1988 
1992 
Trend" 
­
­
143,064 
236,147 
ifl!;f;*Pi 
(608) 
887 
10,937 
16,057 
;ff;Äf 
18,146 
(13,014) 
■ : ■ : : : . : : : : ' . * * 
30,029 
68,158 
lÉlif: 
(13,542) 
mimi 
:ίί;;;:++φ ν 
13,748 
8,497 
..,:,:;::x¿a>;·;:; 
(4,680) 
(i 0,967) 
■mm:*:':.'. 
5,659 
14,784 
P i l i 
1,887 
(S,179) 
■' ï , ; . . . * * ; : 
18,673 
35,620 
PIPÍ! 
(1,794) 
(2,859) 
** 
1,794 
2,934 
BBBMii 
22,002 
40;603 
::: +++ 
9,654 
15,958 
5,006 
18,859 
2,568 
4,759 
(10,638) 
(19,091) 
26,055 
30,709 
(2.216) 
(4,601) 
2,329 
6,853 
(13,558) 
3.147 
++ 
21,613 
31,830 
EXTRA­EC 
Trade balance 
1988 
1993 
Trend" 
Imports 
1988 
1993 
Trend" 
(22,401) 
(6,739) 
131,005 
189,377 
.mimimi 
6,379 
1688 
; »«ii 
2,938 
4,344 
mmmm 
(6,401) 
4,564 
imu m 
43,781 
58,864 
+ 
(1.665) 
(920) 
++ 
2,107 
1,988 
(2,791) 
909 
4,919 
5,434 
19,552 
14,783 
10,917 
18,500 
(894) 
(1,530) 
932 
2,509 
+ 
7,468 
18,392 
6,691 
11,404 
(2,996) 
: : ; Ε;572Ϊ : 
m?: ■++ 
4,838 
5,695 
(4.038) 
(5,356) 
10,344 
11,566 
58 
(164) 
398 
998 
(37,073) 
(45,677) 
43,140 
68,075 
Notes: 
Source: 
' Co-axial cable and other co-axial electric conductors, insulated (CN 8544200). 
2 Positive trend: +(0.6 < r2 < 0.75), ++ (0.75 < r2 < 0.85), +++ (r2 > 0.85). 
* (0.6 < r2 < 0.75), ** (0.75 <r2< 0.85), *** (r2 > 0.85). Negative trend: 
Comext database (Eurostat, 1995). 
Table 14.5 shows the change of trade flows of co-axial cables as defined in the combined 
nomenclature code 8544200. 
Table 14.5 shows: 
(a) a strong positive trend in intra-EC trade; 
(b) Italy, Ireland (major net-exporters) and the UK are the main countries to have benefited 
from the changes; 
(c) Denmark is the only country to show a substantial decrease in intra-EC imports; 
(d) an overall extra-EC trade deficit, mainly due to the good performance of Italy and 
Ireland and Germany over the same period; 
(e) the extra-EC trade balance for Belgium, Greece and the UK to have deteriorated due to a 
sharp rise in imports. 
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Table 14.6. Cardiac monitor!('000 ECU in current prices) 
EUR-12 B/L D DK GR IRL NL UK 
INTRA-EC 
Trade balance 
1989 
1992 
Trend" 
Imports 
1989 
1992 
Trend" 
-
-
17,049 
18,675 
123 
(268) 
696 
1,022 
Pis*;:;; 
1,822 
;;:;;;;;:;;;;;;;:8|fc: 
:mm::tt**::. 
2.603 
2,632 
(128) 
(90) 
** 
202 
134 
++ 
(2,629) 
(1,115) 
+ 
2,641 
1,190 
* 
(2,826) 
(1,935) 
3,226 
3,197 
(50) 
Pi$P 
mm;:***:; 
159 
396 
+ 
6,022 
4846 
1,394 
832 
897 
1.443 
166 
165 
(2,982) 
(2,774) 
2,982 
4,603 
1,318 
1,767 
198 
372 
(1.569) 
(468) 
2,784 
2,297 
EXTRA-EC 
Trade balance 
1989 
1993 
Trend" 
Imports 
1989 
1993 
Trend" 
(11,919) 
(13,871) 
18,498 
24,486 
Bwwwm. 
(719) 
(1,270) 
821 
1,465 
(2,873) 
(4,836) 
5,626 
8,460 
(305) 
(60) 
+++ 
344 
130 
m::-**m. 
(436) 
(434) 
455 
457 
(3,338) 
(4,303) 
3,776 
5,376 
.BimSa 
(567) 
mmm 
mmmMii 
567 
147 
*** 
119 
409 
846 
1,761 
(244) 
33 
308 
5 
(1,166) 
(1,276) 
1,166 
2,214 
1,632 
i,4ÍS 
102 
539 
(4,022) 
(3,481) 
4,487 
3,932 
Notes: ' Black and white or other monochrome video monitors (CN 85282020). 
2 Positive trend: +(0.6 < r2 < 0.75), ++ (0.75 < r2 < 0.85), +++ (r2 > 0.85). 
Negative trend: * (0.6 < r1 < 0.75), ** (0.75 <r2< 0.85), *** (r2 > 0.85). 
Source: Comext database (Eurostat, 1995). 
Table 14.6 shows the changes in trade flow of cardiac monitors identified in combined 
nomenclature code 85282020. 
Table 14.6 does not show many significant changes over the period 1988-93. In particular: 
(a) Italy, Portugal, Ireland and Germany are the net exporters at intra-EC level, while all 
other Member States show a negative trade balance; 
(b) overall intra- and extra-EC trade was static. 
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Notes: 
Source: 
1 Apparatus based on the use of X­rays, for medical, surgical, dental or veterinary use (CN 84719390). 
2 Positive trend: +(0.6 < r2 < 0.75), ++ (0.75 <r2< 0.85), +++ (r2 > 0.85). 
Negative trend: * (0.6 < r2 < 0.75), ** (0.75 < r2 < 0.85), *** (r2 > 0.85). 
Comext database (Eurostat, 1995). 
Table 14.7. X-raj 
EUR-12 
' apparatus1 ('000 ECU in 
B/L D DK E 
current prices) 
F GR I IRL NL Ρ UK 
INTRA­EC 
Trade balance 
1988 
1992 
Imports 
1988 
1992 
Trend" 
-
208,486 
403,418 
mmmmmai 
6,993 
( f 0,897) 
:::;.;.;.::;.;:v:: ¿j. 
15,897 
plf ip ; pp§p ; 
70,319 
p ? ! P 
32,084 
77,309 
(3,099) 
(2,442) 
4,305 
6,882 
(8,879) 
(18,066) 
13,175 
29,000 
(19,444) 
(1,371) 
50,475 
63,421 
(4,617) 
(10,004) 
4,624 
10,004 
8,338 
(29,107) 
26,238 
«7 069 
: ' ■**£:: 
(2,527) 
(1,581) 
2,614 
2,074 
(26,532) 
32,035 
26,532 
55,183 
·■■■': ­piP 
(4,411) 
(5,974) 
4,548 
5,988 
(16,141) 
(37,897) 
27,994 
45,412 
EXTRA­EC 
Trade balance 
1988 
1993 
Trend" 
Imports 
1988 
1993 
Trend" 
349,124 
immmm 
ffPPI 
131,056 
202,763 
4,140 
21.286 
mmmmii 
4,631 
6,368 
321,965 
507 911 
mmmm 
25,365 
54,829 
(1,244) 
(1,121) 
1,704 
2,598 
(801) 
16,975 
12,677 
3,843 
61,130 
94,957 
19,803 
49,961 
(1,272) 
(340) 
1,272 
376 
(9,053) 
5,672 
': ■ + ; 
22,239 
11,620 
(569) 
161 
569 
113 
(28,022) 
93,122 
:: :* 
28.022 
57,937 
(505) 
(1,386) 
** 
515 
1,468 
3,355 
9,670 
"i mi: 
14,259 
13,650 
Table 14.7 shows the changes in trade flow of apparatus based on the use of X­rays^as 
identified in the combined nomenclature code 84719390. 
Table 14.7 shows: 
(a) a strong positive trend in intra­EC trade; 
(b) Germany and the Netherlands are the only countries to show a positive intra­EC trade 
balance, improving over the period 1988­92; 
(c) other countries, with the exception of Ireland and France, show a deteriorating intra­EC 
trade balance with a particular strong negative trend for Italy; 
(d) a strong positive trend in intra­EC imports for Belgium­Luxembourg, Italy, Germany 
and Netherlands; 
(e) a positive trend in the overall extra­EC trade balance for Germany, Belgium­
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Italy and the UK, particularly due to the relatively higher 
exports increases. 
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Table 14.8. Boilers1 ('000 ECU in current prices) 
EUR-12 B/L D DK E F GR I IRL NL Ρ 
229 
UK 
INTRA­EC 
Trade balance 
1988 
1992 
Trend" 
Imports 
1988 
1992 
Trend" 
­
­
4,145 
2,733 
BWBBBmm 
(106) 
(426) 
437 
447 
102 
mmwii 
732 
403 
91 
86 
102 
64 
19 
mmW: 
89 
40 
(276) 
(HO) 
945 
356 
Pilli! 
(104) 
(181) 
104 
181 
;:::; 725i; 
189 
250 
414 
(238) 
(261) 
239 
261 
15 
(80) 
391 
190 
(386) 
(122) 
398 
125 
160 
100 
456 
249 
EXTRA­EC 
Trade balance 
1988 
1993 
Trend" 
Imports 
1988 
1993 
Trend" 
6,216 
WBB^M$: 
1,127 
6,047 
PivPl! 
(62) 
mBBWÊ 
♦ · 
68 
7 
3,509 
3,980 
908 
3,857 
llliff 
188 
6 
0 
33 
91 
95 
4 
0 
1,340 
908 
68 
162 
1 
3 
0 
0 
553 
(1,1«) 
12 
1,940 
(30) 
0 
30 
0 
(3) 
7 
11 
25 
11 
0 
0 
0 
618 
845 
26 
23 
Notes: ' Super­heated water boilers (CN 840220). 
2 Positive trend: +(0.6 < r2 < 0.75), ++ (0.75 < r2 < 0.85), +++ (r2 > 0.85). 
Negative trend: * (0.6 < r2 < 0.75), ** (0.75 < r2 < 0.85), *** (r2 > 0.85). 
Source: Comext database (Eurostat, 1995). 
Table 14.8 shows the changes in trade flow of super­heated boilers identified by the combined 
nomenclature code 840220. The product is usually supplied to the public sector (utilities) as a 
part of a system, not as a single product. 
Table 14.8 shows: 
(a) a negative trend in overall intra­EC trade; 
(b) Germany has the largest trade surplus; 
(c) a significant decrease in intra­EC imports for France (with decreasing exports) and 
Germany (with increasing exports); 
(d) an overall positive extra­EC trade balance, with only Italy exhibiting a deteriorating 
trade balance at both extra­ and intra­EC levels; 
(e) a significant increase of extra­EC trade as shown by a substantial increase in imports and 
exports over the 1988­93 period; 
(f) a considerable increase in extra­EC imports for: 
(i) Italy, with a strong negative extra­EC trade balance, 
(ii) Germany, which was a major net exporter at both extra­ and intra­EC level. 
230 Public procurement 
14.2.3. Products bought primarily by the private sector 
Table 14.9. Network server1 ('000 ECU in current prices) 
EUR-12 B/L D DK GR IRL NL UK 
INTRA­EC 
Trade balance 
1988 
1992 
Trend" 
Imports 
1988 
1992 
Trend" 
_ 
123,313 
51509 
■ : ; . * * » > ; 
15,562 
3,144 
9,686 
4,828 
20,168 
(nam: 
17,292 
12,460 
(3,370) 
mmwmi. 
::m:'*m*: 
3,775 
825 
-oBí;;;;***;;: 
(14,790) 
(1,666) 
16,130 
3,838 
(17,322) 
{Î 386) 
::: ï*** 
21,702 
7,770 
■ Í Í Í ; : ; Í Í : | ^ * * ; Í 
(562) 
(121) 
562 
121 
(7,588) 
( W ) 
11,283 
5,811 
(4,424) 
(1,566) 
7,104 
2,043 
(1,304) 
(D 
13,399 
8,783 
(1,663) 
(771) 
1,665 
805 
15,295 
12,172 
20,713 
4,224 
: : : * * * : ■ 
EXTRA­EC 
Trade balance 
1988 
1993 
Trend" 
Imports 
1988 
1993 
Trend2 
(252,889) 
(92,408) 
vieil! 
314,503 
199,870 
*». 
(7,700) 
tmm mmm 
10,539 
23,631 
mmmmi 
(93,895) 
(22,783) 
+++ 
115,007 
31,435 
'mmmm: 
(5.264) 
3,984 
++ 
6,367 
3,189 
:mm:**^a: 
(7,202) 
(4,548) 
9,549 
5,910 
(9,521) 
(13,643) 
12,849 
19,535 
(173) 
(26) 
+ 
180 
26 
* 
(42,555) 
(23,924) 
57,252 
29,369 
(2,956) 
(15,220) 
3,422 
28,977 
(15,058) 
(24,139) 
16,728 
26,231 
(200) 
(384) 
207 
406 
(68,365) 
25,949 
82,403 
31,161 
■ mm:::**:: 
Notes: 
Source: 
1 Storage units for digital automatic data processing machines (CN 84719390). 
2 Positive trend: +(0.6 < r2 < 0.75), ++ (0.75 < r2 < 0.85), +++ (r2 > 0.85). 
Negative trend: * (0.6 < r2 < 0.75), ** (0.75 < r2 < 0.85), *** (r2 > 0.85). 
Comext database (Eurostat, 1995). 
Table 14.9 shows the changes in trade of storage units for digital automatic data processing 
machines identified by the combined nomenclature code 84719390. 
In particular, Table 14.9 shows: 
(a) a strong negative trend in intra­EC trade value; 
(b) the UK and Belgium are the only countries with a positive intra­EC trade balance; 
(c) all other Member States had a negative but improving intra­EC trade balance, reflecting 
a decrease in imports; 
(d) an overall extra­EC trade deficit, with the UK enjoying a positive balance, and Denmark 
and Germany significantly reduced deficits. 
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Table 14.10. Personal computer1 (million ECU in current prices) 
EUR-12 B/L D DK E F GR I IRL NL Ρ UK 
INTRA-EC 
Trade balance 
1988 
1992 
Trend" 
Imports 
1988 
1992 
Trend" 
-
-
1,492 
1,074 
:.ammmi*i: 
(63.6) 
(36.4) 
221 
190 
m:mm*m 
9.8 
(38.8) 
225 
235 
(36.8) 
(41.5) 
42 
45 
(72) 
(54.8) 
74 
61 
(89.4) 
(99) 
221 
190 
(6.8) 
(5) 
6.7 
5.0 
(152) 
(114) 
+ 
160 
123 
757 
mmaim: 
■im: 
15 
13 
(5) 
(67) 
155 
133 
(15) 
(15) 
15.5 
16.8 
(326) 
;;;:;ί:80 
+ . 
488 
193 
?;;·;**· 
EXTRA-EC 
Trade balance 
1988 
1992 
Trend" 
Imports 
1988 
1992 
Trend" 
(709.6) 
P i S M ! 
1,286 
1,275 
(11.1) 
(8.0) 
16.6 
14.0 
(173.7) 
(224) 
319 
373 
(9.8) 
(97) 
13 
14 
(31.7) 
(50.7) 
36 
65 
(94.3) 
(134) 
203 
206 
(7.8) 
(33) 
7.8 
3.3 
(14.5) 
(35.8) 
33.4 
45.8 
147 
135 
6.4 
6.6 
(255) 
(57) 
291 
75 
(8) 
(14.3) 
8.3 
15.8 
(250) 
(170) 
349 
458 
Notes: Digital automatic data processing machines, combined with an input and output unit, with a random access 
memory of a capacity > 512 kilobyte (CN 84712090). 
2 Positive trend +(0.6 < r2 < 0.75), ++ (0.75 < r2 < 0.85), +++ (r2 > 0.85). 
Source: 
Negative trend: 
Comext database (Eurostat, 1995). 
* (0.6 < r2 < 0.75), ** (0.75 < r2 < 0.85), *** (r2 > 0.85). 
Table 14.10 shows the changes in trade for personal computers as identified within the 
combined nomenclature code 84712090. 
Table 14.10 shows: 
(a) a negative trend in intra-EC trade over the period 1988-92; 
(b) Ireland and the UK are the net exporters at intra-EC level; 
(c) a general decrease in extra-EC trade; 
(d) Ireland is the only EC country to have a positive extra-EC trade balance. 
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Table 14.11 Car1 (million ECU 
EUR-12 B/L D 
in current prices) 
DK E F GR I IRL NL Ρ UK 
INTRA­EC 
Trade balance 
1989 
1992 
Trend" 
Imports 
1989 
1992 
Trend" 
­
­
11,007 
14,170 
m-iBBSi 
37 
Pi l i ; 
1,073 
1,075 
1,199 
(520) 
1,282 
3,022 
iffiif 
(88) 
(49) 
95 
81 
2,902 
4,94 f 
399 
424 
362 
ma::m.:. 
2,177 
2,570 
(160) 
(536) 
160 
536 
Pili!: 
(1,427) 
(2,876) 
2,469 
3,682 
(111) 
(97) 
121 
110 
(427) 
(499) 
581 
549 
(451) 
(610) 
575 
923 
+ 
(1.836) 
(384) 
2,072 
1,196 
: : ■ * . 
EXTRA­EC 
Trade balance 
1989 
1993 
Trend" 
Imports 
1989 
1993 
Trend" 
(1,219) 
13 
2,816 
2,885 
(268) 
826 
275 
299 
(396) 
(503) 
316 
345 
(55) 
(77) 
608 
80.3 
■ 
278 
yl;; ,376:: 
32 
47 
422 
:BBBWå 
275 
298 
(55) 
(77) 
64 
160 
(60) 
135 
235 
111 
ff§|;P;' 
(64) 
(74) 
65 
74 
(240) 
(360) 
246 
377 
(42) 
(93) 
42 
102 
: 'φψψ::. 
(729) 
(342) 
744 
430 
* 
Notes: 1 Motor cars and other motor vehicles principally designed for the transport of persons (other than those of 
heading No 87.02), including station wagons and racing cars, with spark­ignition internal combustion 
reciprocating piston engine, of a cylinder capacity 1000<cc<1500 (CN 87032219). 
2 Positive trend: +(0.6 < r2 < 0.75), ++ (0.75 < r2 < 0.85), +++ (r2 > 0.85). 
Negative trend: * (0.6 < r2 < 0.75), ** (0.75 < r2 < 0.85), *** (r2 > 0.85). 
Source: Comext database (Eurostat, 1995). 
Table 14.11 shows the changes in trade flows of cars. The product is generally supplied to the 
public sector both directly from manufacturers or through local dealers according to the size of 
contracts. 
Table 14.11 shows: 
(a) 
(b) 
(b) 
(c) 
Spain, France, and Belgium are the net exporters at intra­EC level; 
a significantly improving trade balance (intra and extra) for the UK; 
intra­EC imports have generally increased with a strong trend for Greece and with the 
exception of the UK, Ireland, the Netherlands and Belgium­Luxembourg showing 
decreasing imports; 
Italy and the UK benefited from decreasing extra­EC imports and Denmark and Portugal 
suffered from rising extra­EC imports. 
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Table 14.12. Van 
EUR­12 
1 ('000 ECU in current prices) 
B/L D DK E F GR I IRL NL Ρ UK 
INTRA­EC 
Trade balance 
1988 
1992 
Trend" 
Imports 
1988 
1992 
Trend" 
­
611,433 
659,627 
90,281 
(20,811) 
■ » ■ » * : . 
33,808 
43,578 
6,563 
(85,612) 
92,004 
146,023 
y .pp.; 
(7,946) 
(12,087) 
8,233 
12,656 
94,714 
(68,764) 
14,434 
122,228 
(33,396) 
(26,434) 
135,430 
131,506 
(12,177) 
(47,569) 
12,187 
47,588 
45,588 
(30,822) 
■":'. i* 
22,858 
63,089 
(1,534) 
(2,687) 
3,302 
3,024 
(21,815) 
(34,380) 
31.577 
38,786 
5,425 
imMii: 
41,177 
12,020 
(165,707) 
326,360 
++V" 
216,425 
39,131 
m-/m.::**..: 
EXTRA­EC 
Trade balance 
1988 
1992 
Trend" 
Imports 
1988 
1992 
Trend" 
(8,797) 
(??,4M) 
299,596 
288,288 
48,757 
'λ489 
mai * **■; 
9,517 
6,202 
80,352 
11854 
44,195 
48,112 
(5,717) 
(26.857) 
; ; : . ; . ; : :*# 
6,948 
27,015 
p.:; p 
14,030 
9,636 
1,154 
2,330 
41,231 
78,061 
21,048 
9,792 
(47,171) 
(109.592) 
**4 
47,230 
109,626 
2,228 
(7,817) 
13,563 
19,792 
(2,208) 
ffifi! 
■;■; :■ :-+**:;. 
2,208 
43 
(13,260) 
(27,211) 
**# 
17,432 
29,860 
170 
448 
0 
129 
(127,209) 
(23,379) : 
; ■ ; ; * * * ­ : : 
136,301 
35,387 
::::**i*m 
Notes: 
Source: 
' Motor vehicles for the transport of goods, with spark­ignition internal combustion piston engine, of a gross 
vehicle weight =< 5 tonnes, of a cylinder capacity =< 2 800 cc, new (CN 87043191). 
+(0.6 < r' < 0.75), ++ ( 0.75 < r < 0.85), +++ (/■" > 0.85). 
2 . 
Positive trend: 
Negative trend: * (0.6 </< 0.75), ** ( 0.75 <r< 0.85), *** ( / > 0.85) 
Comext database (Eurostat, 1995) 
Table 14.12 shows the change in trade flows of vans at intra­ and extra­EC level. The product 
is generally supplied to the public sector both directly from manufacturers or through local 
dealers according to the contract size. 
Table 14.12 shows: 
(a) there was no significant change in total intra­EC trade between 1988 and 1992; 
(b) at country level: 
(i) intra­EC trade balances for Belgium­Luxembourg, Italy and Spain deteriorated, 
(ii) the UK moved from a negative to a positive trade balance due to a substantial and 
consistent decrease in imports, 
(iii) Germany and Italy suffered a rising trend in imports, 
(iv) substantial growth of Spanish intra­EC imports; 
(c) total extra­EC deteriorated trade balance, except for the UK (strong positive trend), 
France, Ireland and Portugal; 
(d) the large negative trend in extra­EC trade balance: 
(i) Germany, Belgium­Luxembourg mainly due to decreasing exports, 
(ii) Denmark, Greece and the Netherlands mainly due to rising imports. 
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Table 14.13. Bus' ('000 ECU in current prices) 
EUR­12 B/L D DK E F GR I IRL NL Ρ UK 
INTRA­EC 
Trade balance 
1988 
1992 
Trend" 
Imports 
1988 
1992 
Trend" 
■ 
353,612 
496,962 
iflfip 
90,420 
91,093 
23,708 
42,918 
f PHI 
110,000 
25,117 
* 
28,441 
129,714 
mmmwm 
(9,272) 
(3,451) 
9,708 
15,367 
PPP 
(8,098) 
(1,344) 
13,594 
21,951 
(87,500) 
(71,0(7) 
117,083 
143,444 
(1,852) 
(3,013) 
1,852 
4,732 
(41,687) 
(40,887) 
44,824 
42,715 
(1,612) 
(6,934) 
1,627 
7,269 
(437) 
43,458 
; . . . . : + ■ : 
38,411 
35,210 
21,921 
13,295 
475 
203 
(71,883) 
(46,317) 
73,889 
53,439 
EXTRA­EC 
Trade balance 
1988 
1992 
Trend" 
Imports 
1988 
1992 
Trend2 
388,671 
354,873 
9,519 
30,645 
61,865 
73,952 
298 
1,085 
226,674 
181,021 
* 
1,448 
16 <20 
(632) 
t,684 
2,130 
3,440 
16,453 
33 898 
0 
731 
57,502 
32,013 
242 
2,304 
(537) 
(592) 
537 
1,625 
18,355 
12,799 
285 
318 
(48) 
0 
48 
0 
3,516 
5,071 
1,964 
407 
5,415 
5,438 
0 
IO 
108 
: ; : 9,589; 
' . . ' ­LV«­ ­
2.567 
4.205 ; 
Notes: 1 Motor vehicles for the transport of >=10 persons, including driver, with compression­ignition internal 
combustion piston engine diesel or semi­diesel, of a cylinder capacity of > 2500 cm3, new (CN 87021011). 
2 Positive trend: +(0.6 < r2 < 0.75), ++ (0.75 <r2< 0.85), +++ (r2 > 0.85). 
Negative trend: * (0.6 < r2 < 0.75), ** (0.75 < r2 < 0.85), *** (r2 > 0.85). 
Source: Comext database (Eurostat, 1995). 
Table 14.13 shows the changes in trade flows of buses. The product is usually supplied to the 
public sector directly by the manufacturers or by local dealers according to the size and 
number of buses ordered. 
Table 14.13 shows: 
(a) an increase of intra­EC trade over the period 1988­92; 
(b) a significant rise in imports for Belgium­Luxembourg, Germany and Denmark; 
(c) a significant deterioration in intra­EC trade balance for Germany and Ireland; 
(d) a significant improvement in intra­EC trade balance for the Netherlands, reflecting a 
positive trend in exports; 
(e) an improvement in intra­EC trade balance of the UK, mainly due to a decrease in 
imports; 
(f) a large and static extra­EC trade surplus, with only Greece having an extra­EC trade 
deficit; 
(g) overall extra­EC exports and imports increased substantially. 
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Table 14.14. Uniforms1 ('000 ECU in current prices) 
EUR-12 B/L D DK E F GR I IRL NL Ρ UK 
INTRA­EC 
Trade balance 
1988 
1992 
Trend" 
Imports 
1988 
1992 
Trend" 
■ 
49,172 
64,505 
vvyy: 
2,662 
3,748 
4,181 
10,911 
(10,307) 
(29,634) 
. , . . , . . , . ■ . , . „ Λ . 
16.242 
39,389 
ΒΒΒΒΒΒ. 
2.485 
Í3.938 
■mmm. 
1,280 
2,242 
(509) 
(2,852) 
m:::'**.- · 
630 
2,892 
iifii 
(5.050) 
(5,599) 
6,724 
7,647 
4,868 
4,198 
484 
731 
8,211 
21,357 
4­f­
785 
1,244 
2,753 
(698) 
. " . ; ; * * ■ * : ; : 
2,225 
1,832 
* 
(3,743) 
(6,415) 
8.615 
18,120 
iff f i l 
2,424 
4,119 
++ 
149 
2,712 
+++ 
(3,796) 
(2,245) 
7,859 
6,658 
EXTRA­EC 
Trade balance 
1988 
1993 
Trend" 
Imports 
1988 
1993 
Trend" 
(50,275) 
(JSU16) 
.'·:: .¥*«' 
95,725 
186,459 
!P!ÉP; 
(5,957) 
(10,198) 
7,720 
10,976 
(49,777) 
(108,083) 
*** 
56,300 
114,814 
: V++*:;Í; 
1,551 
miWM: 
mmm*: 
3,129 
3,756 
458 
(1,038) 
;..;:::::;<»..;.. 
66 
1,353 
PIP;:;: 
(9,840) 
(33,697) 
mmm::***: 
13,559 
37,413 
261 
(36) 
71 
137 
1,436 
(1,242) 
4,281 
5,125 
212 
2,909 
65 
427 
(2,806) 
(6,717) 
* 
4,203 
8,129 
9,213 
6,745 
67 
265 
++ 
4,974 
596 
6,264 
4,064 
++ 
Notes: ' Men's or boys' industrial and occupational clothing of cotton (CN 62032210, 62032310, 62033210, 
62033310,62033310, 62033911, 62034211, 62034211, 62034311). 
2 Positive trend: +(0.6 < r2 < 0.75), ++ (0.75 < r2 < 0.85), +++ (r2 > 0.85). 
Negative trend: * (0.6 < r2 < 0.75), ** (0.75 < r2 < 0.85), *** (r2 > 0.85). 
Source: Comext database (Eurostat, 1995). 
Table 14.14 shows the changes in trade flows for men's or boys' industrial and occupational 
clothing. 
Reference to this aggregate in relation to the uniforms has been made under the assumption 
that if a country has a competitive and/or comparative advantage in professional clothing, it is 
likely to exist in the uniforms market as well. 
Table 14.14 shows: 
(a) a positive trend in intra­EC trade increase; 
(b) Italy and Denmark benefited mostly from the changes; 
(c) Germany experienced a significant deterioration, reflecting the German and French 
situations; 
(d) the extra­EC trade balanced deteriorated of the German and French trade balance; 
(e) the UK is the only European country to show a decrease in extra­EC imports. 
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Table 14.15. Filing cabinets' ('000 ECU in current prices) 
EUR­12 B/L D DK GR IRL NL UK 
INTRA­EC 
Trade balance 
1988 
1992 
Trend" 
Imports 
1988 
1992 
Trend" 
­
­
15,114 
31,041 
llliil 
(1,173) 
(1,854) 
1,890 
1,584 
(690) 
(4,704) 
* * 
3,333 
9,327 
Ili;::; 
353 
256 
600 
599 
129 
mt 
■ ■ ■ : · : * : * : * : 
357 
1987 
IPiP 
538 
(2.275) 
■■■■■.■m*:*.*.. 
2,281 
3,817 
(79) 
(1,196) 
79 
1,196 
(464) 
(1,292) 
892 
1,793 
(1,691) 
<3.968) 
** 
1.746 
4,073 
iPiff 
(215) 
(615) 
1,524 
3,434 
(232) 
(581) 
233 
581 
3,526 
17.180 
Λ : ; :*+■+, .;■; 
2,177 
1,879 
EXTRA­EC 
Trade balance 
1988 
1993 
Trend" 
Imports 
1988 
1993 
Trend" 
108 
3,415 
10,427 
12,542 
(695) 
(393) 
785 
424 
(283) 
(732) 
2,216 
3,801 
657 
220 
431 
423 
(371) 
(210) 
552 
567 
366 
(1,314) 
905 
lit»;; 
(3) 
(22) 
* 
16 
30 
165 
1,399 
167 
335 
+ 
8 
339 
84 
52 
(778) 
(1,168) 
1,123 
1,848 
65 
(24) 
* 
13 
31 
977 
m$M> 
4,135 
mw$m 
Notes: 
Source: 
' Filing cabinets, card­index cabinets, paper trays, paper rests, pen trays, office­stamp stands and similar office 
or desk equipment, of base metal (CN 83040000). 
2 Positive trend: +(0.6 < r2 < 0.75), ++ (0.75 <r2< 0.85), +++ (r2 > 0.85). 
Negative trend: * (0.6 <r2< 0.75), ** (0.75 < r2 < 0.85), *** (r2 > 0.85). 
Comext database (Eurostat, 1995). 
Table 14.15 shows the changes in trade flows of filing cabinets at intra­ and extra­EC level. 
Filing cabinets are typically supplied to the public and private sectors in Member States by 
local wholesalers, which purchase directly from manufacturers. 
Table 14.15 shows: 
(a) a strong positive trend in intra­EC trade; 
(b) a negative and deteriorating intra­EC trade balance in all Member States other than the 
UK and Denmark; 
(c) a growing and substantial UK trade balance at intra­EC as well as at extra­EC level; 
(d) a growing extra­EC trade balance, reflecting the UK's extra­EC positive export trend; 
(e) substantial growth in extra­EC imports for France, Germany and Italy. 
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Table 14.16. Shelf1 ('000 E C U in current prices) 
EUR­12 B/L DK GR IRL NL UK 
INTRA­EC 
Trade balance 
1988 
1992 
trend" 
Imports 
1988 
1992 
trend" 
­
­
85,073 
126,601 
(7,012) 
(4,478) 
9,440 
19,429 
WmWWi. 
6,599 
4,774 
14,813 
19,795 
(436) 
1 
1,676 
1,183 
(1,022) 
(3,175) 
2,241 
7,228 
BBmWi 
(13,268) 
(19,462) 
2,2019 
30,982 
(786) 
(2,171) 
■Λ;:*** ÎÏ 
786 
2,183 
mmimm 
26,561 
24,305 
3.833 
6,149 
(3,521) 
(4,862) 
4,265 
6,554 
+ 
(6,303) 
(2,233) 
12,075 
16,275 
(592) 
(1,198) 
735 
2,844 
(222) 
: V 8¿499;; 
+ 
13,192 
13,979 
EXTRA­EC 
Trade balance 
1988 
1993 
trend" 
Imports 
1988 
1993 
trend" 
35,351 
38,244 
19,701 
29,518 
.vPP­l.­.jvti'; 
(719) 
(1,681) 
873 
2,717 
'mmWm 
12,442 
11,997 
3,189 
9,964 
ÜÜÜ 
(699) 
(372) 
1,878 
2,273 
1,599 
487 
81 
999 
P I ! 
7,558 
6,313 
1,862 
1,736 
2 
209 
8 
56 
20,330 
22¿?22 
: : ■ : : * ■ : 
797 
768 
(97) 
(293) 
120 
571 
+ 
(707) 
(843) 
1,296 
3,506 
+ 
27 
WBWii 
mma 
59 
61 
(4,385) 
(1,057) 
9,538 
6,867 
i. im i. 
Notes: 
Source: 
1 Metal furniture for offices, of > 80 cm in height (excl. drawing tables, cupboards with doors, shutters or flaps, 
and seats) (CN 94031099). 
2 Positive trend: +(0.6 < r2 < 0.75), ++ (0.75 < r2 < 0.85), +++ (r2 > 0.85). 
Negative trend: * (0.6 < r2 < 0.75), ** (0.75 < r2 < 0.85), *** (r2 > 0.85). 
Comext database, Eurostat 1995. 
Table 14.16 shows the changes in trade flows of metal shelving identified within the combined 
nomenclature 94031099. The product is usually imported by wholesalers, which supply the 
public sector as well as the private sector. 
Table 14.16 shows: 
(a) a positive trend in intra­EC trade over the period 1988­92; 
(b) Germany and Italy are the only countries with a positive trade balance at both intra­EC 
and extra­EC level; 
(c) the U K has benefited from the changes through export growth as shown by the trade­
balance improvement at both intra and extra­EC levels; 
(d) a substantial increase in Belgian intra­EC exports as reflected in an improved trade 
balance with increased imports; 
(e) a strong negative trend for the Greek intra­EC trade balance; 
(f) a substantial growth in extra­EC exports for Germany and Belgium­Luxembourg. 
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Table 14.17. Office desk1 ('000 ECU in current prices) 
Notes: 
Source: 
1 Office desks, with metal frames (CN 94031051 ). 
2 Positive trend: +(0.6 < r1 < 0.75), ++ (0.75 < r2 < 0.85), +++ (r2 > 0.85). 
Negative trend: * (0.6 < r2 < 0.75), ** (0.75 <r2< 0.85), *** (r2 > 0.85). 
Comext database (Eurostat, 1995). 
EUR­12 B/L D DK E F GR I IRL NL Ρ UK 
INTRA­EC 
Trade balance 
1988 
1992 
Trend" 
Imports 
1988 
1992 
Trend" 
­
­
27,108 
35,623 
(4,015) 
(2,227) 
6,050 
7,194 
+ 
5616 
(1,767) 
;:;; ;;+.*. 
2,783 
8,080 
ilÍ!l4­+¿¿:::: 
323 
1,863 
;ÏS;**·*. ; 
81 
60 
4,002 
6,835 
:'■ m'***:: 
542 
914 
(1,772) 
(799) 
3,329 
3,855 
(153) 
(226) 
*** 
156 
230 
: :+*+ : 
532 
672 
546 
496 
(209) 
(162) 
228 
192 
2,081 
(1,025) 
6,462 
9,793 
+ 
(141) 
470 
290 
511 
(6,264) 
(3,634) 
6,639 
mMmm 
EXTRA­EC 
Trade balance 
1988 
1993 
Trend2 
Imports 
1988 
1993 
Trend" 
8,528 
9,813 
3,095 
4,573 
72 
145 
29 
40 
4,034 
3,522 
398 
1,324 
i:;;;;;; **+:* 
725 
(254) 
39 
1,150 
1,328 
1,084 
20 
186 
Pilli!; 
59 
627 
2,037 
798 
12 
61 
1 
0 
1,091 
1,690 
3 
133 
­
(2) 
0 
2 
448 
1,014 
259 
442 
471 
1,405 
• 
2 
1 
288 
521 
307 
497 
Table 14.17 shows the changes in trade flows of office desks with a metal frame at intra­ and 
extra­EC level. Office desks are typically supplied to the public and private sector in Member 
States by local wholesalers, which purchase directly from manufacturers. 
Table 14.17 shows: 
(a) an increase in trade at both intra­ and extra­EC level; 
(b) a strong positive trend for the Danish and Spanish intra­EC trade balances; 
(c) a strong growth in German imports at both intra­EC and extra­EC level; 
(d) a negative trend for the Greek intra­EC trade balance reflecting import growth; 
(e) substantial improvement of the UK intra­EC trade balance; 
(f) the absence of significant changes at extra­EC level, with the exception of substantial 
import increases in Germany and Denmark. 
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Table 14.18. Fixed armchair ('000 ECU in current prices) 
EUR-12 B/L D DK E F GR I IRL NL Ρ UK 
INTRA-EC 
Trade balance 
1988 
1992 
Trend" 
Imports 
1988 
1992 
Trend" 
-
152,923 
238,513 
vip*... 
(3,062) 
(7,964) 
amm***:. 
15,350 
20,165 
p i p ! 
7,872 
(46,135) 
mmii***::. 
37,107 
88,259 
(3,788) 
1,667 
v y *y: 
5,756 
4,794 
5,694 
6,395 
2,498 
7,083 
(26,919) 
(24,484) 
39,729 
48,691 
(1,679) 
(1,885) 
1,690 
1,888 
52,589 
101,983 
5,107 
5,710 
1,229 
2,952 
453 
1,022 
+ 
(17,923) 
(9,597) 
29,549 
33,233 
.'-".:■:.:::"+■* 
(877) 
(3,173) 
1,293 
3,561 
++.+ 
(13,135) 
(19,760) 
14,389 
24,109 
EXTRA-EC 
Trade balance 
1988 
1993 
Trend" 
Imports 
1988 
1993 
Trend" 
65,868 
41,580 
ι;;'-.:':;.;;;;;;**-;;; 
35,762 
60,209 
mimm: 
40 
(1,400) 
mi ν **;; 
589 
1,658 
+ 
16,719 
(1,979) 
: : ' : : : : : ' ■ * * : 
13,602 
29,325 
2,900 
(126) 
2,335 
3,976 
7,495 
7,705 
384 
2,474 
291 
(308) 
11,053 
9,888 
** 
8 
(155) 
20 
161 
38,953 
43,835 
693 
830 
(176) 
31 
186 
93 
1,858 
(5.918) 
mmmm*-i 
2,385 
8,235 
99 
505 
69 
206 
(2,319) 
(610) 
4,446 
3,363 
Notes: 
Source: 
Upholstered seats, with metal frames (excl. seats for aircraft or motor vehicles, swivel seats with variable 
height adjustments and medical, dental or surgical furniture) (CN 9401700). 
Positive trend: +(0.6 < r2 < 0.75), ++ (0.75 < r2 < 0.85), +++ (r2 > 0.85). 
Negative trend: * (0.6 < r2 < 0.75), ** (0.75 < r2 < 0.85), *** (r2 > 0.85). 
Comext database (Eurostat, 1995). 
Table 14.18 shows the changes in trade flows of fixed armchairs. Fixed armchairs are typically 
supplied to the public and private sectors in Member States by local wholesalers, which 
purchase them directly from manufacturers. 
Table 14.18 shows: 
(a) a strong positive trend in intra-EC trade; 
(b) a significant negative trend in intra-EC trade balances in Belgium, Germany and 
Portugal and a positive trend in Denmark, Italy and Ireland; 
(c) Italy is the main beneficiary in terms of intra-EC trade; 
(d) an overall positive but deteriorating extra-EC trade balance which could be negative 
without Italy; 
(e) a substantial growth in extra-EC imports, with a particularly strong trend for Germany, 
Portugal and Ireland; 
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Table 14.19. Copier paper1 ('000 ECU in current prices) 
EUR-12 B/L D DK GR IRL NL UK 
INTRA­EC 
Trade balance 
1988 
1992 
Trend" 
Imports 
1988 
1992 
Trend" 
■ 
102,157 
209,124 
(16,855) 
(22,625) 
18,458 
25,625 
23,903 
(900) 
«·* 
21,072 
49,265 
immmi' 
(1,566) 
(3,399) 
1,574 
4,912 
P:P! 
(2,302) 
(19,473) 
■ . ­ . : ■ * * : ; : 
2,359 
20,478 
:i::ii*m 
2,769 
V«?,­??« 
11,969 
18,333 
(576) 
(2,766) 
575 
2,817 
(5,536) 
(24,501) 
6,647 
26,534 
(1,948) 
(2,823) 
2,043 
2,969 
16,618 
11,721 
9,660 
21,099 
1,630 
3,154 
226 
3,437 
mm: .·* 
(16,137) 
(7.665) 
2,757! 
33,654 
EXTRA­EC 
Trade balance 
1988 
1993 
Trend" 
Imports 
1988 
1993 
Trend" 
(247,857) 
(313,111) 
275,039 
364,251 
(22,866) 
(47,897) 
»** 
23,248 
48,876 
fffffti;! 
(98,675) 
(96,966) 
107,090 
120,919 
(6,924) 
(3,817) 
+ 
7,007 
4,010 
(4,021) 
(16,707) 
4,297 
17,379 
(12,537) 
(32,253) 
17,192 
45,280 
(1,319) 
(5,966) 
mmm:]:**:: 
1,319 
6,026 
'immBm 
(4,614) 
(22,770) 
8,255 
24,620 
(64) 
(530) 
64 
532 
(2,919) 
(15,061) 
:.mm:-9'*:: 
6,003 
20,307 
99 
(1,671) 
• 
63 
2,252 
'VíVVPV 
(94,017) 
(69,473) 
100,501 
74,050 
Notes: ' Paper and paperboard for writing, printing or other graphic purposes, in strips or rolls with a width of 
< 15 cm, in rectangular or square sheets, with no side measuring > 36 cm when unfolded, or cut into shapes 
other than rectangles or squares (CN 48235990). 
2 Positive trend: +(0.6 < r2 < 0.75), ++ (0.75 < r2 < 0.85), +++ (r2 > 0.85). 
Negative trend: * (0.6 < r2 < 0.75), ** (0.75 < r2 < 0.85), *** (r2 > 0.85). 
Source: Comext database (Eurostat, 1995). 
Table 14.19 shows the changes in trade flows of paper for writing and printing purposes. 
Paper is typically supplied to the public and private sectors in Member States by local 
wholesalers, which purchase them directly from manufacturers. 
Table 14.19 shows: 
(a) a substantial growth in intra­EC trade over the period 1988­92; 
(b) France is the major beneficiary and Germany, Denmark and Spain are the principal 
losers; 
(c) a significant change in the extra­EC trade balance, which was negative between 1988 
and 1993. 
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Table 14.20. Telephone handset1 ('000 ECU in current prices) 
EUR-12 B/L D DK E F GR . IRL NL Ρ UK 
INTRA-EC 
Trade balance 
1988 
1992 
Trend" 
Imports 
1988 
1992 
Trend" 
-
" 
71,581 
242,050 
(2,965) 
8.108 
11,936 
20,290 
+ 
22,788 
(8,563) 
mmm m 
4.900 
67,017 
:':'■ φ4 :;ί·: 
1,521 
5,703 
1,043 
5,766 
IIP;! 
(671) 
(579) 
2,025 
12,461 
(11,471) 
(5,696) 
14,135 
43,598 
+ 
(1.514) 
(7,244) 
'''■S*». 
1,523 
7,278 
+ 
(7,276) 
(13,547) 
10,068 
21,998 
++ 
(244) 
(7,736) 
:*:. 
2,557 
9,829 
+ 
(7,591) 
(10,945) 
14,560 
33,565 
+ 
(2,112) mmm 
V:.Pyy 
3.068 
12,496 
9,535 
33.Í83 
;: ;;;*++; 
5,764 
7,754 
EXTRA­EC 
Trade balance 
1988 
1993 
Trend" 
Imports 
1988 
1993 
Trend" 
(177,756) 
(476.017) 
:m.::m:***::: 
297,523 
691,315 
IIP 
(2,967) 
(49,176) 
: : : . : : ■ : ■ : : * . * * : : 
11,940 
52,254 
:v;;;;V;;;**äv: 
(11,907) 
(207,416) 
.V.;::.:;;:;..;.;;;***:;.. 
53,166 
275,418 
■*** 
13,215 
5,827 
2,830 
10,196 
2,063 
(711) 
** 
11,533 
9,700 
m::.**-: 
1,135 
(23,142) 
12,398 
51,149 
mrni-tm 
(11,506) 
(9,363) 
11,533 
9,700 
(35,592) 
(27,614) 
39,638 
49,201 
(1,927) 
(1,466) 
2,650 
3,184 
(17,816) 
(62i733) 
mm: ***:. 
21,096 
69,364 
..;.; +·**;;:" 
(1,586) 
(3,185) 
1,931 
4,765 
(110,868) 
(97,038) 
134,435 
140,135 
Notes: 
Source: 
1 Telephone handsets (CN 85171000). 
2 Positive trend: +(0.6 < r2 < 0.75), ++ (0.75 < r2 < 0.85), +++ (r2 > 0.85). 
Negative trend: * (0.6 < r2 < 0.75), ** (0.75 < r2 < 0.85), *** (r2 > 0.85). 
Comext database (Eurostat, 1995). 
Table 14.20 shows the changes in trade flows of telephone handsets. Telephone handsets are 
supplied to the public and private sectors by network operators and a wide range of 
intermediaries. 
Table 14.20 shows: 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
(d) 
a substantial increase in intra­EC trade; 
countries that have mostly benefited from the change at intra­EC level are: 
(i) the UK, Belgium­Luxembourg, Denmark and Portugal, with a positive and 
improving trade balance, 
(ii) France with a negative but improving trade balance; 
a strong negative trend in the overall extra­EC trade balance due to the substantial and 
consistent growth of imports; 
a strong rise in extra­EC imports and deteriorating trade balance for Belgium­
Luxembourg, Germany, France and the Netherlands. 
14.3. Import penetration 
14.3.1. Overview 
Public­sector import penetration is defined as: 
public ­ sector purchases of foreign origin 
total public sector purchases 
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Public-sector purchases of foreign origin equal the sum of direct and indirect imports by the 
public sector. A direct import is a purchase from a supplier from outside the purchaser's 
national territory. An indirect import is a purchase of foreign origin from a supplier operating 
inside the purchaser's national territory. 
This analysis provides estimates of total public-sector import penetration for 1994 segmented 
by: 
(a) nature of import (i.e. direct/indirect and intra-/extra-EU), 
(b) Member State, 
(c) supplying sector. 
In addition, a comparison has been made between these estimates and those for 1987 
contained in the Cecchini report (where available) to determine whether any changes have 
taken place since the implementation of the directives. 
Using the results of the supply-side survey, estimates of public-sector import penetration are 
provided in the form of a range with: 
(a) an upper limit, whereby the 'don't know' responses are disregarded under the 
assumption that respondents are truly unaware of the percentage of their sales to the 
public sector in other EU Member States, or the percentage of public-sector sales 
imported; 
(b) a lower limit, whereby 'don't know' responses are interpreted as no (0%) public-sector 
sales to other EU Member States or no (0%) imports under the assumption that if the 
company was exporting a measurable share, respondents, i.e. sales or commercial 
directors, would be aware of this and able to provide an estimate. 
14.3.2. Public-sector import penetration 
Supply-side survey results 
Based on the results of the supply-side survey (covering only the 'procurement sensitive' 
sectors), an estimated 3-4% of European public procurement was purchased directly from 
foreign suppliers in 1994. When indirect foreign purchases (via domestic suppliers) are 
included, 10-13% of public-sector purchases was estimated to be of foreign origin. 
The bulk of the direct public-sector imports in the 'procurement sensitive' areas came from 
suppliers in other EU Member States, representing an estimated 3-3.5% of public-sector 
purchases in 1994. Suppliers from third countries accounted for around 0.5% of public-sector 
purchases in 1994. 
Figure 14.1 summarizes the breakdown of the public-sector import penetration for purchases 
of a 'procurement sensitive' nature, based on the results of the supply-side survey. 
Trade analysis 243 
Figure 14.1. Public-sector import penetration for 'procurement sensitive' sectors/ 
products (supply-side survey results, 1994) 
direct EU 
direct non-EU 
indirect 
total 
Λ ! 
5 \ \ 
1 
■ Ì 
1 1 ; : 1 1 1 
¡■low j 
j D high t 
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Sources: Supply­side survey questions 26, 27 and 28. 
Member States' statistical reports, DG XV, 1995. 
Total upper and lower estimates 
It should be noted that the estimates in Figure 14.1 are solely based on an analysis of public­
sector purchases from suppliers in the 'procurement sensitive' sectors as opposed to all sectors 
supplying to the public sector and utilities. Despite the fact that these 'procurement sensitive' 
sectors account for a large share of total public procurement (63% in 1987), their import 
penetration estimates cannot be assumed to be representative of public­sector import 
penetration in the remaining supplying sectors, since the latter's goods and services are less 
tradable, or not tradable at all. 
For example, public­sector purchases from foreign suppliers will be negligible in the areas of: 
(a) electric power, 
(b) lodging and catering services, 
(c) recovery and repair services, 
(d) communication and transport services, etc. 
Notable exceptions include: 
(a) pharmaceuticals, 
(b) industrial equipment, including mining equipment. 
In total these two sectors represent an estimated 4­4.5% of public purchasing. 
Therefore, the levels of public­sector import penetration for the supplying sectors not covered 
in the survey are expected to be significantly lower than the estimates based on the results 
from the supply­side survey, but they cannot be assumed to be negligible, due to cross­border 
purchasing by the public sector in the areas of pharmaceuticals and industrial equipment. 
Figure 14.2 displays the results of a sensitivity analysis of public­sector import penetration in 
relation to share of total public procurement covered by the survey results, namely 63%, 
assuming that this subset of sectors is representative of: 
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(a) the total market ( 100%), 
(b) 90% of the total market, 
(c) 80% of the total market, 
(d) 70% of the total market. 
Figure 14.2. Public-sector import penetration by percentage of public purchasing to 
which the supply-side survey results apply (1994) 
100% survey 
+30% 
survey 
+20% 
survey 
+ 10% 
%PP to which survey results are applied 
Sources: Supply-side survey questions 26, 27 and 28. 
Member States' statistical reports, DG XV, 1995. 
Taking account of the sectors where no trade is considered feasible, an upper limit to the 
coverage has been assumed at survey +10% (73% of the total market). 
Using the results of the sensitivity analysis, Table 14.21 provides estimated ranges for total 
public-sector import penetration in 1994 broken down by type and origin. The actual level of 
imports into the public sector and utilities is likely to be closer to the lower limit. 
Table 14.21. Total public sector import penetration in 1994 
yType 
Direct 
Indirec 
Total 
Sources: 
I 
Origin 
Intra-EU 
Extra-EU 
Intra- and Extra-EU 
Intra- and Extra-EU 
100% of PP covered 
by survey results 
2.9-3.0% 
0.4-0.5% 
3.3-3.5% 
6.9-9.4% 
10.2-12.9% 
Supply-side survey questions 26, 27 and 28. 
Member States' statistical reports, DG XV, 1995. 
Survey+10%ofPP 
covered by survey 
results 
2.0-2.1% 
0.2-0.3% 
2.2-2.4% 
4.9-6.6% 
7.1-9.0% 
Total 
estimate 
2.0-3.0% 
0.2-0.5% 
2.2-3.5% 
4.9-9.4% 
7.1-12.9% 
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Based on the results presented in Table 14.21, an estimated 96-98% of total EU public-sector 
purchases in 1994 was procured from domestic suppliers. When indirect foreign purchases 
(via domestic suppliers such as subsidiaries, agents or importers) are included, an estimated 
87-93% of total European public-sector purchases was of domestic origin. 
Of the goods and services purchased directly from foreign suppliers (those in other Member 
States accounted for the majority), an estimated 2-3% of total European public-sector 
purchases in 1994. Third country suppliers accounted for less than an estimated 0.5%. 
It was not possible to use the supply-side survey results to make reliable estimates of the 
geographic breakdown of indirect foreign purchases. 
Examples of difficulties in estimating the value of imports as a share of total public-sector 
sales can be found in the following sectors: 
(a) uniforms, where design is carried out domestically, fabrics and textiles are bought from 
an importer in another EU Member State, and the actual goods are produced outside 
Europe (mainly North Africa); 
(b) office machinery and motor vehicles, where the actual product is partially or completely 
assembled domestically, but the individual components are imported from around the 
globe. 
14.3.3. Public-sector import penetration by sector 
Upper and lower estimates 
Figure 14.3 shows the importance of non-domestic suppliers to the public sector and utilities 
segmented by supplying sector. 
Figure 14.3. Estimated public-sector import penetration by supplying sector (1994) 
45% ., 
40% 
35% 
□ high 
glow 
Kit 
315 316 33 341/2 344 351 362 37 453 471/2 502 83 EUR-15 
Sources: Supply-side survey questions 26, 27 and 28. 
Member States' statistical reports, DG XV, 1995. 
The level of public-sector import penetration varies significantly between the supplying 
sectors surveyed. Estimates range from 34-41% for medical equipment purchases to 6-7% for 
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business services. This compares with an estimated average of 7-13% for all EU public-sector 
purchases. 
In general, public-sector purchases which are complex and have a higher technology content 
have a high level of cross-border trade: 
(a) medical equipment (34-41 %); 
(b) office machinery (26-33%); 
(c) railway rolling stock (29-32%). 
Other sectors supplying to the public sector and utilities with a high level of import 
penetration are motor vehicles (20-23%) and power equipment (17-20%). 
Direct versus indirect import penetration 
Figure 14.4 provides a breakdown between direct and indirect public-sector import 
penetration. 
Figure 14.4. Direct and indirect public-sector import penetration by supplying sector 
(1994) 
315 316 33 341/2 344 351 362 37 453 471/2 502 83 EUR-15 
Note: Figures are based on the mean of the upper and lower estimates. 
Sources: Supply-side survey questions 26, 27 and 28. 
Member States' statistical reports, DG XV, 1995. 
The majority of public-sector purchases of foreign origin is imported indirectly (via domestic 
suppliers). Supplying sectors with high levels of indirect imports are: 
(a) paper and stationery; 
(b) office machinery; 
(c) medical equipment; 
(d) motor vehicles; 
(e) uniforms. 
Construction shows a relatively high proportion of public-sector sales being imported directly. 
This is mainly due to subcontracting activities abroad being classified as sales to the public 
sector in another EU Member State. 
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Third country participation 
The extent to which third country suppliers in the different sectors surveyed are participating 
in direct public-sector purchases from foreign suppliers is shown in Figure 14.5. 
Figure 14.5 Geographic breakdown of total direct public-sector import penetration by 
supplying sector (1994) 
12% ι 
10% 
6% 
4% 
2% 
0% 
■ direct extra-EU ι Π direct EU 
315 316 33 341/2 344 351 362 37 453 471/2 502 83 EUR-15 
Note: Figures are based on the mean of the upper and lower estimates. 
Sources: Supply-side survey questions 26, 27 and 28. 
Member States' statistical reports, DG XV, 1995. 
Direct imports from third countries are minimal in the 'procurement sensitive' sectors. 
Supplying sectors where third country suppliers have a measurable impact on the total of 
public-sector sales from foreign suppliers are: 
(a) boilers and vessels, mainly nuclear technology; 
(b) power generating equipment; 
(c) telecommunications equipment; 
(d) medical equipment. 
This does not imply that EU public-sector markets are entirely closed to third country 
suppliers. It is more indicative of (an implicit) public-sector requirement for a domestic 
presence in some shape or form (see case studies). In consequence, third country suppliers 
mainly benefit through indirect public-sector imports. 
14.3.4. Public-sector import penetration by Member State 
Under the assumption that the relation between direct and indirect public-sector imports 
estimated for the EU as a whole is applicable to individual Member States, a broad estimate 
for total public-sector import penetration by Member State was made by using this relationship 
and the indirect public-sector import estimates from the supply-side survey. 
The estimates of public-sector import penetration are shown in Figure 14.6. 
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Figure 14.6. Estimated public-sector import penetration by Member State (1994) 
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Sources: Supply­side survey questions 26, 27 and 28. 
Member States' statistical reports, DG XV, 1995. 
In general, purchases of foreign origin appeared to account for a lower share of total public­
sector procurement in the larger Member States compared to the smaller Member States. The 
higher levels of import penetration in the smaller Member States reflect the more limited 
scope of the domestic industry, particularly where strategic purchases are concerned. 
14.3.5. Public sector ­ national import penetration 
The levels of public­sector import penetration compared to those of the national economies as 
a whole are shown in Figure 14.7. 
Figure 14.7. Public-sector import penetration compared to national import penetration 
■ national imp. pen. 
Π public sector imp. pen. 
B/L DK D GR IRL NL PT UK 
Note: National import penetration is calculated as total imports over apparent consumption. 
Sources: Supply­side survey. 
EuroStrategy Consultants estimates. 
Eurostat. 
Trade analysis 249 
The analysis in Figure 14.7 demonstrates that the levels of public-sector import penetration for 
most Member States are significantly lower than their national counterparts. From this it may 
inferred that the private sector has a substantially higher share of total purchases originating 
from non-domestic suppliers than the public sector. 
Excluding the smaller Member States, the 'public:national' sector import penetration ratios 
vary significantly: 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
(d) 
(e) 
0.29 in Germany, 
0.39 in Spain, 
0.42 in Italy, 
0.55 in the UK, 
0.67 in France. 
14.3.6. Change in public-sector import penetration 
An important aspect of measuring the effectiveness of the public procurement legislation is to 
analyse the nature and structure of any changes in levels of imports into the public sector since 
the directives came into force. 
Figure 14.8 shows, for the larger Member States and Belgium, the estimated changes between 
1987 and 1994 in total imports into the public sector. 
Figure 14.8. Estimated change in public-sector import penetration for selected 
countries between 1987 and 1994 
Belgium France Germany Italy UK EUR-15 
Note: Estimates for 1994 are based on the average of the upper and lower limits. 
Sources: Cost of non-Europe in public sector procurement, Tables 1.6.2.9 and II, p. 175 [European Commission, 1988]. 
Table 4.7. 
The analysis in Figure 14.8 demonstrates that overall import penetration levels into the public 
sector have increased from 6% in 1987 to an estimated 10% in 1994. The larger Member 
States showed significant increases, with the exception of Germany: 
(a) an increase from 4% to 12% in the UK, 
(b) an increase from 1% to 6% in Italy, 
(c) an increase from 5% to 12% in France. 
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The small increase in Germany might be partly explained by the fact that in 1987 public-sector 
purchases from and via East Germany were classified as imports, whereas since unification 
these purchases are classified as purchases of domestic origin. 
Also in Belgium, which is considered to be representative of the smaller EU Member States, 
import penetration into the public sector increased significantly, from 12% in 1987 to around 
20% in 1994. 
Not only do absolute changes in import penetration rates provide an insight into changing 
purchasing practices of the European public sector and utilities, but the changes in structure of 
import penetration also provide valuable information on whether European or third country 
suppliers are participating equally in the changes and in what form: direct or indirect via 
subsidiaries. 
Figure 14.9 provides a broad analysis of the changes in structure of public-sector import 
penetration. 
Figure 14.9. Change in public-sector import penetration breakdown between 1987 and 
1994 
1987 1994 
direct EU direct non-
9.8% EU 
12.1% 
indirect 
78.2% 
direct EU 
25.0% 
indirect 
71.5% 
EU public-sector import penetration 6 % EU public-sector import penetration 10% 
Sources: Cost of non-Europe in public sector procurement, Tables 1.6.2.9 and II, p. 175 [European Commission, 1988], 
Table 4.7 
The analysis in Figure 14.9 of the change in public-sector import penetration structure 
demonstrates that: 
(a) direct imports in 1994 accounted for a larger share of total purchases of foreign origin 
than in 1987; 
(b) the increase in direct imports is entirely accounted for by intra-EU trade; 
(c) the importance of direct public-sector imports from third countries has decreased. 
The decrease in direct extra-EU import penetration reflects the change in supply-side structure 
and, in particular, that of third country participation via subsidiaries and sales offices 
established in the EU. This is supported by the supply-side survey results, where extra-EU 
subsidiaries reported a higher average indirect import penetration rate than domestic and other 
EU companies. 
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15. Price disparities 
15.1. Overview 
15.1.1. Ex ante hypothesis 
In 1987, the EU public procurement markets were characterized by: 
(a) large price differences between and within Member States for similarly specified 
products; 
(b) being closed to new suppliers from other Member States and generally. 
It was assumed that the opening up of public procurement to pan-European competition would 
lead to price convergence in tradable sectors. 
15.1.2. Coverage 
The price analysis focused primarily on the shopping list of selected: 
(a) 'procurement sensitive' sectors, which combined account for over 60% of total 
procurement; 
(b) indicator products within these sectors, which, in 1987 and 1990, demonstrated 
significant price differences. 
Additionally, the indicator products were considered in terms of their technology content as: 
(a) low-tech products, such as office furniture, copier paper, uniforms and telephone 
handsets; 
(b) high-tech products, which include strategic products bought primarily by the public 
sector, such as transformers, power cables and railway rolling stock. 
This segmentation was introduced to take account of differences in distribution channels, and 
thus, in pricing, with: 
(a) low-tech products often being purchased via intermediaries, such as local 
wholesalers/distributors, value-added resellers, importers, etc.; 
(b) high-tech products being purchased either directly from a manufacturer or as part of a 
large system. 
The overall aim of the price analysis was to ascertain: 
(a) whether price differences still existed in 1994 for the same or similar procurements 
between Member States of the European Union; 
(b) whether there has been a degree of price convergence since 1987, taking into account the 
impacts of: 
(i) differential inflation, 
(ii) exchange rate movements. 
252 Public procurement 
15.1.3. Data 
Considerable difficulties were encountered in obtaining reliable price data, since this 
information is, understandably, highly sensitive. As a result, it was necessary to obtain price 
data from a range of sources: 
(a) the report The cost of non-Europe in public sector procurement (European Commission, 
1988); 
(b) the report Implications of opening up public procurement in Greece, Italy, Portugal and 
Spain (European Commission, 1990); 
(c) Eurostat; 
(d) price data created by DRI for a study undertaken for the European Commission on price 
convergence (European Commission, 1997). 
Despite the limited availability of price data, comparisons of prices between Member States 
and over time (1987-94) are considered reliable indicators of price differences for the same or 
similar products within the EU, since: 
(a) data sources are not significantly different, due to: 
(i) all data referring to prices paid by purchasers, 
(ii) the Cecchini study (European Commission, 1988) and DRI figures all being based 
on Eurostat data; 
(b) any changes in product over time, which happen universally or only in one country, are 
irrelevant. What matters is purchaser behaviour. For example, in a case study interview 
it emerged that one utility in one Member State had purchased a technologically 
advanced product in another Member State at a third of the domestic price. Despite this, 
all other utilities in the first Member State continued to buy the outdated technology, 
domestically at the higher price; 
(c) there is a value in showing price data for the individual years to identify the level and 
nature of price disparities between Member States. 
Cost of non-Europe 
Data were available for most target procurements from the report The cost of non-Europe in 
public sector procurement, with the exception of PCs and network servers, which were not 
widely purchased in 1986, and which were included in the 1995/96 survey to reflect changes 
in technology. 
Excluded sectors 
Data from the report Implications of opening up public procurement in Greece, Italy, Portugal 
and Spain were limited to strategic purchases bought by utilities and to the four Member 
States studied. 
Eurostat 
Eurostat, which obtains comprehensive price data from all Member States, was unable to 
provide us with the raw price information at a product level for confidentiality reasons. 
However, it was able to provide us with a range of indices for many of the target products for 
1994, having, as requested, calculated the indices using the products' current prices for 1994, 
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converted to a common ECU base at current exchange rates. It was unable to provide us with 
similar data for 1990. 
DRI 
The DRI study for the Commission, Price competition and price convergence (European 
Commission, 1997), provided information on prices for products primarily bought by the 
private sector, and which are of a comparable nature to those bought by the public sector, i.e. 
the equipment goods. 
Since the price information was inclusive of taxes, an adjustment was made by removing 
value-added tax (VAT) under the assumption that equipment goods are subject to the standard 
rate of VAT in all Member States. 
15.1.4. Key findings 
Overall, there is no conclusive evidence of price convergence between Member States for 
products bought by the public sector. There are some exceptions for certain products where a 
degree of price convergence has occurred between 1987 and 1994, such as cardiac monitors, 
buses and office machinery, which are generally purchased direct from the manufacturer. 
Since no clear price convergence has been identified, it can be assumed that the competition 
effect predicted by the Cecchini report in relation to the opening of public procurement has not 
yet materialized. Therefore, any price changes observed within a Member State can only be 
attributed to factors other than the single market in public procurement. 
Despite the continued existence of price differences in 1994, the relative position of Member 
States in terms of absolute prices has changed between 1987 and 1994 for certain products, 
which can be partly explained by: 
(a) exchange rate movements; 
(b) differences in inflation rates. 
Regarding price disparities for comparable products bought primarily by the private sector, no 
clear price convergence was observed between 1985 and 1993, except for transport equipment, 
such as motor vehicles, bikes, ships, and aircraft. 
15.2. Member State disparities 
15.2.1. Disparities in 1987 and 1990 
Tables 15.1 and 15.2 show the level of price disparities in 1987 and 1990 for products bought 
by the public sector split by: 
(a) low-tech products; 
(b) high-tech products. 
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Table 15.1. Price indices in 1987 (100 = lowest price) 
Product 
Low-tech products 
Fixed armchair 
Filing cabinet 
Shelf 
School desk 
Office desk 
Typewriter 
Uniform 
Copier paper 
Telephone handset 
High-tech products 
Power cable 
Transformer 
Cardiac monitor 
X­ray machine 
Average of car 
Vanb6 
Vanb7 
Busd8 
Busdl4 
Goods wagon 
Belgium 
118 
126 
227 
201 
197 
101 
259 
115 
207 
150 
100 
108 
133 
100 
100 
100 
­
100 
121 
France 
133 
154 
165 
187 
211 
117 
158 
142 
300 
105 
117 
114 
155 
109 
102 
134 
113 
151 
100 
Germany 
162 
132 
163 
283 
256 
100 
100 
153 
355 
101 
117 
119 
153 
103 
119 
111 
101 
110 
136 
Italy 
100 
183 
110 
126 
100 
p y p . j 4 6 . ■mm 
186 
100 
183 
105 
102 
118 
217 
116 
122 
122 
129 
­
112 
UK 
141 
100 
100 
100 
174 
144 
124 
118 
100 
100 
V v. 154 
100 
100 
119 
■■.,■■: :iilmm 
122 
100 
133 
117 
Source: Cost of non-Europe inpublic sector procurement, Tables II.3.1 and II.3.2 (European Commission, 1988). 
Table 15.2. Price indices in 1990 (100 = lowest price) 
Product 
Low-tech products 
Telephone handset 
High-tech products 
Transformer 1000 kVA 
Transformer 100 kVA 
Generating set 
Steam boiler 0.6 M Kc/h 
Steam boiler 30 M Kc/h 
Water pump 
Goods wagon 
Railway rail 50 or 60 kg/m 
Citybus 
Bus chassis MAN 16330 
Telephone cables 
Power cables 
Pipes 
Average of car 
Average of office machinery 
D 
270 
118 
140 
­
100 
­
179 
­
100 
206 
118 
221 
139 
100 
101 
107 
E 
244 
100 
100 
110 
­
100 
103 
205 
104 
­
100 
166 
139 
108 
ÌÌVVV«:;: 
F 
241 
156 
122 
100 
16Ï 
129 
235 
100 
101 
249 
­
211 
135 
106 
103 
127 
GR 
170 
f''"'t8pP 
213 
­
139 
­
176 
109 
113 
­
115 
100 
100 
­
124 
113 
I 
241 
­
134 
­
­
159 
100 
177 
112 
328 
110 
­
­
103 
135 
Ρ 
233 
147 
144 
152 
104 
­
120 
166 
131 : 
100 
130 
­
­
153 
101 
100 
UK 
100 
129 
194 
­
­
­
­
145 
105 
213 
­
­
­
100 
113 
Note: 1990 price indices from DRI study. 
Source: Opening up public procurement in the excluded sectors, Annex 1.1 (European Commission, 1992). 
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On the basis of Tables 15.1 and 15.2, price disparities between Member States were extensive 
in 1987 and 1990, with the greatest disparities for: 
(a) low­tech products, telephone handsets being up to 350% more expensive in Germany 
than in the UK in 1987; 
(b) high­tech products, X­ray machines being up to 200% more expensive in Italy than in 
the UK. 
In addition, there seems to be no consistent relationship in certain Member States being 
cheaper in one product area and more expensive in others. 
Since these products are highly tradable, the price disparities demonstrated the significant 
potential price savings in 1987 and 1990 by purchasing from other Member States, even when 
allowing for extra transport costs. 
15.2.2. Price convergence 
Table 15.3. Price indices in 1994 (100 = lowest price) 
Low-tech 
Swivel chair 
Filing cabinet 
Shelf 
Office desk 
Typewriter 
Copier paper 
High-tech 
Transformer 
Cardiac monitor 
Dental X­ray machine 
Goods wagon 
Bus 
Van 
Lorry 
Average of car 
Avg. of office mach. 
B 
198 
117 
123 
­
­
144 
i 72 
­
116 
­
104 
102 
122 
100 
101 
D 
306 
lull! 
149 
Hü 
148 
122 
­
125 
258 
­
140 
128 
153 
133 
109 
DK 
214 
154 
127 
103 
154 
175 
119 
­
147 
­
200 
127 
114 
109 
112 
E 
108 
112 
lili 
164 
­
­
­
127 
156 
107 
100 
111 
134 
125 
115 
F 
273 
177 
­
150 
fil;: 
171 
151 
129 
208 
100 
­
120 
168 
135 
110 
GR 
100 
­
­
­
­
­
100 
147 
­
­
.­
139 
127 
138: 
121 
I 
130 
123 
112 
100 
124 
100 
­
123 
150 
135 
135 
100 
,f;ï;55f: 
119 
103 
IRL 
159 
101 
116 
125 
120 
104 
133 
130 
161 
145 
119 
111 
100 
110 
102 
NL 
265 
­
­
195 
­
135 
129 
118 
­
­
145 
119 
140 
128 
140 
Ρ 
­
­
117 
­
129 
134 
163 
151 
100 
228 
­
127 
113 
136 
136 
UK 
­
136 
100 
176 
123 
169 
109 
126 
195 
141 
130 
118 
118 
117 
100 
A 
­
100 
124 
125 
100 
119 
152 
­
306 
216 
143 
­
148 
­
­
S 
154 
146 
148 
­
127 
100 
104 
110 
132 
126 
132 
119 
126 
­
­
FIN 
206 
­
­
­
125 
174 
104 
100 
­
­
170 
mmm 
135 
­
­
Note: 1994 price indices from DRI study. 
Source: Eurostat, 1995. 
Regarding the prices for 1994, Table 15.3 shows that compared to the price disparities in 1987 
and 1990: 
(a) there are still significant price differences between Member States for products bought 
by the public sector; 
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(b) the relative position of Member States in terms of absolute prices has changed for 
certain products. 
Both low-tech and high-tech products still show large price differences 
between Member States, with the greatest disparities for: 
up to 300% -
(a) low-tech products, swivel chairs being 300% more expensive in Germany than in 
Greece, and office desks being over 240% more expensive in Germany than in Italy; 
(b) high-tech products, X-ray machines being over 300% more expensive in Austria than in 
Portugal, and goods wagons still being over 220% more expensive in Portugal than in 
France. 
Despite the continued existence of significant price differences between Member States, a 
degree of price convergence might still have occurred as a result of increased competition 
between certain Member States. Table 15.4 identifies the level of price convergence by 
showing changes in the coefficient of variation, where possible, between: 
(a) 1987 and 1994 for Belgium, France, Germany, Italy and the UK - five Member States; 
(b) 1990 and 1994 for France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain and the UK - seven 
Member States. 
Table 15.4. Price convergence 
Low-tech 
Filing cabinet 
Shelf 
Office desk 
Typewriter 
Copier paper 
High-tech 
Transformer 
Cardiac monitor 
X-ray machine 
Goods wagon 
Bus 
Van 
Average of car 
Avg. of office mach.2 
Coefficient of 
variation' 1987 
(5 Member States) 
0.23 
0.33 
0.31 
0.18 
0.17 
0.18 
0.07 
0.28 
0.11 
0.12 
0.10 
0.07 
-
Coefficient of 
variation' 1994 
(5 Member States) 
0.23 
0.17 
0.36 
0.18 
0.22 
0.22 
0.02 
0.30 
0.18 
0.13 
0.11 
0.12 
-
Coefficient of 
variation' 1990 
(7 Member States) 
-
-
-
-
-
0.22 
-
-
0.27 
0.38 
-
0.08 
0.14 
Coefficient of 
variation' 1994 
(7 Member States) 
-
-
-
-
-
0.24 
-
-
0.36 
0.14 
-
0.07 
0.11 
Notes: ' Coefficient of variation is defined as standard deviation divided by the mean. 
2 1993 price indices from DRI study. 
Source: Tables 15.1, 15.2 and 15.3. 
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For the low-tech products, Table 15.4 shows that except for shelves no price convergence has 
occurred. Excluding shelves, overall price disparities for low-tech products have remained the 
same or even increased in some cases. 
In terms of high-tech products, some price convergence has occurred since 1990 for cardiac 
monitors, buses and office machinery. Price disparities have increased for transformers, X-ray 
machines and goods wagons. 
Compared to the high-tech products, price disparities for low-tech products appear to be 
higher on average, both in 1987 and 1994, which might be explained by the fact that low-tech 
products are in the main supplied to the public sector via wholesalers and distributors which 
have pricing policies largely uninfluenced by international trade. 
In general, no conclusive evidence exists for a measurable degree of price convergence 
between Member States for products bought by the public sector. There are some exceptions, 
pertaining to high-tech products. 
15.2.3. Exchange rates and inflation 
Table 15.5. Impact of exchange rates and inflation on price disparities 
Member State 
Belgium 
Denmark 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
Spain 
United Kingdom 
Austria 
Finland 
Sweden 
Change in exchange rate 
against ECU (1987-94) 
(%) 
8.5 
4.5 
5.2 
7.6 
-34.6 
-2.3 
-21.9 
8.5 
8.1 
-17.4 
-10.5 . 
-9.1 
26.9 
-5.8 
-6.3 
Compounded annual inflation 
(1988-94) 
(%) 
20 
21 
21 
24 
173 
21 
44 
23 
18 
89 
47 
42 
24 
32 
49 
Source: Eurostat, 1995. 
Table 15.5 shows the variation in exchange rates and inflation rates between 1987 and 1994, 
and therefore in theory, should have had a considerable impact on price competitiveness in the 
individual Member States, with: 
(a) Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain and the UK showing large decreases in ECU exchange 
rates and relatively high inflation rates; 
(b) the Benelux countries, Germany and, to a lesser extent, France showing increases in 
ECU exchange rates and relatively low inflation rates. 
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The impact of these factors on the competitive position of Member States is demonstrated in 
the relative price changes for certain products, with: 
(a) transformers having changed from being the cheapest in Belgium and the most 
expensive in the UK in 1987 and Greece in 1990, to being the most expensive in 
Belgium in 1994 and the cheapest in the UK and Greece; 
(b) the relative price of filing cabinets having increased substantially in Germany and come 
down in Italy and the UK between 1987 and 1994. 
However, the changes in exchange rates and inflation rates are not conclusive in explaining 
changes in price levels between Member States. For example, France remained the cheapest 
producer of goods wagons, with total price disparities increasing as shown by the coefficient 
of variation. Other factors affecting relative price levels are: 
(a) recessionary pressures, 
(b) unemployment, 
(c) increases in productivity, 
(d) global developments in technology. 
15.3. Public- and private-sector disparities 
Price disparities for products primarily bought by the private sector were significant in 1993, 
as shown by the high coefficients of variation for a range of equipment goods (Table 15.6). 
Table 15.6. Coefficients of variation1 for selected equipment goods for EUR-12 
Equipment goods 
Structural metal products 
Products of boilermaking 
Tools and finished metal articles 
Agricultural machinery and tractors 
Machine tools for metal working 
Machinery equipment for mining, building and civil 
engineering 
Textile machinery 
Machinery for food, chemicals, rubber, packaging 
Machinery for working wood, paper 
Other machinery and mechanical equipment 
Office and data processing machines 
Precision instruments 
Optical instruments, photographic material 
Electrical equipment including lighting 
Telecommunications equipment, meters 
Electronic equipment, radios and televisions 
Motor vehicles and engines 
Ships 
Trains, railway equipment 
Aircraft, helicopters, aeronautical equipment 
Other transport equipment (bicycles, motorcycles, etc.) 
1980 
0.16 
0.25 
0.20 
0.21 
0.20 
0.14 
0.19 
0.12 
0.18 
0.12 
0.12 
0.18 
0.18 
0.18 
0.18 
0.24 
0.21 
0.29 
0.36 
0.23 
0.22 
1985 
0.09 
0.20 
0.14 
0.11 
0.15 
0.10 
0.21 
0.17 
0.12 
0.09 
0.11 
0.15 
0.15 
0.07 
0.14 
0.15 
0.20 
0.22 
0.34 
0.23 
0.21 
1990 
0.13 
0.12 
0.24 
0.08 
0.18 
0.10 
0.12 
0.12 
0.16 
0.12 
0.11 
0.17 
0.17 
0.16 
0.21 
0.17 
0.09 
0.19 
0.23 
0.19 
0.18 
1993 
0.18 
0.30 
0.29 
0.13 
0.51 
0.20 
0.17 
0.16 
0.38 
0.19 
0.12 
0.20 
0.20 
0.16 
0.14 
0.16 
0.10 
0.09 
0.12 
0.09 
0.08 
1 Coefficient of variation is defined as standard deviation divided by the mean. 
Sources: Price competition and price convergence (European Commission, 1997). 
EuroStrategy Consultants adjustments to exclude VAT. 
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Overall, the DRI study concluded that: 
(a) there had been a general trend towards price convergence in the EUR-12 over the period 
1980-93 and this trend was more pronounced for equipment goods than for energy, 
services and construction, the former more likely to reflect high levels of trade and, in 
particular, openness to competition from other EU producers; 
(b) the tendency for prices to converge has been comparatively greater in the three newer 
Member States (Greece, Portugal and Spain) than in the EUR-9, suggesting a 'catch-up' 
effect of integration. 
This is also shown in Table 15.6, where the majority of products showed a degree of price 
convergence between 1980 and 1993. However, when excluding 1980 to allow for a 
comparison with the public sector, no clear price convergence has occurred between 1985 and 
1993 for the majority of the equipment goods, with the exception of transport equipment. 
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16. Supply-side structure 
16.1. Overview 
16.1.1. Ex ante hypothesis 
The introduction of competition into previously closed markets was expected to result in price 
reductions and improved efficiency in both 'commodity' and strategic areas. 
Additionally, restructuring was expected in certain strategic industries along pan-European 
lines via joint ventures, mergers and acquisitions, and alliances to create global players 
capable of benefiting from the single European market and competing with the US and 
Japanese giants. 
16.1.2. Coverage 
This section analyses the change in supply-side structure of the 'procurement sensitive' sectors 
over the period 1987-94 in terms of changes in: 
(a) output, as measured by production volumes; 
(b) employment; 
(c) industry specialization, as defined by the Balassa index; 
(d) supplier concentration, covering: 
(i) the degree of concentration within the industry, 
(ii) merger and acquisition activity. 
The Balassa index is indicative of the importance of an industry in a Member State's economy 
in relation to the other EU countries. The index is defined as: 
SI = l o i J 
'ßic-j^ 
ßc - j W 
where 
ßy = output of product / of country j , 
Q) = total output of country ƒ 
ßic-j = output of product /' in the EU minus output of product /' of country j , 
ßc_j = total output in the EU minus total output of country/ 
and 
0 < SI < 1 low degree of specialization, 
1 <SI<2 some degree of specialization, 
SI > 2 high degree of specialization. 
This analysis was carried out at the lowest level of aggregation for which sufficient and 
reliable statistics were available. For the majority of sectors, this was at a NACE three-digit 
level. 
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16.1.3. Data 
The sources used for the collection of data on production, employment and industry 
specialization are: 
(a) Eurostat 1994-95, 
(b) DEBA, industry and database estimates, 1994-95, 
(c) Basic statistics of the Community, Eurostat 1993, 1995, 
(d) industry publications. 
The main data sources used for supplier concentration were: 
(a) Panorama of EU industry 1995/96, 
(b) industry publications, 
(c) company accounts. 
Where possible, the analysis covered the 1987-94 period. 
16.1.4. Key findings 
In all industries, there has been a significant reduction in employment. 
In the 'commodity' areas, there has been a redistribution of market shares between Member 
States, resulting in changes in specialization. 
For strategic industries, significant restructuring resulted in increased supplier concentration 
and the creation of global players in the telecommunications, railway rolling stock and power 
generation sectors. 
16.2. Telecommunications equipment 
16.2.1. Size 
The telecommunications equipment industry in Europe has undergone a period of significant 
rationalization, with total output and employment decreasing. The UK, Denmark and Spain 
accounted for the bulk of this decrease. Germany and Belgium were the only Member States 
with a positive trend in volume output. 
France and Germany are still the largest producers of telecommunications equipment and 
accounted for over half of EU output in 1994. 
16.2.3. Supplier concentration 
The European telecommunications equipment industry is characterized by a high degree of 
supplier concentration, reflecting the restructuring of the supply side since 1987, principally by 
mergers and acquisitions. Today, the market for telecommunications equipment is dominated 
by three global players: 
(a) Alcatel, whose communications division's 1994 sales amounted to ECU 10.2 billion; 
(b) Ericsson, whose 1994 sales turnover was ECU 5.7 billion; 
(c) Siemens, whose 1994 telecommunications turnover was ECU 10.2 billion. 
Supply-side structure 263 
For these companies, 40-60% of sales were accounted for by the public sector. 
Table 16.1. Telecommunications equipment 
Production 
(ECU bn 1993 prices) 
1988 
1994 
% CAGR 88-94 
Trend1 
Balassa index 
1988 
1993 
Employment2 
('OOOs) 
1988 
1994 
Β 
792 
851 
1.2 
111 
1.67 
-
D 
5,601 
6,511 
2.5 
1.03 
1.12 
447 
387 
DK 
112 
95 
(2.4) 
** 
0.24 
0.27 
-
E 
1,761 
1,087 
(7.7) 
1.17 
0.98 
28 
18 
F 
4,147 
4.003 
(0.6) 
1.00 
1.08 
90 
81 
I 
3,061 
3,018 
(0.2) 
0.91 
0.95 
51 
59 
IRL 
242 
188 
(4.1) 
** 
1.92 
1.40 
6 
6 
NL 
786 
787 
0.0 
0.80 
1.06 
-
UK 
2,818 
1,372 
(113) 
+ * * 
0.85 
0.52 
207 
156 
A 
357 
359 
(5.3) 
*** 
0.61 
0.64 
-
S 
1,508 
1,091 
(2.0) 
2.32 
2.09 
-
FIN 
288 
255 
(0.3) 
0.89 
1.04 
-
Total 
21,473 
19.616 
(1.5) 
-
912 
772 
Notes: 
Sources: 
1 Positive trend: +(0.6 <r< 0.75), ++ (0.75 < r < 0.85), +++ (r2 > 0.85). 
Negative trend: * (0.6 < r < 0.75), ** (0.75 < r < 0.85). ***(r> 0.85). 
2 Figures refer to NACE 344 (Telecommunication, electrical and measuring, electro-medical equipment). 
VISA database, Eurostat 1995. 
Profile of the world-wide telecommunications Industry, Elsevier Advanced Technology, 1995. 
DEBA, industry and database estimates. 
Company accounts, 1994/95. 
Basic statistics of the Community, 1989, 1993, 1995, Eurostat. 
16.2.3. Specialization 
The trend in merger and acquisitions since 1987 has resulted in a redistribution of 
telecommunications equipment production within the EU to the extent that most Member 
States exhibited around average specialization, with the exception of Sweden, which had a 
relatively high degree of specialization with a Balassa index of 2.09 in 1993. 
The reduction in the degree of specialization in Sweden simply reflects Ericsson's policy of 
shifting production to key centres in EU. 
16.3. Railway rolling stock 
16.3.1. Size 
The EU railway rolling stock industry has grown substantially in the period 1987-94, at a rate 
of 6.6% per annum, suggesting an increase in competitiveness. A successful rationalization 
process appears to be underlying this growth, as indicated by the substantial reductions in 
employment in the UK, Italy and, to a lesser extent, Spain. 
The French industry in particular, followed by that of Germany, has experienced significant 
growth compared to the rest of the EU. 
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16.3.2. Supplier concentration 
The industry rationalization is also demonstrated by the significant increase in supplier 
concentration. Since 1987, when over 15 major producers existed in Europe, only three main 
players have emerged, focusing on providing total transportation systems: 
(a) Adtranz, the most recent alliance between ABB and AEG in Germany; 
(b) GEC-Alsthom, a joint-venture between GEC in the UK and Alcatel in France; 
(c) Siemens in Germany. 
Table 16.2. Railway rolling stock (NACE 362) 
Production 
(ECU m 1990 prices) 
1987 
1994 
% CAGR 87-94 
Trend' 
Balassa index 
1987 
1993 
Employment 
('OOOs) 
1987 
1994 
D 
677 
1,093 
7.0 
++ 
0.55 
0.67 
10.4 
12.2 
E 
525 
780 
5.8 
+ 
1.73 
2.08 
11.3 
10.6 
F 
848 
2.453 
16.4 
++ 
0.92 
2.17 
10.2 
16.7 
GR 
26 
34 
3.9 
0.52 
0.40 
2.6 
1.9 
1 
1,181 
1,148 
(0.4) 
1.75 
0.35 
15.3 
10.7 
UK 
1,198 
1,426 
2.5 
1.59 
1.49 
19.6 
13.9 
DK/B/P 
109 
188 
9.2 
++ 
-
-
2.1 
2.2 
EUR-12 
4,565 
7,138 
6.6 
++ 
-
-
71.5 
68.3 
Notes: 
Sources: 
1 Positive trend: +(0.6 < r2 < 0.75), ++ ( 0.75 < r < 0.85), +++ (r2 > 0.85). 
Negative trend: * (0.6 <r< 0.75), ** ( 0.75 < r< 0.85), *** {? > 0.85). 
VISA database, Eurostat 1995. 
DEBA, industry and database estimates. 
Company accounts, 1994/95. 
Basic statistics of the Community, 1989, 1993, 1995, Eurostat. 
Of particular note is the joint venture between GEC and Alsthom, and the mergers and 
alliances of ABB, both of which occurred as a competitive response to the opportunities 
created by the single European market, and, in particular, the single market in public 
procurement. 
In addition to these leading suppliers, there are a number of national players whose future 
market position has yet to be decided. As most recent major projects have been awarded to 
consortia, their future success appears to lie in strategic alliances, such as Ansaldo's 
collaborative agreement with Breda Ferroviaria and Siemens. 
16.4. Power generation and distribution equipment 
16.4.1. Size 
In terms of volume output, the power generation and distribution equipment industry in 
Europe has grown significantly in the period 1987-94, at a rate of nearly 3% per annum. The 
German industry remained the largest by far, accounting for over 40% of total European 
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volume output in 1994. As suggested by the large decrease in employment, the output 
increases were accompanied by industry restructuring. 
Table 16.3. Power generation and distribution equipment1 
Production 
(ECU mn 1990 prices) 
1987 
1994 
% CAGR 87-94 
Trend2 
Balassa index 
1987 
1993 
Employment 
('OOOs) 
1987 
1994 
Β 
1,719 
1,684 
(0.7) 
0.63 
0.63 
16J 
144 
D 
29,460 
36,740 
3.2 
+++ 
2.01 
1.89 
392 
342 
DK 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
E 
3,457 
4,495 
3.8 
++ 
0.58 
0.53 
47 
37 
Γ 
14,365 
16,037 
1.6 
0.96 
1.01 
170 
143 
GR 
380 
395 
0.5 
0.39 
0.38 
5 
4 
I 
10,216 
12,988 
3.5 
0.77 
0.76 
107 
88 
IRL 
-
-
-
-
-
4.9 
7.0J 
NL 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
Ρ 
463 
602 
3.9 
0.64 
0.75 
11 
13J 
UK 
9,610 
10,936 
1.9 
0.76 
0.80 
178 
137 
EUR-12 
73,043 
87,797 
2.7 
++ 
-
-
965 
814 
Note ' Data refer to the aggregation of NACE 342 (Electrical machinery), NACE 341 (Insulated wires and cables), 
NACE 343 (Electrical Equipment for industrial use, batteries and accumulators). 
2 Positive trend: +(0.6 <r< 0.75), ++ (0.75 < r < 0.85), +++ ( r > 0.85). 
Negative trend: * (0.6 < r < 0.75), ** (0.75 < r < 0.85), *** ( r > 0.85). 
3 1990 figure. 
4 1993 figure. 
Sources: VISA database. Eurostat 1995. 
Panorama of EU industry 1995/96, Eurostat. 
DEBA, industry and database estimates. 
Basic statistics of the Community, 1989, 1993, 1995,Eurostat. 
16.4.2. Supplier concentration 
Both in the cable and wire industry (NACE 341) and the power generation equipment industry 
supplier concentration is high and increasing. In the cable and wire industry, concentration 
increased mainly through cross-border mergers and acquisitions by the largest suppliers: 
(a) Alcatel (F), 
(b) BICC (UK), 
(c) Pirelli (I), 
(d) ABB and Siemens (D), 
(e) Nokia (S/FIN). 
The power generation equipment industry has become more concentrated through cross-border 
alliances aimed at providing large turn-key systems: 
(a) ABB and Siemens (D), 
(b) GEC-Alsthom (UK/F). 
16.4.3. Specialization 
The trend in cross-border mergers and acquisitions, particularly in the cable and wire industry, 
has resulted in some redistribution of production within the EU, with: 
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(a) German specialization decreasing from 2.01 to 1.89, reflecting the restructuring which 
occurred in the German industry following unification; 
(b) France and the UK showing a slight increase in specialization as a result of the 
successful joint-venture between GEC and Alcatel. 
16.5. Boilers and metal containers 
Table 16.4. Boilers and metal containers (NACE 315) 
Production 
(ECU m 1990 prices) 
1987 
1994 
% CAGR 87-94 
Trend' 
Balassa index 
1987 
1993 
Employment 
('OOOs) 
1987 
1994 
Β 
242 
525 
11.72 
0.47 
0.83 
3.6 
6.8 
D 
5,813 
5,475 
(0.85) 
1.49 
1.41 
67 
64 
DK 
197 
410 
7.27 
+++ 
0.48 
0.88 
2.9 
3.52 
E 
727 
762 
0.68 
0.53 
0.47 
13 
10 
F 
5,998 
5,710 
(0.70) 
2.18 
1.79 
74 
68 
GR 
36 
15 
(11.8) 
** 
0.17 
0.05 
0.9 
0.4 
I 
1,210 
1,797 
5.81 
++ 
0.39 
0.50 
16 
16 
IRL 
41 
67 
7.27 
+++ 
0.33 
0.40 
0.6 
0.8 
NL 
287 
420 
5.6 
++ 
0.33 
0.43 
4.2 
5.1 
p3 
114 
30 
(17.3) 
0.70 
0.16 
4.5 
1.03 
UK 
2,311 
2,486 
1.05 
0.78 
0.89 
40 
32 
EUR-12 
16,984 
17,375 
0.57 
-
-
227 
208 
Notes: ' Positive trend: +(0.6 <, r2 < 0.75), ++ ( 0.75 < r < 0.85), +++ (r2 > 0.85). 
Negative trend: * (0.6 < r < 0.75), ** ( 0.75 < r < 0.85), *** (r > 0.85). 
2 1993 figure. 
3 Break in series between 1989 and 1990. Figures are not comparable. 
Sources: VISA database, Eurostat, 1995. 
Panorama of EU industry 1995/96, Eurostat. 
DEBA, industry and database estimates. 
Basic statistics of the Community, 1989, 1993, 1995, Eurostat. 
15.5.1. Size 
In general, the EU industry for boilers and metal containers has only experienced a marginal 
growth in output since 1987, with Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, Italy and the Netherlands 
seeing output rise and other Member States experiencing no change or declining output. 
In terms of employment, the industry has shrunk in the period 1987-94, most notably in the 
UK and France, reflecting a continuing process of restructuring and rationalization among the 
larger players. 
16.5.2. Concentration 
The boilers and metal containers industry in Europe is dominated by a small number of large 
players, following a period of significant mergers and acquisitions activity, which is still 
ongoing. From more than 20 major companies in 1987, several large integrated global players 
have emerged, including: 
(a) Deutsche Babcock (D), 
(b) Alsthom (F), 
(c) Dexion International, a subsidiary of Interlake (US), 
(d) CLN (I). 
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16.5.3. Specialization 
In terms of specialization as measured by the Balassa index, the boiler and metal container 
industry accounted for a relatively large, but decreasing, share of total industry in Germany 
and France, whereas the other Member States showed no significant degree of specialization. 
16.6. Office machinery 
Table 16.5. Office machinery (NACE 33) 
Production 
(ECU m 1990 prices) 
1987 
1994 
% CAGR 87-94 
Trend' 
Balassa index 
1987 
1993 
Employment 
(OOOs) 
1987 
1994 
Share of top 
ten vendors 
1991 
1993 
Β 
120 
106 
(1.7) 
0.08 
0.07 
1.2 
0.9 
76.5 
60.5 
D 
10,241 
14,350 
4.9 
1.25 
0.98 
91.8 
67.8 
74.2 
56.6 
DK 
115 
211 
9.1 
++ 
0.15 
0.17 
2.3 
1.42 
82.2 
62.0 
E 
860 
1,194 
4.8 
+ 
0.28 
0.28 
3.3 
3.0 
68.0 
53.9 
F 
8,196 
7,702 
(0.9) 
1.04 
0.85 
49.9 
48.9 
76.6 
60.3 
GR 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
I3 
6,685 
10,638 
6.9 
++ 
1.02 
0.85 
43.3 
25.8 
78.9 
62.9 
IRL 
2,779 
3,178 
1.9 
10.3 
10.6 
6.3 
8.4 
-
-
NL 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
74.7 
61.1 
Ρ 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
UK 
7,713 
18,799 
13.5 
+++ 
1.19 
2.03 
41.0 
55.8 
72.4 
51.1 
EUR-12 
37,675 
58,615 
6.5 
+++ 
-
-
246 
217 
-
-
Notes: 
Sources: 
1 Positive trend: +(0.6 < r < 0.75), ++ ( 0.75 < r < 0.85), +++ ( r > 0.85). 
Negative trend: * (0.6 < r < 0.75), ** ( 0.75 <r< 0.85), ***{r> 0.85). 
2 1993 figure. 
3 Break in series between 1988 and 1989 
VISA database, Eurostat, 1995. 
Panorama of EU industry 1995/96, Eurostat. 
Enterprises in Europe, Eurostat, 1994. 
DEBA, industry and database estimates. 
Basic statistics of the Community, 1989, 1993, 1995, Eurostat. 
16.6.1. Size 
In terms of output, the European office machinery industry has grown substantially in the 
period 1987-94, at a rate of 6.5% per annum. The significant reductions in employment, 
particularly in Germany and Italy, indicate ongoing restructuring and a shift to a more 
specialized manufacturing industry. This shift is particularly noticeable in Ireland and the UK, 
both of which have attracted substantial flows of foreign direct investment from mainly North-
American and Japanese players. 
16.6.2. Concentration 
The office machinery industry is characterized by a high degree of concentration, albeit 
decreasing as indicated by the top ten market shares over the period 1991-93. The major 
players include only three European companies - Groupe Bull, Olivetti and Siemens-Nixdorf 
- with the others being predominately American, such as IBM, Digital Equipment, Compaq, 
Hewlett Packard, etc. 
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16.6.3. Specialization 
The three Member States with large national suppliers, France, Germany and Italy, 
experienced a reduction in specialization, which is indicative of the competitive pressures 
from third country suppliers. The high and increasing levels of specialization in Ireland and 
the UK reflect the successful attraction of foreign investments. 
16.7. Motor vehicles 
Table 16.6. Motor vehicles (NACE 351) 
Production 
(ECU m 1990 prices) 
1987 
1994 
% CAGR 87-94 
Trend' 
Balassa index 
1987 
1993 
Employment 
(OOOs) 
1987 
1994 
B/L 
. 
-
-
-
-
-
D 
74,485 
72,861 
(0.1) 
2.11 
1.86 
555 
466 
DK 
. 
-
-
-
-
-
E 
17,457 
18,603 
0.9 
1.34 
1.12 
99 
90 
F 
38,241 
40,075 
0.7 
1.05 
1.13 
225 
190 
GR 
102 
256 
13.9 
++ 
0.06 
0.10 
1.0 
1.7 
I 
18,613 
16,466 
(1.7) 
0.55 
0.41 
138 
113 
IRL 
_ 
-
-
-
-
-
NL 
. 
-
-
-
-
-
Ρ2 
677 
962 
5.2 
0.37 
0.46 
5.3 
6.9 
UK 
18,8063 
19,291 
1.34 
0.583 
0.66 
I243 
EUR-12 
179,955 
181,167 
0.1 
-
-
1213 
1024 
Notes: 
Sources: 
' Positive trend: +(0.6 < r < 0.75), ++ (0.75 < r < 0.85), ++ ( r > 0.85) 
Negative trend: *(0.6 < r < 0.75), ** (0.75 < r < 0.85), *** (? > 0.85). 
2 Break in series between 1989 and 1990. 
3 1992 figure. 
4 % CAGR from 1992 to 1994. 
VISA database, Eurostat, 1995. 
The new car market in Europe, The Economist Intelligence Unit, 1992/93. 
DEBA, industry and database estimates. 
Basic statistics of the Community, 1989, 1993, 1995, Eurostat. 
16.7.1 Size 
The European automotive industry experienced stagnating output volumes in recent years, 
which were mainly recession related. Overall volume output grew by a mere 0.1% per annum 
between 1987 and 1994. As suggested by the significant decrease in employment, the industry 
is in a continuous state of cost cutting. 
16.7.2. Concentration 
A high degree of supplier concentration characterizes the European automotive industry, with 
in: 
(a) Germany, nine companies accounting for 81% of turnover; 
(b) Italy, five companies accounting for 86% of turnover; 
(c) France, five companies accounting for 84% of turnover; 
(d) the UK, seven companies accounting for 80% of turnover; 
(e) Spain, five companies accounting for 81% of turnover. 
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Since 1987, concentration in the industry has increased, with the number of independent 
manufacturers having reduced. Partnerships and alliances are increasingly regarded as 
providing the most cost-effective method of developing a competitive product portfolio and 
reducing dependence on domestic markets, as demonstrated by the: 
(a) alliance between Iveco and Ford in light commercial vehicles; 
(b) acquisition of Rover group by BMW; 
(c) alliances between PSA and Fiat, Ford and VW for the development and production of a 
multipurpose vehicle. 
16.7.3. Specialization 
The increase in concentration through acquisitions and partnerships has, apart from differences 
in ownership, not resulted in a significant redistribution of automotive manufacturing in 
Europe, as demonstrated by relatively unchanged specialization levels over the period 1987-
94. The German industry is an exception with a decreasing specialization from 2.11 in 1987 to 
1.86 in 1994. 
16.8. Clothing 
Table 16.7. Clothing (NACE 453) 
Production 
(ECU m 1990 prices) 
1987 
1994 
% CAGR 87-94 
Trend' 
Balassa index 
1987 
1993 
Employment 
('OOOs) 
1987 
1994 
Β 
1,117 
1,613 
5.4 
+++ 
0.86 
1.21 
26 
18 
D 
9,757 
8,761 
(1.5) 
0.95 
0.73 
157 
90 
DK 
454 
387 
(2.6) 
0.39 
0.47 
8 
6J 
E 
3,457 
5,119 
5.7 
++ 
1.10 
1.23 
87 
79 
F 
7,126 
6,487 
(1.3) 
0.82 
0.82 
139 
96 
GR 
593 
630 
0.9 
1.32 
1.14 
30 
22 
I 
10,924 
13,504 
3.1 
1.73 
1.85 
156 
134 
IRL 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
NL 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
Ρ 
1,9882 
1,692 
(4.0) 
3.92 
4.4 
1122 
114 
UK 
5,870 
5,507 
(0.9) 
0.85 
0.80 
192 
142 
EUR-12 
41,031 
44,480 
1.2 
-
-
863 
740 
Notes: ' Positive trend: +(0.6 < r2 < 0.75), ++ (0.75 < r < 0.85), +++ ( r > 0.85). 
Negative trend: * (0.6 < r2 < 0.75), ** (0.75 < r < 0.85), *** (r >. 0.85). 
2 1990 figure. 
Sources: VISA database. Eurostat, 1995. 
Panorama of EU industry 1995/96, Eurostat. 
DEBA, industry and database estimates. 
Basic statistics of the Community, 1989, 1993, 1995, Eurostat. 
Since no statistics at a lower level of aggregation are available, exhaustive conclusions on the 
basis of Table 16.7 can be misleading, as uniform manufacturing represents only a very small 
part of the overall clothing industry. 
A more comprehensive analysis of changes in the supply-side structure in the uniform 
manufacturing is provided in the case study on uniforms (see Chapter 21). 
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16.9. Metal furniture 
Table 16.8. Metal furniture (NACE 316) 
Production 
(ECU m 1990 prices) 
1987 
1994 
% CAGR 87-94 
Trend' 
Balassa index 
1987 
1993 
Employment 
(OOOs) 
1987 
1994 
B/L 
244 
292 
2.6 
0.86 
0.77 
3.3 
3.12 
D 
2,857 
3.625 
3.5 
1.40 
1.44 
34.0 
37.0 
DK 
315 
397 
3.4 
1.47 
1.51 
3.9 
3.52 
E 
1,002 
1,360 
4.5 
1.45 
1.62 
15.0 
17.0 
F 
1,405 
1,534 
1.3 
0.73 
0.66 
20.5 
18.4 
GR 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
I 
1,576 
1,623 
0.4 
0.96 
0.87 
14.5 
14.0 
IRL 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
NL 
-
-
-
-
-
5.3 
5.8 
Ρ 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
UK 
1,043 
1,060 
0.2 
0.64 
0.62 
17.1 
17.1 
EUR-12 
8,443 
9.899 
2.3 
-
-
114 
115 
Notes: 
Sources: 
Positive trend: +(0.6 <r< 0.75), ++ (0.75 < r < 0.85), +++ ( r > 0.85). 
Negative trend: * (0.6 < r < 0.75), ** (0.75 < r2 < 0.85), *** (r > 0.85). 
1993 figure. 
VISA database, Eurostat, 1995. 
Panorama of EU industry 1995/96, Eurostat. 
DEBA, industry and database estimates. 
Basic statistics of the Community, 1989, 1993, 1995, Eurostat. 
16.9.1. Size 
Output in the metal furniture industry has increased in the period 1987-94, whereas total 
employment in the industry remained static, indicating increased productivity. Germany alone 
accounted for nearly all the output increase. 
16.9.2. Supplier concentration 
The metal furniture industry is highly fragmented and dominated by SMEs. The average size 
of firms has increased recently, suggesting that concentration in the industry is growing. 
16.9.3. Specialization 
Recent concentration trends in the industry appeared to have redistributed some of the 
production, with small increases in specialization in Germany, Denmark and Spain, and 
similar decreases in Belgium, France, Italy and the UK. 
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16.10. Paper and stationery 
Table 16.9. Paper (NACE 472) 
Production 
(ECU m 1990 prices) 
1987 
1994 
% CAGR 87-94 
Trend' 
Balassa index 
1987 
1993 
Employment 
('OOOs) 
1987 
1994 
Β 
1,188 
1,277 
1.0 
1.02 
0.87 
10.6 
11.0 
D 
9,546 
13,233 
4.8 
++ 
1.04 
1.07 
100 
108 
DK 
782 
884 
1.8 
0.84 
0.85 
7.4 
6.52 
E 
2,478 
3,194 
3.7 
+++ 
0.92 
0.79 
24.0 
22.7 
F 
7,454 
9,750 
3.9 
+++ 
0.97 
1.04 
68.8 
68.7 
GR 
311 
237 
(3.8) 
*** 
0.64 
0.43 
3.9 
4.3 
I 
4,504 
6,972 
6.4 
+++ 
0.66 
0.78 
34.0 
32.7 
IRL 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
NL 
1,895 
2,181 
2.0 
+++ 
1.05 
1.02 
15.5 
15.92 
Ρ 
309 
265 
(2.2) 
** 
0.87 
0.53 
5.9 
3.72 
UK 
8,592 
9,280 
1.1 
1.49 
1.40 
110 
97 
EUR-12 
37,308 
47,462 
3.5 
+++ 
-
383 
372 
Notes: 
Sources: 
Positive trend: +(0.6 < r< 0.75), ++ (0.75 < r < 0.85), +++ ( r > 0.85). 
Negative trend: * (0.6 < r < 0.75), ** (0.75 < r < 0.85), *** (r2 > 0.85). 
1993 figure. 
VISA database, Eurostat, 1995. 
DEBA, industry and database estimates. 
Basic statistics of the Community, 1989, 1993, 1995, Eurostat. 
16.10.1. Size 
EU output has grown by 30% between 1987 and 1994 with no significant change in 
employment. This indicates a productivity gain of over 3% per annum. 
16.10.2. Concentration 
The paper industry has traditionally been fragmented with a large number of producers and 
widely dispersed production facilities, located close to the market. However, the industry has 
recently experienced a surge in mergers and acquisition activity, focused on rationalizing 
fragmented production. 
16.10.3. Specialization 
The recent concentration and rationalization trends appear to have resulted in redistribution of 
some of EU production, with specialization decreasing slightly in the UK and Spain, and 
increasing in Germany, France, and Italy. 
In view of these industry changes, it should be noted that the public sector generally purchases 
paper and stationery mainly from local wholesalers, which are characterized by a highly 
fragmented structure. In addition, the public sector, in contrast to the private sector, is not the 
dominant purchaser in the paper and stationery industry. In this respect, any changes in the 
supply-side structure cannot be related to the opening up of the European public procurement 
markets. 
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16.11. Civil engineering 
Table 16.10 Civil engineering (NACE 502) 
Production 
changes 
(1991 constant 
prices) 
% CAGR 87-95 
% CAGR 91-95 
Employment 
('OOOs) 
1987 
1991 
19953 
%CAGR 87-95 
%CAGR 91-95 
Β 
6.2 
12 
198 
235 
233 
2.0 
(0.2) 
D' 
4.5 
2.6 
1,739 
1,984 
2,672 
5.5 
7.7 
DK 
0.0 
1.0 
191 
157 
175 
(1.0) 
(2.7) 
E 
6.2 
(5.5) 
926 
1,273 
1,033 
1.4 
(5.1) 
F 
1.0 
(3.6) 
1,588 
1,651 
1,4604 
(1.0) 
(3.0) 
I 
(4.2) 
(8.5) 
1,615 
1,681 
1,563 
(0.5) 
(2.4) 
IRL 
3.35 
-
71 
78 
71> 
0.0 
(4.6) 
NL 
2.1 
2.0 
371 
389 
387 
0.5 
(0.1) 
Ρ 
8.3 
5.2 
354 
363 
340 
(0.5) 
(1.6) 
UK 
4.4 
(3.2) 
1,592 
1,698 
1,355 
(2.0) 
(5.5) 
A 
1.74 
1.79 
124 
134 
134 
1.0 
0.0 
S 
5.4 
8.0 
278 
312 
215 
(3.2) 
(8.9) 
FIN 
(2.8) 
(6.0) 
184 
179 
117 
(5.5) 
(10.0) 
EUR-15 
2.4 
(1.6) 
9,230 
10,136 
9,926 
1.2 
(1.0) 
Notes: ' Break in series in 1991 (West Germany and East Germany). 
2 Total does not include Greece and Luxembourg. 
1991 break series for Germany (West Germany and East Germany after 1991). 
4 1995 figures are FIEC estimates. 
5 1994 figure. 
6 1993 figure. 
Source: Year-on-year percentage variation of production in 1991 prices, FIEC 12/95. 
16.11.1. Size 
Overall, total output increased between 1987 and 1994 at a rate of 2.4% per annum. However, 
as a result of the economic recession, a sharp downturn in construction output in the first half 
of the 1990s was experienced by all Member States, other than Germany which benefited from 
rebuilding the infrastructure in the eastern Lander. This is also reflected in the sharp fall in 
employment in the construction industry since 1991. 
16.11.2. Supplier concentration 
As in 1987, a small number of large national contractors dominated the civil engineering 
sector in 1994. The level of concentration has increased due to recession, forcing further 
rationalization through closures, mergers and acquisitions. Out of the top 19 companies in 
Europe, France dominates with eight (four of which are in the top seven), followed by the UK 
and Germany both with four, and Sweden, Spain and the Netherlands with one each. 
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SECTION F 
Case studies 
This section examines in detail six sectors that were identified as being most likely to have 
been affected by the creation of a single market in public procurement. 

Telecommunications equipment 275 
17. Telecommunications equipment 
17.1. Overview 
17.1.1. Ex ante hypothesis 
In 1987, the EC telecommunications equipment market was characterized by: 
(a) being generally uncompetitive in global terms, supporting a range of (incompatible) 
digital technology; 
(b) having a surplus of both systems and producers; 
(c) benefiting from nationalistic procurement policies. 
It was assumed that the opening up of public telecommunications markets to global 
competition would lead to: 
(a) a redistribution of markets shares within the industry with Alcatel and Siemens being net 
gainers; 
(b) an increase in extra-EU import penetration, mostly from the USA, Canada and Sweden; 
(c) the public télécoms operators enjoying substantial procurement savings. 
17.1.2. Coverage 
The main items of telecommunications equipment purchased by the public sector are public 
switches, cables and telephone hand-sets. 
This case study will focus on public switching equipment, which accounts for some 40% of 
telecommunications procurement. Telecommunications equipment represents some 35% of 
products classified under NACE 344, which includes medical equipment. 
17.1.3. Data 
The following information sources have been used in this case study: 
(a) Profile of the world-wide telecommunication industry, Elsevier Advanced Technology, 
1995, for telecommunications equipment market size and production, defined by sector 
as well as at product level; 
(b) Comext database, Eurostat, 1995, for the trade flow analysis at public procurement 
sensitive product level; 
(c) interviews carried out with marketing directors of some European and non-European 
leading companies. Their feedback has been used for public procurement legislation 
impact analysis, market evolution trends and scenario drawing; 
(d) Panorama of EU industry 1995/96, Eurostat 1995, for data on industry structure, trade 
and feedback in relation to industry evolution. 
17.1.4. Key findings 
The EU telecommunications equipment market has undergone fundamental change since 
1987: 
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(a) the supply-side has been restructured and is today dominated by three economically 
strong and technologically advanced European groups; 
(b) equipment prices have come down by 20-30% in nominal terms; 
(c) market leaders - Alcatel, Siemens and Ericsson - have transferred production to other 
Member States to ensure access to local (public-sector) markets; 
(d) indirect import penetration has risen significantly, largely in components; 
(e) the EU's trade surplus with the rest of the world has been growing steadily since 1987, 
reflecting the industry's competitiveness on the world stage. 
The main drivers of change have been the globalization of the market for telecommunications 
services, which has been the motor of liberalization. Service providers operating networks -
the entities covered by the Utilities Directive - have responded by demanding the best 
technical solutions. 
Although much of the ex ante hypothesis has been achieved, the role of the Utilities Directive, 
which came into force in January 1993 in most Member States, has been strictly limited. 
Liberalization of network services in January 1998 will accelerate the changes already in 
progress and is likely to contribute to the achievement of a competitive and fair 'public 
procurement' market almost overnight. 
17.2. Evolution of the telecommunications market 
17.2.1. Drivers of change 
Since 1987, the key drivers of change influencing the demand for telecommunications 
equipment in the EU have been: 
(a) liberalization of the provision of telecommunications services, 
(b) technological developments, 
(c) privatization, 
(d) globalization. 
These drivers are inextricably linked: 
(a) the liberalization of the provision of mobile communications, satellite and value added 
services has led to the opening up of the market for a range of telecommunications 
equipment; 
(b) the privatization of British Telecommunications (BT) in the UK resulted in: 
(i) the company being subject to commercial pressures in respect of bottom-line 
performance and of loss of market share due to licences being granted to new 
network operators, 
(ii) other Member States planning to adopt the UK mode; 
(c) Integrated Services Digital Network (ISDN) and other related technologies have 
contributed to product standardization; 
(d) the rapid globalization of the telecommunications market, coupled with the need to 
compete internationally with low cost service providers, has benefited equipment 
suppliers from the USA and Sweden. 
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17.2.2. Demand side (1987-94) 
Structure 
The most radical change in the structure of demand has occurred in the UK: 
(a) BT was privatized and became a quoted company on the London Stock Exchange; 
(b) network carrier licences have been granted to Mercury Communications and Energis. 
With the exception of Spain, where Telefonica is a private company, 33% owned by the state, 
and the UK, where BT is a publicly quoted company, all other network carriers are still state 
owned or controlled. However, most tend to be run along commercial lines with no noticeable 
state influence on their purchasing policies. 
Market size 
The EU market for telecommunications equipment in 1994 was worth some ECU 18 billion. 
Figure 17.1. Telecommunications equipment market in Europe1 
ECUbn 
I D B F B l OUK OOthers 
1992 
1 Excludes Portugal, Greece and Luxembourg and mobile communication equipment. 
Sources: Profile of the world-wide telecommunications industry, Elsevier Advanced Technology, 1995. 
Panorama of EU industry 1995/96, Eurostat. 
The recession of the early 1990s had only a limited impact on public procurement in 
telecommunications. To a great extent the market was buoyed by: 
(a) the commercial imperative to respond to demand for new technologies, 
(b) infrastructure requirements resulting from German unification. 
The situation was somewhat different in the area of public switching equipment, where current 
price expenditure fell by some 22% between 1988 and 1993 (Table 17.1). 
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Table 17.1 Public switching equipment market (million ECU) 
Germany 
France 
Italy 
United Kingdom 
Total 
1988 
2,355 
1,291 
1,678 
1,245 
6,595 
1993 
1,412 
1,450 
1,462 
763 
5,087 
Percentage change 
1988-93 
-40.04 
12.32 
-12.87 
-38.71 
-22.56 
Sources: Profile of the world-wide telecommunications industry, Elsevier Advanced Technology, 1995. 
Panorama of EU industry 1995/96, Eurostat. 
Rather than a decline in volume demand, this situation is seen more to reflect: 
(a) the introduction of new technologies offering better performance/price ratios; 
(b) the increase in the number of foreign competitors operating in national markets as a 
result of mergers and acquisitions, and establishment of national presences; 
(c) overall price reductions of 20-30%. 
Concentration of supply 
In 1987, Member State markets were dominated by a small number of national champions. 
Today, the national markets are still served by a small number of suppliers. However, they are 
not exclusively national champions, reflecting cross-border mergers and acquisitions. 
The most important suppliers in the larger Member States are described below. 
Key suppliers - France 
Alcatel Cit, which is the largest unit of Alcatel's Network system group is an acknowledged 
world leader in digital telephone switching equipment with operations in 14 other countries. 
Public switching equipment sales in 1993 accounted for roughly 60% of the company's total 
revenue (FF 10.1 billion). In the same year, network operators in Belgium, Denmark, France, 
Germany, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain placed orders for Alcatel's 1000 systems. 
Matra-Ericsson Telecommunication is the other major player in France, and is a joint venture 
between Ericsson and Matra Communication. It produces and markets Ericsson AXE switches 
in France. 
Key suppliers - Germany 
Siemens, which developed the advanced EWSD switch has been improving its presence 
abroad through alliances and acquisitions. In 1989 the company bought 40% of GPT, part of 
GEC Plessey (UK). In 1993 it took control of Teleco Cavi (Italy) and Cablestream Ltd (UK). 
In 1995 the company created a new equipment supplier in Italy through the merger of Italtel 
and Siemens Telecommunications. 
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Table 17.2. Key recent acquisitions, mergers, joint ventures, agreements and contracts 
in the last years 
Companies concerned 
Siemens 
GPT 
Alcatel 
Telettra 
Alcatel Alsthom 
Alcatel 
Ericsson 
Schrack 
Ericsson 
Intracom 
Northern Telecom 
STC 
Alcatel 
Bell Atlantic 
STET 
Ericsson, STET Hellas 
Panafon consortium 
AEG, Matra Communication 
Northern Telecom 
Matra 
Northern Telecom 
Ericsson 
Mercury Communication 
Alcatel 
Ericsson 
Hans Kolbe & Co. 
Siemens and Italtel 
Details 
1989. Siemens bought 40% in GPT, a GEC Alsthom subsidiary 
October 1990. Alcatel agreed to acquire Fiat's 90% shareholding in Telettra 
March 1992. ITT sold its 30% stake in Alcatel to Alcatel Alsthom 
March 1991. Ericsson, with a group of Austrian banks, agreed to buy 83% of the 
Austrian telecommunication supplier. In 1993 Ericsson increased its holding from 50% 
to 80% 
Ericsson acquired a 15% stake in Intracom, the biggest telecommunications equipment ' 
supplier in Greece 
March 1991. Northern Telecom acquired STC for US$ 2.6 billion. STC was merged 
with NT's existing European operation to form a new company, Northern Telecom 
Europe. In 1993 Alcatel took over STC submarine systems investigations 
Bell Atlantic and STET have formed a joint venture to develop software for large 
telephone networks 
Greece became an important market for Ericsson in 1993: Panafon consortium signed a 
contract for the delivery of GSM equipment into the year 1997 and STET Hellas ordered 
SKR 300 million worth turnkey equipment 
They are to jointly develop and market mobile and switches. AEG has taken a small 
stake in Matra Communication 
Northern Telecom sells off STC to Alcatel and increases its stake in Matra 
Communication from 20% to 50% 
In July 1994, Northern Telecom signed a contract with Concert Communications Co. 
Mercury has awarded a contract to Ericsson for AXE digital switching equipment - valte 
around US$ 17 million 
In 1993 network operators in Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Ireland, 
Norway, Portugal, Spain and the UK placed orders for Alcatel 1000 systems 
1991. Ericsson buys a 51% stake in Hans Kolbe & Co. (D) 
1995. They join their production activities through the creation of the company Telsi 
Sources: Profile of the world-wide telecommunications industry. Elsevier Advanced Technology, 1995. 
Financial Times, 1992-95. 
Alcatel's presence in Germany is substantial and is increasing following the growth of 
Deutsche Telekom orders. In 1993 switching equipment production was DM 2,715 million, 
with an increase of 20% on 1991. 
DeTeWe's public communication system divisions accounted for 53% (DM 500 million) of 
company turnover in 1993, and it has developed a technical co-operation agreement with 
Ericsson and Fuba. 
Ericsson strengthened its presence in the German market with the acquisition of the local 
manufacturer Hans Kolbe & Co. in 1991. 
Key suppliers - Italy 
Italtel is 80% owned by STET, a wholly owned subsidiary of another state holding IRI and 
20% by AT&T. Italtel is a major supplier of Linea UT public switching equipment and has an 
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estimated 50% share of its domestic market. In response to increased competition the 
manufacturing company Telsi was formed with Siemens in 1995. 
Alcatel Face is a subsidiary of Alcatel Italia Spa, one of the country's major suppliers of 
telecommunication equipment, and is responsible for the production of the public switching 
system known as System 12. 
Telettra, previously owned by Fiat, is now part of Alcatel Italia, which owns 75% of the shares 
with an option to purchase the remaining 25%. 
Siemens Telecommunications, a wholly owned subsidiary of Siemens AG, is increasing its 
activities in public communications following the joint venture with Italtel in 1995, when it 
formed Telsi (manufacturing facilities). 
Ericsson Fatme, a subsidiary of Ericsson Spa, is a major supplier of AXE public switching 
equipment and telecommunications equipment. 
Key suppliers - United Kingdom 
GPT is the result of a joint venture between Siemens (40%) and GEC Plessey (60%). Due to a 
serious decline in orders, the company has been going through a major rationalization 
programme. 
Northern Telecom Europe is the European headquarters of the largest Canadian tele-
communications equipment manufacturer. In the recent past, European activities have been 
growing through the acquisition of a stake in Matra Communication (F) and the establishment 
of 2,500 people in R&D units, 1,500 of them in the UK. In 1994 they created a multimedia 
alliance with Mitsubishi, focusing on the development of ATM switching equipment. In 1994 
the company signed a contract with Concert Co., the joint venture between BT and MCI, to 
supply advanced switching equipment. 
Ericsson (UK) had a turnover in 1993 of UK£ 309 million, 95% of which was from the 
domestic market. BT and Mercury are the biggest customers of its public systems division. 
17.2.3. Supply side (1987-94) 
Supplier concentration 
The European telecommunications equipment market is characterized by a high degree of 
supplier concentration, reflecting the restructuring of the supply side since 1987, principally by 
mergers and acquisitions. Today, the market for telecommunications equipment is dominated 
by three global players: 
(a) Alcatel, whose communications division's 1994 sales amounted to ECU 10.2 billion; 
(b) Ericsson, whose 1994 sales turnover was ECU 5.7 billion; 
(c) Siemens, whose 1994 telecommunications turnover was ECU 10.2 billion. 
For these three companies, 40-60% of sales were accounted for by the public sector. 
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Supply-side specialization 
The importance of the telecommunications equipment sector in national output of a Member 
State relative to the rest of the EU has been measured by the Balassa index. 
If the index is between 0 and 1, the Member State has a low degree of specialization in 
telecommunications equipment manufacture. If it falls between 1 and 2, there is above 
average, but not high specialization. If it is greater than 2, the Member State is considered to 
have a high degree of specialization. 
Table 17.3 shows the Balassa index for the northern EU Member States. 
Table 17.3. Balassa index 
Belgium 
Sweden 
Ireland 
Germany 
France 
Netherlands 
Finland 
Spain 
Italy 
Austria 
United Kingdom 
Denmark 
1988 
1.11 
2.32 
1.92 
1.03 
1.00 
0.80 
0.89 
1.17 
0.91 
0.61 
0.85 
0.24 
1990 
1.35 
2.21 
1.45 
0.94 
0.91 
0.87 
1.21 
1.53 
1.08 
0.53 
0.63 
0.24 
1993 
1.67 
2.09 
1.40 
1.12 
1.08 
1.06 
1.04 
0.98 
0.95 
0.64 
0.52 
0.27 
Sources: Profile of the world-wide telecommunications industry, Elsevier Advanced Technology, 1995. 
Panorama of EU industry 1995/96, Eurostat. 
The trend in mergers and acquisitions since 1987 has resulted in a redistribution of 
telecommunications equipment production within the EU. As a result, most Member States 
exhibit around average specialization. The most notable changes were in Belgium and Spain. 
This analysis is consistent with a Europe-wide restructuring of the telecommunications 
equipment industry. 
Competitiveness 
The restructuring of the European telecommunications industry has led to improved 
competitiveness in European and global markets. In particular, the EU has improved its 
position as a net exporter of public sector telecommunications equipment since 1987. 
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Figure 17.2. Extra-EUR-12 trade balance of telephonic and telegraphic switching 
apparatus 
ECUmn 
1000 T ­
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Source: Comext database. Eurostat, 1995. 
Bearing in mind the sharp reduction in equipment prices since 1987 and the nominal trade 
balance with the rest of the world in 1993, EU equipment suppliers have been successful in 
exporting to third countries. 
Today, EU telecommunications equipment suppliers are competitive in terms of technology 
and price with North American players, with Alcatel, Siemens and Ericsson playing an 
increasingly important role in world markets. To maintain their position, they are investing 
ECU 1­2 billion per annum on R&D. 
Trade flows 
Intra­EU trade in telecommunications equipment has increased significantly in real terms since 
1987. However, the key measure of the health of the EU industry is extra­EU trade. 
Figure 17.3. EUR-12 imports of telephonic and telegraphic switching apparatus 
a8gsgga¡gBÍ . ^ _ «™ο°ββ°< 
I Intra­EC Dejrtra­EC ! 
Source: Comext database, Eurostat, 1995. 
From 1993 the intra­Community flows have been collected using new procedures (Intrastat system). 
The sharp rise in the extra­EC trade balance and relatively static increase in extra­EC imports, 
coupled with the reported reduction in the nominal price of telecommunications equipment, 
indicates a fourfold increase in real extra­EC exports. This situation is confirmed by the 
supply­side survey results which show: 
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(a) import penetration levels having risen from 8% in 1987 to over 25% in 1994; 
(b) extra-EU import penetration levels of under 1%; 
(c) intra-EU direct and indirect import penetration levels of 6% and 19% respectively. 
The restructuring of the EU telecommunications industry has contributed to a significant 
increase in indirect imports of telecommunications equipment. 
17.3. Impact of the single European market 
17.3.1. History 
The main drivers of change since 1987 have been: 
(a) technological developments, 
(b) market liberalization and globalization, 
(c) privatization. 
Although the implementation of the Utilities Directive was not seen by either the supply side 
or the demand side as a major factor, the ex ante hypothesis is well on the way to being 
achieved with the aims of the legislation clearly being met: 
(a) strong European players are competing effectively in global markets; 
(b) although supplier concentration is extremely high, with three groups dominating the EU 
supply-side, intra- and extra-EU competition has resulted in: 
(i) improved manufacturing efficiency, 
(ii) a significant reduction in nominal prices of equipment, 
(iii) high levels of investment in R&D; 
(c) a restructured EU industry, where local manufacturing presence through acquisitions and 
mergers has substituted for direct exporting. 
17.3.2. Future 
The key drivers of the future are considered to be: 
(a) liberalization of the EU telecommunications market; 
(b) establishment of a truly global telecommunications market, where the technical and 
legal barriers between providers of telecommunications, IT and media services will be 
swept aside; 
(c) privatization of the EU network providers. 
On 1 January 1998, the market for all telecommunications services in the EU will be 
liberalized in all Member States other than Denmark, Portugal and Greece. This will be 
reflected in an acceleration of the trend in mergers and acquisitions among service providers to 
create world-class information services companies. 
Liberalization will herald a rapid move to privatization of the national telecommunications 
companies in most Member States. Joint ventures and strategic alliances will blur the 
boundaries between equipment suppliers and service providers. 
There is little doubt that the new market environment will promote efficient procurement and, 
therefore, facilitate the achievement of the aims of the Utilities Directive. However, in certain 
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circumstances, the strict application of the legislation may be in conflict with the commercial 
decisions of the providers, for example, strategic alliances between purchasers and equipment 
suppliers. 
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18. Railway rolling stock 
18.1 Overview 
ISAA.Ex ante hypothesis 
Historically, the market for railway rolling stock has been characterized by 'national 
champions' supported by subsidies and reserved national markets. In 1987, however, it was 
assumed that the opening up of public procurement in a situation of technical harmonization 
would lead to: 
(a) a weakening of the historically strong ties between purchasers and their traditional 
suppliers; 
(b) increased supplier concentration through mergers and acquisitions, allowing companies 
to take advantage of economies of scale in production and R&D; 
increased trade in subcomponents and assembled locomotives; 
(d) significantly increased import penetration; 
(e) price reductions of 20-30%. 
18.1.2. Coverage 
This case study considers the railway sector as defined by NACE 362, namely: 
(a) locomotives powered from an external source of electricity, 
(b) diesel-electric locomotives, 
(c) railway and tramway goods vans and wagons, covered and closed. 
18.1.3. Sources 
The following sources ofinformation have been used in this case study: 
(a) The cost of non-Europe in public sector procurement (Cecchini report), European 
Commision, 1988; 
(b) Panorama of EU industry 1995/96, Eurostat; 
(c) DEBA, for production and trade statistics; 
(d) Comext database for trade statistics; 
(e) interviews with senior executives of major European organizations involved in the 
railway rolling stock industry; 
(f) the annual reports of major industry players. 
Some problems arising with these sources were, however, encountered, including: 
(a) significant omissions in national data from DEBA; 
(b) the difficulty of identifying trends in either production or trade because of the project-
based nature of the industry. 
18.1.4. Key findings 
On the demand side, governments are being pressured to liberalize previously heavily 
subsidized national markets and increase the operational independence of network operators. 
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Similarly, deregulation, privatization and separation of network management from the 
provision of services is creating competition between service providers, further weakening the 
links between purchasers and traditional suppliers. As a result, the concentration of supply has 
reduced in the majority of Member States. 
Since 1987, these developments are considered to have resulted in price reductions of the 
order of 20-30%. 
On the supply side, over-capacity due to reduced public sector expenditure and the high cost of 
R&D have resulted in a radical process of rationalization since 1987, significantly increasing 
supplier concentration. The industry is now dominated by three major players - Adtranz, 
GEC-Alsthom and Siemens - all having a strong presence in other Member States. 
The public procurement legislation has had little impact on the competitiveness of the industry 
as the varied technical standards employed by national railways provide an inherent advantage 
to traditional suppliers which were either involved in their development, or have prior 
experience of them. 
Only in the market for new urban-/mass-transit systems has the increased transparency caused 
by the directives been considered a key factor in opening up the markets to competition. 
18.2. Evolution of the railway rolling stock industry 
18.2.1. Drivers of change 
The main drivers of change influencing the industry are: 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
(d) 
(e) 
18.2 
deregulation, 
privatization, 
the economy, 
technology, 
public procurement legislation. 
.2. Demand side (1987-94) 
Structure 
The railway transport industry comprises public transport companies engaged in the transport 
of passengers and goods by rail, and can be classified into two main groups: 
(a) national/regional railway networks - DB (Germany), SNCF (France), FS (Italy) and BR 
(UK); 
(b) local transport companies operating in a single city, town or suburban area. 
In 1987, both groups were essentially closed to foreign suppliers, with government 
transportation policy playing an important role within the wider context of social policy. As a 
result, large subsidies to the state-owned network operators were the norm. 
As continued budgetary constraints since 1987 have made it difficult for Member States to 
support rail networks through subsidized transport tariffs and investment, governments are 
being pressured to liberalize markets and increase the operational independence of network 
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operators. As demonstrated by the privatization process in the UK, this is reflected in a more 
commercially orientated approach towards purchasing. 
Similarly, deregulation and the separation of network management from the provision of 
services are creating competition between service providers which is further weakening the 
links between purchasers and their traditional suppliers. These new purchasers are increasingly 
demanding complete system solutions, as provided by build, operate and transfer (BOT) 
schemes. 
The ongoing harmonization of technical standards is also allowing suppliers not originally 
involved in the development of equipment, to enter previously closed markets by the creation 
of a more unified industry and its concurrent economies of scale in production and R&D. 
Market size 
In 1987, apparent consumption of railway rolling stock equipment in Europe was ECU 3.2 
billion (Figure 18.1), of which the most important markets were Italy (34%), the UK (26%), 
Spain (14%), Germany (11%) and France (9%). 
Figure 18.1. EUR-12 apparent consumption 
Π Others 
Q Germany 
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D UK 
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Q France 
Source: DEBA. 
By 1994, the investment cycle had changed in favour of the French and UK markets, when 
apparent consumption was ECU 2.4 billion (39%) in France, and ECU 1.8 billion (28%) in the 
UK, a direct result of the Channel Tunnel and (in France) of other high speed link projects. 
Concentration of supply 
Since 1987 when 'national champions' supported by government subsidies and reserved 
national markets were commonplace, increased competition, reduced budgets and other 
commercial pressures have resulted in a reduced concentration of supply in the majority of 
Member States. Where previously traditional suppliers would have been used (many of which 
have now closed or been taken over), purchasers now seek tenders from a number of pan-
European manufacturers in an attempt to obtain better value for money. 
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18.2.3. Supply side (1987-94) 
Supplier concentration 
In 1987, Member States able to afford protection of their railway rolling-stock industry 
supported national companies at national and international levels through subsidies, exclusive 
contract awards and the use of technical barriers. This led to 'national champions' creating 
different systems and locomotive designs, causing diseconomies of scale in production and 
R&D. 
In 1987, the major manufacturers were: 
(a) France - Alsthom; 
(b) Germany - AEG, Siemens and BBC (electromotive parts), and Krauss Maffei, Krupp 
Mak and Thyssen Henschel (mechanical parts); 
(c) Italy - over 40 companies made rolling stock, most of which were subsidiaries, 
subcontractors or licensees of the major mechanical contractors, major companies being 
Fiat Ferroviaria (locomotives), Breda and Ansaldo; 
(d) the UK - GEC Transportation, GEC Traction (electrical parts), BREL (the engineering 
group of British Rail), Brush Electrical Machines (locomotives), and Metro Cammei 
(multiple units and metro trains). 
Since 1987, the industry has undergone a process of rationalization through joint ventures and 
mergers, significantly increasing supplier concentration. As indicated in Figure 18.2, three 
major companies have grown from the industry's rationalization process, and now focus on 
providing total systems: 
(a) Adtranz, an alliance between ABB and AEG, 
(b) GEC-Alsthom, a joint venture between GEC and Alsthom, 
(c) Siemens. 
Of particular note is the joint venture between GEC and Alsthom, and the mergers and 
alliances of ABB, both of which occurred as a competitive response to the opportunities 
created by the single European market, and in particular, the public procurement legislation. 
In addition to these leading suppliers, there are a number of national players whose future 
market position has yet to be decided. As most recent major projects have been awarded to 
consortia, their future success appears to lie in strategic alliances, such as Ansaldo's 
collaborative agreement with Breda Ferroviaria and Siemens. 
Bombardier, a leading Canadian supplier in the North American market, is now increasing its 
presence in Europe, with operations in Belgium (BN), France (ANF-Industrie), Germany, 
Austria and the UK. It has already been awarded a number of important contracts and has had 
a strong involvement in manufacturing double and single deck wagons for the Channel Tunnel 
operators. 
Railway rolling stock 289 
Figure 18.2. Evolution of Europe's three leading suppliers 
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Source: EuroStrategy Consultants interview programme. 
Supply-side specialization 
The importance of the railway rolling-stock sector in national output of a Member State 
relative to the rest of the EU has been measured by the Balassa index (see Table 18.1). 
The trend in mergers and acquisitions since 1987 has resulted in a redistribution of production 
within the EU. The greatest movements have been in: 
(a) France, where the index increased from 0.92 to 2.17, reflecting increased demand 
created by the high-speed rail links, and the winning of large contracts in the Far East by 
GEC-Alsthom, for which production takes place in France; 
(b) Italy, where the index decreased from 1.75 to 0.35, reflecting reduced public 
expenditure, falling prices, rationalization of production, and the movement abroad of 
part of Ansaldo's production. 
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Table 18.1. Balassa index 
France 
Spain 
United Kingdom 
Germany 
Greece 
Italy 
1987 
0.92 
1.73 
1.59 
0.55 
0.52 
1.75 
Sources: VISA database, Eurostat, 1995. 
Basic statistics of the Community, 1993, 1995, Eurostat. 
1993 
2.17 
2.08 
1.49 
0.67 
0.40 
0.35 
Competitiveness 
Since 1987, competitiveness within the railway rolling-stock industry has increased 
significantly, with major suppliers interviewed during the study reporting average price 
reductions of 20-30%. This has been brought about by the dramatic rationalization process 
which has seen: 
(a) a large reduction in the number of independent manufacturers in Europe; 
(b) a decrease in industry over-capacity; 
(c) redistribution of employment between Member States; 
(d) a fall in industry employment by 8% over the period; 
(e) increasing use of consortia among smaller suppliers seeking to compete with larger 
players; 
(f) amortization of R&D over larger markets. 
Trade flow analysis 
In 1987 total extra-EUR-12 and intra-EUR-12 imports amounted to ECU 169 million and 259 
million respectively. The 1987 EUR-12 trade balance was ECU 672 million, compared with 
the 1994 value of ECU 545 million. Taking into account the suggested 20-30% reduction in 
prices over the same period, however, the 1994 figure is broadly comparable to that of 1987. 
Over the period, imports have risen at both the intra-EUR-12 (ECU 2.7 billion) and extra-
EUR-12 (ECU 571 million) level. In particular, intra-EUR-12 import penetration has 
increased considerably from 8% to 44% (see Figure 18.3), mainly due to the large European 
projects involving transnational collaboration, and the increase in the trade of components and 
subcomponents. 
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Figure 18.3. Extra-EUR-12 and intra-EUR-12 import penetration 
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Source: DEBA. 
As a result of the fluctuations in trade flows caused by large projects, for example, the 
Channel Tunnel, analysis of import penetration at either national or product level is 
impractical. 
As regards public-sector import penetration, direct imports from the EU meet some 11% of 
total requirements, a high figure in relation to comparable industries, for example, the power 
equipment sector. Direct non-EU imports are minimal but total indirect imports represent 
nearly 21%, giving a total import penetration of some 32%. 
18.3. Impact of the single European market 
18.3.1. History 
Although the public procurement legislation has improved transparency and increased 
availability of information on business opportunities, in general, its impact on competitiveness 
has been negligible. Variations in the technical specifications of national networks provide an 
inherent advantage to traditional suppliers, which were either involved in their development, 
or have prior experience of them. 
One leading manufacturer, however, did suggest the directives have been useful in the market 
for new urban-/mass-transit systems, as the greater transparency combined with the absence of 
established standards, allows more open competition. 
More important in industry development has been a reduction in public-sector expenditure and 
a reduced willingness to subsidize 'national champions', resulting in a rationalized industry 
and the emergence of three dominant players with manufacturing operations in the majority of 
Member States. 
18.3.2. Future 
The industry will be driven towards higher supplier concentration, potentially through a 
merger or joint agreement between two of the largest players, creating further opportunities for 
economies of scale at a European level. Driving this will be a continued increase in: 
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(a) technical harmonization, particularly at regional and local levels; 
(b) interoperability between networks nationally. 
These changes will help to ensure the emergence of a European industry with European 
products able to compete globally. 
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19. Power generation equipment 
19.1. Overview 
19.1.1. JEX ante hypothesis 
In 1987, the EC power equipment market was characterized by: 
(a) a lack of cross-border trade between the major producing Member States (France, 
Germany, Italy and the UK), although all competed in smaller markets, such as Greece; 
(b) significant EC overcapacity (although this was more pronounced in boilers than in 
turbine generators); 
(c) dependence on export business due to fluctuating and negligible domestic business; 
(d) difficulty in comparing prices bid for particular contracts as they were largely unrelated 
to costs; 
(e) public sector support, via nationalistic purchasing policies, subsidies and aid; 
(f) the major barrier to trade being national standards. 
Although at the time most firms considered the opening of the market to intra-EC competition 
highly improbable, with any short-term impact unlikely, it was assumed that: 
(a) there would be an increase in Far East (boilers) and US and EFTA (turbine generators) 
penetration of markets; 
(b) some firms would merge and others close; 
(c) prices would fall by 20% (boilers) and 10% (turbine generators); 
(d) specialization among remaining EC players leading to increased cross-border trade -
representing 20% import penetration. 
19.1.2. Coverage 
The case study's focus is the main strategic items of generation equipment purchased by 
power generators: 
(a) boilers, 
(b) turbine generators. 
19.1.3. Data 
The following sources have been used for this case study: 
(a) DEBA, 
(b) Comext database, Eurostat, 
(c) Panorama of EU industry 1995/96, Eurostat, 1995, 
(d) interviews carried out with the marketing directors of leading European companies. 
The availability of industry data at both European and Member State levels is severely limited, 
due to the small number of suppliers and consequent need for high levels of confidentiality. 
Despite this, there is no shortage of opinions on broad market issues and trends. 
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Statistics are not produced at the level of boilers and turbine generators. They are subsumed 
within NACE 342 (electrical machinery) which covers equipment related to both generation 
and distribution (covering products, such as transformers, switchgear and protection and 
control equipment). Consequently, NACE 342 data have been used, with appropriate 
comments to put them into context. 
19.1.4. Key findings 
The electricity generation industry is moving, via a process of liberalization and privatization, 
towards greater private sector involvement and more market-driven behaviour. Together with 
the impact of the recession, general reductions in infrastructure investment, over capacity and 
increased competition from North American suppliers, have caused equipment prices to fall 
between 30% and 40% since 1990. 
The public procurement legislation has acted as an accelerator of these changes, but despite its 
existence, some markets have been slow to liberalize. While technical harmonization has 
increased cross-border trade, the industry is still hampered by internal and external barriers, 
such as enlarged testing requirements and certification activities. 
The supply side has begun to restructure in response to these changes, with manufacturers 
trying to enter national markets, either through consortia or acquisitions, but significant 
adjustment has not yet taken place. However, over the next 18 months, a number of 
manufacturers are predicting large job losses. 
19.2. Evolution of the power generation equipment market 
19.2.1. Drivers of change 
Since 1987, the key drivers of change influencing the demand for power generation equipment 
in the EU have been: 
(a) economic performance, 
(b) harmonization of technical standards across the EU, 
(c) environmental legislation, 
(d) privatization and deregulation (in some Member States), 
(e) public procurement legislation. 
In the medium to long term, the creation of the Internal Energy Market (IEM) and Third Party 
Access (TPA) mechanisms will have a significant impact on EU power generation, but has 
not, to date, exerted any great influence on the nature of demand for equipment. 
19.2.2. Demand side (1987-94) 
Structure 
Since 1987, the electricity industry has undergone a number of changes: 
(a) in Belgium, the three private generators (Ebes, Intercom and Unerg) were grouped 
together in 1990 to form a new entity, Electrabel; 
(b) in the former East Germany, the main generator and transmission system operator, 
VEAG, was privatized; 
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(c) in Ireland, ESB has now segmented generation, transmission and distribution activities 
to accommodate developments in regulation at the European level; 
(d) in Italy, ENEL was incorporated as a joint stock company in 1992 and is awaiting 
privatization; 
(e) in Portugal, EDP has been substantially reorganized and power generation is now open 
to competition; 
(f) in Spain, there have been a number of mergers and asset swaps, with the industry 
comprising private and public companies, but being dominated by just four; 
(g) in the UK, the industry was privatized in 1990/91, creating 15 suppliers, a transmission 
company and three principal generators in England and Wales, and two vertically 
integrated suppliers and a nuclear generator in Scotland. Since then, there has been a 
number of takeovers and mergers within the industry, and the nuclear generators are 
being prepared for privatization. 
These trends, together with reduced public-sector spending, are leading to an increasingly 
commercial approach towards purchasing from generators, many of which are facing open 
competition for the first time. Additionally, there is increasing interest in cost reductions, 
turnkey projects, possible private-sector finance for new projects, and independent power 
producers (which are considered by many to be a growing market). 
Market size 
Apparent consumption of electrical machinery as defined by NACE 342 (generation and 
distribution equipment) is estimated at ECU 35-40 billion in 1993. Segmentation covering 
only power generation equipment is not possible due to gaps in available data and inconsistent 
classification between Member States. Additionally, estimation of this market is not 
considered useful, given that much investment is project-based and varies significantly from 
year to year. 
The market for power generating equipment has, however, been declining in recent years as 
saturated markets, falling fossil fuel prices and increased use of energy saving measures slow 
demand for electricity. Additionally, it can be expected that future investment by utilities will 
be orientated towards replacement rather than capacity increases, as they come to the end of a 
substantial programme of works. 
Concentration of supply 
With few exceptions, concentration of supply continues to remain high, with the major 
manufacturers reporting little increase in the openness of markets. Many purchasers remain 
reluctant to consider equipment from non-traditional, often non-national, suppliers, citing 
technical differences and testing requirements as justification. 
The German market, for example, is considered reserved for German manufacturers, and 
although the Italians have had some success in exporting to France, their home market is 
considered closed to all but Italian manufacturers. 
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19.2.3. Supply side (1987-94) 
Supplier concentration 
The market for turbine generators and boilers is dominated by a small number of large players. 
Several of these have changed since 1987 due to mergers and acquisitions, the most well 
known of which was the GEC-Alsthom joint venture in 1989. The group now has 
manufacturing facilities in the UK, France, Belgium, Italy and Germany. Other developments 
include: 
(a) Deutsche Babcock's (D) acquisition of Thomassen (NL), 
(b) GEC-Alsthom's (UK-F) sale of its boiler business to Foster Wheeler (USA), 
(c) Mitsubishi's (JPN) acquisition of Babcock Engineering (UK), 
(d) GE's (USA) purchase of Nuovopine (I), 
(e) ABB's (CH-S) purchase of some of the activities of Westinghouse (USA). 
In addition to these developments, ABB and Siemens have made strategic investments in 
Eastern Europe in an attempt to penetrate these emerging markets and acquire low-cost 
manufacturing facilities. Furthermore, through a licensing agreement, Ansaldo now has access 
to Siemens gas turbine technology. 
In the market for gas turbines, the principal manufacturers are now GEC-Alsthom, Siemens, 
ABB, Fiat and Ansaldo, which together have an estimated 80% of the EU market. Other large 
manufacturers include Reyrolle Parsons (UK), Kvaerner (N) and Eline (A). 
In the boiler market, Deutsche Babcock (D) is the market leader. Other major suppliers 
include Foster Wheeler (USA) following their recent acquisition of GEC-Alsthom's boiler 
business, Babcock Mitsubishi, Babcock Spain, Steenmuller (D), Lentjes (D), Cockerill (B) and 
Stork (NL). 
Competitiveness 
Since 1990, competition has increased and major manufacturers report price reductions of 
between 30% and 40% as a result of: 
(a) previously artificially high prices, 
(b) worldwide overcapacity, 
(c) aggressive pricing, particularly from US and Italian players, 
(d) the use of low-cost labour in Eastern Europe, 
(e) the preoccupation with costs by purchasers, particularly with restrictions on public sector 
expenditure. 
Increasing competitiveness is also evidenced by the reductions in employment within the 
sector, with the UK and France losing 25% and 28% of their workforce respectively in the ten 
years to 1993. Further job losses are expected over the next 18 months as price cutting and 
rationalization continue. 
Trade flow analysis 
Traditionally, the power generation equipment market has been characterized by high levels of 
exports, to the extent that over 50% of turnover of some of the major German companies is 
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realized in export markets, the majority of which are outside Europe. At NACE 342 level, 
Germany accounted for over 40% (ECU 10.6 billion) of total EU export trade in 1993, 
followed by France with 20% (ECU 4.9 billion), the UK with 13% (ECU 3.2 billion) and Italy 
with 9% (ECU 2.3 billion). 
In 1994, estimated direct public-sector extra-EU import penetration was less than 1% (see 
Section 14.3), and direct public-sector intra-EU import penetration was over 5%. With total 
indirect imports of approximately 13%, total public-sector import penetration is estimated at 
between 17% and 20%. This indicates a changing preference for non-national suppliers as a 
result of rationalization through mergers and acquisitions on the supply side and increased 
pressure on costs on the demand side. 
19.3. Impact of the single European market 
19.3.1. History 
In 1987, the EC power generation equipment market was characterized by a lack of cross-
border trade, in many cases due to reserved markets and subsidies for national suppliers. 
While the market has opened to non-national competition, the public procurement legislation 
is regarded by major suppliers only as an accelerator of processes already begun. More 
important in achieving the claimed 30-40% reduction in prices has been the impact of the 
recession, a preoccupation with costs by purchasers, overcapacity and increased competition 
from non-EU players. 
Despite these changes, the perception among major suppliers is that some markets have been 
slow to liberalize, particularly Germany and Italy, which are considered not to have awarded 
any significant business in this sector to non-national suppliers. The response of manufacturers 
has been to obtain a local presence in national markets, either through consortia or acquisition. 
As a result, GEC-Alsthom, for example, now has manufacturing facilities in Austria, Belgium, 
Italy, Germany, the UK and France. 
19.3.2. Future 
On the demand side, although the public sector will continue to play a major role in the future, 
the importance of the private sector in power generation will increase as liberalization of 
power generation and privatization of national monopolies gathers pace. This will continue to 
exert downward pressure on prices, and suppliers will increasingly be required to become 
financially and managerially involved in completed projects. 
Demand for new power generation equipment in the EU will continue to remain depressed and 
the next international opportunity will be North America where the power generation industry 
faces the need to renew an ageing infrastructure. Stronger demand in their home market will 
strengthen the position of US suppliers globally, which will result in continued aggressive 
pricing in an attempt to gain further market share in Europe. 
There will be continued rationalization within the industry accompanied by drastic reductions 
in employment over the next few years. However, the structure is not expected to change 
significantly. 
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20. Engineering consultancy 
20.1. Overview 
20.1.1. Ex ante hypothesis 
In 1987, differences in culture, standards, regulations on fees and the mutual recognition of 
qualifications between Member States represented significant barriers to entry for non-national 
suppliers. It was thought that increasing competition as a result of the opening-up of public 
procurement and the move towards common European standards would lead to: 
(a) an increase in cross-border trade, particularly among the large, independent engineering 
consultancies; 
(b) reductions in price and convergence of fees across Europe. 
20.1.2. Coverage 
This case study considers the consulting engineering sector as defined by NACE 837, namely 
the initiation, research, design and monitoring of the execution of all forms of engineering 
projects and systems. It focuses on professional, stand-alone engineering consultancies, as 
these are the principal suppliers within the EU and their activities are most readily identifiable. 
20.1.3. Data 
The following sources ofinformation have been used in this case study: 
(a) European Federation of Engineering Consulting Associations (EFCA), Industry 
panorama, 1993. 
(b) In-house engineering consultancy within the public sector, White Book, EFCA, June 
1995. 
(c) Statistical analysis related to the EU Services Directive, Danish Association of 
Consulting Engineers, March 1996. 
(d) The top 150 consulting engineering and/or architectural groups, Arkitekt & 
Ingenjörsföretagen, January 1996. 
(e) International projects entrusted to members during 1995, British Association of 
Consulting Engineers, 1996. 
(f) Cecchini report, The cost of non-Europe in public sector procurement, European 
Commission, 1988. 
(g) Interviews with senior executives of major European organizations involved in the 
engineering consultancy industry. 
Comparison of data at a European level, however, was hampered by a shortage of reliable 
statistics on this relatively specialized but fragmented sector, and in particular Member State 
differences in the: 
(a) classification of consulting engineering activities, 
(b) nature of associated professional activities, 
(c) nature of demand. 
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20.1.4. Key findings 
In 1987, the engineering consultancy market was generally fragmented on both the supply and 
the demand side. This has not changed significantly, although a dramatic reduction in demand 
has reduced prices and increased the intensity of competition. This effect, however, has taken 
place nationally, with cross-border EU activity remaining low (3^4% of revenue), despite the 
continued success of European consultancies outside Europe. 
There is a trend towards large companies becoming larger and seeking to use strategic 
partnerships and consortia as a means of developing intra-European business. Presently, 
however, the positions of the leading consultancies in the UK, Germany and the Netherlands 
have not altered markedly because of continued barriers to intra-EU trade, including 
differences in fee regulations and qualifications required. 
20.2. Evolution of the engineering consultancy market 
20.2.1. Drivers of change 
The major drivers of change are: 
(a) Economic constraints - the recession, coupled with cut-backs in public expenditure, has 
seriously affected investment levels across Europe and resulted in a reduction of 
activities in home markets and an increase in the emerging and more dynamic markets of 
the Far and Middle East. 
(b) Nature of demand: 
(i) Demand for a full range of services within a single company is increasing the 
critical mass necessary to compete effectively. Together with an accelerating rate 
of technological change, this is leading to strategic alliances, partnerships and 
increased subcontracting to specialist consultancies, as firms are unable to justify 
the investment necessary to provide all services in-house. 
(ii) Reduced public-sector expenditure has resulted in demand for contractors to 
address issues of risk management by providing guaranteed levels of performance 
from the project on its completion. This is particularly relevant in the UK, where 
the Public Finance Initiative has seen the private sector invest some ECU 6 billion 
in public-sector projects over the past year. 
20.2.2. Demand side (1987-94) 
Structure 
The public-sector demand for civil engineering services is related to investments in the 
following areas: 
(a) transport systems and infrastructure, 
(b) building and housing: administrative buildings and other building and structures. 
(c) water supply and environmental projects, 
(d) energy supply and related infrastructure, 
(e) telecommunications, 
(f) industrial complexes. 
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The nature of consulting engineering varies significantly from country to country, as does its 
profitability. National markets are still separated by major differences relating to bureaucratic 
procedures, fee regulations and pre-qualification criteria. Generally, however, at Member State 
level, the fragmented nature of demand has changed little since 1987. 
Market size 
Estimation of market size is frustrated by the ill-defined contours of the supply side. Projects 
are often carried out by contractors which provide engineering services incidental to their 
other activities, making it difficult to isolate the consulting component from the cost of the 
overall project. 
The European Federation of Engineering Consulting Associations (EFCA), however, 
estimates the volume of investments in Europe requiring engineering consultancy in 1992 to 
be approximately ECU 670 billion. As consulting engineering typically represents 8-9% of the 
cost of a project, the value of the market could be of the order of ECU 55 billion, of which 
they estimate the public-sector share to be ECU 17 billion. 
The only data available on the industry as a whole are provided by EFCA, whose members 
represent approximately 40% of engineering consultants in Europe. On the basis of their 1993 
turnover of ECU 13 billion, the total market is estimated at ECU 31 billion. The ECU 24 
billion difference between this value and the initial estimate of ECU 55 billion represents the 
value of consulting engineering services provided in-house by both the public and private 
sectors. 
EFCA estimates that as much as 40% of the ECU 17 billion public-sector consulting market is 
effectively closed to competition as projects are automatically passed through to existing in-
house facilities. 
Concentration of supply 
Concentration of supply varies across Europe, depending on the nature of the supply side. In 
Member States such as the UK and the Netherlands, which have a tradition of large, 
independent engineering consultancies, concentration is relatively low. Conversely, in 
Member States where the supply side is dominated by purchasers' in-house facilities and there 
are fewer independent consultancies, for example France and Italy, concentration is 
considerably higher as work is carried out internally. 
20.2.3. Supply side (1987-94) 
Supplier concentration 
The consulting sector can be characterized by two distinct groupings as regards supplier 
concentration, namely those companies which traditionally operate within the construction 
industry, and those which are stand-alone and not controlled by any companies with 
manufacturing or contracting interests. 
In Member States such as Italy and France, the industry tends to be dominated by small and 
medium-sized enterprises, resulting in low supplier concentration. However, contractors in the 
UK, the Netherlands and, to a lesser extent, Germany, tend to be large, usually independent, 
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stand-alone consultancies. Consequently, supplier concentration is relatively high, particularly 
where large public-sector projects are concerned. 
There is a strong relationship between national concentration of supply, sales turnover and the 
ability of domestic suppliers to compete in the international arena. As Table 20.1 indicates, 
almost one in three of the top 150 companies, and 15 of the top 40, are UK-based, while in 
France, only five companies appear in the top 150, and one in the top 40. 
Table 20.1. Nationality of the top 150 European consulting engineering companies in 
the EU 
Member State 
United Kingdom 
Germany 
Sweden 
Netherlands 
Spain 
Finland 
Denmark 
France 
Italy 
Others1 
Number of companies within the top ISO 
48 
27 
17 
14 
7 
7 
7 
5 
1 
24 
Note: ' Includes Switzerland, Poland, Norway, Portugal. 
Source: Danish Association of Consulting Engineers, 1996. 
Table 20.2 provides a summary of key facts on the top 40 consulting engineering practices in 
Europe. 
Competitiveness 
Since 1987, competitiveness within the consulting engineering sector has increased, price 
levels have fallen sharply and fees are converging. These trends have been driven by the 
economic constraints facing public purchasers, which have led to greater emphasis on price 
when evaluating tenders. 
Trade flow analysis 
Major players in the industry suggest only 3-4% of sales are typically intra-European. A 
number of reasons on both the demand and supply sides account for this: 
(a) public authorities are inclined to discriminate against non-national companies; 
(b) there are a number of legislative and bureaucratic differences between Member States; 
(c) there is often a lack of recognition of non-national qualifications; 
(d) saturated markets and decreasing demand have generally reduced profit margins across 
Europe making it more difficult for non-national companies to penetrate unfamiliar 
markets; 
(e) in general, suppliers concentrate on domestic markets and non-EU countries. 
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Table 20.2. Major European companies 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
Company 
Heidemij Group 
Gibb & Partners/Law Co. Group 
Jaakko Poyry Group 
Mott MacDonald Group 
Over Amp Partnership 
WS Atkins Ltd 
Fugro NV 
Acer Consultants 
Pell Frischman Group Ltd 
Maunsell Group 
Rust Limited 
DHV Group 
Sir William Halcrow & Partner 
Lahmeyer International GmbH 
Carl Bro Group 
COWI consult 
Scott Wilson Kirkpatrick 
VBBgroup 
J&W Group 
Electrowatt Engineering Services 
Ramboil, Hannemann & Hojlund 
Dorsch Consult Ing. GmbH 
Tebodin, Consultants & engineers 
Oranjewoud group 
Fichtner Group 
AF­Group 
Babtie Group 
Binnie & Partners 
Serete group 
Haskoning BV 
Haas Consult Group 
Scandiaconsult Group 
Mouchel Group 
Tawn Group 
Initec 
High Point plc 
Parkman Group 
GOPA 
Sener 
BDP 
Services 
MN 
MD 
MD 
MD 
MD 
MD 
CE 
MD 
MD 
CE 
CE 
MD 
MD 
MD 
MD 
MD 
MD 
MD 
MD 
E,I 
MD 
MD 
MD 
MD 
MD 
Ι,Ε,Μ 
MD 
CE 
MD 
MD 
MD 
MD 
PM,CE 
MD 
MD 
MD 
MD 
MD 
MD 
MD 
Nationality 
NL 
UK/USA 
FIN 
UK 
UK 
UK 
NL 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
NL 
UK 
D 
DK 
DK 
UK 
S 
S 
CH 
DK 
D 
NL 
NL 
D 
S 
UK 
UK 
F 
NL . 
D 
S 
UK 
NL 
E 
UK 
UK 
D 
E 
UK 
Employees 
4,584 
4,500 
4,500 
4,436 
4,250 
3,841 
3,454 
3,250 
2,730 
2,515 
2,383 
2,356 
2,234 
2,132 
2,085 
1,983 
1,946 
1,868 
1,809 
1,712 
1,661 
1,660 
1,650 
1,664 
1,337 
1,321 
1,240 
1,203 
1,200 
1,100 
1100 
1013 
980 
979 
938 
920 
880 
820 
815 
760 
Cumulative 
employees 
4,584 
9,084 
13,584 
18,020 
22,270 
26,111 
29,565 
32,815 
35,545 
38,060 
40,443 
42,799 
45,033 
47,165 
49,250 
51,233 
53,179 
55,047 
56,856 
58,568 
60,229 
61,889 
63,539 
65,203 
66,540 
67,861 
69,101 
70,304 
71,504 
72,604 
73,704 
74,717 
75,697 
76,676 
77,614 
78,534 
79,414 
80,234 
81,049 
81,809 
Turnover 
(million 
ECU) 
386 
294 
228 
222 
202 
249 
310 
178 
486 
116 
137 
195 
115 
183 
142 
148 
97 
144 
133 
162 
128 
102 
106 
117 
119 
80 
60 
63 
323 
82 
55 
64 
59 
50 
83 
34 
34 
192 
57 
46 
Cumulative 
value 
(million ECU) 
386 
680 
908 
1,130 
1,332 
1,581 
1,891 
2,069 
2,555 
2,671 
2,808 
3,003 
3,118 
3,301 
3,443 
3,591 
3,688 
3,832 
3,965 
4,127 
4,255 
4,357 
4,463 
4,580 
4,699 
4,779 
4,839 
4,902 
5,225 
5,307 
5,362 
5,426 
5,485 
5,535 
5,618 
5,652 
5,686 
5,878 
5,935 
5,981 
Notes: PM = project management, A = architecture, CE =civil engineering, E =electrical, M =mechanical, 
1 industrial, MD = multi­disciplinary. 
Source: Arckitekt & Ingenjörsföretagen, 1996. 
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Analysis of published notices provides further evidence of very small trade flows. As Table 
20.3 indicates, although transparency has increased dramatically, even over the period of one 
year, cross-border activities as measured by the number of contracts awarded to non-domestic 
suppliers, are strictly limited. 
Table 20.3. Published notices and awarded contracts 
Country 
Austria 
Belgium 
Germany 
Denmark 
Spain 
France 
United Kingdom 
Italy 
Netherlands 
Sweden 
Portugal 
Others 
Total 
Number of notices 
1994 
1 
0 
177 
44 
38 
172 
317 
23 
26 
19 
2 
88 
907 
Number of notices 
1995 
27 
10 
428 
98 
279 
486 
527 
72 
64 
58 
37 
197 
2,283 
Contracts awarded to 
foreign companies 
1995 
0 
0 
2 
5 
0 
0 
0 
3 
3 
2 
0 
5 
20 
Total contract 
awards pubi. 
1995 
3 
23 
113 
37 
35 
120 
182 
23 
45 
157 
3 
134 
875 
Source: Danish Association of Consulting Engineers. 
20.3. Impact of the single European market 
20.3.1. History 
In general, the impact of the single market has been minimal on the general nature of the 
consulting engineering market. As in 1987, it continues to be strongly influenced by cultural 
attitudes towards design and the role of consulting engineers. Freedom of movement of 
persons and services has not resulted in a substantial increase in cross-border activities. 
Although the public procurement legislation has increased awareness of opportunities within 
the EU, its effect has been marginal as evidenced by the small percentage of business won by 
non-national suppliers. Two areas of particular concern within the industry are that: 
(a) it cannot impact the estimated 40% of public-sector engineering consulting which is 
provided in-house; 
(b) some companies consider it has had a negative impact on their traditionally close 
relationship with architects. 'Automatic' sub-contracting by a winning architect to the 
engineering consultancy which helped prepare a proposal is no longer possible in a 
number of cases, leading to unrecovered costs and duplication of work with new 
consultancies with which they are unfamiliar. 
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20.3.2. Future 
Development of the consulting engineering industry is closely related to the evolution of the 
construction industry. Thus, it can be expected that continued reductions in public expenditure 
for infrastructure projects will lead to increased competition, resulting in: 
(a) pressure to market-test and outsource in-house service providers, opening up previously 
closed internal markets; 
(b) more widespread use of public-/private-sector partnerships as alternatives to traditional 
methods of finance; 
(c) increased rationalization and use of collaborative agreements, particularly by the large, 
independent consultancies in the UK and the Netherlands seeking to penetrate non-
national markets. 
Rationalization will also continue as public-sector purchasers increasingly demand complete 
solutions (design, build and operate), particularly in Member States where historically the 
supply side has been fragmented. This will lead to the provision of engineering consultancy 
services by larger and more cost-effective multidisciplinary consultancies. 
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21. Uniforms 
21.1. Overview 
21.1.1. Ex ante hypothesis 
In 1987, the public sector was an insignificant purchaser of clothing with the exception of 
uniforms for the military, emergency services and health services. In common with the textiles 
and clothing sector in general, uniform manufacturing was dominated by SMEs, with little in 
the way of cross-border trade, and significant price variations between Member States. 
The opening up of public-sector markets was expected to lead to an increase in cross-border 
trade, with competitive suppliers taking advantage of significant price disparities, although the 
extent to which 'smaller' SMEs would benefit was not clear. 
21.1.2. Coverage 
Public-sector demand for uniforms is principally for: 
(a) military type uniforms (army, police, etc.), 
(b) civil uniforms (fire brigades, city councils, post office, railways operators, etc.), 
(c) professional workwear/uniforms (primarily hospitals). 
Demand can be further segmented by: 
(a) purchasing entity size: 
(i) more than 1,000 employees, 
(ii) fewer than 1,000 employees; 
(b) purchasing requirements: 
(i) bespoke/tailored items, procured with a greater emphasis on quality and delivery, 
(ii) standard items purchased primarily on price. 
The markets most sensitive to the public procurement legislation are purchasers with more 
than 1,000 employees buying standard items - high volume standard items, with the military 
(Ministry of Defence and police forces) the key purchaser. 
21.1.3. Data 
The case study is based primarily on qualitative information since there are no European 
statistics at the level of uniforms, as defined above. As a result, the principal sources of 
information were in-depth interviews with senior executives from leading companies and trade 
associations. 
Trade flow analysis has been carried out on 'men's and boys' industrial and occupational 
clothes' as the category closest to 'uniforms'. 
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21.1.4. Key findings 
The public procurement legislation has played a role in opening up previously closed markets, 
but other factors have been as important, such as a decline in demand which was reflected in 
an increase in the intensity of supply-side competition. 
The experience of major suppliers indicates that: 
(a) the potential for purchasers to continue to discriminate against new suppliers, even when 
complying with the legislation, is considerable; 
(b) non-compliance, in particular by splitting contracts (failing to aggregate), is still 
widespread, especially in smaller (sub-central) purchasers. 
The benefits of increased cross-border trade have only been realized by the industry's largest 
players. There is a strong perception, even among larger suppliers that have been successful in 
selling across borders, that key markets are still closed to non-domestic suppliers. 
SMEs have continued to focus on local and regional markets since they: 
(a) lack the resource to compete for non-domestic business, 
(b) do not consider other markets to be truly open and fair. 
In addition, the legislation is seen to have complicated the tendering process with additional 
bureaucracy in relation to, for example, (pre-)qualification, which is particularly burdensome 
for SMEs. 
There is an apparent contradiction between the continued closed nature of regional and 
local markets, with purchasers still showing a national preference, and reported reductions 
in prices. It appears, however, that, in common with several other case-study sectors, 
purchasers have used the legislation as a means of driving down prices whilst keeping the 
same suppliers. 
21.2. Evolution of the uniforms market 
21.2.1. Drivers of change 
The major drivers of change in the market since 1987 have been: 
(a) reductions in public spending, 
(b) changes in public-sector uniform procurement strategies, 
(c) public procurement legislation, 
(d) increases in public-sector outsourcing and privatization. 
21.2.2. Demand side (1987-94) 
Structure 
The overall structure of the demand side has not changed substantially since 1987, with the 
exception of some Member States, such as the Netherlands and the UK, where certain public-
sector services have been outsourced, such as: 
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(a) security, 
(b) waste management, 
(c) health. 
This has, in practice, taken these activities into the private sector. 
The principal purchaser of uniforms in each Member State is the Ministry of Defence, 
followed by centralized uniformed services, such as the police in some Member States. 
Market size 
No market size statistics are available for uniforms. However, as the result of a decline in 
overall demand, the total EUR-15 market is estimated at ECU 3-4 billion (approximately 
0.5% of total procurement). The decline in demand between 1987 and 1994 is attributed to: 
(a) budget constraints in most Member States, with a general reduction in order volumes; 
(b) reductions in the size of key markets, such as defence (due to spending cuts as a result of 
the end of the Cold War) and customs (due to the single market). 
The nature of demand has also changed, with: 
(a) a shift away from the traditional practice of purchasing a standard number of uniforms 
per employee to one based on a 'wear-and-tear' replacement policy, with purchasers 
placing more frequent smaller orders; 
(b) increases in the number of female employees changing the nature of uniform 
specifications; 
(c) an increase in the number of tenders being published in the Official Journal. 
Concentration of supply 
There is evidence to suggest that sub-central markets are being served by fewer suppliers due 
to exits from the market by a number of firms. At the larger end of the market, little change is 
seen to have taken place, with the exception of some new larger non-domestic operators. 
21.2.3. Supply side (1987-94) 
Supplier concentration 
The supply side is dominated by SMEs, with even the largest players only medium-sized, 
compared with those in other sectors. Most firms have continued to focus on their local and 
regional public-sector markets, with resource constraints and perceived barriers to entry 
discouraging attempts to sell across borders. 
The reduction in overall demand has led to some concentration of supply. A number of 
companies, which had maintained a public-sector uniforms capacity alongside private-sector 
production, have exited this market segment, closing down operations to focus on the (higher 
margin) private-sector market. 
The subsequent decline in employment has also been exacerbated by a shift in production 
towards lower-cost facilities in North Africa and Eastern Europe. However, these 
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developments are not unique to uniforms, and reflect a general trend in the clothing and 
textiles industry. 
Supply-side specialization 
The nature and (un)availability of statistics for this sector mean use of the Balassa index of 
specialization is not possible. At a qualitative level, there was no evidence to suggest that any 
significant changes had taken place from this perspective. 
Competitiveness 
Reductions in overall demand, combined with changes in purchasing policy have, as described 
above, led to increased supplier concentration. Despite a reduction in the number of players, 
pressure on prices has still been significant. 
In the majority of Member States and market segments, prices are considered to have reduced 
significantly. Published figures are unavailable, but industry estimates of reductions were of 
20-30%. These reductions were attributed to a combination of: 
(a) increased cross-border competition in high-volume market segments; 
(b) entry into the market of wholesalers sourcing from low-cost non-EU producers, and 
therefore without domestic suppliers' national cost base; 
(c) use of 'lowest price' by local/regional purchasers. 
Public-sector import penetration 
Despite the dominance of SMEs, the larger players from most Member States, such as Induico 
from Spain (the EU's market leader), Syntex from Belgium and Albatross from Portugal, have 
been actively involved in cross-border public-sector markets. Non-domestic players are seen to 
have been successful in winning market share. In the key defence market segment, it is 
estimated such firms now account for: 
(a) 40% of the Italian market (versus 0% in 1987), 
(b) 5 0-60% of the Dutch market, 
(c) an increasing share of the French market. 
Whilst the larger players have been successful in penetrating volume markets, this is not seen 
to have extended to the lower volume market segment. 
These developments were reflected in estimates of EU public-sector import penetration in 
1994 of between 15.3% and 16.2%, of which: 
(a) some 2.7% represented direct imports, 
(b) 12.6-13.5% represented indirect imports. 
Trade flow analysis 
Changes in the supply side are reflected in trade statistics (Figure 21.1). These show imports 
had increased: 
(a) at intra-EUR-12 level from some ECU 49 million in 1988 to ECU 64 million in 1993; 
Uniforms 311 
(b) at extra-EUR-12 level from around ECU 100 million in 1988 to over ECU 180 million 
in 1993, reflecting the shifts in production to outside Europe. 
Figure 21.1. Imports into EUR-12 of men's or boys' workwear 
Hinlra-EC12 
acxtra-EC12 I 
Note: 1993 figures have been collected using new procedures (Intrastat system). 
Source: Comext database, Eurostat, 1995. 
The shift in production outside of the EU has resulted in a trebling of the EUR-12 trade 
balance to over ECU 150 million (Figure 21.2). 
Figure 21.2. Trade balance - men's or boys' workwear 
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Note: 1993 figures have been collected using new procedures (Intrastat system). 
Source: Comext database. Eurostat, 1995. 
21.3. Impact of the single European market 
21.3.1. History 
The key impact of the single European market on the industry has been the free movement of 
goods, which has: 
(a) reduced delays and transport costs, 
(b) facilitated market access. 
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In addition, the abolition of import quotas has increased the market share of non-EU countries, 
resulting in a shifting of uniform production to North Africa and Eastern Europe. 
The public procurement legislation is seen to have led to an increase in: 
(a) openness (publication of notices), 
(b) non-domestic firms winning business. 
Despite this, a number of major barriers to achievement of the legislation's aims (areas of non-
compliance) were highlighted: 
(a) a lack of adequate/appropriate procedures to tackle infringements - firms are reluctant to 
'take on' (potential) customers under the present arrangements; 
(b) the intangible nature of award criteria used by purchasers means that they can be (and 
are perceived to be) used to favour preferred suppliers; 
(c) although legally correct, response times given for submission of tenders are often 
inadequate; 
(d) awarding authorities are still splitting contracts and avoiding having to publish tender 
notices by not aggregating annual requirements at either a departmental or an entity 
level; 
(e) specifications are frequently not functional, but, for example, define specific fabric 
characteristics which give preferred suppliers a competitive edge; 
(f) the tendering process introduced by some purchasers to comply with the legislation's 
requirements has resulted in excessive bureaucracy which acts as a deterrent to potential 
new suppliers. 
21.3.2. Future 
No new major drivers were highlighted with regard to future market developments, with a 
continuation of the current trends considered most likely. 
It would appear unlikely that, given the preponderance of SMEs in the sector, any significant 
increase in cross-border, or even intra-Member State, business will take place if the current 
(perceived) way in which purchasers have implemented the legislation's requirements 
continues. 
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22. Construction 
22.1. Overview 
22 Λ Λ. Ex ante hypothesis 
By the 1980s, European civil engineering contractors had earned a global reputation by 
winning major projects - roads, power stations, dams, railways, tunnels, etc. - in Africa, Asia, 
the Middle East, and South America. However, despite being members of the EC and, in 
particular, the public sector in EC Member States being subject to the Public Works Directive 
(71/305/EEC), intra-EC public-sector trade in construction and civil engineering was minimal. 
As a rule, only national champions were invited to compete for major public contracts. 
In 1987, it was assumed that the opening up of public-sector construction markets to intra-EU 
competition would lead to: 
(a) growth in intra-EU trade in major civil engineering projects; 
(b) changes in the domestic supplier base within Member States, with medium-sized - and 
small - contractors gaining access to previously closed local markets; 
(c) major players establishing in other Member States by means of mergers/acquisitions, 
joint ventures, strategic alliances (including EEIGs) and project-based consortia; 
(d) a general lowering of contract prices. 
22.1.2. Coverage 
Public works covers the expenditure by central government, sub-central government and 
utilities on civil and structural engineering, including maintenance and repairs as defined by 
NACE 500. Typical projects are roads, bridges, tunnels, power stations, railways, airport 
terminals and runways, ports, offices, etc. 
Since the ECU 5 million publication threshold in the Public Works and the works section of 
the Utilities Directives applies to the size of individual contracts, this case study will focus on 
civil engineering, where the contracts tend to be large and more easily tradeable. 
22.1.3. Data 
The following sources ofinformation have been used in this case study: 
(a) Cecchini report, The cost of non-Europe in public procurement, European Commission, 
1988; 
(b) International European Construction Federation (FIEC) sector publication, report 
number 37, December 1995; 
(c) The state of the construction industry UK Department of the Environment, 1996; 
(d) Annual Report on the Italian Construction Industry, (Associazione Nazionale Costruttori 
Edili), 1995; 
(e) German Construction Industry, Hauptverband der Deutschen Bauindustrie eV, 1994; 
(f) Panorama of EU industry 1995/96, Eurostat; 
(g) interviews with senior executives of major European organizations involved in the 
domestic construction industry. 
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22.1.4. Key findings 
The overall impact of the single European market and public procurement legislation on the 
EU civil engineering market has been minimal in comparison with the changes brought about 
by declining demand due to reduced public finance for infrastructure investments. The result 
has been a dramatic rise in competition with prices falling throughout Europe. 
The majority of large civil engineering contracts, however, continue to be won by national 
suppliers, although in a small number of cases, non-national suppliers are being used to drive 
down prices of traditional suppliers. What success there has been in developing intra-EU trade 
is due to smaller specialist subcontractors which have had significant success in exporting 
their know-how throughout Europe. 
The supply side continues to be dominated by a small number of large national contractors in 
France, Germany and the UK. The level of concentration has increased slightly due to the 
recession, forcing further mergers and acquisitions at national as well as at international level. 
The existing market structure will not remain static indefinitely, and the most likely 
competitive response will be an upsurge in mergers and acquisitions, particularly among the 
leading French and German players, as they seek to restructure and rationalize their operations, 
eliminate competition and penetrate non-national markets through cross-border ownership. 
22.2. Evolution of the construction market 
22.2.1. Drivers of change 
Construction output is very much a barometer of the economic cycle, with large projects being 
postponed in times of economic downturn. 
Since 1987, the key drivers of change influencing construction demand and supply in the area 
of public-sector projects have been: 
(a) economic recession, 
(b) German unification, 
(c) the creation of the single European market and implementation of the Public Works and 
Utilities Directives. 
22.2.2. Demand side (1987-94) 
Structure 
With the exception of the UK, where utilities in the water, power, gas, ports/airports and 
telecommunications sectors have been privatized, the structure of purchasing entities and their 
responsibilities have not changed appreciably since 1987. 
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Market size 
The EU construction market in 1994 was worth an estimated ECU 650 billion,52 of which 
public works accounted for almost 40%. Some 60% of public works expenditure was on civil 
engineering projects (including maintenance and repairs). 
The economic recession of the first half of the 1990s was reflected in a sharp downturn in 
construction output in all Member States other than Germany which benefited from rebuilding 
of the infrastructure in the eastern Länder. With all governments putting pressure on public 
spending and operating relatively high interest rate policies in order to reduce public deficits, 
major civil engineering projects suffered disproportionately (see Figure 22.1). 
Table 22.1. New construction output in the major EU markets (million ECU in 1991 
prices) 
France 
Germany1 
Italy 
UK 
Spain 
Year 
1987 
1991 
1994 
1987 
1991 
1994 
1987 
1991 
1994 
1987 
1991 
1994 
1987 
1991 
1994 
' West and East Germany. 
Source: FIEC, December, 1 
Constr. 
75,172 
86,059 
78,207 
145,302 
198,931 
245,381 
86,632 
96,472 
83,904 
67,210 
73,078 
69,548 
42,542 
59,940 
52,763 
995. 
Civil 
engineering 
17,311 
21,606 
19,229 
21,644 
27,687 
31,360 
12,819 
12,905 
9,271 
9,925 
13,385 
11,390 
8,944 
18,169 
14,966 
Public 
non-residential 
7,496 
8,288 
11,731 
14,066 
16,990 
17,878 
5,788 
7,739 
5,458 
8,378 
12,597 
11,218 
2,125 
3,760 
3,036 
Constr. 
(%) 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
Civil eng. 
(%) 
23 
25 
25 
15 
14 
13 
14.8 
13.3 
11 
14.7 
18.3 
17 
21 
30 
28.3 
Public 
non-residential 
(%) 
10 
9.6 
15 
10 
8.5 
7 
6.7 
8 
7 
12.4 
17 
16 
4.9 
6.2 
5.7 
Concentration of supply 
The lead-up to completion of the single European market in respect of the freedom of 
movement of persons, goods, capital and services, the use of European standards and the 
implementation of the Public Procurement Directives encouraged major European contractors 
to pursue large civil engineering projects in other Member States. 
Although there are examples of important civil engineering projects having been awarded to 
contractors from other Member States, the in-depth interview programme indicated that in all 
Member States other than Germany and, to an extent, Spain, the concentration of supply was 
52 International European Construction Federation (FIEC). 
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extremely high and that this had not changed since 1987. Germany and Spain had a number of 
large regional contractors that tended to win major projects, making their concentration of 
supply less pronounced than in, say, France. 
This view is supported by: 
(a) the results of the demand-side survey, where purchasing entities claimed not to have 
experienced any change in supply following implementation of the public procurement 
directives; 
(b) the estimate of intra-EU import penetration in civil engineering (7.4-10.6%) - the 
second lowest of all the tradable sectors investigated - which was largely indirect 
imports and reflected (specialist) subcontracting. 
The in-depth interview programme indicates that: 
(a) in 1994 the national markets were still being supplied predominantly by national 
contractors; 
(b) in certain Member States, some contracts have been awarded to contractors from other 
Member States. 
22.2.3. Supply side (1987-94) 
Supplier concentration 
As in 1987, a small number of large national contractors dominate the civil engineering sector, 
although the level of concentration has increased due to recession, forcing further 
rationalization through closures, mergers and acquisitions. Out of the top 19 companies in 
Europe, France dominates with eight (four of which are in the top seven), followed by the UK 
and Germany both with four, and Sweden, Spain and the Netherlands with one each (Table 
22.2). 
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Table 22.2. Top construction firms, 1993 
Company 
Bouygues 
SGE (Générale des Eaux) 
Pilipp Holzmann 
BICC 
Eiffage 
Trafalgar House 
GTM-Entrepose (Lyonnaise des Eaux) 
Hochtief 
Bilfinger & Berger 
Tarmac 
Svanska 
AMEC 
Spie Batignolles (Schneider) 
Strabag 
Colas (Bouygues) 
FCC 
CEGELEC (Alcatel Alsthom) 
HBG 
Dumez 
Country of origin 
France 
France 
Germany 
United Kingdom 
France 
United Kingdom 
France 
Germany 
Germany 
United Kingdom 
Sweden 
United Kingdom 
France 
Germany 
France 
Spain 
France 
Netherlands 
France 
Turnover 
(million ECU) 
9,223 
6,523 
6,437 
5,023 
5,003 
4,973 
4,338 
4,136 
3,475 
3,422 
3,171 
2,800 
2,751 
2,598 
2,492 
2,471 
2,413 
2,404 
2,342 
Share of exports 
in turnover 
(%) 
30.0 
42.6 
34.4 
31.0 
16.4 
60.0 
38.6 
26.2 
40.6 
17.0 
23.0 
20.0 
31.4 
15.7 
27.3 
5.0 
41.7 
41.0 
45.9 
Number of 
employees 
90,100 
64,000 
43,800 
39,200 
47,800 
35,900 
46,100 
31,800 
45,800 , 
24,800 
27,400 
25,700 
29,800 
21,300 
28,300 
30,600 
26,200 
18,400 
25,900 
Source: Special Mille Entreprises, Le Moniteur, November 1994. 
In France, civil engineering forms the major component of total turnover of the top five 
construction companies (Bouygues, SGE, Eiffage, GTM and Spie). A Pareto analysis based on 
value indicates the concentrated nature of the industry (see Figure 22.1), with the first three 
players enjoying a 25-35% share of the civil engineering market and some 80% of major 
domestic projects. 
Figure 22.1. Estimated Pareto curve in France - civil engineering market 
30 40 50 60 
cumulative Çf of number of companies 
Source: Interviews, EuroStrategy Consultants estimate. 
In Germany, the seven largest companies (Holzmann, Hochtief, Bilfinger & Berger, Strabag, 
Dyckerhoff & Widman, Zublin and Walter Bau) account for approximately 7% of sector 
output. The three largest companies are the major players within the civil engineering sector, 
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dominating the majority of large projects in the domestic market and pursuing business in 
other European countries through acquisitions and strategic alliances. 
In terms of a Pareto analysis, the German civil engineering sector appears very close to 
Pareto's 80/20 rule (see Figure 22.2). 
Figure 22.2. Estimated Pareto curve in Germany - civil engineering market 
30 40 50 60 
cumulative %of numb er of companies 
Source: Interviews, EuroStrategy Consultants estimate. 
In the UK, 25% of total construction output by value is accounted for by the top eight 
companies (BICC, Trafalgar House, Tarmac, AMEC, P&O Construction, George Wimpey, 
John Laing and John Mowlem & Co). Despite this, supplier concentration in the civil 
engineering subsector is less than in France (where 30% of output is accounted for by the top 
three companies) due to a smaller share of company output realized in the civil engineering 
sector. 
As with the German market, the UK civil engineering sector appears very close to Pareto's 
80/20 rule (see Figure 22.3). 
Figure 22.3. Estimated Pareto curve in the UK - civil engineering market 
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cumulative % of number o f companies 
Source: Interviews, EuroStrategy Consultants estimate. 
In Italy, supplier concentration is the lowest of the major markets (Figure 22.4), with the 
largest Italian companies being smaller than their German, French or UK counterparts. The top 
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50 companies cover approximately 6% of the total domestic construction output and 40% of 
the civil engineering market. This industry structure is largely the result of a relatively 
fragmented demand policy implemented over an extended period. 
Figure 22.4. Estimated Pareto curve in Italy - civil engineering market 
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Source: Interviews, EuroStrategy Consultants estimate. 
Competitiveness 
Since 1987, competition within the construction industry has increased sharply due to a heavy 
contraction of demand caused by greatly reduced public expenditure. Consequently, the 
industry has been pushed towards a rationalization process through mergers and acquisitions. 
In Italy, the three major companies - Cogefar, Fiat Impresit and Lodigiani - recently joined 
forces through a collaborative agreement, while in Germany, Holzmann acquired Nord France 
and Bilfinger acquired Razel. In France, Générale des Eaux acquired a range of companies in 
Germany and GTM and Dumez merged. 
According to the leading contractors interviewed, during the recession project prices were 
squeezed by the public sector in most Member States, to the extent that in 1994 they were 20-
30% below 1990 levels. Although this view is not supported by the demand-side survey 
results, where respondents reported no such savings, it is consistent with the statistical data 
provided by FIEC and with what has happened in previous recessions. 
Since implementation of the directives, a small number of projects have been placed with non-
national suppliers to encourage competitive pricing from existing contractors. However, in 
general, few contracts have been won by 'new' suppliers and there is no evidence of 
significant loss of market share in the larger Member States. 
Trade flow analysis 
As Figure 22.5 indicates, there has been an increase in the trade of building and civil 
engineering components within Europe. This has been driven largely by technical progress and 
facilitated by growing harmonization of standards, which has lead to increased préfabrication 
of subsystems and assembly of major structural components on site. 
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Figure 22.5. Imports into the EUR-12 of structural components for building or civil 
engineering, prefabricated, or cement or articificial stone 
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Source: Comext database, Eurostat, 1995. 
Between 1988 and 1993, total intra-EUR-12 imports increased by 65% in nominal terms from 
approximately ECU 97 million to ECU 161 million in 1993. Over the same period, extra-
EUR-12 imports grew much faster, with import penetration rising from approximately ECU 
4.5 million to ECU 93 million. This increase sent the trade balance from ECU 58 million in 
1988 to a negative value of ECU 20 million in 1993. 
Overall, however, the value of trade is still relatively low compared to the total value of the 
construction market in Europe. This is supported by EuroStrategy Consultants' estimates of 
public-sector import penetration, which suggest that direct imports from within the EU are 
approximately 3%, while direct imports outwith the EU are insignificant. Taking into account 
indirect imports, overall import penetration is between 7% and 10%. 
The greatest proportion of intra-EU imports, however, is understood to be in the area of 
specialist subcontracting, rather than the direct activities of principal contractors attempting to 
gain access to new markets (where there has been little change). 
22.3. Impact of the single European market 
22.3.1. History 
In general, the impact of the public procurement legislation on the construction industry has 
been marginal, .with the majority of identified savings due to the recession rather than 
competitive pressures. Although the requirement to advertise in the OJ has increased 
information on market opportunities and the number of tenders published, there is little 
evidence to suggest the public sector has, in general, availed itself of these new opportunities. 
The legislation has, however, resulted in a small number of contracts being won on price by 
new, non-national players. In such cases, the legislation has been used more as a convenient 
technique to drive down the prices of traditional suppliers. 
The structure of the industry has remained essentially unchanged since 1987, with national 
markets continuing to be dominated by a small number of large domestic contractors. 
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22.3.2. Future 
The existing structure of the construction industry is not expected to remain static indefinitely, 
particularly as competitive pressures increase, and external drivers such as the harmonization 
of technical standards, mutual recognition of qualification procedures, and the move to 
economic and monetary union take effect. 
The most likely competitive response will be an upsurge in mergers and acquisitions, 
particularly among the leading French and German players, as they seek to restructure and 
rationalize their operations, eliminate competition and penetrate non-national markets through 
cross-border ownership. Medium-sized companies will tend to disappear as they find 
themselves unable to reach the critical mass necessary to compete effectively. 
At the level of the EU, the concentration of supply and suppliers will increase, with all 
markets for major civil engineering projects being shared by the leading European contractors. 
However, within Member States, the concentration of supply is likely to decrease. 
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SECTION G 
Impact assessment 
This sections draws together the findings and results of all the previous sections to arrive at an 
assessment of the extent to which the ex ante hypotheses concerning the legislation have been 
realized in relation to both purchasers (the demand side) and their key supplying sectors (the 
supply side), and the reasons for their realization. 
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23. Impact assessment 
23.1. Ex ante hypothesis 
The ex ante hypothesis is considered under two headings: 
(a) direct impacts, 
(b) downstream impacts. 
The legislation was put in place to regulate the demand side with the aim of creating an open 
and fair public procurement market. The extent to which this aim has been met has been 
termed the direct impact of the legislation. The downstream impacts examine the changes 
which have taken place on the demand and supply sides as a result. 
23.1.1. Direct impacts 
It is expected that every interested supplier should: 
(a) have equal opportunity to tender for contracts covered by the directives (openness -
transparency); 
(b) be treated equally in the assessment of their bids (fairness). 
23.1.2. Downstream impacts 
It is expected that: 
(a) supplying industries should have adapted to meet the challenge of the new purchasing 
environment in terms of: 
(i) responding to new public-sector opportunities created by the new transparent and 
fair procurement market, 
(ii) restructuring (where necessary) to improve competitiveness and, generally, to take 
advantage of trade liberalization afforded by the SEM; 
(b) public-sector bodies and utilities should have experienced a reduction in purchasing 
costs. 
23.2. Direct impacts 
23.2.1. Measures of success 
The direct impacts of the opening up of the EU public procurement market are measured in 
terms of: 
(a) openness: 
(i) use of the Official Journal, 
(ii) numbers of entities publishing in relation to the coverage of the directives, 
(iii) extent of publication of notices in relation to the coverage of the directives, 
(iv) use of procedures; 
(b) fairness: 
(i) selection and award criteria and their application, 
(ii) means of redress. 
326 Public procurement 
23.2.2. Openness 
Use of the Official Journal 
In general, the OJ has been a very valuable source of information, for those who read it. It is 
regarded as the single point of focus for business in the public sector, either domestically or in 
other Member States, in particular by those suppliers which are committed to entering new 
markets. This was illustrated by the supply-side survey, which found that: 
(a) an estimated 41% of suppliers to the public sector obtain information from the OJ, but 
SMEs have only a 30% readership, suggesting that larger companies are the main 
beneficiaries of this information; 
(b) an estimated 14-20% of all suppliers to the public sector had identified additional 
opportunities in their domestic markets, and an estimated 9-13% in other EU markets; 
(c) over two-thirds of OJ readers considered information provided in notices to be adequate 
for business purposes. 
These findings were supported by results from the demand-side survey, where the majority of 
purchasers reported their only change in publication media to be the OJ. This implies that 
there has been an increase in access to opportunities within a Member State and in other EU 
Member States, since, previously, public-sector calls for competition were only published 
locally and nationally, not internationally, whilst utilities, in general, did not publish at all. 
Therefore, if suppliers did not know about opportunities before legislation came into force, 
without the OJ, they would probably still be unaware of them today. In this respect, the 
directives have created, in the form of the OJ, greater openness and consistency in relation to 
public-sector opportunities. 
However, there is a lack of knowledge among potential suppliers on the extent of information 
on public-sector opportunities available in the O J due to: 
(a) limited promotion of the OJ at Member State level; 
(b) relatively high subscription fees for the OJ and the TED database, especially for SMEs. 
It can also be inferred that, based on the results of the demand-side survey and the previous 
analysis, it is SMEs which have benefited the least from the legislation since: 
(a) smaller contracts are still let locally to broadly the same suppliers without publication in 
the O J (as they are not being aggregated); 
(b) a lower proportion of SMEs use the OJ. 
Numbers of entities publishing in relation to the coverage of the directives 
As a result of the procurement legislation, there has been an increase in the number of entities 
publishing, reflecting: 
(a) implementation of the Utilities Directives, 
(b) as indicated by the demand-side survey, entities, particularly sub-central government 
bodies, only recently starting to fulfil the directives' publishing requirements. 
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However, the number of entities which are covered and should be publishing does not 
correspond with the actual number of entities publishing. This is illustrated by the significant 
differences between the number of entities in the EAP database (> 100,000) and the number 
that had published in 1995 (>15,000). 
Overall, an estimated 14% of the total number of entities covered by the legislation is actually 
publishing in the OJ. 
Reasons for non-publication by entities reflect a varied understanding of the directives' 
requirements, for example: 
(a) a contract-based approach to purchasing, resulting from a misinterpretation of the 
aggregation rules; 
(b) different definitions for discrete operating units; 
(c) misunderstanding of coverage leading to non-compliance. 
In addition, non-publication is exacerbated by: 
(a) the absence of active policing and enforcement of the directives' requirements at 
Member State level; 
(b) inefficient national legal systems of redress; 
(c) suppliers' reluctance to 'prosecute' potential customers; 
(d) lack of awareness of the legislation's requirements by suppliers, particularly SMEs. 
Extent of publication of notices in relation to the coverage of the directives 
The implementation of legislation has resulted in a significant increase in the total number of 
notices published in the OJ from around 12,000 in 1987 to over 95,000 in 1995, reflecting: 
(a) the entry into force of the Utilities and Services Directives on 1 January 1993; 
(b) the overall increase in awareness of the directives, as reported in the demand-side 
survey, resulting in both more entities publishing and more notices being published per 
entity. 
The impact of the implementation of the Utilities and Services Directives is vividly illustrated 
by the step change in the number of: 
(a) notices published by the utilities, from 0% in 1992 to 14.7% of all notices published in 
1995; 
(b) services notices published, from 11.3% of all notices published by central and sub-
central government in 1993 to 28% of total number of notices in 1995. 
However, there is still under-publication of tender notices as illustrated by: 
(a) entities not publishing, due to the varied understanding of the directives' requirements; 
(b) the continuing increase in number of supplies notices being published by public-sector 
entities despite legislation having been in force since 1989; 
(c) for every two tender notices only one CAN being published (itself an indicator of 
openness); 
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(d) the reported differences in above-threshold procurement, with central government in 
some Member States claiming above-threshold procurement at a mere 16%. This is 
inconceivable in terms of the size of aggregated budgets on supplies and services, even 
taking into account the existence of discrete operating units. 
These views are supported by a 1994 study for the European Commission on EC-US 
procurement, which showed that in one of the EU's largest Member States: 
(a) almost 10% of towns with more than 100,000 inhabitants did not report any procurement 
in 1993; 
(b) 28% of towns of 10,000-50,000 inhabitants, and over 30% of towns of 50,000-100,000 
inhabitants reported no contracts. 
It was concluded to be inconceivable that these entities did not have any purchases covered by 
the directives. Likewise, a Commission analysis highlighted considerable variation between 
notice publication by similar-sized (major) sub-central government bodies with similar 
responsibilities in other Member States. 
The overall conclusion is that significant under-publication in the OJ exists as a result of: 
(a) varied interpretations of: 
(i) a contract, 
(ii) a discrete operating unit, 
(iii) the definition of 'products/services with similar characteristics' under the 
aggregation rules; 
(b) in some cases, non-compliance. 
In addition, from a demand-side perspective, there is a perceived lack of incentive to publish 
due to: 
(a) difficulties in understanding some key elements of the directives (and, consequently, 
national transpositions); 
(b) little supplier response when tender notices are published; 
(c) no active policing or enforcement. 
This is creating a 'self-fulfilling prophecy', reflecting attitudes and actions of not only the 
demand side but also of the supply side, as will be shown in the downstream impact 
assessment (Section 23.3). 
Use of procedures 
A direct impact of the legislation has been that when entities are publishing a call for 
competition, they are, in general, complying in terms of the type of procedure used, with: 
(a) central and sub-central government primarily using the open and restricted procedures; 
(b) utilities primarily using the negotiated and restricted procedures. 
The scope of openness is only limited in relation to the use of qualification systems and 
negotiated procedures, since: 
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(a) opportunities are not required to be made public. Even when the supplier is on an 
approved list, there is no obligation to notify every supplier of the opportunity; 
(b) the level of information required to be accepted on a qualification list can be used to 
deter new suppliers (albeit unintentionally). 
Similarly, although compliant, the publication of indicative notices or notices of existence of 
qualification systems on an annual basis means suppliers which either miss the announcement 
or do not obtain information from the OJ/TED will not respond or be aware. 
In general, there is a preference by purchasers to use restricted procedures to avoid the higher 
costs associated with the administrative implications of using the open procedure. 
23.2.3. Fairness 
Selection of award criteria and their application 
Regarding the application of award criteria, a distinction has to be made between the tendering 
procedure chosen, with: 
(a) for the open procedure, only contract award criteria being applied; 
(b) for the restricted and negotiated procedures, three types of criteria being applied: 
(i) pre-qualification, 
(ii) short-listing, 
(iii) award. 
In general, the pre-qualification stage can cut out competition by setting criteria which prevent 
potential suppliers from submitting tenders. In addition, assuming the awarding authority sets 
objective pre-qualification criteria, there appears to be no objective basis for selecting a subset 
of pre-qualified suppliers to tender. The absence of any permissible criteria for short-listing 
increases the scope for misuse and the favouring of traditional suppliers. 
The vast majority of awarding authorities claim to award contracts on the basis of the 'most 
economically advantageous tender', which requires the purchaser to select the overall best 
tender according to a combination of objective award criteria. Under normal circumstances the 
award criteria should be prioritized, implying the existence of a weighting system. 
In practice, purchasers: 
(a) find it difficult to measure some of their stated award criteria, such as quality; 
(b) often create a short-list of tenders based on all criteria other than price, then choose the 
cheapest; 
(c) invariably, select on price. 
As a result, suppliers often submit tenders on one basis, and are evaluated on another. 
Both the surveys and the in-depth interviews confirmed that: 
(a) price is often the sole decision criterion (without weighting being applied); 
(b) purchasing authorities often introduce competition and award an occasional contract to a 
new supplier to force traditional players to reduce prices, even though they would have 
won under the strict application of'most economically advantageous'. 
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Redress 
In all regulated environments there is always a degree of unfairness. This can be minimized by 
having: 
(a) clear and unambiguous rules, 
(b) effective policing, 
(c) efficient enforcement. 
Regarding clarity, important areas of the directives have been identified as unclear, notably: 
(a) boundaries between works and supply contracts; 
(b) application of the 'aggregation rules', both regarding the level at which products or 
services should be aggregated and the treatment of discrete operating units within the 
same entity; 
(c) use of 'framework agreements' in the public sector; 
(d) permissible criteria for shortlisting in the public sector; 
(e) the extent to which renewals, extensions or amendment to existing contractual 
agreements constitute new contracts; 
(f) the extent to which alterations to bids are permitted in open and restricted procedures; 
(g) rules on criteria and evidence for assessing qualification in the utilities sector applying to 
qualification systems in some circumstance but not in others, without any apparent 
justification. 
In general, there is no active policing of compliance at Member State level. 
Regarding enforcement, there is no provision for Member States to enforce compliance. 
Enforcement is restricted to suppliers instituting an action against a purchasing authority under 
the legal remedies legislation in a particular case. However, with the exception of Denmark 
and Sweden, the efficiency and effectiveness of national arrangements in relation to remedies 
are considered to be inadequate, due to: 
(a) an inability to obtain remedies with sufficient rapidity, 
(b) a lack of clarity in the manner in which damages are calculated and obtained. 
23.3. Downstream impacts 
23.3.1. Measures of success 
Downstream impacts on both the demand and supply sides have been measured by: 
(a) the extent of competition for public contracts: 
(i) supplier response to new opportunities, 
(ii) price convergence, 
(iii) import penetration, 
(iv) rationalization and restructuring; 
(b) public-sector costs and benefits. 
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23.3.2. Competition 
Supplier response 
Based on the supply-side survey results, an estimated: 
(a) 14-20% of all suppliers to the public sector have identified additional opportunities in 
their domestic markets from notices published in the OJ, with 9-13% of all suppliers to 
the public sector winning new business as a result; 
(b) 9-13% of all suppliers to the public sector had identified additional opportunities in 
other EU Member States from notices published in the OJ, with 3^1% winning 
additional business as a result. 
In both cases, this level of success is directly attributable to the directives' requirement to 
publish notices in the OJ, and their impact on the purchasing procedures and attitudes of 
public-sector entities. 
Although firms of all sizes have been successful in winning additional business using the OJ, 
the weighting has been in favour of large companies, particularly for non-domestic business, 
reflecting their: 
(a) higher readership of the OJ: 69% of all large companies compared to 53% for medium-
sized companies and 34% for SMEs; 
(b) greater presence in non-domestic markets. 
These changes on the supply side are corroborated by the views of purchasers that there had 
been: 
(a) some increase in non-domestic suppliers tendering for opportunities; 
(b) some change in the mix of their supplier bases, predominantly large and multinational 
companies, particularly among utilities and subcentral government. 
Public-sector import penetration 
Public-sector purchases of non-domestic origin moved from an estimated 6% in 1987 to 10% 
of total public-sector purchases in 1994, of which: 
(a) direct imports increased from 1.4% to 3%; 
(b) indirect imports increased from 4.5% to 7%. 
This was consistent with the estimated increase in the number of suppliers to the public sector 
winning new additional business in other EU Member States. 
In general, the demand side did not perceive any change in nationality of their supplier base, 
which reflects: 
(a) the small and uneven nature of the increase in direct public-sector import penetration; 
(b) the majority of the increase in public-sector import penetration being purchased from a 
'domestic' supplier (including subsidiaries of foreign companies) which imported the 
procurement. 
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When considering public-sector purchases in terms of 'commodity' products, which are low-
tech standard purchases (office furniture, paper, stationery, etc.), and of high-cost strategic 
products, it is in the area of 'commodity' purchases where there has been a general significant 
increase in intra-EU trade. This was reflected in the rise in public-sector indirect import 
penetration. 
For example, in paper there has been a significant increase in intra-EU trade, which is 
consistent with a high level (18%) of indirect public-sector imports. This is supported by the 
reported lack of success in winning new direct business in other Member States by paper 
suppliers to the public sector (see Table 23.1). 
Table 23.1. Supplier response and public-sector import penetration 
Sector/product 
Low-tech products 
Office furniture 
Uniforms 
Printing and paper 
High-tech products with 
common tech. specs. 
Office machinery 
Motor vehicles 
Medical equipment 
High-tech products with 
different tech. specs. 
Boilers 
Power generating equip. 
Telecommunications 
equipment 
Railway rolling stock 
Works 
Construction/civil eng. 
Services 
Consulting engineering 
EU average 
NACE 
316 
453 
471/2 
33 
351 
37 
315 
341/2 
344 
362 
502 
83 
OJ 
readership' 
(%) 
34 
47 
26 
45 
41 
26 
31 
42 
42 
49 
44 
52 
41 
Winners of 
new domestic 
business2 
(%) 
9 
12 
6 
17 
12 
10 
12 
10 
13 
12 
11 
22 
9-13 
Winners of 
new other-EU 
business3 
(%) 
2 
4 
0 
3 
3 
2 
4 
4 
7 
10 
4 
4 
3-4 
Public-sector import 
penetration (%J*, 1994 
Direct 
5 
3 
<1 
4 
3-4 
5-6 
4 
6-7 
6-8 
10-11 
3 
1 
2-4 
Indirect 
8 
13 
17-19 
22-29 
16-19 
19-21 
9-10 
11-14 
18-22 
19-21 
4-7 
5-6 
5-9 
Sources: ' Percentage of suppliers to the public sector using the OJ and TED (Figure 13.2). 
2 Percentage of suppliers to the public sector winning additional domestic business (Figure 13.12). 
3 Percentage of suppliers to the public sector winning additional business in other EU Member States (Figure 
13.23). 
4 Table 1.1.31 in the unpublished Annex to this report. 
Since both public and private sectors procure these commodity products from the same 
intermediate local suppliers, by inference, public-sector import penetration equals private-
sector import penetration. 
With respect to purchases of strategic products, in general this area of procurement has 
experienced increases in intra-EU and extra-EU trade, albeit at a somewhat lower level than 
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the corresponding changes in trade for 'commodity' purchases. However, their level of direct 
purchases from non-domestic suppliers is, today, more important than that for 'commodity' 
purchases. This is supported by the supply-side survey where suppliers of strategic products, 
such as railway rolling stock and telecommunications equipment, reported the highest levels 
of new additional business in other Member States. 
In the areas of works and services, public-sector import penetration is, in broad terms far 
lower, with any public-sector trade, in the main, being related to a small number of large 
international construction projects and their closely related services, such as architecture and 
engineering consultancy. The case studies indicated a perceived continued existence of 
barriers to trade in these areas, which, in essence, the public procurement legislation could not 
be expected to overcome. 
Price convergence 
Within a national market a company's competitiveness is determined by the efficiency of the 
use of labour and capital. The domestic price of a product is a function of the productivity and 
cost of labour, and the cost of bought-in goods and services, of which raw materials are 
generally the most important component. 
Although a depreciating currency can make the export price competitive for the country 
concerned, this price advantage is usually eroded by higher inflation and lower productivity. 
The situation is further complicated when dealing with technologically complex products, 
where a price advantage may result from innovative design, such that competitors' products 
are technologically different, though, possibly, functionally similar. 
When considering price convergence, the following key factors should be taken into account: 
(a) degree of imperfect competition - the demand- and supply-side surveys indicate that a 
minority of purchasers and suppliers are aware of the opportunities in the marketplace; 
(b) technical incompatibility - purchasing entities are restricted to existing, national 
suppliers or, when feasible, other EU suppliers incur additional costs to satisfy national 
technical requirements; 
(c) technical/functional specifications - the use of technical rather than functional 
specifications mitigates against the use of innovative (often lower cost) solutions; 
(d) supply chain structure - the nature of national supply chain structures often restricts 
price savings to intermediaries rather than end-purchasers; 
(e) exchange rates - exchange rate movements create artificial price advantages of a 
temporary or permanent nature and result in a climate of commercial uncertainty. 
Within the EU the above factors, particularly imperfect competition throughout the EU, have 
individually and collectively contributed to a situation in which there has been no observable 
price convergence. 
Regarding commodity products, the dominant factor has been the supply-chain structure where 
these products are almost exclusively purchased locally from national (private sector) 
suppliers. These suppliers are normally intermediaries, which source their purchases 
internationally on (ex-factory) price - as illustrated by the increases in trade since 1987 - and 
sell at national price levels. This also reflects the completion of the single market programme. 
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In general, these observations are consistent with the high levels of indirect import penetration 
for commodity products, as illustrated by filing cabinets being 36% more expensive in the UK 
than the cheapest Member State, and yet the UK being the largest exporter of filing cabinets to 
the rest of Europe in 1994, reflecting the change in the terms of trade due to exchange rate 
movements. 
In addition, there is little competition in these products with minimal tendering resulting from 
misinterpretation of the aggregation rules, whereby the focus is on contracts rather than 
aggregated annual expenditure. This might also explain the lack of price convergence and the 
high levels of price disparities in these areas. 
Regarding strategic products, they are considered to fall into two categories: 
(a) those with common technical specifications, such as medical equipment, vehicles and 
office machinery; 
(b) those with significantly different technical requirements due to incompatibility of 
systems between Member States, as illustrated by differences in national railway, and 
power distribution systems. 
Although there have been recession-induced price reductions for strategic purchases, no real 
price convergence has occurred, with the exception of cardiac monitors, buses and office 
machinery, which can be explained by: 
(a) their relatively more transparent markets with few European players; 
(b) the products requiring little to no adaptation for different EU markets. 
The fact that there has been no price convergence for the other strategic products reflects: 
(a) their being 'bespoke' in nature and manufactured to satisfy widely differing national 
technical standards; 
(b) supplier strategies of having a local presence (as generally preferred by the purchasers), 
resulting in a national cost base and pricing to national markets. 
This is supported by the fact that for these strategic purchases, direct public-sector import 
penetration is low compared to indirect imports. 
Rationalization and restructuring 
In all procurement-sensitive sectors there has been significant supply-side rationalization, 
reflected in reduced employment and productivity improvements. 
In the 'commodity' areas, despite significant recession-induced price reductions in national 
markets, any change cannot be attributed to the procurement legislation since: 
(a) there has been no price convergence, reflecting the supply-chain structure (purchasing 
from national wholesalers) and the bulk of the public-sector imports being indirect; 
(b) there has been significant non-publication both in terms of number of entities publishing 
(an estimated 14% of the potential published) and the underpublication of above-
threshold procurement (as illustrated by the example of the typical sub-central 
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government entity which published an estimated 25-30% of their purchasing of works 
and supplies). 
Table 23.2. Economic indicators 
Sector/product 
Low-tech products 
Office furniture 
Uniforms 
Printing and paper 
High-tech products: 
common tech. specs. 
Motor vehicles 
Office machinery 
Medical equipment 
High-tech products: 
different tech. specs. 
Telecommunications 
equipment*** 
Power generating equip.*** 
Power distribution 
equipment*** 
Railway rolling stock*** 
Boilers 
Works 
Construction/civil eng. 
Services 
Engineering consultancy 
Public-sector import 
penetration (%f 1994 
direct 
5 
3 
<1 
3-4 
4 
5-6 
6-8 
6-7 
6-7 
10-11 
4 
3 
1 
indirect 
8 
13 
17-19 
16-19 
22-29 
19-21 
18-22 
11-14 
11-14 
19-21 
9-10 
4-7 
5-6 
Price 
convergence 
1987-932 
N 
n/a 
N 
N/S* 
S 
N/S** 
N 
N 
N 
N/S 
N 
n/a 
n/a 
Trade 
change 
1988-923 
++ 
++ 
+ 
++ 
++ 
++ 
+ 
++ 
++ 
++ 
-
+ 
+ 
Production 
% change 
1988-924 
+2.3 
+1.2 
+3.5 
+0.1 
+6.5 
n/a 
-1.5 
+2.7 
+2.7 
+6.6 
+1.2 
-
Employment 
change 
1988-925 
+1 
-17 
-3 . 
-18 
-13 
n/a 
-18 
-19 
-19 
-5 
-9 
+7 
n/a 
Notes: N = none, S = some, n/a = not available, ++ = strong increase, + = increase, - = decrease. 
* Buses. 
** Cardiac monitors. 
*** Single market (public sector) induced restructured industries. 
Sources: ' Table 1.1.31. 
2 Tables 15.5 and 15.6. 
3 Tables 14.1-14.20. 
4 Tables 16.1-16.10. and 22.1. 
5 Tables 16.1-16.10. 
In the strategic areas, there has not only been a recession-induced reduction in employment, 
but also a (public-sector) market-induced restructuring, which has resulted in: 
(a) the creation of a small number of global players in telecommunications, power 
generation equipment and railway rolling stock; 
(b) significantly increased intra and extra-EU trade, the bulk of which has been in indirect 
imports reflecting the strategies of these global players to have local manufacturing 
(assembly) capabilities in key European markets; 
(c) no apparent price convergence, largely reflecting the additional costs associated with: 
(i) complying with national technical standards, 
(ii) the use of local production facilities, 
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(iii) the general resistance of public bodies in certain Member States to innovative 
technology. For example, in one of the large Member States with in excess of ten 
purchasing entities in a sector, only one had purchased a high-cost strategic 
product based on a new and proven technology from another large Member State 
at a third of the national price level. 
Despite the lack of price convergence, since 1990 suppliers in high-cost strategic product areas 
have been forced by public purchasers to reduce their prices by 20-40%, reflecting the 
recession and squeeze on public spending. According to interviews with market leaders, the 
public sector has used the procurement legislation to bring down national price levels in 
national markets by threatening traditional suppliers that they would award contracts to new, 
lower priced competitors. In practice, there have been occasional contracts awarded to non-
domestic players, resulting in lower prices but no appreciable change in market shares. 
23.3.3. Public-sector cost-benefit analysis 
For strategic products with common technical specifications, the identified price convergence 
between 1987 and 1994, implies the achievement of savings in the less competitive Member 
States. Particularly in the telecommunications area, the in-depth interviews showed that the 
public sector has enjoyed significant technology-related savings, reflecting the liberalization of 
the European telecommunications market. 
Elsewhere in the strategic areas, the absence of price convergence implies that any national 
price savings can only be attributed to the recession. 
The introduction of the public procurement legislation has caused some purchasers to put 
more calls for competition in the OJ, particularly in the area of 'commodity' products. This 
has resulted in 9-13% of all suppliers to the public sector winning at least one new contract, 
which would not have been identified otherwise. Since both demand and supply side 
confirmed that contracts in these areas are in the main awarded on the basis of price, this 
implies that the public sector has experienced some price savings due to application of the 
legislation. 
This conclusion is consistent with the demand-side survey results where a minority of the 
central and sub-central government claimed some degree of price savings due to opening their 
procurement markets. 
There are two principal sources of price savings in terms of increased direct competition from: 
(a) domestic suppliers, 
(b) other EU suppliers. 
Although there were a number of central and sub-central government bodies reporting price 
savings resulting from the implementation of the public procurement legislation, this was the 
exception rather than the rule. 
In terms of direct competition from other EU suppliers, estimated total intra-EU direct import 
penetration rose from 1.4% in 1987 to 3% in 1994 - an increase of 1.6% - which, due to its 
low weighting in total public-sector purchasing, could not have resulted in significant price 
savings. 
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Similarly, there is a consensus of opinion of those surveyed in the demand-side survey that the 
application of the legislation has created additional administration costs. 
As the Utilities Directive has only been in force for the majority of Member States since 
January 1993 (for supplies and works) and the Services Directive for the public sector since 
July 1993 and for utilities since July 1994 (in most Member States), it could be argued that, 
realistically, the timescales are too short to expect the legislation to have fully achieved its 
objectives. Since the public-sector Supplies and Works Directives have been in force since 
January 1989 and July 1990 respectively in the majority of Member States - a period of some 
6-7 years - it would be reasonable to expect a high degree of compliance with the legislation, 
a necessary condition for achieving the downstream gains. However, a combination of related 
demand-side (Chapter 12), supply-side (Chapters 13 and 17-22) and legal factors (Chapters 5 -
9) have hampered the achievement of these gains. 
Overall, it is important to note that, as a consequence of the implementation of the public 
procurement legislation: 
(a) there have been instances where purchasing entities have achieved considerable savings 
on individual procurements, which, coupled with the continued existence of substantial 
intra-EU price differences, support the hypothesis that there is potential for significant 
public-sector savings; 
(b) when new suppliers responded positively to public-sector opportunities, a high 
proportion was successful, implying that the purchasing entity had benefited from a 
more 'economically advantageous' offer. 
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Table A.l. Supply-side sectors 
NACE 
315 
316 
33 
341/2 
344 
351 
362 
37 
453 
471/472 
83 
502 
Sector 
Boilers, vessels 
Metal office furniture 
Office machinery 
Cables and wires; power generation 
equipment 
Telecommunications equipment 
Motor vehicles 
Railway rolling stock 
Medical equipment 
Textiles and clothing 
Paper and printing 
Business services 
Construction/civil engineering 
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Community legislation, etc. 
B.l. Treaties, bilateral agreements, etc. 
Agreement on free trade and trade-related matters between the European Community, the European 
Atomic Energy Community, the European Coal and Steel Community, of the one part, and the 
Republic of Estonia, of the other part (OJ L 373, 31.12.1994, p. 1). 
Agreement on free trade and trade-related matters between the European Community, the European 
Atomic Energy Community, the European Coal and Steel Community, of the one part, and the 
Republic of Latvia, of the other part — Agreement between the European Economic Community 
and the Republic of Latvia on trade in textile products — Final act (OJ L 374, 31.12.1994, p. 2). 
Agreement on free trade and trade-related matters between the European Community, the European 
Atomic Energy Community, the European Coal and Steel Community, of the one part, and the 
Republic of Lithuania, of the other part — Agreement between the European Economic 
Community and the Republic of Lithuania on trade in textile products — Final act (OJ L 375, 
31.12.1994, p. 2). 
B.2. Regulations 
1461/93: Council Regulation (EEC) of 8 June 1993 concerning access to public contracts for tenderers 
from the United States of America (OJ L 146, 17.6.1993, p. 1). 
B.3. Directives 
89/665/EEC: Council Directive of 21 December 1989 on the co-ordination of the laws, regulations 
and administrative provisions relating to the application of review procedures to the award of 
public supply and public works contracts (OJ L 395, 30.12.1989, p. 33). 
90/531/EEC: Council Directive of 17 September 1990 on the procurement procedures of entities 
operating in the water, energy, transport and telecommunications (OJ L 297, 29.10.1990, p. 1), as 
amended by Directive 94/22/EC (OJ L 164, 30.6.1994, p. 3). 
92/13/EEC: Council Directive of 25 February 1992 co-ordinating the laws, regulations and 
administrative procedures relating to the application of Community rules on the procurement 
procedures of entities operating in the water, energy, transport and telecommunications sectors (OJ 
L 76, 23.3.1992, p. 14). 
92/50/EEC: Council Directive of 18 June 1992 relating to the co-ordination of procedures for the 
award of public service contracts (OJ L 209, 24.7.1992, p. 1). 
93/36/EEC: Council Directive of 14 June 1993 co-ordinating procedures for the award of public 
supply contracts (OJ L 199, 9.8.1993, p. 1). 
93/37/EEC: Council Directive of 14 June 1993 concerning the co-ordination of procedures for the 
award of public works contracts (OJ L 199, 9.8.1993, p. 54). 
93/38/EEC: Council Directive of 14 June 1993 co-ordinating the procurement procedures of entities 
operating in the water, energy, transport and telecommunications sectors (OJ L 199, 9.8.1993, p. 
84). 
94/22/EC: European Parliament and Council Directive of 30 May 1994 on the conditions for granting 
and using authorizations for the prospection, exploration and production of hydrocarbons (OJ L 
164, 30.6.1994, p. 3). 
B.4. Case law 
Case 29/84 Commission ν Germany [1985] ECR 1661. 
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